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EDITOR'S NOTE
I once heard someone say that water touches everything. Water is
deeply rooted in our country's history. It is essential for most plant
and animal life. Water often sits at the center of controversy and our
choices regarding this precious fluid will inevitably shape man's future.
This issue of the Water Law Review presents a collection of articles
describing past and present controversies surrounding local, national,
and global water use. In our lead article, Professor John Leshy
evaluates how the national government has historically secured water
rights for federal land programs and suggests a new approach. In Part
1 of a two-part series, James Lochhead provides a comprehensive
historical account of the development of the Colorado River Compact
The article focuses on the
from an Upper Basin perspective.
motivations of the Upper Basin states, particularly Colorado, in
pressing for the Compact and later laws in response to California's
claims to water from the Colorado River.
Several articles address current "hot topics" in water law. John Hill
examines the controversial "right to float" on Colorado streams while
Peter Lacy explores the illegal practice of water spreading on
unauthorized federal lands. E. Brendan Shane evaluates the effect of
the Gila River III decision on the issue of whether federal reserve water
rights extend to groundwater. From a global perspective, Patricia
Wouters, Salman M. A. Salman, and Patricia Jones reflect upon the
legal response to world's water crisis following the meeting of the
second World Water Forum.
Beginning with this issue, the Water Law Review is pleased to present a
new Website Review section. The Website Reviews present an overview
of the contents and coverage of water-focused websites for anyone
interested in water law and water-related topics. This issue reviews
websites maintained by the Colorado Water Research Institute and the
Water Environment Research Foundation. Our goal is to provide our
readers with information on various on-line resources for future
research on current water issues.
The Water Law Review proudly dedicates this issue to John A.
Carver, Jr., an incredible lawyer whose federal government career
helped shape this country's water and energy laws and whose
dedication to teaching continues to shape the minds and souls of
young lawyers. For an in-depth view of Professor Carver's life and
career, see the Practitioner'sPerspective section of this issue.
The Water Law Review staff hopes that you enjoy this issue. As
always, we welcome your comments and suggestions, and we
appreciate your continued support.
Kris A. Zumalt
Editor-in-Chief
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JOHN A. CARVER, JR.

IN TRIBUTE

PROFESSOR EMERIrrUs JOHN A. CARVER, JR.
CHIP CUTLER

It is with great honor, and indeed privilege, that the Water Law
Review pays tribute to John A. Carver, Jr., Emeritus Professor of Law at
the University of Denver College of Law. Professor Carver has played
an integral role in preparing more than one generation of Colorado's
lawyers for practice in the water and natural resource fields. Most will
undoubtedly acknowledge that he strongly embraces the pure prior
appropriation system in his introductory water law class. One leaves
Professor Carver's class with a deep appreciation for the origins of, and
reasons for, this unique means of administering this precious and
limited resource. Lest any of us forget, "the doctrine of 'first in time,
first in right,' is supposed to have teeth, it has bite," and therein lies
the prior appropriation system's strength and beauty. To properly
understand the prior appropriation doctrine is, for Professor Carver's
student, to study historical efforts to apply the West's limited water
resources to multiple beneficial uses. One quickly appreciates that the
same basic principles and challenges exist today in the administration
of Colorado's water.
John A. Carver, Jr. was born in Preston, Idaho in 1918. He grew up
in the 1920's learning the value and use of water while working on his
grandfather's farm. His grandfather imbued the youngJohn Carver at
an early age with the worth of water, but it was his father's love of the
law and public service, which helped focus John Carver's career. John
Carver's father served the State of Idaho as United States Attorney for
twenty years, and later as a trial court judge. At ten years of age, the
young John Carver helped his father pull cases in the library and
assisted with trial preparation. Later John Carver's father ran for the
United States Senate. John Carver served an integral part in this
campaign, traveling with his father throughout Idaho-no small feat
in those days to get the word out. This early affinity with the law and
politics instilled in John Carver what would become a lifelong love for
politics and government work.
John Carver, Jr. went to Washington, D.C., for the first time, in
1936 as a messenger for a United States senate committee. He
received a civil service appoinunent in 1940, and served the United
States in the Office of the Secretary of War from 1941 through 1943.
John Carver served in the Army from 1943 through 1946, and
returned to the Office of the Secretary of War in 1947. After
graduating from Georgetown University in 1947 with an L.L.B., John
Carver returned to Boise, Idaho, where he opened a law practice.
From 1947 to 1956, this practiced concentrated primarily in timber
and mining law. In addition, John Carver served Idaho as an Assistant
Attorney General from 1948 to 1950.
The lure of Washington, D.C. and government work eventually
won out. In 1956 John Carver returned to Washington, D.C., serving
t J.D., University of Denver College of Law, May 2000. Mr. Cutler is currently an
associate practicing water law with Carlson, Hammond, & Paddock, L.L.C.

as Senator Frank Church's Administrative Assistant. It was during
Senator Church's 1956 campaign that John Carver was once again
baptized in the conflicted world of western water. While serving
Senator Church, John Carver met John F. Kennedy, and his brother
Robert F. Kennedy. In 1960,John Carver was asked to serve as John F.
Kennedy's Michigan campaign coordinator. His role was to find
middle ground between that state's two Democratic parties, which he
did, although he humbly acknowledges his success in this effort. The
Kennedy administration handsomely rewarded John Carver with an
appointment in 1961 as Assistant Interior Secretary for Public Land
Management, and promoted him in 1964 to Under Secretary of the
Interior. By 1966, John Carver was a Federal Power Commissioner,
and he served that agency until 1972, when he joined, at the behest of
Dean Robert Yegge, the faculty at the University of Denver College of
Law.
Professor Carver taught water and natural resource law at D.U. on
a full time basis through 1988, at which time he officially retired. Not
one to quit, Professor Carver has continued, for over a decade into
retirement, to teach water law on a volunteer basis each spring. With
the greatest respect and admiration, the Water Law Review pays tribute
to this great teacher, politician, and public servant. Thank you,
Professor Carver for all you have shared.
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WATER RIGHTS FOR NEW FEDERAL LAND
CONSERVATION PROGRAMS:
A TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY EVALUATION
JOHN D. LESHYW
ADAPTED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW
CARVER LECTURE
FEBRUARY 6, 2001

I. FOREWORD BY UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW PROFESSOR
JAN G. LAITos'

John Leshy's Carver Lecture is published in this issue of the Water
Law Review in an expanded form. The article is typical John Leshy
scholarship-insightful, thoughtful, provocative, and useful. What his
article on water rights for federal land conservation programs does not
convey is the role John Leshy played in the creation of these programs.
Therefore, a summary of the important position John Leshy held in
the history of the Department of the Interior of the United States
might be useful.
When Leshy became the Solicitor of the Interior Department in
1993, the Congress was split between Republicans and Democrats who
could not seem to agree on natural resources programs. By 1994,
when the Republicans gained control of the Congress, the United

t Professor of Law, Arizona State University (on leave); Solicitor, Department of the
Interior, 1993-2001; Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Hastings College of the
Law, 2001-2002. This article is a somewhat edited version of the Carver Lecture I
delivered at the University of Denver, College of Law, on February 6, 2001. I
appreciate the helpful comments of Professors Joseph Sax, Janet C. Neuman, and
Michael C. Blumm on a draft version.
John CarverJr. Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources and Environmental
Law Program, University of Denver College of Law.
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States government was further split between a Democratic President
and a Republican House and Senate. The political situation remained
fractionated untilJohn Leshy left the federal government in 2001.
This political reality meant that, as a practical and realistic matter,
it would likely be impossible for Secretary of the Interior, Bruce
Babbitt, or his Solicitor, John Leshy, to have political initiatives
successfully run the gauntlet through Congress and become signed by
the President. New legislation would likely not be adopted during
Leshy's tenure as Solicitor.
In fact, even though much federal environmental and natural
resources legislation would have benefited from reauthorization by the
Congress, virtually none was during the eight years that Leshy was
Solicitor. The result was that not only did the Congress and the
President fail to amend or revise existing federal lands laws, but few
new laws involving public lands and resources received the blessings of
the Executive and Legislative branches between the years 1992 and
2000. This meant that if Babbitt and Leshy were to impose any policy
reform within the Interior Department, and on our public lands, they
would have to do so in a way that did not need the formal approval of
the Congress and the President.
And that is exactly what they did.
The real John Leshy legacy is that he and his boss, Bruce Babbitt,
were able to bring about somewhat of a revolution in public lands and
resources philosophy without the need of new or amended statutory
authorization. John Leshy became the master of using his office, and
the powers inherent in his office, to bring about change. He used
Opinions of the Solicitor, new rules adopted under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and administrative interpretations of existing laws to
ensure that many Leshy and Babbitt policies were implemented during
the eight years they served together in the Interior Department.
Again, this implementation of their policies did not require new
federal legislation. Although some may quarrel about the nature of, or
even the benefits associated with, these policies, they certainly seemed
consistent with the idea of conservation of scarce natural resources.
John Leshy's article on water rights for federal conservation
programs discusses a change that occurred while he was Solicitor, but
which, unlike some others, had the benefit of a specific congressional
authorization, in the form of Great Sand Dunes National Park and
Preserve Act. The Great Sand Dunes, along with other public lands,
were set aside as a result of the far-thinking creativity of Leshy and
Babbitt. Moreover, most of these public lands have some semblance of
water that can be deployed to ensure their preservation long into the
future.
The United States should look back one day in wonder at how an
Interior Secretary and his Solicitor were able to bring about so many
changes in our public lands policies, almost single-handedly (and
certainly without explicit congressional approval). John Leshy showed
how it can be done, for better or worse, but certainly with his signature
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My topic is how to integrate the water requirements associated with
new federal land conservation initiatives-such as new national parks,
wildlife refuges, conservation areas, recreation areas, and wilderness
areas-with state water law systems. I am excluding any consideration
of Indian water rights, because while they are closely linked
conceptually with my topic, they are distinct enough-in contours,
history, and equity-to require separate thinking. I am also excluding
water needs to carry out federal regulatory programs such as the Clean
Water Act or the Endangered Species Act.
How the national government should secure water rights for its
federal land programs has been the subject of discussion for a long
time. Just one piece of this large puzzle, the extent to which
wilderness designations of federal land carry federal water rights with
them, has led to a vigorous debate, waged in and out of courts for
more than two decades. A lot of ink has been spilled on the subjectsome, I'll admit, by me'-yet the matter is still not finally settled. Just
last year, voters threw off the bench an Idaho Supreme Court Justice
after a spirited campaign in which the principal issue was the Justice's
opinion, and her deciding vote in a court split 3-2, in favor of a federal
reserved water right for national forest wilderness areas. After the
Justice's defeat at the polls, but before she left the bench, another
member of the court, the ChiefJustice, switched her vote in the matter
and the court reversed its decision.2
This episode was a sobering reminder of how ajudiciary, subject to
popular vote, may feel the sting of the backlash from a single decision.
More pertinent to my topic here, it showed how much water rights
issues-particularly those involving the federal government-still
command great cultural and political value in the arid West. This was
not, after all, a death penalty or abortion or election law case which
1. See, e.g., 86 Interior Decision 553, 609-10 (1979) (co-author);JOSEPH L. SAXET
AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 809-10 (3d ed. 2000); John D. Leshy, Water
and Wilderness/Law and Politics, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 389, 398-406 (1988).

2. Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000); see also, Rocky
Barker, Water Ruling Reversed: Idaho High Court Decides Feds Don't Own Wilderness Flows
but Reserve Control of 'Wild and Scenic'Salmon, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 28, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 28731552.
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can train public attention on the judiciary anywhere. But it illustrates
what makes the disputatious West a lively venue for those of us
interested in water law.
Congress had made the wilderness designations at issue in the
Idaho case several decades ago, in 1964, 1978, and 1980. What I want
to focus on here is not what has been done on this subject in the past,
but on what Congress (or the executive, exercising power delegated to
it by the Congress) might do in the future when they consider, as they
surely will, setting aside more federal land for conservation purposes.
What should they say, if anything, about securing water rights needed
for such conservation set-asides from available, unappropriated water
supplies? These last four words are important to bear in mind: I will
assume throughout that water is available for these federal uses at the
time Congress makes the new conservation designations. If the
needed water is already subject to vested rights inconsistent with those
uses, the federal government can secure water rights for new federal
purposes only by purchase or donation.
BACKGROUND

Let me set the stage by first sketching out, in very broad strokes,
how we got to where we are. To water aficionados, the story is familiar.
Starting with the California Gold Rush in 1848, the issue of whether
federal or state law would be paramount in allocating and
administering water rights in the West was an abiding concern. Over
the next century and a half, the underlying tension between national
and state primacy was resolved by a series of expansions and
contractions of state primacy. Those accordion-like movements took
place every generation or so.
At first, the federal government basically got out of the way. The
states and territories seized the initiative (or, more accurately, rushed
into the vacuum left by federal inaction) to develop local laws and
customs. The states mostly followed principles of prior appropriation,
and applied these principles on, as well as off, federal lands. After
almost two decades of silence, the federal government formally
stepped aside in the Mining Acts of 1866' and 1870, 4 and the Desert
Land Act of 1877,' deferring to local laws and customs to govern
private parties' appropriation of water on federal lands. This made
sense at the time, because the federal government wasn't really
thinking about conserving land for national purposes, with one
notable exception: Yellowstone.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the national
3. Act ofJuly 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253. See generally SAX ETAL., supra
note 1, at 287-89.
4. Act ofJuly 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218.
5. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377. See SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at
306.
6. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 21
(1994)).
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government began, in earnest, to reserve large tracts of federal land
from disposition, and concomitantly began to reassert some control
over western water resources. In its 1899 Rio Grande decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court made clear that the federal government had the right,
"as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to [command] the
continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the
beneficial uses of the government property."7 Less than a decade later,
the Supreme Court developed this idea into a black letter principle of
federal law. In the famous Winters case, it held that when the United
States reserved land for national purposes-in that case, for an Indian
reservation-and was silent on water, it also implicitly reserved enough
available water (i.e., which had not already been spoken for under
federal or state law) to carry out those purposes.
Twenty-seven years after Winters, the pendulum swung back. In its
1935 California Oregon Power decision,9 the Court interpreted the 1866,
1870, and 1877 statutes as "severing" water from land in the West, at
least for purposes of private appropriation. While the Court's opinion
did not address Winters (though it did discuss Rio Grande), its emphasis
on the "public interest in... state control in the arid-land states" left
an impression that the Court was not going to expansively interpret
the "implied-federal-reserved-water-rights" doctrine.
Another generation, another swing of the pendulum. In 1955, in
its so-called Pelton Dam decision, the Court strongly hinted that federal
reservations of land outside the Indian context also carry Winters'
rights with them, by holding that California Oregon Powers severance
doctrine did not apply to reserved federal lands. In 1963, the Court
confirmed this result, almost as an afterthought, in the landmark
decision Arizona v. California."
The application of the Winters principle to reservations of federal
land for other than non-Indian purposes troubled the states, who
already didn't think much of Winters in the Indian context. By the
time the Court decided Arizona v. California,the national government
had set aside upwards of two hundred million acres of federal land as
national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, and other protected categories.
Almost none of these reservations specifically mentioned water, but
Arizona v. Californiaseemed to say all of them silently reserved water.
Perhaps reflecting the quickening population and economic
growth in the West, the next pendulum swin took less than a
generation. In the 1976 Devil's Hole pupfish case, the Court signaled
a limit as to how far it would go to find a water right implied from
silence. The decision itself dramatically asserted federal supremacy,
7. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
8. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
9. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
10. Id. at 165.
11. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
12. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
13. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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because the Court applied federal law to shut down groundwater
pumping authorized under state law on private land in order to
protect an underground pool found on federal land more than two
miles away. The pool was included in a national monument President
Truman established in 1952, under the Antiquities Act of 1906 , in
order to protect the habitat of a rare fish. But the Court seemed to go
out of its way to say that President Truman had expressly, not
impliedly, reserved water in the proclamation. And then it said,
ominously for pro-federal interests, that water reserved by the
"implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine" was "only that amount of
water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. " "
Cappaertlaid the groundwork for the New Mexico decision two years
later.'
There the Court handed federal land managers a major
setback by finding that water had not been implicitly reserved for
wildlife, recreation or other such uses when Congress established the
Gila National Forest in New Mexico at the end of the previous century.
Instead, the reservation was only for the primary purposes of timber
supply and "favorable [conditions of] water flows" (whatever the latter
might mean), but not for "secondary use [s]" of the reservation, like
wildlife and recreation. This distinction between principal purposes
and secondary uses appeared for the first time in this case-seventy
years after Winters.
POST-NEW MEXnCO DEVELOPMENTS
In the twenty-three years since New Mexico, the century-old practice
of setting aside federal land for various conservation purposes has
continued apace. Congress has done it in numerous statutes, and the
Executive-especially Presidents Carter and Clinton-has done it by
exercising authority delegated by Congress under the Antiquities Act.
In these more recent actions, a rather remarkable, but mostly
unremarked-upon, thing has happened. As explained further below,
most of these acts have specifically addressed water rights. The trend
is moving away from the traditional approach of silence'--that is, not
expressly saying whether water was or was not reserved. The trend line
is not unbroken; Congress enacted legislation last year establishing
national conservation areas east of Tucson and north of Reno, a
national monument near Palm Springs, and protections for the Steens
Mountain in Oregon, all of which were silent on whether water was

14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
15. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 141.
16. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
17. Id. at 700, 702, 716.
18. What I call silence includes situations where Congress (or the Executive) says
something about water, but what it says is not very meaningful. Typical of these
disclaimers is the one found in the Wilderness Act: "Nothing in this [act] shall
constitute an express or implied claim or denialon the part of the Federal Government
as to exemption from State water laws." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6) (1994) (emphasis
added).
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reserved. 9
This brings up another remarkable, and also mostly unremarkedWhile the federal government now often
upon, development.
explicitly addresses water, there is no consistent pattern in what it has
said. For example, 1984 and 1990 legislation designating federal lands
in Arizona as wilderness, 1987 legislation establishing a national
monument, national conservation area, and wilderness on federal land
in New Mexico, 1988 legislation establishing national park wilderness
in the state of Washington and a national riparian conservation area in
Arizona, 1990 legislation establishing national conservation areas in
Nevada and Arizona, and 1994 legislation establishing conservation
units in the California Desert, all explicitly reserved water for these
purposes as a matter of federal law. By contrast, 1988 legislation
establishing national monuments in Idaho and 2000 legislation
establishing a national conservation area and a wilderness area in
Colorado expressly disclaimed any reservation of water under federal
law.2 ' There is also the occasional oddball provision that does
neither.2
Those crafting legislation often find that silence is a convenient
way to paper over differences on a difficult or controversial aspect of
the proposal under consideration. But in the context of new federal
land conservation legislation, silence on water is now sometimes
resisted so much that, if the pertinent interest groups cannot come to
agreement about how water will be addressed, the result may be no
legislation at all. For instance, a stalemate over whether Congress
would reserve water held up Colorado wilderness legislation for nearly
The impasse broke in 1992-93 only after intensive
a decade.

19. Las Cienegas National Conservation Area Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-538, 114
Stat. 2563 (Arizona); Black Rock Desert-High Rock Canyon Emigrant Trails National
Conservation Area Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Nevada); Santa
Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains National Monument Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106351, 114 Stat. 1362 (California); Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-399, 114 Stat. 1655 (Oregon).
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-49 (1994) (El Malpais National Monument and
Conservation Area, New Mexico); 16 U.S.C. § 460xx-1 (d) (1994) (San Pedro Riparian
National Conservation Area, Arizona); 16 U.S.C. § 460ccc-8 (1994) (Red Rock Canyon
National Conservation Area, Nevada); 16 U.S.C. § 460ddd(f) (Gila Box Riparian
National Conservation Area, Arizona); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 812-13.
21. See 16 U.S.C. § 460yy-1(f) (1994) (City of Rocks National Reserve, Idaho);
Colorado Canyons National Conservation Area and Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-353, § 6 (1)(2), 114 Stat. 1374, 1378.
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 46011-3(d) (1994), which provided that nothing in the 1980
legislation establishing the Rattlesnake National Recreation Area in Montana "shall be
construed to permit the [federal land managing agency] to affect or diminish any
water right which is vested under either State or Federal law on October 19, 1980," nor
affect access by the owner of any such water right to operate and maintain any water
facilities. See also 16 U.S.C. § 460iii-5(d) (1994) (Snake River Birds of Prey National
Conservation Area, Idaho) (no need for additional reservation of water because
United States already claiming prior water rights for conservation purposes in ongoing
general stream adjudication); 16 U.S.C. § 543c(b) (1994) (Mono Basin National
Forest Scenic Area, California) (area to be managed consistent with protection of
established water rights).
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negotiations produced agreement that, while the legislation would
expressly not reserve water, it would contain an elaborately defined
alternative way to protect the water resources of the high altitude
wilderness areas-through controls on access by the federal land
23
manager.
The Carter and Clinton Administrations also generally opted
against silence when they exercised executive authority to reserve
federal land for conservation purposes. President Carter's seventeen
Alaska national monuments (covering fifty-six million acres of federal
land) expressly reserved water.2 4 Almost all of President Clinton's
nearly two dozen national monument proclamations addressed water,
though not in a uniform way. Water was expressly reserved to carry
out the gurposes of the Agua Fria National Monument north of
Phoenix, the Cascade Siskiyou in southern Oregon, the Sequoia in
California, 7 and the enlargement of the Pinnacles National
Monument in California. 2' A reservation of water was expressly
disclaimed in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument,2 the
Grand Canyon-Parashant,0 Vermilion Cliffs, 31 Canyons of the
Ancients, 32 Ironwood Forest,33 Sonoran Desert," and in the
enlargement of the Craters of the Moon." The Missouri Breaks and

23. See Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-77, §8, 107 Stat. 756, 76263; SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 813-14. Specifically authorizing control of access to
federal lands to protect water avoids the controversy that sometimes accompanies
federal land managers using their ordinary authority over access to the same end. See
Janet C. Neuman & Michael C. Blumm, Waterfor National Forests: the Bypass Flow Report
and the GreatDivide in Western Water Law, 18 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 3 (1999).
24. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 57,035, 57,036 (Dec. 5, 1978) (Denali National
Monument) ("There is also reserved all water necessary to the proper care and
management of those objects protected by this monument and for the proper
administration of the monument in accordance with applicable laws.").
25. Proclamation No. 7263, 65 Fed. Reg. 2817, 2818 (Jan. 11, 2000) (Agua Fria
National Monument).
26. Proclamation No. 7318, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,249, 37,250 (June 13, 2000) (CascadeSiskiyou National Monument).
27. Proclamation No. 7295, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,095, 24,098 (Apr. 25, 2000) (Giant
Sequoia National Monument).
28. Proclamation No. 7266, 65 Fed. Reg. 2831, 2832 (Jan. 18, 2000) (Boundary
Enlargement of the Pinnacles National Monument).
29. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (Sept. 24, 1996)
(Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument).
30. Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825, 2828 (Jan. 18, 2000) (Establishment
of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument).
31. Proclamation No. 7374, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,227, 69,229 (Nov. 15, 2000) (Vermilion
Cliffs National Monument).
32. Proclamation No. 7317, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,243, 37,245 (June 13, 2000)
(Establishment of the Canyons of the Ancients National Monument).
33. Proclamation No. 7320, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,259, 37,260 (June 13, 2000)
(Establishment of the Ironwood Forest National Monument).
34. Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg. 7354, 7356 (Jan. 22, 2001) (Establishment
of the Sonoran Desert National Monument).
35. Proclamation No. 7373, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,221, 69,223 (Nov. 15, 2000) (Boundary
Enlargement of the Craters of the Moon National Monument). These proclamations
(notes 29-35) typically instructed the federal land manager to cooperate with state
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Hanford Reach proclamations took a middle course: in Missouri
Breaks, water was expressly reserved only in two tributaries with
outstanding cottonwood gallery forests;3 6 and at Hanford, water was
expressly reserved only in the main stem of the Columbia, but not in
tributaries. 7
In each case, the President accepted Secretary Babbitt's
recommendation regarding water, which was based on the Secretary's
judgment about whether a reservation of water was necessary to
protect the monument's purposes. As one deeply involved in this
process, I can attest that we looked at what the monument's needs for
water were; whether the necessary water resources were already
protected by other, previous federal reservations; and whether any
additional protection that might be advisable could be afforded other
ways (such as through land access controls). We also assessed the risk
that new water rights might be perfected under state law outside the
monument that could interfere with monument purposes.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH SILENCE?

The trend away from silence in the last twenty years has been a sea
change, a departure from well over a century of traditional practice. It
is worth pausing to explore why this has happened. One reason is that
conservation opponents have seized upon this issue as a useful way to
resist conservation designations. Many traditional water developers
and their allies believe a demand that water be addressed will mean
either that water won't be reserved, or better yet (in the eyes of some),
conservation designations won't be made at all.
But there is more to it than this. Opponents of silence also make a
more principled argument, that silence simply leaves too much
uncertain. There may exist a wide gulf between what the federal
government claims as a water right from silence under the impliedreservation-of-water doctrine, and what other interests, claiming rights
Until a binding
under state law, are willing to acknowledge.
much, water is
how
or
whether,
knows
one
no
adjudication occurs,
being reserved. The uncertainty may continue for decades. While the
McCarran Amendmente gives the states first crack at figuring out what
silence means (if they want to go to the trouble of conducting general
stream adjudications), a long time may pass before litigation is
instituted, and even longer before it is brought to the point of
decision." Almost eighty years went by before the U.S. Supreme Court
water authorities to secure needed water rights.
36. Proclamation No. 7398, 66 Fed. Reg. 7359, 7361 (Jan. 22, 2001) (Establishment
of the Upper Missouri River Breaks National Monument).
37. Proclamation No. 7319, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,253, 37,255 (June 13, 2000)
(Establishment of the Hanford Reach National Monument).
38. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1994); see SAX ET AL., supra note 1, at 815-29.
39. Note, however, that this is not so much of a problem with new land reservations
in Colorado because of Colorado's unique system of continuous or rolling
adjudications of water rights, including those based on federal law. See, e.g., United
States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-23 (1971).
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interpreted the silence of an 1899 forest reservation in United States v.
New Mexico'0 Thirty-six years elapsed before the Idaho Supreme Court
decided what a 1964 wilderness designation meant for water rights.4 '
Moreover, punting to the courts to decide the matter at some
future time is playing a form of roulette with the outcome, given the
historical shifts of the Supreme Court on the subject recounted earlier.
It is difficult to predict how the courts will decide, or when they will
decide, what silence means in the numerous federal reservations. The
decision depends, at least in part, on when and in what form the issue
is taken to the courts, and who is sitting on the bench.
It is also worth noting that even when Congress or the Executive
expressly reserves water, neither typically identifies a specific amount.
While the fact that Congress reserves water for specified purposes is no
longer open to dispute in such legislation, the amount of water
necessary to carry out the purposes may be vigorously disputed.
Adjudication is necessary to settle the matter. Therefore, even an
express reservation of water leaves important issues open, perhaps for
a long time.
Opponents of federal reservations of water usually put forward
arguments against silence in new federal reservations. However, the
uncertainty created by silence (or left even by an express but
unquantified reservation of water, as pointed out in the preceding
paragraph) is potentially harmful to federal interests as well. The
United States usually lacks sufficient incentive to identify and quantify
its claims until it is compelled to do so when joined in a state general
stream adjudication. In the meantime, uncertainty may lead the
federal land managing agency not to act vigilantly in protecting its
inchoate federal water right claims against encroachment by later
appropriators. This can make the assertion and defense of federal
water rights harder, in a practical and political if not a legal sense,
when an adjudication of those rights is finally at hand. Furthermore, if
the courts eventually decide that silence in a particular reservation
does not reserve water for some federal purposes, the federal
government will at that point have lost potentially valuable years of
priority, if it then takes what may be the only practicable course left:
file an application to appropriate the needed water under state law.
(The practice of the United States has been not to file under state law
for water that it believes it has already reserved under the reserved
rights doctrine, for fear that filing for the former will undermine its
claim to the latter once the matter goes to adjudication.) Assuming
the United States could have appropriated water under New Mexico
law for wildlife or recreational flows when Congress created the Gila
40. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
41. Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000). The Idaho
Supreme Court provided another example earlier this year when, in a questionable
decision, it determined that a 1937 reservation of the Deer Flat Migratory Waterfowl
Refuge on some islands in the Snake River did not implicitly reserve water to maintain
the character of the islands as a refuge from predators. United States v. State, 2001
WL 170644 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2001).
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National Forest in 1899,42 the fact that the Supreme Court took
seventy-nine years to decide, in United States v. New Mexico, that the
reservation did not include an implied federal reserved water right for
these purposes was costly. The difference of priority might well
determine whether water is available to be appropriated to serve the
federal purposes.
Although I have suggested reasons why silence can threaten all
sides, the problems silence causes may be larger in theory than in fact.
It is true that nearly all the major land reservation systems in the
west-national forests, national parks, etc.-were created without
specifically addressing water. And it is also true that many of the
implied federal reserved water rights that may attach to these
hundreds of millions of acres of federal land have not yet been finally,
definitively settled. Yet this uncertainty has had no demonstrable
negative impact on economic activity in the region. By almost every
conventional measure-such as population and economic growththe West has plainly thrived for many decades amidst uncertainty over
the scope of federal claims to water. Whether silence has had a
negative effect on the federal government's ability to secure water for
conservation purposes is more difficult to assess." The U.S. Forest
Service will have a more difficult time securing recreational and
environmental flows for national forests because of how the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted silence in the New Mexico case, and
securing wilderness flows because of how the Idaho Supreme Court
interpreted silence in the recent Idaho case. But whether federal
programs will be thwarted as a result is harder to say. It is possible,
then, that silence has not proved crippling. But the uncertainty
silence breeds is at least annoying, and at worst has the potential to
adversely affect both federal and state water interests.
Although opinions may differ on whether silence ought to remain
acceptable, the political reality is that those with power to make new
designations in the executive and legislative branches generally believe
silence is unacceptable. This reality alone makes silence less likely in
the making of new federal land conservation designations than it was a
generation ago. The effect may be to postpone the land conservation
actions, or to go ahead with the designation but expressly not reserve
water. The latter leaves the United States wholly dependent on state
law and, as I will explain in a moment, at the mercy of state forces, who
lack a structural check against the tendency to act hostile to federal
interests.
Nevertheless, as noted above, some new federal land conservation
legislation has remained silent on water. This move away from silence

42. Admittedly, this a dubious assumption because even today New Mexico law
sharply limits instream flow appropriations, if indeed it allows them at all. See SAX ET
AL., supra note 1, at 114-15.
43. Probably silence has had a negative impact on securing water for Indians, but
that question is beyond my compass here. Cf Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983).
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leaves an interesting question: when Congress enacts some land
conservation bills that expressly disclaim any reservation of water, and
others that expressly reserve water, what does a bill that is silent on the
subject mean to say about the matter? Can one draw an inference that
silence means water is reserved, or that it is not reserved, or is silence
merely neutral? The answer is not clear, but it is entirely possible that
a court not very moved by claims on behalf of the environment, which
is a fair characterization of the current Supreme Court, will find
silence today means no federal reservation of water. This suggests, in
turn, that environmental advocates, who want to maximize federal
reservations of water for environmental purposes, face an increasingly
uphill fight in convincing the courts that silence now means-as it
once did, in the era of the Winters-thatwater is reserved as a matter of
federal law."
This puts pro-conservation interests on the horns of a dilemma.
On the one hand, pro-conservationists may accept silence now only to
see, twenty or fifty years from now, the courts decide that today's
silence does not reserve water. This would mean, as pointed out above,
that the federal government will have lost twenty or fifty years of
priority if it then files under state law to appropriate the water it needs.
In the worst case, no more unappropriated water may exist. On the
other hand, environmental interests may oppose an otherwise proconservation designation because they decide they can't accept silence
on water or, worse, an express decision not to reserve water as a matter
of federal law. In such a situation, if silence or an express disclaimer
that no water is reserved is the only way to secure enough political
support to take the action, the result would be that the proconservation designation does not go forward. Where this dilemma
exists, in other words, environmentalists must decide whether they
should (a) support pro-conservation actions without assurance that
water will be protected as a matter of federal law; or instead (b) accept
a delay in achieving protection, and hope that the national
government will eventually find a way to protect whatever water is then
available for the federal purposes as a matter of federal (or possibly
state) law.
STATE VERSUS FEDERAL INTERESTS

At this point, it may be useful to take a step back, to examine the
broader question of what federal and state interests are really at stake
in this debate. This will prepare the ground for exploring whether
there is an approach that might, at least in some circumstances, better
reconcile those interests. The states have a sovereign interest in
having their laws control water rights administration as much as
44. Pro-reservation advocates are not without arguments. For example, they can
focus more on the necessity of water to the reservation purpose rather than any
implied intent to reserve. They can also argue that legislative silence simply reflected a
determination to leave the matter to the courts, rather than being a congressional
decision not to reserve water.
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possible. They also perceive an economic interest in controlling water
through state law. This economic interest exists partly because, in my
experience at least, the states tend to favor traditional uses of water for
what might be called commodity purposes-agricultural irrigation and
municipal and industrial uses. Finally, the states also have a general
interest in securing notice of federal as well as other water claims, and
certainty about what those claims are. On its side, the federal
government has a general interest in securing water (including, where
appropriate, perfecting property rights in water) to meet the needs of
federal programs, especially environmentally related programs, as
easily and cheaply as possible.
States'-righters argue that complete deference to state water law
systems will work just fine to meet federal needs. Both history and
political science suggest the contrary, however. Powerful forces pull
states away from responding to federal needs, even when
unappropriated water is available. As a broad generalization, state
water administration systems in the West tend to be at least somewhat
captive of traditional interests; that is, no long and strong tradition of
independent-mindedness exists among state water bureaucracies.
Moreover, some state substantive laws simply do not adequately
recognize water rights (e.g., instream flows, or rights that protect
surface water from groundwater diversions) that may be necessary to
protect federal interests, and they may not permit federal agencies to
hold such rights.45 While state governing bodies (including state
courts) have generally become more progressive on water issues in the
last couple of decades, they still have a considerable distance to travel
before one can depend on them to recognize, let alone safeguard, the
needs of federal land conservation systems wholly through state law.46
States may never get there, for they have powerful internal
incentives to let parochial, anti-federal interests win out. In addition
to the backlash against the Idaho Supreme Court decision described
above, this was illustrated in 1995 when both Arizona and Nevada
amended their state laws in response to ranching interests. Both states
prohibited the federal Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), and
Arizona additionally prohibited the U.S. Forest Service, from applying
for water rights for livestock grazing on federal lands. These new laws
applied only to the federal agencies, and not to state land
management agencies. They altered, only for federal lands, the
traditional rule in both states that allowed the landowner, not the
livestock owner, to hold the water rights associated with livestock
45. See, e.g., Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private
Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVrL. L. 203 (1997).
46. For a thoughtful general review of the disappointing efforts to reform state
water policy in the 1990s, see David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water
Policy: Have FederalLaws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role? 20 STAN. ENvTL. L.J.
3, 71 (2001) ("Although the reasons for reform persist and are better understood than
ever, existing state legal and institutional frameworks endure virtually unchanged.
Vocal interests with expectations or vested rights rooted in old policies typically resist
proposals to... dedicate more water to instream uses.").
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grazing.47 While the issue was not on its face a dispute over
environmental conservation, in reality it was: the livestock interests in
the states wanted water rights associated with public land livestock
grazing exclusively in their own names, not in the names of
government agencies. The purpose was both symbolic and practicalto make it harder for the federal agencies to restrict or reduce
livestock grazing on public lands for environmental protection or
restoration purposes."
Livestock graziers compose a tiny part of each state's economy.
Nearly all other water interests in each state are indifferent to the
matter. Yet regarding this issue, the state legislatures easily adopted
laws that blatantly discriminated against federal land managers. This
behavior neatly illustrates the ineluctable fact that, while state interests
are well represented in the operations of the national government, the
contrary is not so true. 9 When the states are found in the arid West
and the subject matter is water, the difficulty state governments have in
accounting for federal government interests is even more pronounced.
These facts do not lead to the conclusion that the federal
government should seek to minimize involvement with state water
rights systems, even if it had that luxury (which it does not). On the
contrary, the federal government's long-term interest is to work
through and help build up the quality of state water rights
administration. This goal recognizes several enduring realities. First,
state systems are the primary force in the field-there is not, and likely
never will be, a general federal water law or water rights administrative
system that parallels that of the states. Second, the McCarran
Amendment, which basically gives the states the option to adjudicate
and administer federal reserved water rights in state systems along with
their own state law water rights, is very unlikely to be repealed in the
foreseeable future. Third, federal reserved water rights have never
been, and will never be, the only way the federal government secures
water needed for federal purposes. The Bureau of Reclamation and
the Bureau of Land Management are primarily dependent on state law
to meet the water needs of their programs. Even federal agencies like
the U.S. Forest Service (particularly after New Mexico) and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service also rely on state law for at least some of their
water needs."0
For all these reasons, the more competent, professional, and
impartial the state systems are, the better for the federal government.
But simply improving the quality of state systems cannot solve the
structural problem-the built-in temptation to favor local interests

47. See SAX ETAL., supra note 1, at 871-72.
48. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (1998); Mitchell v. United States,
41 Fed. Cl. 617 (1998); Store Safe Redlands Assocs. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726
(1996).
49. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
50. See SAX ETAL., supra note 1, at 866-72.
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over federal ones. This situation sugVests the need to retain a
The need for a federal
counterbalancing dose of federal law.
counterweight is particularly true in making new federal conservation
designations, for this is where state water law may be the weakest
compared to what would obtain under the federal reserved rights
doctrine. It is rather difficult to imagine, for example, that a state
agency or court would have applied state law to reach the same result
the Supreme Court reached in the Devil's Hole pupfish case-to find a
water right to protect an obscure fish of no commercial value (albeit of
significant scientific interest) when such protection required shutting
down a farmer's wellfield.52
A THIRD WAY
Which brings me, finally, to the question of whether there might
be another way, when Congress considers new federal land
conservation programs, to integrate associated federal water needs
with state water law systems. At least in some circumstances, the
answer may be yes. Legislation recently adopted regarding the Great
Sand Dunes in Colorado, legislation strongly supported by most of
Colorado's congressional delegation and the Clinton Administration,
is worth examining." Its approach did not conform to the traditional
dichotomy between state water rights and federal reserved water rights.
It holds some promise for breaking out of that box in a way that
accommodates both federal and state interests.
Proposals to export water from the San Luis Valley to Colorado's
burgeoning Front Range had created controversy in recent years.
Last year, export opponents joined forces with conservationists who
wanted to see the Great Sand Dunes National Monument55 expanded
yet again6 to encompass all of the natural features now understood,
given advances in scientific knowledge, as necessary for the
preservation of the Dunes ecosystem. (Those natural features, not
incidentally, include surface and groundwater resources upon which

51. Professor Getches persuasively explains how many of the more progressive
reforms in state water management in the last decade have come about because of
federal pressure. See Getches, supra note 46, at 42-59.
52. In Cappaert, the National Park Service asked the Nevada State Engineer either
to deny or delay a decision on Cappaert's application to install a wellfield until the
completion of a Park Service commissioned hydrologic study to assess the proposed
wellfield's impact on the national monument and the pupfish habitat. The State
Engineer brushed the request aside, finding the grasses and grains Cappaert wanted to
grow with well water better served the public interest than doing the study. See
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1976).
53. Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-530,
114 Stat. 2527.
54. See, e.g., Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994).
55. President Hoover first created the Great Sand Dunes National Monument in
1932. SeeAct of Mar. 17, 1932, 47 Stat. 2506.
56. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower expanded the Great Sand Dunes National
Monument in 1946 and 1956, respectively. SeeAct of Mar. 12, 1946, 60 Stat. 1339; Act
ofJune 7, 1956, 70 Stat. c31.
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the Dunes depend.) Others who thought tourism would be promoted
if the Great Sand Dunes were made a full-fledged national park joined
these two interests. Secretary Babbitt and the Clinton Administration
quickly endorsed the idea.
The question was how to handle the water issue in the designation
process. Secretary Babbitt strongly supported an express reservation in
the legislation of a traditional federal reserved water right for the
expanded conservation area, defined to include the surface and
groundwater resources that were necessary to protect the Dunes. The
congressional delegation and local interests opposed a federal
reserved right, largely on ideological and political grounds, because
they did not want to be seen as promoting a full-scale takeover of the
area's water resources. They argued for letting state water law control
all aspects of the situation.
Our response, on behalf of the Interior Department, was that we
didn't think state law was adequate to protect the federal interests, in
two key respects. First, to the extent an instream flow water right
would be required, state law would not allow the National Park Service
to hold the right in its name. Only a state agency (the Colorado Water
Conservation Board) could hold the right.57 This was unacceptable-if
this was to be a national park, the water right necessary for its
protection ought to be held in the name of, and controlled and
enforceable by, the National Park Service. Second, we were concerned
about how much substantive legal protection a Colorado state water
right actually afforded to the surface and groundwater resources upon
which the Dunes ecosystem depends.
While the initial discussions revealed a wide gap on the mechanism
for getting there, clearly everyone shared the goal of expanding the
federal land reservation, and securing adequate protection for its vital
water resources. This agreement on the goal, and some flexibility on
both sides, led in the end to an unusual and adroit marriage of state
and federal law. The legislation Congress adopted last fall authorizes
the federal government to secure a water right that will be
appropriated, not reserved, through the processes of state law and in
accordance with the priority system of state law. But, the right will be
defined according to federal law-namely, whatever unappropriated
surface and ground water is shown necessary for protection of the
Dunes ecosystem-and the right will be held in the name of the Park
Service.58 It is a new breed of federal water right-a federal non-reserved

57. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2000).
58. The legislation's key section, 9(b)(2)(B), says the Secretary of the Interior is
"specifically authorized to appropriate water under this Act exclusively for the
purposes of maintaining ground water levels, surface water levels, and stream flows on,
across, and under the national park and national preserve, in order to accomplish the
purposes of the national park and the national preserve and to protect park resources
and park uses." Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-530, § 9(b) (2) (B), 114 Stat. 2527, 2533-34. That this substantive standard of
federal law preempts any inconsistent state law is made clear by an earlier part of
section 9(b) (2) (A), which says the water rights obtained and exercised by the
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right.
To water lawyers with memories that go back twenty-two years,
those are very loaded words. I know, because I helped load them. As
Associate Solicitor for Energy and Resources in the Carter
Administration's Interior Department, I helped craft the infamous
"Krulitz Opinion"59 (named after Solicitor Leo Krulitz), which boldly
announced that the federal government could claim a right to use
water under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19760
("FLPMA") without following the substance of state law. The
reasoning was straightforward: FLPMA laid out a series of new
management objectives for the BLM-managed public lands. Many of
those objectives, such as wildlife habitat and ecosystem protection and
some forms of recreation, required water, but the laws of many western
states where public lands were located did not then acknowledge that
water rights could be secured for such uses. Therefore, Solicitor
Krulitz opined, if unappropriated water was available, the BLM could
acquire a right to it using the procedures of state law, in accordance
with the priority system of state law, but without conforming to the
substance of state law. Instead, federal law-specifically, FLPMAwould define the substance of the right.
The opinion created a firestorm of protest that led the western
governors to rise up en masse and persuade one of their former
colleagues, then-Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus, to cease and
desist. Within a year, Solicitor Krulitz had left and his successor,
seasoned Colorado water lawyer and former professor Clyde Martz,
rethought the matter. Martz issued a supplement to the Krulitz
opinion saying Krulitz had it right in theory-there could be occasions
where federal law could trump the substance of state water law where
necessary to carry out federal programs-but wrong in application,
because FLPMA did not contemplate that result. 6' Krulitz had misread
the statute, Martz said, in finding within it an intent to override state
substantive water law.
There were more twists in the path to come. When the Reagan
Administration took office, its Solicitor, William Coldiron, issued his
own supplement to Martz's supplement to Krulitz's opinion. Coldiron
said Krulitz and Martz were both wrong. Coldiron wrote that Congress
could not-as a constitutional matter-ignore state substantive water
law other than through a federal reserved water right.62 The federal
"non-reserved" right, in other words, simply could not exist.
Finally, the Department of Justice weighed in, through Theodore
Secretary "to fulfill the purposes of the national park and the national preserve...
shall be appropriated, adjudicated, changed, and administered pursuant to the
proceduralrequirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado." Id. §
9(b) (2)(A), 114 Stat. at 2533 (emphasis added).
59. See 86 Interior Decision 553, 614-618 (1979); see also SAX ET AL., supranote 1, at
872-73.
60. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
61. 88 Interior Decision 253 (1981).
62. 88 Interior Decision 1055, 1064-65 (1981).
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Olson, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel." Olson's opinion,4
issued in 1982, is the modern equivalent of an Attorney General's
opinion, the highest legal authority in the executive branch. Olson
very gently chided Coldiron, 5 saying he as well as Krulitz had got it
wrong, and Martz was right. Congress has the constitutional power to
create a non-reserved federal water right if its legislation made clear
that's what it was doing (so Coldiron's suggestion to the contrary was
wrong). But Congress had not done so in FLPMA (so on that point
Krulitz was wrong and Martz was right).6 Olson's opinion is the last
word on the subject; not having been disturbed since, it still expresses
executive branch policy. Moreover, it seems clearly right on the issue
of constitutional power, at least to this observer.
Nearly twenty years later, the Sand Dunes legislation gives Olson's
view concrete realization. This legislation contains what may be the
nation's first clear-cut example of a federal non-reserved water right,
and a possible roadmap for how Congress might handle water issues in
future federal land conservation designations.
CONCLUSION

The Great Sand Dunes approach directly addresses most of the
concerns that have arisen about the traditional way of handling water
issues in new federal land conservation designations. It offers some
distinct advantages over the alternatives of silence, an express federal
reserved right, or total deference to state law. National interests are
protected because the federal government holds an enforceable water
right in its own name, and federal, not state law measures the
substance of the right. This means the standard by which the right is
quantified and adjudicated is one of federal law which, like the
quantification and adjudication of a traditional federal reserved right,
63. Theodore Olson is known more recently for his work for President George W.
Bush concerning the Florida election litigation. In late May 2001, the U.S. Senate
confirmed Olson as Solicitor General of the United States.
64. Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328 (1982).
65. Olson crafted his opinion to provide maximum comfort to the state water
interests in the West while preserving federal supremacy. The opinion's opening
paragraph sweepingly announces that the "federal non-reserved water rights theory
which we address in this opinion does not provide an appropriate legal basis for
assertion of water rights by federal agencies in the western states," id. at 329, but the
bulk of the opinion carefully and persuasively explains its conclusion that Congress
has "ample power" to supersede state water law in particular cases without asserting a
federal reserved water right. Id. at 383. Similarly, while Olson's opinion criticizes the
Krulitz Opinion at length, it never directly rebukes Solicitor Coldiron's opinion,
although its conclusion is plainly at odds with Coldiron's. Compare id, at 361 with id. at
374-83.
66. See, e.g., id. at 357, 361-62, 383.
67. I addressed the background of the Great Sand Dunes legislation and how its
water rights provisions should be implemented in somewhat more detail in a legal
opinion I signed, and in which Secretary Babbitt concurred, on January 18, 2001.
Memorandum from the Office of the Solicitor, to the Director of the National Park
Service (Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of Denver, College of Law, Water
Law Review).
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is ultimately reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States.6
State interests are protected because the federal agency has to file
for the right and, thus, the right may be adjudicated and administered
in the state water administration system, and in accordance with the
state priority system. Both sides are served by the fact that the
uncertainty over the contours of the right may be resolved relatively
promptly, without the need to wait decades for a general stream
adjudication. And, more subtly, both sides are served because this
approach compels them to cooperate more closely, which may foster
better communications between, and more confidence in, each other.
This is not to say that questions won't arise about the contours of
the Great Sand Dunes water right as Congress implements the statute.
Gray areas will inevitably emerge when one tries to distinguish between
process (governed by state law) and substance (governed by federal
law). But problems of this kind exist today, when federal reserved
rights are adjudicated and administered in state systems under the
McCarran Amendment.69
All told, where proposed new federal land conservation
designations are stalemated by a concern over what to say or not to say
about water rights, the Great Sand Dunes approach may offer a way to
break the impasse that accommodates the legitimate interests of both
the federal and state governments." It deserves a serious look.

68. See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
69. See, e.g., SAXETAL., supranote 1, at 825-29.
70. One might well ask, if this is such a good approach, why didn't the Clinton
Administration take it in designating new national monuments? As noted in the text
accompanying notes 24-37 supra, most of the recent national monuments specifically
addressed water, but none took the non-reserved right approach. For one thing, we
thought the idea would be controversial, given its relative novelty, and its association
We were
with the Krulitz/Martz/Coldiron opinions of a generation earlier.
concerned that a controversy could undermine the larger land conservation objectives
at stake in the monument designation process. It is also not completely clear that
Congress had given the President the authority in the Antiquities Act to create a nonreserved right-to appropriate water through a state water right system but under
federal substantive law. Although the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") rejected
Solicitor Coldiron's view (see supra text accompanying note 62) that Congress could
not give the Executive this power (see supra text accompanying notes 63-66), OLC left
open the question whether, in individual statutes, Congress has done so. Perhaps,
then, the Antiquities Act fails to give the Executive such authority, even though it
seems ironic to argue that, while the Act implicitly gave the President authority to
reserve water under the Winters doctrine (see supra text accompanying notes 13-15
(Cappaertdiscussion)), it did not at the same time implicitly authorize the Executive to
preempt state water law in a considerably more limited way. The bottom line for the
Administration was that the issues were too subtle, and the context too sensitive, to
embark on a new approach as part of the national monuments initiative. While we
thought the approach had merit, we believed it preferable to work through a test case,
as it were, in bipartisan discussions with Congress in the context of the Sand Dunes
legislation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Even before the negotiation of the 1922 Colorado River Compact'
("Compact"), the Upper Division States in the Colorado River Basin
were concerned about securing and protecting a reliable water supply
for their use and development.
That concern persists, and is
manifested in their positions relative to current issues that include
endangered species; marketing, leasing, and banking; Indian reserved
rights; salinity; and the needs and values of the inexorable inmigration of people to the West. The Upper Basin 3 has also felt itself
under constant threat of the prospect that rapid development in
California could give rise to a priority of use-ultimately usurping
future development and economic opportunity in the Upper Basin.
As a result, issues in California have always been at the top of the
Upper Basin's agenda and remain a paramount Upper Basin concern.
California's dependence on the use of water surplus to its basic
apportionment under the Law of the River' represents the most
1. Colorado River Compact, 123 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61101 to -104 (2000) [hereinafter Compact].
2. The Compact defines "States of the Upper Division" to mean the states of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. § 37-61-101, art. II(e).
3. The Compact defines "Upper Basin" to mean those parts of the States of
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming within the Colorado River Basin
above Lee Ferry, and also areas in those states outside of the Basin to which Colorado
River water is diverted for beneficial use. Id. § 37-61-101, art. II(f).
4. The term "basic apportionment" refers to the amount of water that can be
beneficially consumed by a Lower Division state pursuant to Article II(B)(1) of the
Decree of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 342
(1964), and under a "Normal" determination by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant
to Article 111(3) (a) of the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado
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current "California problem." For many years, California has been
using as much as 800,000 acre-feet in excess of its basic
apportionment. Increasing water use in Arizona and Nevada that has
pushed total water use in the Lower Basin 6 over its Compact allocation
has exacerbated the problem. As a result, the Secretary of the Interior
and the Basin states, other than California,7 have pressured California
water supply agencies to reduce their dependence on surplus
Colorado River flows. Additionally, they have demanded California
meet its legal obligation to live within its means under the Law of the
River.
The reason for such mandates is simple and illustrates why solving
the California problem is of fundamental importance to the other
states. If California is allowed to continue to exceed its basic
apportionment in the face of increasing need in the other Basin states,
and if established allocations are not enforced, then the foundation of
the Law of the River-the allocation of the right to consume water
among the states-may be meaningless. This loss of security of
allocation would undermine the certainty and reliability of supply for
water users in each of the Basin states, thereby making resolution of
other management and environmental issues on the Colorado River
virtually impossible, short of divisive, costly, and time-consuming
litigation. A reliable allocation of supply provides a legal framework
through which the federal government and the states can manage the
Colorado River to meet changing demands and values. Therefore,
each state has a vital stake in assuring the maintenance and
enforcement of that framework.
The Law of the River, of which the Compact is the foundation, is
the product of economic need, social conflict, politics, and law. To
appreciate fully this set of laws, one must understand the historical
context that created the laws and the motives of those who fought for
and negotiated each compromise. Through that understanding, one
River Reservoirs, 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (June 10, 1970) [hereinafter Operating Criteria].
Article 11(d) of the Compact defines "States of the Lower Division" to mean Arizona,
California, and Nevada. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. 11(d). The basic
apportionment of the Lower Division States is as follows: Arizona-2.8 million acre-feet
per year ("m.a.f./yr"); California-4.4 m.a.f./yr; and Nevada-0.3 m.a.f./yr. Arizona, 376
U.S. at 342. The Decree in Arizona v. California and the Operating Criteria make
provisions for "shortage" and "surplus" conditions, when the states of the Lower
Division can use less or more, respectively, than their basic apportionments. Id.; see
also OperatingCriteria,at 8951.
5. The "Law of the River" refers to a body of law affecting the interstate and
international use, management, and allocation of water in the Colorado River System,
including the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, several United States Supreme Court decisions,
the Decree in Arizona v. California, and a host of federal laws and administrative
regulations.
6. Article II(g) of the Compact defines "Lower Basin" to mean those parts of
Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within the Colorado River Basin
below Lee Ferry, and also areas in those states outside of the Basin to which Colorado
River water is diverted for beneficial use. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art.
H(g).
7. Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
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can discern the policy underpinnings of the current positions of the
states, tribes, and water agencies that rely on the Colorado River's
supply. Therefore, this article will examine the historical context of
the Law of the River before reviewing the evolution and potential
resolution of the current problem of California's dependence on
surplus flows.
This article will consist of two parts. Part I will review the
development of the Law of the River from an Upper Basin perspective.
It will focus on the motivations of the Upper Division states,
particularly Colorado, in pressing for the Compact and later laws.
These motivations were premised on key themes or principles that
remain relevant today. Part I also will summarize a few of the major
unresolved issues under the Law of the River that create uncertainty,
and therefore motivate the Upper Basin to press the California issue.
Part II of the article, which will appear in a later edition of the
University of Denver Water Law Review, will use the historical perspective
of Part I as a basis to review the history of discussions over the last ten
years between the states, the Department of the Interior, Indian
Tribes, and other water users. These discussions have resulted in
historic proposals and agreements by which California agencies will in
fact work toward reducing their overall water use. Since, like other
states, California requires some reliability of supply, interim surplus
guidelines for the operation of Colorado River Reservoirs will facilitate
this "California Plan." Adopted by the Secretary of the Interior, these
procedures will guide operations of the reservoirs in a way that will
assist California in achieving a "soft landing" to water use within its
basic allocation.
II. THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT
The development of the Colorado River began when the early
irrigation of the Imperial Valley in California involved a canal route
through Mexico. The canal route required the cooperation of the
Mexican government and implicated international relations between
This international complication
the United States and Mexico.'
for an "All-American Canal"
Valley
the
Imperial
in
the
desire
increased
the
need to construct large
and led to discussion and debate over
storage facilities on the lower Colorado River.9 Irrigation interests in
California clamored for construction of a large dam to reduce the
threat of floods, such as those that occurred between 1905 and 1907
and created the Salton Sea.' These interests looked to enhance the
reliability and security of their water supply. Competing proposals for
development of a large hydroelectric project augmented the demand
for a large reservoir.
It soon became clear that such comprehensive financing and

8. NoRRis HUNDLEY, JR., WATERAND THE WEST 22-23 (1975).
9. Id. at 45-52.
10. Id. at 27.
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development required the assistance of the federal government.
Comments of federal employees and commentators, such as John
Wesley Powell, Richard J. Hinton, and Arthur Powell Davis, further
fueled the debate. As early as 1878, they argued for federal control
over the comprehensive development of the Colorado River."
However, federal assistance also required the cooperation of the other
Basin states, which successfully blocked any financing proposals in
Congress. The Upper Basin was anxious about the potential rate of
development in the Lower Basin and was concerned that the water
supply forecasts of the federal government might be unreasonably
optimistic. 12 Thus, the California proposals threatened the security
and reliability of the Upper Basin supply.
A proposal made in 1920 by Delph Carpenter of Colorado to the
League of the Southwest ("League"), in his capacity as legal advisor to
Colorado's Governor, broke the stalemate."3 Carpenter urged the
states to use the powers retained by them under the Compact Clause
of the United States Constitution to equitably apportion the right to
use the waters of the Basin among them. Carpenter designed his
proposal to protect the security of future development opportunity in
the other states, while allowing development for the benefit of
California to proceed. The proposal provided the vehicle for the
League to urge Congress to construct an All-American Canal and flood
control storage on the lower Colorado River, with a compact as a
necessary prerequisite. 5 Hence in 1921, Congress authorized the
appointment of a federal6 commissioner and approved the negotiation
of an interstate compact.'
Carpenter did not make his proposal out of thin air, nor did he do
so without a clear understanding of the goals he wanted to achieve in
the subsequent compact negotiations. He had in mind several basic
principles he thought a compact could establish, which ultimately
would inure to the benefit of the Upper Basin and to Colorado in
particular. First, Carpenter sought assurance that Colorado could
develop a share of the Colorado River in perpetuity, as needs and
economic conditions dictated. Second, although he was a staunch
proponent of the prior appropriation doctrine and the belief that a
water right is a property right, Carpenter sought to eliminate the
operation of the prior appropriation doctrine as applied on an
interstate basis. Third, Carpenter was adamant in his defense of state
sovereignty and sought to preserve state autonomy over intrastate
water appropriation and administration. Fourth, he felt strongly that
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 96-97.
13. Daniel Tyler, Delphus Emoy Carpenterand the ColoradoRiver Compact of 1922, 1 U.
DENy. WATER L. REv. 228, 240 (1998).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.3. The most complete discussion of the Compact
Clause remains Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ. 685 (1925).
15. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 90-93.
16. Act of Aug. 19, 1921, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171, 171-72.
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litigation was the interstate equivalent of war and sought to avoid the
threat of litigation among the states as well as between the states and
the federal government. Finally, Carpenter saw development of the
Colorado River as key to reliability and security of supply and sought to
create a foundation for its comprehensive development and
regulation.
Although the principles of the Upper Basin in proposing and
negotiating the compact were clear, it is worthwhile discussing them in
some detail, since the same motivations underlie the policy positions
of many states today.
A.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT THE ASSURANCE OF THE ABILTY TO DEVELOP A
SHARE OF THE COLORADO RIVER IN PERPETUIY, AS NEEDS AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS DICTATE

Delph Carpenter looked at early United States Supreme Court
cases and studied the constitutional foundation of the relationships
In his view, under
between state and federal governments.
international law, a lower nation could not arrest the development of
an upper nation and deny to its inhabitants the use of water. However,
while Carpenter felt the upper nation was entitled to make full use of
waters, the nations, as a matter of international comity, could allocate
waters through a treaty. 7 Carpenter believed that before formation of
the Union, the territories were independent sovereigns and
surrendered only specific powers to the federal government. Under
the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the states
retained specific powers not surrendered. The power to compact was
founded upon the same principle as the power in the Supreme Court
to settle controversies between the states, or between the United States
and a state. These powers assume the respective sovereignty of the
states and the federal government. 8 As a result of these sovereign
powers, Carpenter believed the states could, with the consent of
Congress under the Compact Clause, agree to a perpetual allocation of
water. Through this allocation, Carpenter's intent was to preserve

17. The Harmon Doctrine may have influenced Carpenter's views. The Harmon
Doctrine was an 1895 U.S. Attorney General's opinion advising the Secretary of State
that the United States could exercise absolute sovereignty over the Rio Grande River
in the United States. Since that time, international law has evolved to reflect more
equitable principles. See A. Dan Tarlock, InternationalWater Law and the Protection of
River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYUJ. PUB. L. 181 (1996).
18. Carpenter stated: "In other words, the States of the Union, by consent of
Congress, have the same power to enter into compacts with each other as do
independent nations, upon all matters not delegated to the Federal Government."
Historical Memorandum In Re Colorado River and Brief of Law of Interstate Compacts:
Hearings on H.R. 6821 Before the HouseJudiciary Comm., 67th Cong. (1921) (brief written

by Delph E. Carpenter) [hereinafter HistoricalMemorandum]; see also Tyler, supra note
13, at 232-35.

19. Delph E. Carpenter, Application of the Reserve Treaty Powers of the States to
Interstate Water Controversies, Address before the Colorado Bar Association (1921),
in 24 CoLo. BAR ASS'N 1, 1-29 (1921) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board).
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the Upper Basin's right to develop water resources as economic needs
dictated."
The final Compact achieved the Upper Basin's desire for a
perpetual allocation.
Article III(a) of the Compact apportions
exclusive beneficial use of water to each Basin "in perpetuity" despite
extensive discussions of possible time limits in the negotiations." In
the ultimate consent to the Compact, the congressional debates
underscore the clear intent of Congress that the Compact effectuated
an equitable, perpetual allocation between the Upper and Lower
Basins.
After finalization of the Compact, Carpenter emphasized the
perpetual nature of the allocation in urging ratification of the
Compact by the Colorado legislature, stating:
The apportionment to the upper territory is perpetual. It is

in no manner affected by subsequent development. It is not required
that the water shall be used within any prescribed period.

Broadly speaking, from a Colorado viewpoint, the compact
perpetually sets apart and withholds for the benefit of Colorado a

20. During the negotiation of the Compact, Carpenter stated with regard to a
proposed time limit on the Compact:
There is no impending disaster above. That country should develop
along its natural lines. It is to the welfare of the river that it should not
develop suddenly above, and it is to the welfare of the river that it should
develop suddenly below. Now, the span of time should be sufficient in the
growth of the Basin generally, so that each individual farmer, as well as each
individual project should be protected. Thus, each may start naturally, and
in such a way that when he does develop a new farm or a new project the
country will be ready and the returns from the production will be sufficient,
so that he may pay for the burden of the development.

...
That will serve to illustrate the reasons why upper development
will come gradually. The development will not be all at once. It will be
promoted by need.
Minutes, Fourteenth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge,
Santa Fe, NM. (Nov. 13, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board).
Later in the negotiations, Carpenter stated, "[t]
he whole theory of the compact
is this: That the water apportioned to each basin is adequate not only for all of its
present uses, but for the increase of development within each basin." Minutes,
Twenty-fourth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge, Santa Fe,
N.M. (Nov. 23, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
21. See, e.g., Minutes, Sixth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board); Fourteenth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supra note 20; Twentyfourth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supranote 20.

22. John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado
River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, 32 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 21-1, 21-4 to 21-7 (1986).
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preferred right to utilize the waters of the river
within this State to the
23
extent of our present and future necessities.
Thus, the Compact renders a race for development between Upper
and Lower Basins unnecessary. The Compact assures the Upper Basin
that the Lower Basin's entitlement is only a finite share of the
Colorado River, thus allowing the Upper Basin to make long-term
capital investments with a degree of security in its water supply. The
Upper Basin is free to develop water as economic need dictates,
regardless of how long that might take. The Upper Basin is not
required to answer questions about the pace of its development, or,
more importantly, to undertake premature or environmentally
destructive water project development simply to hoard water for future
need against the Lower Basin. 5
B.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO ELIMINATE THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE ON AN INTERSTATE BASIS

In addition to the enormous financial demand of large-scale
development, the need for coordination in the development of the
Colorado River also became apparent because of the slightly different
legal doctrines in each of the western states. Interstate disputes
highlighted these differences, and the assertion of federal authority
over interstate waters exacerbated them.
Early in the twentieth
century, Colorado litigated three lawsuits in the United States
Supreme Court involving interstate waters-Kansas v. Colorado I and
27
I,
and Wyoming v. Colorado.
The Kansas v. Colorado cases involved

23. Delph E. Carpenter, In Re Colorado River Compact, Report before the Governor
of Colorado, Oliver H. Shroup (Dec. 15, 1922), reprinted in SENATEJOuRNAL, 24th Gen.
Assembly, at 78-79 (Colo. 1923) [hereinafter Carpenter Report] (on file with the
Colorado Water Conservation Board).
24. In his inaugural address in January 1923, newly elected Governor William E.
Sweet agreed with the policy of his predecessor Oliver Shoup, supporting the
Compact:
Our present irrigated area in round numbers is about three and
one-half million acres. We must extend this area and thereby increase our
agricultural output and our rural population, thus building up our towns and
cities.

The Colorado River Compact... seems to effect a division that is
fair and at the same time gives to private and public capital that degree of
certainty necessary to investment in enterprises depending upon water supply
from that source.
Governor William E. Sweet, Inaugural Address (Jan. 9, 1923), reprinted in SENATE
JOURNAL, 24th Gen. Assembly, at 148-49 (Colo. 1923).
25. In fact, Article III(e) of the Compact expressly prohibits the hoarding of water,
providing that, "[t]he States of the Upper Division shall not withhold water, and the
States of the Lower Division shall not require the delivery of water, which can not
reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses." Compact, supranote 1, § 3761-101, art. III(e).
26. Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas I), 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Kansas v. Colorado (Kansas
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disputes between two states with different water law systems. Colorado
was a pure prior appropriation state, while Kansas water law, like
California law, employed a combination of riparian and prior
appropriation doctrines. Colorado asserted it had a sovereign right to
fully deplete the Arkansas River. 8 The Supreme Court held that
Kansas, as a downstream state, did not have the right to all of the water
in the Arkansas River undepleted by Colorado.9 However, the Court
also held that Colorado, as the state of origin, did not have the right to
retain all the water within its borders. 0 Therefore, the Court imposed
an equitable apportionment of water, without regard to the relative
dates of use within the two states.
In contrast, the decision in Wyoming v. Colorado involved two pure
prior appropriation states. In this case, the Court declined to apply
the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment, and instead applied a rule
of interstate priority-between two prior appropriation states, the
doctrine of prior appropriation applies."' Thus, the result in the
Wyoming case became one of the principal motivating factors in
Colorado's desire to pursue the negotiation of the Compact. The
Upper Basin feared the Lower Basin could use the Wyoming decision to
obtain permanent preferential rights to water simply by developing
faster.3 In the Compact negotiations, Colorado sought to make sure
the states would never use the rule in the Wyoming case to deprive the
Upper Basin of its right of development.
The Upper Basin achieved its goal. Several provisions of the
Compact limit the Lower Basin's claim on Upper Basin water. The
first, of course, is the perpetual allocation of consumptive use made in
Article III(a). Regarding water flowing from the Upper to the Lower
Basin, Article III(e) provides that one cannot make a claim except to
the extent actually needed for domestic and agricultural purposes.
Article IV(b) makes power generation subservient to consumption for
domestic and agricultural purposes. Finally, Article VIII provides that
the Compact does not impair present perfected rights, and all other
rights are to be satisfied solely from water apportioned to the basin in
which they are situated.
After the Compact negotiations, Carpenter discussed his view of
the effect of the Wyoming case, and how the Compact had resolved the

II), 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
27. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
28. Kansas1, 185 U.S. at 143.
29. Kansas I, 206 U.S. at 117-18.
30. Id.
31. Wyoming, 259 U.S. at 470-71.
32. David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REv.
413, 420 (1985).
33. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 104. At one point in the Compact negotiations,
Herbert Hoover asked Carpenter, "I take it that you necessarily deny the whole theory
of priority of utilization as between states." Carpenter replied, "Emphatically."
Minutes, Seventh meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Dep't of Commerce, Wash.,
D.C. (Jan. 30, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
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issue.
Further development on the lower river will in no manner affect this
apportionment or impair the right of the upper States to consume
Any
their apportionment whenever their necessities require.
immense reservoir hereafter constructed on the lower river cannot be
the basis of a preferred claim which will interfere with the future
development of the Upper Basin. The development in the Lower
Basin will be confined to the apportionment made to that basin, with
the permissible increase. Any excess of development cannot infringe
upon the reservation perpetually set apart to the upper territory.
There can be no rivalry or contest of speed in the development of the
two basins. Priority of development in the Lower Basin will give no
preference of right as against the apportionment to the Upper
Basin.

C.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO PRESERVE STATE AUTONOMY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OVER INTRASTATE WATER APPROPRIATION
AND ADMINISTRATION

For years, the West had seen far reaching claims of authority
asserted by the federal government over the use, allocation, and
development of western waters. One of the major purposes in
negotiating the Compact for the Upper Basin was to erect a shield
against federal claims of authority, thus preserving state regulatory
authority over allocation and administration of waters within state
borders.
One example of this federal incursion about which Carpenter was
concerned occurred pending the negotiation of the Root-Casasus
Treaty with Mexico in 1906. The Department of the Interior placed an
embargo on the construction of all water projects on public lands in
the Rio Grande Basin. The embargo lasted some thirty years,
preventing development in the Rio Grande Basin in Colorado.
Carpenter sensed a federal plot, stating, "[t]he real purpose was to
prevent any construction on the headwaters of the stream while
encouraging that construction along the lower river through which a
monopolistic claim could later be asserted."35 Carpenter asserted that

34. CarpenterReport, supra note 23, at 78. Some disagreement occurred in Colorado
about whether the Wyoming decision would even apply on the Colorado River.
Colorado attorney Ward Bannister believed that California and the interstate
application of the prior appropriation doctrine was not so much of a threat. He
stated:
Now, it is the contention of the people in our State, and I think of the
other upper States as well, that inasmuch as California has exactly the same
kind of water law as has Kansas-in other words, a State whose fundamental
water law is riparianism, with such appropriation rights as there are carved
out of previously existing riparian rights, that the rule to be applied to [the
Colorado River] would be exactly the same as the rule laid down in Kansas v.
Colorado for the Arkansas River.
REUEL LESUIE OLSON, THE COLORADO RrvER COMPACr 171 n.207 (1926) (citations
omitted); see also HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 179-80.
35. Upper ColoradoRiver States: Hearings on Swing-Johnson Bill Before the House Comm.
on Irrigationand Reclamation, 67th Cong. 9 (1926) (statement of Delph E. Carpenter,
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after Wyoming had initiated the construction of the Pathfinder
Reservoir, a similar embargo occurred against development in the
headwaters of the North Platte Basin in Colorado.36
The United States also made direct assertions of broad legal
authority in the case of Kansas v. Colorado. Carpenter summarized,
"the United States intervened in the case urging that, by the
enactment of the [National Reclamation Act], Congress had adopted a
policy of national control and supervision over interstate streams,
which was to supersede state control, upon a rule of priority of
appropriation regardless of state lines."37
The United States had asserted a similar claim in a Colorado
proceeding for the adjudication of the water rights to the Grand Valley
project by local water users. Carpenter explained:
Government counsel appeared before the State Court and insisted
that the proposed project would occupy a preferred position
compared with other appropriators; that the United States and not
the states is the source of title to all water rights; that by the
enactment of the National Reclamation Act Congress had, by
implication, set apart and dedicated all of the then unappropriated
waters of western rivers for the primary purpose of ultimate diversion
by canals to be built under the National Reclamation Act and that all
rights of other appropriators and users must be subordinate to the
preferred right of the Government to divert as much water as it might
see fit under date of the approval of the National Reclamation Act.5°
The United States lost the Grand Valley case but continued to
assert plenary federal control in other forums. In Wyoming v. Colorado,
the federal government asserted claim to all the unappropriated water
in western streams and rivers. However, the Supreme Court found it
was not necessary to address the federal claims.
The federal
government also asserted appropriation claims in federal courts under
the theory state courts had no jurisdiction over them.
Even in the Compact negotiations, the United States made broad
claims of superceding authority. The relationship of state and federal
authority was one of the fundamental issues the Compact addressed.
Herbert Hoover explained the Constitutional interests of the United
States in his opening address to the Colorado River Commission
("Commission"), stating: "The Federal Government is interested
through its control of navigation, through protection of its treaty
obligations, through development of national irrigation projects and
through virtual control of power development depending upon the
use of public lands."3 9
Interstate River Comm'r for Colorado) [hereinafter Hearings]; see also, Tyler, supra
note 13, at 233.
36. Tyler, supranote 13, at 233-34.
37. Hearings,supra note 35, at 11.
38. Id,at 12-13.
39. Minutes, First meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C. (Jan. 26, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
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The discussion of federal/state authority also arose directly toward
the end of the Compact negotiations, when Herbert Hoover raised
concerns about the issue of the retained authority of the federal
government then under discussion. Ottamer Hamele, Chief Counsel
of the Reclamation Service, urged that the Compact contain a general
reservation of rights by the federal government. Hamele asserted that
the Compact was in reality an agreement only among the states and
that failure to include a reservation of federal rights could jeopardize
the prospects for congressional ratification. When asked by Hoover
for an enumeration of the federal rights, Hamele responded:
Why the federal rights are first, the paramount right of
navigation, which affects flood control. The United States also has
the ownership, I believe, of all of the unappropriated water of the
Basin. It has an interest in the building of irrigation works under the
national irrigation act. It has rights under the Federal Water Power
Act that possibly don't conflict with anything in this compact, but
there are possibilities that we could conceive of by which that Act
could be amended so that those rights might become in conflict with
ights in
this compact unless they were reserved. It 40also has
h
connection with its treaties with the Indian tribes.
In view of his experience in resisting broad federal claims, it would
have been natural if Carpenter were upset with Hamele when Hamele
raised these same federal claims. Fortunately for Carpenter (and for
the prospects of an agreement), Hoover came to Carpenter's defense,
and affirmed the intent of the Compact with regard to the
preservation of states' rights. Hoover said to Hamele, "[w] ell, we have
provided here for an apportionment. That apportionment is not yet
appropriated. If the federal government should intervene and say that
the unappropriated water was its possession and province, it would
destroy this entire apportionment between the seven states.
Ultimately, the Compact did address several of the specific federal
powers the Commissioners had discussed. The Compact made explicit
in Article VIII that it did not affect vested water rights. Article III(a)
and (b) specifically apportioned to the states the right to
consumptively use unappropriated water, thus affirming state
ownership of that water. That ownership was subject to the reserved
authority of the United States to enter into a treaty with Mexico, and
the Compact specified in Article III(c) the waters that the United
States could use to satisfy any such obligation. While Article VII
specifically left the question of quantification of Indian reserved water
rights for future resolution, the Compact appears to charge the use of
reserved rights against the basin in which the use is made. Article IV
acknowledged that the Colorado River was not navigable-in-fact and

40. Minutes, Twenty-second meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's
Lodge, Santa Fe, N.M. (Nov. 22, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation
Board).
41.

Id
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made uses for navigation subservient to domestic, agriculture, and
power purposes (but reserved the authority of Congress to disapprove
of this paragraph).
The Upper Basin asserted the Compact preserved the autonomy of
the states to regulate and allocate water under their own state systems.
After finalization of the Compact, Carpenter addressed the Compact's
intent to preserve intrastate regulation of water through the prior
appropriation doctrine.
Intrastate control of appropriations made within the apportionments
provided by the compact is specifically reserved by paragraph (c)
Article IV. This includes such regulations as each state may provide

by its constitution and laws respecting the preference of one class of
use over other classes of use. In other words the constitution and

laws of Colorado control the details of appropriation, use and
distribution of water within the state. The compact does not attempt
to invade such matters of local concern. When approved, the
compact. will be the law of the river as between the states. It deals

whofly with interstate relations. This paragraph refers to intrastate
control. Whatever the intrastate regulation and control may be it
cannot effect the interstate relations. No law of any state can have
extraterritorial effect 42or interfere with the operation of the compact
as between the states.
After the Compact negotiations, in his testimony on the SwingJohnson Bill (later enacted as the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928), Carpenter asserted that part of the movement to negotiate the
Compact had evolved from the desire to preserve state autonomy.
Before the Compact, the Upper Basin States saw the Boulder Canyon
dam proposal as a "monopolistic structure[] proposed for lower river
protection. "4
Carpenter summarized the Upper Basin States'
opposition to authorization of the lower basin reservoir without
simultaneous ratification of the Compact.
The upper states have done everything within their power to
speedily solve the underlying legal problems involved in the
construction of flood control works for the lower river territory. They

insist that thej be afforded the protection of the Colorado River
Compact, pre erably by all seven states, before any further claims
attach to the fiver.

42.

Delph E.Carpenter, In Re Colorado River Compact, Supplemental Report (Mar. 20,

1923), reprinted in SENATE JOURNAL, 24th Gen. Assembly, at 891 (Colo. 1923)
[hereinafter Supplemental Report]. The United States Supreme Court later upheld this
theory of interstate allocation versus intrastate regulatory control. See Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). However, as held in
Hinderlider, the Compact effectuated a legislative equitable apportionment, and
therefore set a limit on the authority of the states to vest rights to use water in excess of
its limits, and also vested each state with the authority to enforce its terms. Id. at 103,
106-11.
43. Hearings,supranote 35, at 22.
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They are not willing to permit their territory to be burdened

and their people to be harassed [sic] with any such conditions as have
prevailed upon the Rio Grande, North Platte and other rivers. In
necessary self defense they must resist the construction of any
reservoir upon the lower river until their rights have been settled by
compact.
In authorizing the construction of Hoover Dam and consenting to
the Compact, Congress affirmed the concept of state autonomy in
intrastate allocation and administration. When Congress passed the
Boulder Canyon Project Act 45 in 1928, it contained no general federal
reservation of rights. The Act subjected the rights of the United States
in or to waters of the Colorado River to the provisions of the
Compact.46 It gave the states an official advisory role, with full access to
records, in the activities of the Secretary of the Interior under the
Act." Finally, the Act specifically disclaimed any interference with the
rights of the states to adopt laws and policies concerning the
subject
appropriation, control, and use of waters within their borders,
48
only to the Colorado River Compact or other compacts.
D.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO AVOID THE THREAT OF INTERSTATE
LITIGATION AMONG THE STATES AND BETWEEN THE STATES
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

At the opening meeting of the Commission, Hoover stressed that
avoiding litigation was one of the primary purposes of the Compact.
It is hoped that such an agreement may be arrived at by this
Commission as will prevent endless litigation which will inevitably
arise in the conflict of state rights, with the delays and costs that will
be imposed upon our citizens through such conflicts. The success of
its efforts will contribute to the welfare of millions of people.
Carpenter responded to Hoover:
As you well observed in your opening address the prime object of the
creation of this Commission was to avoid future litigation among the
states interested in the Colorado River and the utilization of the
benefits to be obtained from its water supply.'s

Carpenter had experience in the vagaries of interstate Supreme

44.
45.
U.S.C.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 25.
Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended at 43
§ 617 (1994)).
43 U.S.C. §§ 6171 (b)-(d), 617m (1994).
Id. § 617o.
Id. § 617q.
First meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supra note 39.
Id.
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Court litigation and a fear of federal intrusion."
He saw the
mechanism of an interstate compact as a way to settle differences and
avoid protracted and expensive litigation, both among the states, and
between the states and the federal government." Carpenter stated the
following:
A suit between the States is but a substitute for war. It is the

last resort, and should not be resorted to until all avenues of

settlement by compact have been exhausted. It has been suggested
that the Supreme Court should announce the principle that no suit
between the States would be entertained without a preliminary
showing that reasonable efforts had been made by the complaining
State to compose the differences between il and the defendant State
by mutual agreement or interstate compact.

Carpenter also stated:
The Colorado River Compact was conceived and concluded
for the purpose of p reserving the autonomy of the states, of defining
the respective jurisdictions of the states and of the United States and

of assuring the peace and future prosperity of an immense part of our
national territory. With it there will be no overriding of state
authority by national agencies. Otherwise, interstate and statenational conflict,
strife, rivalry and interminable litigation will be
54
inevitable.

Article I of the Compact does, in fact, include as part of its purposes,
"to promote interstate comity" and "to remove causes of present and
future controversies.' 55
E.

THE UPPER BASIN SOUGHT TO CREATE A FOUNDATION FOR THE
COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE COLORADO RIVER

California's primary motivation in entering compact negotiations
was the prospect of gaining political support for construction of the
All-American Canal and a large reservoir on the lower Colorado River
to control floods, generate power, and regulate water supply.
However, all of the Commissioners were aware of the wildly fluctuating
nature of the Colorado River flow, and the need for comprehensive
reservoir development to achieve security in any allocation among the
states. In his opening remarks to the Commission at its first meeting,
Hoover said:
The problem is not as simple as might appear on the surface
for while there is possibly ample water in the river for all purposes if
51. See supra Section I.B.-C.
52. Tyler, supra note 13, at 241.
53.
54.

HistoricalMemorandum, supra note 18.
Hearings,supra note 35, at 2.

55. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. I.
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adequate storage be undertaken, there is not a sufficient supply of
water to meet all claims unless there is some definite program of
water conservation.

[I] t may develop in the course of our inquiry that there is
a deficiency of water in the Colorado River unless we assume
adequate storage. There may be a surplus if storage is provided.
Therefore, the solution of the whole problem may well be contingent
on storage.

It would seem to me that it would be a great misfortune if we
did not give to Congress and to the country a 6broad project for
development of the Colorado River as a whole .... 5
Later in the negotiations, at the thirteenth through sixteenth
meetings, the negotiators reached the heart of the issues in dividing
the waters. They discussed how much water to allocate each basin,
what types of delivery guarantee the Upper Basin should make, and
over what period to measure the delivery obligation.
Ferry. 7
The first agreement reached was the measuring point-Lee
The Commissioners then
Carpenter proposed that
obligation over a period of
Upper Basin would be a
obligation. He stated:

turned to the concept of averaging.
the Upper Basin average its delivery
ten years, recognizing that storage in the
necessary prerequisite to meeting that

[A] consideration of the stream flow tables... indicates that a ten
year period gave a fair and reasonably accurate average of the flow of
the river, taking both high and low cycles, and that a ten year period
would reach into both cycles and largely include them, and that as
the future development in both the upper and the lower basin must
rely upon storage, the storage facilities would care for that rise and
fall

[A] ny student of the river must realize that the future development in
both areas will be that predicated upon the construction of reservoirs.
Nevertheless, we have no power to say by whom these reservoirs shall
be constructed, in what localities or when they shall be constructed.
That should be left free to both communities to use such
instrumentalities as may be at hand, and the division of the water

56. First meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, supra note 39.
57. Delph Carpenter is credited with originating the "fifty-fifty plan" of dividing the
River into two sub-basins and apportioning the water between them. Tyler, supra note
13, at 243.
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should be so made that either area may build, or neglect to build, of
its own notion, and as it may believe construction or lack of
construction is at any one time justified.

In truth, the best possible safeguard for the lower states to insure a
delivery at Lee's Ferry within reasonable inclusive figures from year to
year would be tle immediate development of the reservoir storage of
the upper area.
Ultimately, of course, the Commissioners arrived at a delivery
obligation by the Upper Basin predicated on a ten-year running
average and not contemplated on a one-year minimum delivery
obligation.
Clearly, the basis for this understanding was the
assumption that Congress would approve, at some point, the
comprehensive development of regulatory storage throughout the
entire basin. Congress did lay this foundation for such development in
the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act.
I. THE 1928 BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT
After the representatives of the states and the federal government
negotiated the Compact, the Compact needed each of the States'
ratification and Congress's consent. State ratification proved to be a
challenging undertaking. By 1928, when Congress passed the Boulder
Canyon Project Act,59 only four of the seven states had ratified the
Compact.6 Arizona was particularly adamant in its opposition to the
Compact and refused to ratify. To bypass recalcitrant Arizona, the
effectiveness of the Boulder Canyon Project Act was contingent upon
California limiting itself to total water consumption from the Colorado
River of 4.4 million acre-feet per year ("m.a.f./yr"), and upon
ratification of the Compact by any six states, including California."'

California almost immediately passed the California Limitation Act6
and ratified the Compact. Ratification by Utah followed, and the
Boulder Canyon Project Act became effective.63 Soon after, in the
1931 California Seven-Party Agreement," the major California entities
agreed among themselves on the priorities within California.
58. Minutes, Thirteenth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge,
Santa Fe, N.M. (Nov. 13, 1922) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
59. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 617 (1994)).
60. HuNDLEY, supra note 8, at 276.
61. 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (1994). As with other major ideas in the settlement of
major issues on the Colorado River, Delph Carpenter is credited with the "Six-State
Plan" for ratification of the Compact that Congress adopted in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act. Tyler, supranote 13, at 259.
62. Act of Aug. 14, 1929, 1929 Cal. Stat. 38. Under this Act, the state of California
irrevocably and unconditionally, and as a covenant for the benefit of the other Basin
States, limited its use of Colorado River water to 4.4 m.a.f./yr.
63. HUNDLEY, supra note 8, at 281.
64. See discussion infraSection IV.
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After the Compact negotiation, and pending state ratification and
congressional consent, discussions arose over who would build and pay
for the monumental works contemplated by the states. Possible
candidates included the federal government, irrigators, power
customers, or private entities. Additionally, the states worried about
their respective jurisdictional responsibilities and the authority of the
Federal Power Commission if a private entity constructed a major dam.
This debate did serve to make one fact perfectly clear: the construction
and operation of any major facility on the Colorado River was too big,
and the international and interstate issues too complex, for anyone
other than the federal government to undertake. 65
The federal government did undertake this responsibility in 1928,
when the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the construction of
the Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal. As the states would later
see in the United States Supreme Court decision in Arizona v.
6 6 the Boulder Canyon Project Act also represented a major
California,
step by Congress in the imposition of federal authority (albeit with the
consent of and in coordination with the states), in the allocation,
regulation, and management of the Colorado River.
The Upper Basin interests also pursued their idea of
comprehensive storage development. They secured in the 1928
Boulder Canyon Project Act a provision authorizing the Secretary of
the Interior to study and report to Congress, on a comprehensive and
coordinated basis, the potential development of water projects
throughout the Basin.67
The Depression and World War II delayed the comprehensive
study authorized in 1928. Once completed in 1946, the study
maintained the theme that one could not accomplish coordinated
storage on or management of the Colorado River without first
securing interstate allocations. The study recommended that the
Upper Basin States divide the waters among themselves through their
own interstate compact, so as to allow this development to occur."'
IV. THE 1931 CALIFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT
Although the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the Secretary
of the Interior ("Secretary") to allocate water by contract among water
users in the Lower Basin, the Secretary requested that California water
users provide him with recommendations regarding how to make the
The Seven-Party Agreement
allocation within California.
("Agreement"), between the major water agencies in California, made
that intrastate apportionment. The Agreement allocated the first 3.85
m.a.f. of water delivered to California to agricultural uses in the
Imperial, Coachella, and Palo Verde areas, and to the Yuma Project of
65. Id. at 113-37.
66. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
67. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, § 15, 45 Stat. 1065 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. § 617n (1994)).
68. Carlson & Boles, supranote 22, at 21-7 to 21-9.
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the Bureau of Reclamation.

The Agreement allocated t2

priorities, totaling 1.212 m.a.f., to the Metropolitan Watei
Southern California. 9 The Agreement allocated subsequei
to agricultural agencies. The priorities, and the agenci
them, are important to a clear understanding of current iss
to California's use of water. Table I shows the allocation
made by the Agreement.

TABLE I: CALFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT PR
PRIORITY

DESCRIPTION

A
_A

1

Palo Verde Irrigation District 104,500 acres

2

Yuma Project (Reservation Division) -

3(a)

gross area of

not

exceeding a gross area of 25,000 acres
Imperial Irrigation District and lands in
Imperial and Coachella Valleys to be served by
the All-American Canal

3(b)

Palo Verde Irrigation District of mesa lands

4

Metropolitan Water District and/or City of Los

16,000 acres

Angeles and/or others on coastal plain

5(a)

Metropolitan Water District and/or City of Los
Angeles and/or others on coastal plain

5(b)

City and/or County of San Diego"

6(a)

Imperial Irrigation District and
Imperial and Coachella Valley

6(b)

Palo Verde Irrigation District -

lands in

16,000 acres

of mesa lands

7

Agricultural Use in the Colorado River Basin
in California

TOTAL

69. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (which is

"Metropolitan," "Met," or "MWD"), supplies wholesale water to membc
the Southern California Coastal Plain, from Ventura County to San Dieg(
70. In 1946, the City of San Diego, San Diego County Wat
Metropolitan Water District, and the Secretary of the Interior entered i
in which the right to storage and delivery of Colorado River water vested
San Diego and was merged with and added to the rights of the Metro]
District under conditions since satisfied.
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There are two important points to note concerning these
allocations under the Agreement. First, the Agreement allocated more
than California's basic apportionment of 4.4 m.a.f./yr under the
Boulder Canyon Project Act. Thus, the agreement also allocated
interruptible surplus water. It just so happens that the entity most in
need of a secure water supply, the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California ("Metropolitan"), has the right to divert 550,000
acre-feet within the 4.4 m.a.f. limitation, and 662,000 acre-feet above
the limitation. Metropolitan's diversion facility from the Colorado
River-the Colorado River Aqueduct-has a capacity of about 1.3
m.a.f./yr. Therefore, any limitation that may be imposed on overall
use in California to 4.4 m.a.f./yr will limit Metropolitan to a diversion
of less than one-half of the capacity of its conveyance facility.
Second, the Agreement provides no cap or quantification of use
within the priorities allocated to the agricultural districts entitled to
divert the first 3.85 m.a.f. of California's allocation. Acreage (104,500
acres) limits the first priority, held by the Palo Verde Irrigation
District, not any quantity of water. The Agreement gives the second
priority, held by the Reservation Division of the Yuma Project,
whatever amount of water it may need to irrigate 25,000 acres. Even
more problematic, the Imperial Irrigation District, the Coachella
Valley Water District, and 16,000 acres of land on the Lower Mesa in
the Palo Verde Valley share the third priority, with no allocation or
quantification of rights between them, other than the 1934
Compromise Agreement that gives the Imperial District first call on
third priority water.
These matters have become quite significant in the discussions
among the Basin States and within California over the last several years
on the development of a California Plan to implement measures to
limit California's use to 4.4 m.a.f./yr. As we will see in Part II of this
article, the problem of Metropolitan's priority and capacity over and
above California's basic apportionment, and the lack of defined
quantification in the Agreement, are two of the major issues that
California must resolve to eventually live within its means as provided
in the Law of the River.
V. THE MEXICAN WATER TREATY OF 1944
The Mexican Water Treaty of 1944" ("Treaty") is critical to a
complete understanding of the Law of the River. In years to come,
issues surrounding the environmental and urban demands in the
Colorado River Delta and Mexicali Valley will become increasingly
important. However, the importance of the Treaty for the purpose of
this article is its requirement that the United States guarantee delivery
of 1.5 m.a.f./yr to Mexico, plus up to an additional 200,000 acre-feet, if
the Secretary of the Interior determines that surplus water is

71.

Mexican Water Treaty, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
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available.'
The Treaty made this allocation a "first call" on the
Colorado River.
In granting an element of certainty to Colorado River allocation,
the Mexican delivery obligation also injected new issues into the
relationship between the Upper and Lower Basins, which remain
unresolved." These issues, along with the growing concern about the
condition of the environment in the Delta area, underscore the Upper
Basin's agitation with California's continued reliance on surplus water
in excess of its basic apportionment. If, as a result of the California
Plan discussed in Part II of this article, California is able to implement
measures to reduce its dependence on surplus water, then the states
would improve their ability to take a positive role in resolving some of
these new emerging issues. On the other hand, if the allocation
framework of the Law of the River is undermined, the states will need
to take a much more conservative approach.
VI. THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMPACT
As the 1946 Department of the Interior study suggested, the Upper
Basin states reached an agreement in 1948 allocating water
consumption rights under the Compact." One problem for the Upper
Division states was how to handle the "leftovers" from the Upper Basin
supply after it had met its obligation under Article III(d) not to
deplete the flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry below 75 m.a.f.
every ten years. 75 As a solution, Article III(a) (2) of the Upper
Colorado River Compact divided the consumptive use of water allotted
to the Upper Basin on a percentage basis: Colorado-51.75%; New
Mexico-11.25%; 7 Utah-23.00%; Wyoming-14.00%; and Arizona50,000 acre-feet. 6
The Upper Colorado River Compact also created the Upper
Colorado River Basin Commission, a compact commission that
continues to provide a valuable forum for the Upper Division states.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Commission allows states to
formulate positions, gather data and information, and advocate
positions on federal legislation. Furthermore, this forum allows
member states to develop operating strategies relative to federal
reservoirs on the Colorado River, Mexican Treaty issues, and water
supply and development issues in the Lower Basin.

72. As discussed below, with respect to the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act
and the Operating Criteria, supra note 4, this surplus is not the same as a surplus
determined under that Act and the Decree in Arizona v. California.
73. For a discussion of the major issues surrounding the Compact and the Treaty,
see Getches, supra note 32, at 421-23.
74. Upper Colorado River Compact, 63 Stat. 31, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-62-101 to
-106 (2000) [hereinafter Upper Colorado River Compact].
75. Getches, supra note 32, at 420.
76. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra note 74, § 37-62-101 (because of the
small magnitude of use in Arizona, its share was made definite).
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VII. ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA
During this same period, Arizona pressed Congress for
construction of the Central Arizona Project ("Project"). However,
Lower Division States had not agreed upon a compact. This,
combined with disagreement between Arizona and California as to the
meaning and effect of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, made water
supplies for the Project uncertain. In 1952, Arizona sued California to
obtain ajudicial determination providing such certainty.77
At stake in the lawsuit was the 1.0 m.a.f. of water referenced in
Article III(b) of the Compact. Arizona argued the Project had
allocated 7.5 m.a.f. of water from only the mainstem Colorado River,
limiting California to 4.4 m.a.f. of this amount. California argued the
allocation included Lower Basin tributaries, and therefore, the Court
should equitably apportion mainstem waters in excess of 7.5 m.a.f. to
California. In 1963, the Court ruled in favor of Arizona, holding
Congress had enacted a "complete statutory apportionment" of only
mainstem Colorado River water. 78 The Boulder Canyon Project Act
does not explicitly make such an apportionment. However, the Court
found an implied apportionment based on congressional intent and
the Act's delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Interior to
allocate and distribute water through contracts.
The Court emphasized the Secretary's discretion in making an
initial contract allocation, further noting that the Lower Basin often
refers to the Secretary as the "water master." However, the Court also
emphasized the "significant limitations" on the Secretary's discretion
once he makes that contractual allocation. The Court noted that the
Act limits the purposes for storing and releasing water.8 0 The Act
makes all contracts permanent, 8 ' and limits the revenues generated
from those contracts. 2 The Secretary, and all permittees, licensees,
and contractees, are subject to the Compact," "and therefore can do
nothing to upset or encroach upon the Compact's allocation of4
Basins."1
Colorado River water between the Upper and Lower
Furthermore, the Act requires the Secretary to satisfy present
The only real Secretarial operational discretion
perfected rights."
recognized by the Court is in the apportionment of shortages.8
One year after its decision, the Court entered its Decree. 7 The

77. See FelixJ. Sparks, Article Update, Synopsis of MajorDocuments and Events Relating
to the ColoradoRiver, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 339, 349-54 (2000).
78. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560 (1963).
79. Id. at 584.
80. 43 U.S.C. § 617e (1994).
81. Id. § 617d.
82. Id. §617c(b).
83. Id. § 617g(a).
84. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 584 (1963).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 617e (1994).
86. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 592-94.
87. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
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Decree, as an injunction, enforced the largely non-discretionary nature
of the Secretary's operational authority. The Decree characterized all
water below Lee Ferry and in the United States, as "Water Controlled
by the United States," and enjoined the Secretary to distribute such
water strictly in accordance with its terms. The Decree required the
Secretary to release water only pursuant to valid contracts with water
users,8 and only under three circumstances: normal, 9 surplus, 9° and
shortage." The Decree also required the Secretary to charge any
consumptive use of water to the state in which it is used,92 and allowed
the Secretary the authority to make unused water in one state available
for use in another state, on a temporary basis. 9
VIII. THE 1956 COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ACT
The Compact negotiators understood that comprehensive storage
development would be necessary to even out the wild fluctuations in
Colorado River flow and assure each Basin the security of water
supplies necessary to reach their envisioned potential development.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the Department of the
Interior to study development of such a system, which the Department
completed in 1946. Following the 1948 Upper Basin Compact, the
Upper Basin States looked to the federal government for the
development of a comprehensive river management system. Their
plan consisted of the federal government paying to construct a series
of reservoirs that would create a "bank account" of stored water to
assure that the Upper Basin could meet its Article III(d) delivery
obligation under the Compact, and thus allow each state to develop its
entitlement to water in the Colorado River System.
In response, the federal government enacted the 1956 Colorado
River Storage Project Ace 4 ("1956 Act"). The 1956 Act authorized the
construction of the Curecanti Unit, Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Glen
88. Id. at 343 (Article II(B)(5)).
89. Under Article 11(B) (1) of the Decree, if the Secretary determines sufficient
mainstem water is available to satisfy 7.5 m.a.f. of annual consumptive use in the Lower
Division States, he shall make available 4.4 m.a.f. to California, 2.8 m.a.f. to Arizona,
and 0.3 m.a.f. to Nevada. Id. at 342.
90. Under Article II(B)(2) of the Decree, if the Secretary determines sufficient
mainstem water is available to satisfy the annual consumptive use in the Lower Division
States in excess of 7.5 m.a.f., the surplus consumptive use is apportioned fifty-fifty to
Arizona and California, except if the United States contracts with Nevada, in which
case the surplus is apportioned 50% to California, 46% to Arizona, and 4% to Nevada.
Id.
91. Under Article II(B)(3) of the Decree, if the Secretary determines insufficient
mainstem water is available to satisfy 7.5 m.a.f. of annual consumptive use in the Lower
Division States, he is authorized to apportion such shortage pursuant to the Boulder

Canyon Project Act only after satisfying all present perfected rights in order of their
priority dates and after consultation with parties to major delivery contracts. Id. at

342-43.
92. Id. at 343 (Article II(B)(4)).
93. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1964) (Article 11(B) (6)).
94. Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1994)).
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Canyon Dams, the so-called "holdover reservoirs," to store and release
water to the Lower Basin in satisfaction of the requirements of Article
III(d) of the Compact. These reservoirs allow the Upper Division
States to develop their Colorado River entitlements fully, without the
Lower Division States subjecting them to a "Compact Call."95 The 1956
Act also authorized, subject to subsequent appropriation, several
"participating projects," designed to satisfy more regional consumptive
use demands, mostly irrigation. However, the government did not
build many of these authorized participating projects because of
environmental and financial feasibility problems. The 1956 Act also
developed the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund, which credits power
revenues generated from the facilities. A portion of this credit goes
against costs of project repayment for irrigation components
authorized by Congress.
IX. THE 1968 COLORADO RIVER BASIN PROJECT ACT
In 1968, Congress and the states further solidified the coordinated
interstate operation of various facilities through the adoption of the
Colorado River Basin Project Ace 7 ("1968 Act"). The 1968 Act
assumed as a "national obligation" the provision of water to Mexico
under the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty. 9 The 1968 Act also authorized
the construction of the Central Arizona Project, but at a heavy price to
Arizona. The 1968 Act gave first priority in the Lower Basin to
California, requiring the Secretary of the Interior, in administrating
any shortages among the Lower Division States, to limit diversions
from the Colorado River for the Central Arizona Project to assure the
availability of a total of 4.4 m.a.f. of mainstream water for use in
California." In exchange for authorization of the Central Arizona
Project, the 1968 Act directed the Secretary "to proceed as nearly as
practicable with the construction" of certain participating projects
authorized under the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act,100 thus
the construction would not start later than the date of the first delivery
of water from the Central Arizona Project. 0 ' Although the Central
Arizona Project is now on line, the government did not build these
participating projects.'

95. H.R REP. No. 84-1087, pt.1, at 3 (1956), reprinted in1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346,
2348; see also, Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d
325, 334 (Colo. 2000).
96. 43 U.S.C. § 620d(a)-(e) (1994).
97. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 82 Stat. 886 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1994)).
98. Id. § 1512.
99. Id. § 1521(b).
100. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
101. Id. § 620a-1; see also, Sparks, supra note 77, at 354-55.
102. These authorized but unbuilt projects include the West Divide, Fruitland Mesa,
Savory Pothook, and San Miguel Projects. The Animas-La Plata Project, a central
component of the Ute Indian water rights settlement, may yet be built, albeit in a
substantially reduced form.
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Finally, the 1968 Act gave several directives to the Secretary for the
coordinated operation of several federal reservoirs on the Colorado
River. The 1968 Act directs the Secretary to prepare a "consumptive
uses and losses report" every five years, which accounts for beneficial
consumptive uses on a state-by-state basis.' The 1968 Act also requires
the Secretary to propose criteria for the coordinated long-range
operation of specified federal reservoirs in both the Upper and Lower
Basins (principally Lakes Mead and Powell), to review those criteria
every five years, and to report annually on the actual operations under
the criteria for the preceding year and the projected operation for the
upcoming year.'
This latter report is known as the "Annual
Operating Plan."
With respect to Upper Basin reservoirs, the 1968 Act directs the
Secretary, through the criteria, to store water in storage units of the
Colorado River Storage Projectl'°and release water from Lake Powell in
16
furtherance of the Upper Basin's obligations under the Compact.
First, if the deficiency is chargeable to the Upper Basin, the Secretary
releases water from Lake Powell to supply one-half of any deficiency in
delivery to Mexico under Article III(c) of the Compact.' Second, the
Secretary releases water from Lake Powell in order to meet the Upper
Basin delivery requirement set forth in Article III(d) of the Compact75 m.a.f. every ten years.' 8 Third, the Secretary determines annually if
the amount of water in storage units of the Colorado River Storage
Project is less than or more than what is necessary to meet the abovereferenced delivery obligations, without impairing consumptive uses in
the Upper Basin under the Compact-in other words, without
potentially subjecting the Upper Basin to a "Compact Call."'09 The
government refers to this amount as "602 (a) storage.'
The Secretary
releases any amount of water in excess of 602(a) storage from Lake
Powell for the following purposes: (1) to the extent it can be
reasonably applied to beneficial use in the Lower Basin;"' (2) to
maintain, as nearly as practicable, an equal amount of storage
"a in Lakes
Mead and Powell;' 2 and (3) to avoid spills from Lake Powell. 1
In 1970, pursuant to the 1968 Act, the Secretary promulgated the
103. 43 U.S.C. § 1551(b)(1) (1994).
104. Id. § 1552(a)-(b).
105. The Colorado River Project units include the Curecanti Unit, and Flaming
Gorge, Navajo, and Glen Canyon Dams.
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1994).
107. Id. § 1552(a)(1).
108. Id. § 1552(a) (2).
109. Id. § 1552(a) (3).
110. See OperatingCriteria,supra note 4, at 8951, art. 11(1).
111. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3). This clause of the statute implements Article 111(e) of
the Compact, which requires that "[t]he States of the Upper Division shall not
withhold water, and the States of the Lower Division shall not require the delivery of
water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses."
Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. 111(e).
112. This release is referred to as "equalization."
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3) (1994).
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Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River
Reservoirs ("Operating Criteria")." 4 The Operating Criteria address
the units of the Colorado River Storage Project in the Upper Basin,
and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin. In broad outline, the Operating
Criteria require the Secretary to make several determinations in the
Annual Operating Plan to guide operations of system reservoirs for the
upcoming year. In the Upper Basin, the important determinations
relate to the amount of water that the Secretary will store in and
release from Lake Powell in that year, under the requirements
established in Section 602(a) of the 1968 Act.
For the most part, the Operating Criteria simply repeat the
mandates of Section 602(a). In one area, the Operating Criteria
expand upon those requirements. The Operating Criteria provide
that if the forecasted amount of storage in the Upper Basin is less than
602 (a) storage, or if the storage forecast for Lake Powell is less than
Lake Mead, the Secretary will maintain an "objective" to release a
The government
minimum of 8.23 m.a.f. in the upcoming year.
arrived at this amount ostensibly by taking the average Upper Basin
Compact delivery requirement of 7.5 m.a.f., subtracting tributary
inflows below Glen Canyon Dam and above Lee Ferry (about 20,000
acre-feet), and adding one-half of the United States' delivery
obligations under the 1944 Mexican Treaty (750,000 acre-feet).
This calculation is obviously a matter of convenience, pending
greater development in the Upper Basin, is not an interpretation of
the Compact, and has no basis in the law, for two reasons. First, the
only obligation of the Upper Division States under Article III(d) of the
Compact is to assure that they do not deplete the flow of the Colorado
River at 116Lee Ferry below 75 m.a.f. every ten years, on a running
This obligation imposes no burden or limitation on the
average.
Upper Basin to make any minimum delivery in any one year (except
possibly at the end of a ten-year sequence) and the Operating Criteria
cannot override the Compact. Second, the Upper Division States
disagree that they have any obligation to contribute half of the
Mexican Treaty delivery." 7 Therefore, the Upper Division States have
objected to any assertion by the Secretary that an actual annual
minimum release from Lake Powell may be enforced. They assert that
the 8.23 m.a.f. release is, as stated in the Criteria, an "objective" that
must be overridden by the terms of the Compact and the ultimate
determination of any Upper Basin obligations under the Mexican
Treaty."'
114. OperatingCriteria,supra note 4.
115. Id. at 8951, art. 11(2).
116. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. III(d).
117. See Getches, supra note 32, at 421-23.
118. Resolution by the Upper Colorado River Comm'n, Criteria for Coordinated
Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs (Feb. 27, 1971). See also Article
11(5) of the Operating Criteria, which states that the Operating Criteria "shall not
prejudice the position of either the upper or lower basin interests with respect to
required deliveries at Lee Ferry pursuant to the Colorado River Compact." Operating
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In operating Lake Mead under the Operating Criteria, the
Secretary makes determinations based on a number of factors, largely
repeated from the Decree in Arizona v. California."9 In a "Normal
Year," annual pumping and release from Lake Mead will be sufficient
to satisfy 7.5 m.a.f. of annual consumptive use in accordance with the
Decree.
In a "Surplus Year" (when the Secretary determines that
water in quantities greater than "normal" is available), the Secretary
apportions 50% of the surplus water to California, 46% to Arizona,
and 4% to Nevada, as outlined in the Decree.2 ' If the Secretary
determines a "Shortage" (water in quantities less than "normal" is
available), uses are restricted in accordance with the Decree and the
1968 Act.'
X. SOME MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE UPPER BASIN UNDER THE
LAW OF THE RIVER
States, the United States, Indian Tribes, and water user
organizations have exerted tremendous effort to establish a legal
framework for determining rights to use and develop the waters of the
Colorado River and to regulate its operation. Despite this effort,
however, significant issues exist that threaten to undermine the
security and certainty of supply created by that framework. The
balance of Part I of this article will discuss some of these issues, which
play into the relationships between the Upper Basin States and
California. The first issue regards the basic misunderstanding the
Compact negotiators had concerning how much water was actually in
the Colorado River System. The second issue relates to fundamental
unresolved matters the negotiators left to future generations. The
third issue stems from the fact that millions more people live in the
Basin, and the regulatory environment and public values of today are
considerably different and more complex than in 1922. Finally, some
have argued that market mechanisms and water transfers should be
allowed on an Upper to Lower Basin basis, to satisfy the increasing

Criteria, supra note 4, at 8951; Letter from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Executive Director
of the Upper Colorado River Comm'n, to Donald Paul Hodel, Secretary, Dep't of the
Interior (Jan. 16, 1986) (on file with author); Comments and Recommendations of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming on the Secretary of the Interior's
December 16, 1969 Proposed Long-Range Operating Criteria for Colorado River
Reservoirs (Mar. 26, 1970) (on file with author).
119. See OperatingCriteria,supra note 4, at 8951-52, art. 111(3) (a)-(b).
120. See id. at 8951, art. III(3) (a).
121. It is important to note that "surplus" as used in the Operating Criteria is not
the same as the term "surplus" as used in Article 111(c) of the Compact, which refers to
United States' obligations to Mexico being supplied from waters surplus to those
apportioned under the Compact. See id. at 8952, art. IV(1) (b). See also David E.
Lindgren, The Colorado River: Are New Approaches Possible Now that the Reality of
Overallocationis Here, 38 Rocxy'MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-18 to 25-19 (1992).
122. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (1994). In section 1521(b) of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act, Arizona lost what it had gained in Arizona v. California. Section 1521(b)
provides that in times of shortage, diversions through the Central Arizona Project shall
be limited to the extent necessary to supply total uses in California of 4.4 m.a.f.
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demands in California and Nevada.
A. THE COMPACT NEGOTIATORS OVER-ESTIMATED WATER SUPPLY
It is impossible to negotiate any agreement, much less an interstate
compact making a perpetual allocation of water, and anticipate every
contingency. The Compact negotiators affirmatively put off some
issues, such as Indian reserved water rights and the obligation to
Mexico. However, the biggest variable was water supply, and it was an
issue about which the Compact negotiators were simply mistaken.
The negotiators had some idea of the water supply in the Colorado
River System, and calculated uses based on the consumptive use of
irrigation. However, the negotiators dealt with an extremely limited
period of record. Moreover, the years prior to 1922 were actually
abundant water years. The negotiators made various estimates of
water supply in the mainstream, which ranged from 18 to 21 m.a.f./yr.
The significance of these discussions over water supply is evident
from the Upper Basin's obligation not to deplete the Colorado River
below a ten-year running average of 75 m.a.f. The Upper Basin
negotiators were comfortable that enough water existed in the
Colorado River for their states to meet this obligation and still have the
ability to develop the 7.5 m.a.f./yr of consumption apportioned to
them. In urging the Colorado legislature to ratify the Compact,
Carpenter assured them:
It is evident that the States of the Upper Basin may safely guarantee
75,000,000 acre-feet aggregate delivery at Lee Ferry during each tenyear period. This would mean an average annual delivery of
,500,000 acre-feet as against 15,940,594 acre-feet present net annual
natural
average flow (100%) at Lee Ferry or 18,415,842 acre-feet river.
23
average annual flow (100%) on the basis of a "reconstructed"
Arthur Powell Davis, the Commissioner of Reclamation, backed
Carpenter's and the other Commissioners' assurances. Davis had prior
to and throughout the negotiations stated that plenty of water existed
in the Colorado River System to take care of all existing and future
anticipated uses.
Unfortunately, history has shown these optimistic assumptions
were just that. Since 1922, the undepleted flow of the Colorado River
at Lee Ferry has averaged only 14.2 m.a.f./yr. Ten-year periods with a
flow of 11.8 m.a.f./yr have occurred twice in this century. 2 4 Tree ring
studies have estimated the long-term average supply at5 13.5 m.a.f./yr,
and have put one ten-year period flow at 9.7 m.a.f./yr.1
Table II below, and its accompanying notes, provides a comparison
123. Supplemental Report, supra note 42, at 892-93.
124. UPPER COLORADO RIVERCOMM'N, FORTY-EIGHTHANNUALREP., at 26 (1996).
125. David Meko et al., The Tree-Ring Record of Severe Sustained Drought, 31 WATER
RESOURCES BULL. 789, 799-800 (1995), reprinted in 1 THE POWEL CONSORTIUM 789
(1995).
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between the assumptions made in 1922 and what we now know with
the benefit of an additional eighty years of history.
TABLE II: COMPARISON OF CONSUMPTIVE USES, LOSSES, AND WATER
SUPPLY
(Values in Million Acre-Feet per Year)
Reconstructed average virgin flow at Lee Ferry
Long term reconstructed average
Lowest reconstructed ten-year period
Lowest ten-year period of record
Lower Basin tributary inflow
Total Available Water Supply (Mainstem)
Upper Basin Uses
Upper Basin Reservoir Evaporation
Total Upper Basin Uses
Lower Basin Mainstem Uses
Lower Basin Reservoir Evaporation
Total Lower Basin Mainstem Uses
Delivery to Mexico and Welton-Mohawk bypass
Total Mainstem Uses

1922
17.5'

3.0'
20.5
2.5
-

2.5
2.6 h
2.6
6.1

Present
15.0 b
13.5 d
9.7 d
11.8'
1.4'
11.1-16.4
4.2 g
0.5 g
4.7
8.3'
1.8'
10.1
1.6
16.4

Table II Notes
For the period 1903-1922. Delph E. Carpenter
reported this amount
to the House of Representatives. HistoricalMemorandum In Re Colorado River
and Brief of Law of Interstate Compacts: Hearings on H.R. 6821 Before the House
Judiciary Comm., 67th Cong. (1921) (brief written by Delph E. Carpenter). In
his Comments to Congress on the Colorado River Compact, Commissioner of
Reclamation, Arthur Powell Davis, estimated the reconstructed flow at 18.1
m.a.f./yr. 64 CONG. REC. 2714 (1923).
b This is the long-term average
for the period 1906-1999.
UPPER
COLORADO RIVER COMM'N, FIFty-FIRsT ANNUAL REP., at 25 (1999).
Critical ten-year averages for the periods 1931-1940
and 1954-1963.
For the twelve-year period 1953-1964, the average annual virgin flow at Lee
Ferry was only 11.6 m.a.f. Id. at 26.
d
David Meko et al., The Tree-Ring Record of Severe Sustained Drought,
31
WATER RESOURCES BULL. 789, 799-800 (1995), reprinted in 1 THE POWELL
CONSORTIUM 789 (1995).
e Telephone Interview with Wayne E. Cook, Executive
Director, Upper
Colorado River Commission (Mar. 2001); Telephone Interview with Phil
Mutz, New Mexico Commissioner, Upper Colorado River Commission (Mar.
2001).
' Delph E. Carpenter, In Re Colorado River Compact, Report before the
Governor of Colorado, Oliver H. Shroup (Dec. 15, 1922), reprinted in SENATE
JOURNAL, 24th Gen. Assembly, at 78-79 (Colo. 1923)
g UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMM'N, UPPER COLORADO RIVER STATES
DEPLETION SCHEDULE (2000).
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In his comments to Congress on the Colorado River Compact,

Commissioner of Reclamation, Arthur Powell Davis estimated the Lower
Basin mainstem uses at 2.6 m.a.f./yr. 64 CONG. REC. 2715 (1923).
i Memorandum from Jayne Harkins, Manager, River Operations, U.S.
Dep't of Interior re: Estimate of 2000 Colorado River Water Use (Dec. 27,
2000) (on file with author). However, 2000 is a year of declared surplus.
Under a normal year, Lower Basin mainstem uses are limited to 7.5 m.a.f./yr.
j The Bureau of Reclamation Consumptive Uses and Losses Report,
1981-1985, shows total Lower Basin reservoir evaporation of about 1.0
m.a.f./yr. Table, LOWER COLORADO RIER BASIN: COLORADO RIVER MAIN STEM
ESTIMATED RESERVOIR EVAPORATION AND CHANNEL Loss (1981-1985) (on file
However, through informal communication, current
with author).
accounting of the Lower Colorado Region of the Bureau of Reclamation
estimates 1.8 m.a.f./yr. Telephone Interview with Wayne E. Cook, Executive
Director, Upper Colorado River Commission (Mar. 2001).
Because of the delivery obligation in Article III(d) of the Compact,
the burden of the forecasted supply deficiency falls directly on the
Upper Division States. If the Upper Basin has a firm obligation to
allow a ten-year average of 7.5 m.a.f. to go to the Lower Basin each
year, this obligation limits its use to what remains in the Colorado
River. The amount left depends upon hydrologic cycles. Based on its
hydrologic analysis and interpretation of the Law of the River, the
Bureau of Reclamation's official estimate of the water available to the
Upper Basin is only 6.0 m.a.f./yr. The Upper Division States disagree
with this estimate, but the issue is not yet ripe since Upper Basin
depletions remain below this amount. As shown on the chart above,
total Upper Basin use
2 6 and reservoir evaporation is only about 4.7
m.a.f./yr at this time.
Because of the uncertainty about how much water will ultimately
be available under the Colorado River Compact, the Upper Colorado
River Compact allocated the entitlement to use water under the
Colorado River Compact among the Upper Division States on a
percentage basis. Therefore, unlike the Lower Division States whose
allocations are firm, the allocation of each Upper Division state is
uncertain and variable. For example, Article III(a) (2) of the Upper
Colorado River Compact entitled Colorado to deplete the Colorado
River by 51.75% of the available Upper Basin consumptive use in any
year. 217 Thus, if the total available to the Upper Basin is 6.0 m.a.f./yr,
Colorado may deplete the Colorado River by 3.079 m.a.f./yr. 28 If the
Upper Basin entitlement is 7.5 m.a.f./yr, Colorado may deplete the

126. Additional discussion of the problem of the underestimation of supply is found
in Carlson & Boles, supra note 22, at 21-34.
127. Upper Colorado River Compact, supranote 74, § 37-62-101, art. III(a) (2).
128. ENDANGERED FiSH FLOW AND COLORADO IvER COMPACT WATER DEV.
WORKGROUP, FINAL REP., COLORADO RIVER COMPACT WATER DEv. PROJECTION, at 12

(1995) (on file with the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
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Colorado River
by 3.885 m.a.f./yr."9 Colorado's current uses are about
3
2.5 m.a.f./yr

1

B. THE COMPACT NEGOTIATORS LEFT UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Because of their water supply estimates, the negotiators thought
they left some room in which to work. The negotiators based their
discussions on what they felt were the reasonable water supply needs in
each basin-7.5 m.a.f./yr-and gave the Lower Basin an additional
million acre feet to allow for Lower Basin tributary use. Because they
had not allocated all the water in the Colorado River, they felt that
extra water remained for some intentionally unresolved issues.
For example, the negotiators provided in Article Ill(c) that the
states would handle any obligation to deliver water to Mexico under a
treaty by using water surplus to that allocated under Article 111(a) and
(b). If no surplus exists, the Upper and Lower Basins are to share
equally in meeting any such deficiency. The Lower Basin argues no
such surplus exists, and the Upper Basin therefore has a delivery
obligation. Thus, in addition to its 75 m.a.f. delivery obligation, the
Upper Basin potentially faces the added burden of contributing onehalf of the 1.5 m.a.f. Mexican Treaty obligation, and possibly the
transit losses between Lee Ferry and the Mexican border.
However, the Upper Basin States assert they are under no
obligation to contribute any water to Mexico. They argue that since
the total Lower Basin consumptive use has exceeded its total
apportionment of 8.5 m.a.f./yr, the Lower Basin is using surplus water,
and must reduce its consumptive use to 8.5 m.a.f./yr before the Upper
Basin can have any obligation. The chart above shows Lower Basin
mainstem consumptive uses of 8.0 m.a.f./yr. If one adds in Lower
Basin tributary uses, even deducting for groundwater overdraft, total
Lower Basin consumptive use is currently in excess of its 8.5 m.a.f./yr
allocation. The Upper Basin States argue this excess use eliminates
any burden the Upper Basin might otherwise have toward Mexican
Treaty deliveries. Resolution of the question may depend on how the
Compact accounts for Lower Basin tributary use.
The Compact, in Article VII, does not explicitly resolve the
question of Indian reserved rights-how much they are, or their
priority."s2 In Arizona v. California, the United States Supreme Court
answered that question for five Lower Basin Indian tribes, adjudicating

129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Despite stating that it was not interpreting the Compact, the practical effect of
the Court's decision in Arizona v. Californiawas to hold that the 7.5 m.a.f. allocation to
the Lower Basin in Article III(a) of the Compact was of mainstream water, and the
allocation of 1.0 m.a.f. to the Lower Basin in Article III(b) of the Compact was of
tributary water. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 557-58, 565-69 (1963).
132. "Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the
United States of America to Indian tribes." Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art.
VII.
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to them reserved rights totaling 900,000 acre-feet.'33 The Court's
decision also made clear that in the Lower Basin, use of mainstem
water is charged against the allocation of the state in which the
consumptive use of that water is made.'34 However, both the Upper
and Lower Basins have not quantified Indian reserved rights of
Thus, the impact of this
potentially enormous magnitude.
quantification is still unknown.
C. THE NEGOTIATORS DID NOT FORESEE THE EMERGENCE OF URBAN
DEMANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND RECREATIONAL VALUES

The Compact negotiators did predict increasing demands for
water in the basin. Much of their predictions were defensive in nature,
since a prediction of future demand served as a justification for a
higher claim of entitlement in the Compact negotiations. Irrigation
demand was the primary consideration in these predictions and
calculations of present use. Early in the Compact negotiations, the
Commissioners discussed an allocation formula based on irrigable
acreage. Claims based on irrigable acreage provided some objective
measurement of future demand and avoided pure speculation.
The negotiators could not foresee the influx of population to the
western United States, the magnitude of the shift from rural
communities to urban cities, or the increase in resort, tourism, and
recreational demands such as golf courses, snowmaking, and flat water
and instream recreation. In the negotiations, the parties considered
Denver's potential transbasin demand. However, the negotiators felt
that southern Nevada's potential demands were negligible.3 6
Additionally, areas not discussed included Los Angeles and Phoenix.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Upper Basin States'
concerns included the potential water demands of massive oil shale
development and whether their Compact allocation would adequately
accommodate such demands. Although a push to develop oil shale no
longer exists, these changing economic circumstances illustrate that
the Commissioners could not foresee future demands on the Colorado
River. These changing conditions also underscore the wisdom of
Delph Carpenter's desire to preserve a defined share of the Colorado
River in perpetuity for the Upper Basin, so that the Upper Basin could
meet changing circumstances without interstate conflict or without a
rush to premature water development simply to protect against claims
in the Lower Basin.
133. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 596.
134. Id. at 590.
135. For example, in the 1928 Senate debates on the Boulder Canyon Project Act,
Senator Pittman of Nevada stated that "Nevada has already admitted that it can use
only an insignificant quantity, 300,000 acre-feet." Id. at 578.
136. In response to a question from Arizona Congressman, Carl Hayden, Herbert
Hoover responded that "[n]o data are at hand in regard to any proposed diversion
from the drainage area of the Colorado River in the States of Arizona, California, or
Nevada unless the Imperial Valley diversion be so considered." 64 CONG. REc. 2714
(1923).
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Along with changing economic circumstances in the West has
come a shift in environmental and recreation values. The Endangered
Species Act has forced the reoperation of virtually every federal
reservoir in the Upper Basin. Each facility, and the rivers above and
below it, has generated significant recreation economies. These new
demands on the system have lead some to question whether the huge
reservoirs on the system will ever operate as the Compact negotiators
intended-fluctuating from full to empty as drought cycles come and
go. Moreover, lawsuits filed by environmental organizations have
asserted that the Endangered Species Act creates an overriding
obligation and limitation on the operation of federal reservoirs, 7 and
even requires the delivery of additional water to Mexico to avoid
jeopardy to listed endangered species in Mexico.'38
D. INTERBASIN WATER TRANSFERS AND MARKETING WAS NOT
CONTEMPLATED BY THE COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS AND IS ILLEGAL UNDER
THE LAW OF THE RIVER

Increasing demands in California and southern Nevada, combined
with the continued underutilization in the Upper Basin of its
consumptive use allocation, have encouraged proposals to sell or lease
water between the Basins. Proponents of water marketing argue the
Upper Division States should be able to sell or lease to Lower Basin
entities their unused entitlements to the use of water from the
Colorado River System, or private parties should be able to sell or lease
water rights created under state law. Although proponents have made
many proposals, the three most notorious proposals are the "Galloway
Proposal," the "RCG (Resource Conservation Group) Proposal," and
the "Roan Creek Proposal."
In 1984, the Galloway Group, Ltd. entered into an option with the
San Diego County Water Authority (a member agency of the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California), to lease 300,000
to 500,000 acre-feet per year of water released from future planned
reservoirs on the White or Yampa Rivers in Colorado. According to
the proposal, the Upper Basin under the Compact, and Colorado
under the Upper Colorado River Compact, would debit the water
released for use in San Diego to their respective allocations.
The 1989 RCG Proposal sought to create three types of "water" for
sale or lease from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin. The first type
of water ("Type 1") was undeveloped, unused water in the Upper
Basin, currently flowing to and used in the Lower Basin. Type 1 water
would include water the Upper Basin could, in the future, develop and
consumptively use. The second type of water ("Type 2") was water
stored in Upper Basin Reservoirs, for which there were contracts but
no present use. This type of water was the same as Type 1 water,
137. S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515
(9th Cir. 1998).
138. Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 1700CV01544 (D.C. Cir. filed June 28,
2000).
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except that Type 2 water was subject to contracts of potential users who
had not yet developed their uses. An example of Type 2 water was
water stored in Fontenelle Reservoir in Wyoming under contract to
industrial users who had no current demand. The third type of water
("Type 3") was water presently consumed by irrigated agriculture in
the Upper Basin. Thus, creating Type 3 water under the RCG
Proposal required Upper Basin water users to dry up irrigated acreage,
temporarily or on a rotating basis, and to forego present consumptive
use for sale or lease in the Lower Basin. RCG proposed to create
"pools" of Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 water for sale or lease in the
Lower Basin.
The Roan Creek Proposal, developed by Chevron Oil Shale
Company, was substantively identical to the Galloway Proposal.
Chevron proposed to construct a reservoir on Roan Creek near Grand
Junction in Colorado and to lease water to Nevada pending ultimate
development and use of the water for oil shale development in
Colorado.
The Galloway, RCG, and Roan Creek promoters sought to involve
the Colorado River Basin states and to convince the states that an
arrangement with private enterprise as a "facilitator" was necessary for
their project to take place. The groups tried to sell the concept on an
affirmance of the entitlements to use water in the Upper Basin and on
the development of a stream of revenue to use in the Upper Basin for
new water project development or other state needs.
The states resisted these proposals for a variety of reasons. Among
other things, the states' concerns included that the concepts were
legally impossible, would open an unregulated "water market" on the
Colorado River, 1 s9and that such an arrangement would destroy
interstate comity.

There are many reasons why an interbasin "water market" is simply
illegal under the Law of the River, some of which are discussed below.
More fundamentally, however, it is also clear the very idea of a "water
market" is directly contrary to the basis and foundation of the Law of
the River.
The reciprocal, historical needs of the Upper and Lower Basins,
which remain valid today, are premised on the allocations embedded
in the Law of the River. The Lower Basin was in need of major
regulatory structures to alleviate the threat of flooding and to achieve
water development opportunities. The Upper Basin sought to avoid
the interstate imposition of the prior appropriation doctrine, and to
The
protect future development rights in the Upper Basin.
139.

More recently, the state of Utah has "broken ranks" with its fellow Upper

Division States. Utah's Governor Leavitt suggested his state should investigate the idea
of leasing its unused apportionment to states in the Lower Division, arguing that the

Endangered Species Act and other environmental laws, and a lack of demand, may
prevent Utah from ever using its full entitlement. Governor Leavitt proposed that

money raised from the lease could be used to meet infrastructure needs in Utah. The
proposal was met with opposition by the Upper Division States, and with lukewarm

enthusiasm from the Lower Division States.
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operational and regulatory system of the Law of the River meets these
needs. The very basis of the bargain in the Compact is the Lower
Basin's agreement that the Upper Basin has a peretual allocation of
the right to consume a given amount of water. 4 In exchange, the
Upper Basin agreed to let pass to the Lower Basin, without charge, an
water for which it lacked a reasonably anticipated consumptive need.
Creating a water market in which the Upper Basin charges the Lower
Basin for this water, would undermine this fundamental agreement
between the Basins.
Additionally, an interbasin water market violates the Compact's
premise that the prior appropriation doctrine does not apply interstate
on the Colorado River. Water markets, changes of water rights, and
transfers are hallmarks of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Therefore, an interbasin water market brings about the very result the
Upper Basin negotiators of the Compact sought to avoid-making
water and/or water rights an article of interstate commerce and
layering the Law of the River with an interstate prior appropriation
doctrine. This result allows the economic and political muscle of the
Lower Division States to override the future of the Upper Division
States. The result also allows the Lower Basin to continue economic
development at the expense of the Upper Basin.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept of an interbasin
water market has no basis under the Law of the River. This is true for
any of the "types" of water contemplated under recently proposed
marketing schemes: (1) unused apportionments of the Upper Division
States; (2) water stored in the Upper Basin for later release and use in
the Lower Basin; or (3) water presently consumed in the Upper Basin,
the use of which would be foregone so as to allow an equivalent
amount of use in the Lower Basin.
A summary of three of the many ways an interbasin water market is
illegal under the Law of the River follows.
1. Interbasin Water Sales or Transfers Would Violate the Colorado
River Compact
Article I of the Colorado River Compact specifies that the basis of
the Compact is the apportionment not of water itself, but of the use of
water. 4 2 Article III(a) makes an apportionment, "in perpetuity,"
140. Compact, supranote 1, § 37-61-101, art. I11(a).
141. Id., art. III(e).
142. Article I reads in its entirety as follows:
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable
division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River
System; to establish the relative importance of different beneficial uses of
water; to promote interstate comity; to remove causes of present and future
controversies; and to secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial
development of the Colorado River Basin, the storage of its waters and the
protection of life and property from floods. To these ends the Colorado
River Basin is divided into two Basins, and an apportionment of the use of
part of the water of the Colorado River System is made to each of them with
the provision that further equitable apportionments may be made.
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between Upper and Lower Basins, not of water, but of the right to
To reinforce this concept,
"exclusive beneficial consumptive use.
Article III(d) prevents the Upper Division States from "depleting" the
flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry below 75 m.a.f. in any ten-year
running average." Moreover, Article III(e) provides the Upper Basin
cannot withhold unneeded water for use in the Upper Basin, if a need
exists for the water in the Lower Basin.'45
Once water passes Lee Ferry, and a use occurs in the Lower Basin,
that use is chargeable as a Lower Basin use. The Compact does not
provide an allocation of the "ownership" of water. It guarantees to
each Basin a right of use up to a specified maximum. This view is
consistent with the nature of water rights as usufructuary rights, and
expresses the intent of the Compact negotiators. 4 6 As a result, the
place of use, not the location of the water, determines to which Basin
that use is charged.
For a sale or transfer of an Upper Basin use to the Lower Basin to
occur, the Lower Basin must credit its uses and the Upper Basin debit
its uses. This debit/credit system would allow the Lower Basin to
consumptively use the amount of the water sale in excess of 75 m.a.f.
every ten years and require the Upper Basin to deliver the same
Id. § 37-61-101, art. I (emphasis added).
143. Article 111(a) reads in its entirety as follows:
There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in
pepetuity to the Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin respectively the exclusive
beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre feet of water per annum, which
shall include all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now
exist.
Id. § 37-61-101, art. 111(a) (emphasis added).
144. Article III(d) reads in its entirety as follows:
The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river
at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for
any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series
beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of
this compact.
Id. § 37-61-101, art. III(d) (emphasis added).
145. Article III(e) states in its entirety: "The States of the Upper Division shall not
withhold water, and the States of the Lower Division shall not require the delivery of
water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses." Id. § 3761-101, art. III(e).
146. At the compact negotiation, the following discussion occurred which reinforces
the notion that the intent of the negotiators was to apportion the use of water, not the
water itself.
CHAIRMAN HOOVER: I have doubts as to the ability of the Commission to
divide the water. You can divide the use of the water, but I don't believe you
can divide the water itself. That is the assumption of an ownership in the
body of the water, not the use of water and I think there are essentially
different legal principles if I understand anything about it. I will ask Mr.
Hamele what he thinks about that.
MR. HAMELE: That is true, Mr. Chairman. There is no property right in
running water and there couldn't be any division in a compact of this kind of
the actual water, because it is only the use that is in question. It passes on,
goes down and the very water that is used in the upper division is used again
in the lower division.
Minutes, Twenty-fifth meeting of the Colorado River Comm'n, Bishop's Lodge, Santa
Fe, N.M. (Nov. 23, 1922).
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amount in excess of its ten-year delivery obligation. However, the
Compact does not include a provision for any such debit/credit
system. In fact, such accounting would violate the entire purpose of
the Compact in apportioning the right of use between the two Basins
in perpetuity, and thus, preserving a right of development in each of
the Basins.
An Upper Basin user could not capture water in a reservoir for
delivery to a use in a Lower Division state for the following reasons.
Article III(e) does not allow holding water in the Upper Basin if
needed in the Lower Basin. Furthermore, Article III(a) charges the
use of water in the Lower Basin against the Lower Basin use, and
Article III(d) counts the use as part of the Upper Basin delivery
obligation. Similarly, an Upper Basin user could not forego his use of
water and sell it to a Lower Basin user, since under the Compact, the
use and accounting of the delivery is the same. Moreover, the
Compact expressly forbids any Lower Basin water user from making a
claim on Upper Basin water. Article VIII provides that after the
Hoover Dam construction, only water stored in the Lower Basin "not
in conflict with Article III" could satisfy a claim of an appropriator in
the Lower Basin.'47 All other rights are satisfied "solely from the water
apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate."'
The Compact, ratified by each of the state legislatures and
consented to by Congress, effectuates a legislative equitable
apportionment and is federal law. 9 As such, it removes water as an
article of interstate commerce, 5 ' and thereby not only limits the
authority of each state to confer rights in excess of its limitations, but
also authorizes each state to enforce its terms.'
Therefore, the
limitations of the Compact constrain the authority of each state to
create water rights. No Upper Division state could confer upon any
appropriator the right to sell, lease, or transfer the right to use water
for use in a Lower Division state and have that right charged as a use in
the Upper Basin, because such a right cannot exist under the terms of
the Compact. Any other state signatory to the Compact could sue the
state attempting to create such a right, or could sue the United States
if the United States attempted to effectuate such a right by accounting
or delivery through federal reservoirs.'
Similarly, the states could not
agree to such a fundamental change in Compact accounting without
amending the Compact and obtaining congressional consent.
147. Compact, supra note 1, § 37-61-101, art. VIII.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104-05
(1938).
150. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d. 568, 569-70
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
151. Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 102.
152. Under federal law, the United States consents to suits by states in the event any
officer or agency of the United States does not comply with the compacts, Mexican
Treaty, the Decree in Arizona v. California,or the Colorado River Storage Project Act.
See 43 U.S.C. § 620m (1994).
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Interbasin Sales and Transfers Would Also Violate the Upper
Colorado River Compact

The Upper Colorado River Compact apportions among the Upper
Division States the consumptive use apportioned to the Upper Basin
by the Colorado River Compact. As a result, one can make a parallel
analysis of the Upper Colorado River Compact to the Colorado River
Compact. Article I states the purposes of the Upper Colorado River
Compact include "the equitable division and apportionment of the use
of the waters of the Colorado river system, the use of which was
apportioned in perpetuity to the upper basin by the Colorado [R]iver
[C]ompact."'53 Article III(a) (2) then makes the actual apportionment,
which is of "consumptive use per annum of the quantities resulting
from the application of... percentages to the total quantity of
consumptive use per annum appropriated in perpetuity to and
available for use each year by upper basin under the Colorado [R]iver
[C] ompact. " '
If an Upper Basin state attempted to create a water right for use in
the Lower Basin, it could not argue that it was consumptively using its
apportionment, since the use would not occur in that state, or even in
the Upper Basin.
Article III(b) (1) and (2) state that the
apportionment is of "man-made depletions" and that "[b]eneficial use
is the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use." 5 ' Under
Article VI, depletions are determined by the "inflow-outflow method"
measured at Lee Ferry. Therefore, a state could not create a legal
fiction of a use in that state if consumption did not occur in such
state. 'Nor could a state forego the use of water under its
apportionment, but have the actual use occur in the Lower Basin,
since the state would not make such use consumptively in the Upper
Basin, and the inflow-outflow method could not account for the use at
Lee Ferry.
Article IX of the Upper Colorado River Compact accounts for the
use of water in the state of actual use by providing that the
construction of a reservoir for the storage and delivery of water to a
consumptive use in a lower Upper Basin state is specifically
contemplated, but that such use must be accounted as "within the
apportionment to such lower state made by [the Colorado River
Compact]."'"7 Article IX goes on to provide that any such reservoir is
subject to the rights of water users within that upper state to put the
full amount of that state's Upper Basin allocation to use.
The clear intent of the Upper Colorado River Compact is to put as
153. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra note 74, § 37-62-101, art. I (emphasis
added).
154. Id. § 37-62-101, art. Ill(a)(2).
155. Id. § 37-62-101, art. III(b)(1), (2).
156. Id. § 37-62-101, art. VI.
157. Id. § 37-62-101, art. IX. Although nonconsumptive uses such as instream flows
and power production are recognized under state law, such uses are not accounted for
under either the Colorado River Compact or the Upper Colorado River Compact.
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much of the Upper Basin water to use in the Upper Basin as possible,
before meeting the delivery obligation to the Lower Basin under the
Colorado River Compact. To this end, Article III(b) (3) allows a state
to exceed its apportionment, if such use will not deprive another state
of the use if its apportionment. Therefore, no one state in the Upper
Basin has authority to shepard water through, or prevent the use of
such water by, another Upper Basin state. Article XV(b) specifically
reserves to each of the states the authority to regulate the
"appropriation, use and control of water, the consumptive use
of
which is apportioned and available to such state by this compact."1 58 As
a result, no way exists for a water user in one Upper Basin state to
either store and release water, or forego the consumptive use of water,
and guarantee to a Lower Basin purchaser that the water will be
deliverable to Lee Ferry or that another Upper Basin state will not
consume the water.
3. Interbasin Sales and Transfers Would Violate the Terms of the
Decree of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California
For any interbasin water market to operate, the Upper Basin needs
to generate water, account for it, and transport it through the Upper
Basin to the Lower Basin, and then account and deliver it from Lake
Mead to the ultimate state of use and to the ultimate user in the Lower
Basin. An Upper Basin-to-Lower Basin marketing plan could not
accomplish this necessary accounting and delivery in the Lower Basin
under the Decree in Arizona v. California.
In Arizona v. California,the Supreme Court based its reasoning not
upon the 1922 Colorado River Compact or the Doctrine of Equitable
Apportionment, but upon the power of Congress in the enactment of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("Act"). The Decree makes clear that
once water passes Lee Ferry, it loses any legal characterization it may
have otherwise had, and becomes "mainstream water," "controlled by
the United States." 5 " Moreover, the Court held that the Act precludes
any use of water from the mainstream except pursuant to contract with
the United States and subject only to the allocations in the Act."6 The
158. Upper Colorado River Compact, supra note 74, § 37-62-101, art. XV(b).
159. Article I(B) of the Decree defines "[m]ainstream" as "the mainstream of the
Colorado River downstream from Lee Ferry within the United States, including the
reservoirs thereon." Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 340 (1964). Article I(E) of
the Decree defines "[wiater controlled by the United States" as "water in Lake Mead,
Lake Mohave, Lake Havasu and all other water in the mainstream below Lee Ferry and
within the United States." Id
160. The Court stated:
Having undertaken this beneficial project, Congress, in several provisions of
the Act, made it clear that no one should use mainstream waters save in strict
compliance with the scheme set up by the Act.... To emphasize that water
could be obtained from the Secretary alone, § 5 further declared, "No person
shall have or be entitled to have the use for any purpose of the water
stored.., except by contract made as herein stated."... Moreover, contrary
to the Master's conclusion, we hold that the Secretary in choosing between
users within each State and in settling the terms of his contracts is not bound
by these sections to follow state law.
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Decree strictly enjoins both the Secretary of the Interior and each of
the Lower Division States from acting otherwise.
Therefore, an Upper Basin water user cannot possibly enter into a
contract for the delivery of water to a Lower Basin water user, since the
Lower Basin user can contract only with the United States.
Additionally, water use in each of the Lower Division States would still
be subject to the overall apportionments set forth in the Decree.
Thus, for example, total California mainstream consumptive water
uses in a "normal" year could not exceed 4.4 m.a.f., unless authorized
and determined by the Secretary of Interior.16 ' As a result, no utility
exists in a Lower Basin user seeking to purchase Upper Basin water,
because the total allowable water use from the mainstream in the
Lower Basin is only pursuant to federal contract and within the
limitation of use established by the federal government for that state.
A similar analysis exists as to every aspect of the Law of the River.
For example, the operational constraints established in the Colorado
River Basin Project Act provide strict limitations on the purposes for
which the Secretary may release water from Lake Powell. Additionally,
export statutes in the Upper Basin, for example, in the case of
Colorado, provide that Colorado and the Upper Basin credit delivery
of water to the Lower Basin against its delivery requirement.
Simply stated, an interbasin "water market" is an anathema to the
letter of and the historical and political basis for the Law of the River.
Such a market would undermine, if not destroy, the certainty of supply
and allocation negotiated in the Law of the River and the basis upon
which the states and the federal government have developed to work
toward the resolution of the issues before us today. This strong
opposition to an interbasin water market, and the resulting "water
raids" that the Lower Basin could perpetrate on the Upper Basin, is
one of the reasons Colorado has insisted California resolve its
dependence on water surplus in excess of its basic allocation in the
Lower Basin, preferably within its own state, and not by interbasin
water marketing.
XI. CONCLUSION
This article, Part I of a two part series, provides an overview of the
history of the development of the Law of the River from an Upper
Basin perspective. Through his desire to promote greater certainty
and security of water supply allocation, Colorado's negotiator, Delph
Carpenter, had several goals in mind in the drafting of the Colorado
River Compact. He sought the assurance that Colorado could develop
a defined share of the Colorado River in perpetuity, as needs and
economic conditions dictate. He sought to eliminate the operation of
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 579, 580, 586 (1963).
161. The Secretary of the Interior authorized the use of water by California in 1991
and 1992, in excess of California's basic apportionment and despite a "normal"

declaration, but on the basis that California water users would be required to repay in
a subsequent year any water so used.
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the prior appropriation doctrine applied on an interstate basis. He
sought to preserve state autonomy and sovereignty over intrastate
water appropriation and administration. He sought to avoid the threat
of interstate litigation among the states and between the states and the
federal government. Finally, he sought to create a foundation for the
comprehensive development and regulation of the Colorado River.
At its core, the Colorado River Compact provides the fundamental
allocation and assurances sought by Carpenter. Federal laws, the
Upper Basin Compact, the Mexican Treaty, and the Arizona v.
Californiadecision and Decree followed the Compact. These elements
of the Law of the River built upon the foundation laid by that initial
allocation.
In fact, it was the assurance of a secure interstate allocation that
allowed the states and the federal government to move forward with
the development of the great public works on the Colorado River, and
the operational mechanisms that run those works.
Although
uncertainties remain, some not understood by the original Compact
negotiators and others left intentionally for future resolution, the
Compact and laws that followed it provide a framework for the
resolution of those issues. Operational changes made to system
reservoirs in response to the Endangered Species Act and the Grand
Canyon Protection Act illustrate the flexibility within the fundamental
allocation.
Today, one of the most important issues on the Colorado River
remains California's continued reliance on surplus water in excess of
its basic apportionment. Part II of this article will discuss the
chronology of the negotiations between the states, federal
government, and Indian tribes concerning the potential resolution of
this problem. In these negotiations, the Upper Basin States have
attempted to maintain the foundation of security of perpetual
allocation of supply and the protection of their ability to use and
develop water under the Law of the River. The most important Upper
Basin principle is that the resolution of the California issue should
take place in the Lower Basin, in a manner consistent with the Law of
the River, and without impairing the Upper Basin's ability to exercise
its right to consume water in the Upper Basin as economic need
dictates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Floating on Colorado streams ranks as a popular sport with
individuals and groups who use various watercraft ranging from kayaks
to large pneumatic rafts. This activity utilizes streams flowing through
both public and private land, despite a Colorado Supreme Court
decision holding the public has no right to use waters overlying private
lands for recreational purposes without the landowner's consent.
Some proponents of a right to float through private land contend a
statute defining "premises" for purposes of criminal trespass, or even
an Attorney General's Opinion interpreting it, created an affirmative
right to float so long as the floater does not touch the bottom or
banks. Others insist that a right to float exists under federal law. Still
others believe they should have the right to float any stream that can
tJohn R. Hifl,Jr., is Of Counsel with the firm Bratton & McClow, L.L.C., in Gunnison,
Colorado. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1958, received
his M.S. in Civil Engineering from Stanford University in 1963, and received his J.D.
from George Washington University in 1978. Before entering private practice in 1992,
Mr. Hill was a trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental and
Natural Resources Division. He has also served as Assistant Director of Civil Works,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Daniel S. Young, a third-year
law student at the University of Denver College of Law, who researched the law on
navigability and greatly assisted in reviewing and revising this article.
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be floated.
As floating has spread progressively from large rivers like the
Colorado and Arkansas to smaller tributaries, it has caused conflicts
among the floaters, riparian landowners, and wading anglers.
Conflicts are likely to increase as demand for floating experiences
increases and shallow-draft watercraft lead to floating even smaller
streams. Where the smaller streams run through private land, floating
is more intrusive. Many landowners have built homes near the stream
because they enjoy being near the water. Some ranchers on smaller
streams with good fisheries often generate a significant portion of
their income from exclusive fishing easements. Floating these smaller
streams conflicts with angling, threatening this source of income.
Landowners also value their solitude and find their privacy invaded by
the rafters. Historically, ranchers have had to fence across streams to
manage livestock. Now they are finding their cattle fences and water
diversion structures regarded as unlawful obstacles. Law enforcement
officials in one county have threatened a rancher with arrest and
prosecution for obstructing a waterway "to which the public has
access," if he fences across the stream running through his ranch.
Many otherwise well-informed people, including some landowners
and law enforcement officials, take for granted a right to float through
private property. The expansion of floating from larger streams
flowing through long reaches of public land to smaller streams with
long reaches flowing through private land makes it imperative that the
public be informed about Colorado law regarding floating. To that
end, this article examines the Colorado Constitution, statutes, court
decisions, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the concept of navigability to
demonstrate that no affirmative right to float through private property
exists in Colorado.
II. THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION
In People v. Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court held Article XVI,
section 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not give the public the
right to use streams flowing through private land without the owner's
consent.'
Emmert and others were arrested, charged with and
convicted of criminal trespass while "tubing" on the Colorado River in
Grand County. The facts were not in dispute. Emmert and the other
defendants had floated and fished from rafts over private property on
the Colorado River and had touched the riverbed as they crossed that
property. At the landowner's request, the sheriff arrested Emmert and
the other defendants. The defendants were convicted of violating a
trespass statute that provided: "[a] person commits the crime of third
degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or upon
premises. "' Emmert appealed his conviction to the Colorado Supreme

1. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28, 1030 (Colo. 1979).
2. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-504(1) (1973) (amended 1993); Emmert, 597 P.2d at
1026.
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Court. The court noted the general rule of property law in Colorado
states that land underlying non-navigable streams is the subject of
private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the adjoining
lands.3 The parties had stipulated that the Colorado River was not
navigable and had not been used for any kind of trade or commerce.
The defendants did not challenge the adjacent landowner's ownership
of the riverbed.4
At the time of the defendants' arrest and conviction, the state had
no statutory definition of "premises." The court applied an ancient
common law rule "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," which means
that the person who owns the surface controls everything above it.5
Accordingly, the court concluded ownership of the stream beds
included ownership of the space above those beds. Therefore, one
who intruded upon that space without the permission of the owner,
whether it be for fishing or for other recreational purposes such as
floating, committed a trespass.6 The court applied this rule, stating
"the ownership of the bed of a non-navigable stream vests in the owner
the exclusive right of control of everything above the stream bed,
subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions and
regulations."'
Emmert raised the defense that Article XVI, section 5 of the
Colorado Constitution8 establishes a public right to recreational use of
all waters in the state. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed,
stating, as it had earlier in Hartman v. Tresise,9 that the constitutional
provision applied to appropriation of water for beneficial use." In
other words, Article XVI, section 5 applies only to the right to make
appropriations and not to the use of the state's water for recreation or
fishing. Thus, People v. Emmert clearly enunciated the right of a
riparian landowner to exclude the public from the surface and bed of
streams overlying his land.

3. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo.
1977); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 687 (Colo. 1905); Hanlon v. Hobson, 51 P. 433,
435 (Colo. 1897)).
4. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026.
5. Id. at 1027. The court also noted the General Assembly had recognized the
same rule in 1937 by enacting section 41-1-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which
provides: "[t ] he ownership of space above the lands and waters of this state is declared
to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight
of aircraft." Id.; see COLO. REv. STAT. § 41-1-107 (2000).
6. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159
(1965)).
7. Id. at 1027.
8. This section provides: "[t]he water of every natural stream, not heretofore
appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of
the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
9. Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686 (Colo. 1905).
10. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 4

M. STATUTES
A. COLORADO REVISED STATUTES SECTION 18-4-504.5

Colorado has no statute expressly authorizing public use of any
stream flowing through private property. On the contrary, the
Colorado Supreme Court in Emmert applied the common law "ad
coelum" rule and its statutory equivalent in concluding the owner of the
bed of a non-navigable river has the exclusive right of control of
everything above the bed "subject only to constitutional and statutory
limitations, restrictions and regulations.""
In 1977, after Emmert's conviction of criminal trespass and while
his appeal pended, the General Assembly passed Colorado Revised
Statutes section 18-4-504.5, defining "premises" for purposes of
criminal trespass as follows: "[a]s used in sections 18-4-503 and 18-4504, 'premises' means real property, buildings, and other
improvements thereon, and the stream banks and beds of any
nonnavigable
fresh water streams flowing through such real
property. " "
In 1983, the Executive Director of the Department of Natural
Resources asked then Attorney General Duane Woodard for his formal
4
legal opinion on two related questions (the "Woodard Opinion").1
The first question asked whether section 18-4-504.5 exposed floaters to
criminal trespass liability if they floated through private property and
did not touch the bed or banks. The second question asked whether
section 18-4-504.5 "authorize[s] adjoining landowners to prohibit or
otherwise control such floating or boating." 5 Woodard answered both
questions in the negative.
In answering the first question, Woodard examined legislative
history. '" He concluded the General Assembly, by defining "premises"
in a manner inconsistent with the "ad coelum" doctrine, effectively
repealed, for purposes of the criminal trespass statute, the common
law rule the Colorado Supreme Court applied in affirming Emmert's
conviction. Woodard then concluded it was not a criminal trespass to
float through private property so long as the floater does not touch the
bed or banks. Throughout his analysis, Woodard was careful to limit
the applicability of section 18-4-504.5 to criminal trespass. 8
Unfortunately, Woodard's answer to the second question was
ambiguous. Woodard stated that "[b]ecause section 18-4-504.5 speaks

11. M at 1027.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 184-504.5 (2000).
14. Purpose and effect of C.R.S. 1973, 18-4-504.5 (1978 repl. vol. 8), Colo.Op. Att'y
Gen. No. ONR8303042/KW 1 (Aug. 31, 1983) (hereinafter Woodard Opinion].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 4-6.
18. Id. at 1-8.
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to criminal trespass and does not address civil remedies, it cannot be
viewed as authorizing the owners of stream banks and beds to prohibit
or otherwise control the use for floating of waters passing over their
lands." 9 This language is susceptible of several interpretations, the
most logical being that the landowner has no authority to charge the
floater with criminal trespass, but still has civil remedies available.
Alternatively, the statement is a non sequitur. The first part of the
sentence about civil remedies is a correct statement. However, if
Woodard intended to say that the legislature has to authorize property
owners to exclude others from their property, then the opinion is
wrong. The right to exclude others is inherent in the ownership of
property. 20 "The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right
to exclude others. That is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'" 2 The
legislature does not have to grant the right to exclude others and
cannot take that right away without constitutional consequences.22
Attorney General Woodard would have been correct had he simply
stated that, because section 18-4-504.5 does not address civil remedies,
those remedies remain unaffected.
Additionally, those who rely on the Woodard Opinion as authority
for an affirmative right to float ignore the fact that the issue was not
presented to Woodard. Since the opinion contains no discussion on
whether an affirmative right to float exists, it cannot be relied upon as
a basis for an affirmative right to float.
The unfortunate consequence of Woodard's response to the
second question is that landowners and floaters alike have been misled
into believing that riparian landowners are powerless to confrol or
stop floating through their property. Some even regard the Woodard
Opinion as if it were the equivalent of a court decision or statute. On
the contrary, an attorney general's opinion is given only "respectful
consideration" and a court addressing the issue must make its own
independent analysis. 3 Woodard's answer to the second question
cannot withstand even the most superficial analysis.
In Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that one who
intrudes upon the space above the surface of the land without the
permission of the owner commits a trespass.24 The same conduct can

19. Id. at 7.
20. College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999).
21. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
22. Justice Carrigan, in his dissenting opinion in Emmert, notes that the majority has
"painted the state into a corner" by creating a vested property right in stream water.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Colo. 1979) (Carrigan, J., dissenting). The
consequence is that the General Assembly "cannot give the public recreational access
to rivers without taking away from landowners their newly recognized property
interests and paying them 'just compensation.'" Id.
23. Colonial Bank v. Colo. Fin. Servs. Bd., 961 P.2d 579, 584 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
24. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 159
(1965)).

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 4

be both a crime and a tort." Therefore, the civil remedies available to
the landowner would be those available for a civil trespass: (1)
damages," and (2) injunction where the trespass is continuing or the
threat of continuing trespass exists.
The Colorado Supreme Court's trespass analysis in Emmert has
been criticized for its reliance on the "ad coelum" doctrine. 28 The basis
of the criticism stems from the United States Supreme Court's
statement in United States v. Causby that the "ad coelum" doctrine has
no place in the modem world."" However, in the very
same opinion,
the Supreme Court stated "it is obvious that if the landowner is to have
full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere."" The Supreme
Court held that "[t]he landowner owns at least as much of the space
above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land.""' Thus, the Supreme Court may have drastically reduced the
reach of the "ad coelum" doctrine, but it did reaffirm the landowner's
ownership of all airspace above the land that the landowner can use in
connection with his land. Therefore, Causby supports rather than
undercuts the Colorado Supreme Court's trespass analysis in Emmert.
In addition to the fact that section 18-4-504.5 does not speak to
civil remedies as Woodard correctly noted, the normal rules of
statutory construction militate against reading that section to deprive a
riparian landowner of the civil remedies for trespass in existence at the
time of the Emmert decision. First, the application of the definition of
premises in section 184504.5 is, by its terms, limited to "sections 18-4503 and 18-4-504," second and third degree criminal trespass,
respectively."2 Because the statute is clearly on its face limited in scope
to criminal trespass, resorting to other rules of statutory construction is
inappropriate.3 Second, even if section 18-4-504.5 is not clear on its
face, it must not be presumed to alter the common law unless it does
so expressly or by necessary implication. 4 Third, Colorado Revised
Statutes section 41-1-107, which the Emmert court held was the basis of
a riparian landowner's exclusive right to control everything above the
3
stream bed, is still included in the StatutesY.
If section 18-4-504.5 is an
abrogation of civil remedies rather than a decriminalization of

25.

21 AM.JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 21 (1998).
26. Van Wyk v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 996 P.2d 193, 197 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999),
cert. granted, (Apr.10, 2000).
27. Cobai v. Young, 679 P.2d 121,124 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
28. See, e.g., Richard Gast, Note, People v. Emmert: A Step Backward for Recreational
Water Use in Colorado,52 U. COLO. L. REv. 247, 250 (1981).
29. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); see also Gast, supranote 28.
30. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
31. Id.
32. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-4-503 to -504.5 (2000).
33. SeeJones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo. 1992).
34. City of Colo. Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1055 (Colo. 1998).
35. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 41-1-107 (2000); People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027
(Colo. 1979).
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floating, then it must have repealed by implication Colorado Revised
Statutes section 41-1-107. "[A]n intent to repeal by implication to be
36
effective must appear clearly, manifestly, and with cogent force." No
such intent is apparent. Fourth, courts will "infer no abrogation of a
"
common law right of action absent clear legislative intent. "
Therefore, a court is unlikely to interpret section 18-4-504.5 as a
deprivation of a riparian landowner's right to bring a civil action for
trespass.
Furthermore, the court in Emmert acknowledged the State had
passed section 18-4-504.5 and, in the very next sentence, held, "the
public has no right to the use of waters overlying private lands for
3
recreational purposes without the consent of the owner." 1 Section 184-504.5 was not an issue in deciding Emmert's appeal because it was
passed after his conviction. Had the court believed section 18-4-504.5
abrogated the landowner's civil remedies for trespass, or created an
affirmative right, it is unlikely the court would have stated its holding
so unequivocally.
If section 18-4-504.5 does abrogate the civil remedy for trespass, it
might be unconstitutional because it denies riparian landowners the
ability to protect their right to exclude floaters in court-a right
confirmed by Emmert. The Equality of Justice provision of the Bill of
Rights in the Colorado Constitution guarantees a right of access to the
courts, stating: " [ c] ourts ofjustice shall be open to every person, and a
speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or
character; and right and justice should be administered without sale,
denial or delay."3 In any event, when the General Assembly abrogates
common law remedies, it must provide a statutory remedy."
If section 18-4-504.5 did grant the public the right to float through
private property after Emmert held there was no such right, then this
4
grant operates as a taking of private property for public use. ' In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a
permit issued by the Corps of Engineers, which contained a condition
that made previously private waters open to public use, was a
compensatory taking. 42 Thus, under Kaiser Aetna, if section 18-4-504.5
granted a right to float, this grant constitutes a compensable taking of
private property.
If section 18-4-504.5 authorized the public to float through private
property, then it authorized a permanently recurring physical invasion
36. Prop. Tax Adm'r v. Prod. Geophysical Servs., Inc., 860 P.2d 514, 518 (Colo.
1993).
37. Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 74 (Colo. 1998)
(citations omitted).
38. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029-30.
39. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6.
40. See Finn v. Indus. Comm'n of Colo., 437 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo. 1968)
(abrogation of common law remedies constitutional where substitute statutory remedy
provided); accord Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1306 (Colo. 1982).
41. SeeKaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175-78 (1979).
42. Id. at 180.
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of that property. Courts have long considered physical invasions of
private property authorized or perpetrated by governmental entities to
be takings. The United States Supreme Court considered such an
issue in Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TV Corp." Loretto involved a
New York statute that required a building owner to permit a cable
television ("CATV") company to install its CATV facilities on his
property without payment from the company in excess of a reasonable
amount as determined by a state commission.
The Court
characterized the CATV facilities as a minor, but permanent, physical
occupation of the building owner's property. The New York Court of
Appeals had applied a balancing of interests analysis to uphold the
statute because it benefited the community and served a legitimate
police power purpose." The Court reversed, noting "[t]he one
incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation)
seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly' use, or 'permanently'
occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership." 5 In conclusion, the Court reiterated that "a
permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a
unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that
a court might ordinarily examine. " 4 Therefore, if the General
Assembly actually created a right to float by enacting section 18-4504.5, it has potentially exposed the State to liability for payment of
just compensation to private riparian landowners statewide for
opening to public use what Emmert held was private land.
The General Assembly enacted section 18-4-504.5 in reaction to
Emmert. As noted above, the statute is limited to defining "premises"
for the criminal trespass statutes. It contains no express grant of access
to the streams. Defining a crime and creating a public easement are
fundamentally different things. Perhaps the General Assembly heeded
Justice Carrigan's admonition that the Emmert majority had "painted
the state into a corner," making it impossible for the General Assembly
to create a public right to float without compensating riparian
landowners." In any event, the prospect of the State compensating
riparian landowners statewide, coupled with the arguments presented
above, makes the likelihood of a court finding that section 18-4-504.5
creates a public right to float through private property highly
improbable.

43.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).

44. Id. at 423-26.
45. Id. at 427 n.5 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 432; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)
(placing physical invasions in the category of regulatory action, which requires just
compensation without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced by the
regulation).
47. See supranote 22.
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B. OTHER STATUTES
In Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court found several statutes
implicitly recognized a riparian landowner's right to exclude the
public from streams running through his or her land: (1) Colorado
Revised Statutes section 33-1-112(g) (1973)48 (giving the wildlife
commission the power to enter into agreements with landowners for
public hunting and fishing areas); (2) Colorado Revised Statutes
section 33-41-101 (1973) (stating that Article 41 of Title 33, which
limits the liability of landowners who make land and water areas
available for recreational purposes, is an implicit recognition of the
landowner's right to close to public access the streams running over
his land); and (3) Colorado Revised Statutes section 33-6-123(1)
(1973)'9 (making it a misdemeanor to enter onto private land to hunt
or fish without permission) &
Some floating interests believe Colorado Revised Statutes section
18-9-107 implies the right to float because it makes it a crime to
obstruct a waterway. This statute provides:
[a]n individual or corporation commits an offense if without legal
privilege such individual or corporation intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly... [o]bstructs a highway, street, sidewalk, railway,
waterway, building entrance, elevator, aisle, stairway, or hallway to
which the public or a substantial group of the public has access or any
other place5 1 used
conveyances.

for the

passage

of persons,

vehicles,

or

On its face, the statute does not create any rights; it simply declares
illegal the obstruction of any waterway "to which the public.., has
access."52 There are obviously reaches of waterways flowing through
public land, such as the Colorado and Arkansas Rivers, to which the
public does have access. That fact, alone, provides ample reason for
the legislature to have included waterways in the above statute.
However, as this article demonstrates, no basis in Colorado law exists
for the public to have access to any waterway other than those
waterways flowing through public land. Therefore, the General
Assembly had no legal basis to make the obstruction of a private
waterway a crime, thereby making a rancher a criminal for fencing
across a stream to keep cattle from straying off his or her land.
Indeed, some law enforcement authorities have threatened
Codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-1-105(1) (g) (2000).
49. Codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-6-116 (2000).
50. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Colo.1979).
51. COLO. Rzv. STAT. § 18-9-107(1)(a) (2000).
52. Id.
53. In addition, the General Assembly had no legal basis to make the rancher's
neighbor a criminal for building a fence to keep the rancher's cattle from entering his
or her land by way of the stream, as the law requires maintaining a fence in order for
the neighbor to recover damages caused by livestock straying onto the neighbor's
land. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 35-46-101(1),-102 (2000).
48.
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landowners with arrest and prosecution if they build fences across
streams flowing through their land that obstruct the passage of
floaters. This threat is probably idle because securing a conviction
would depend upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the public
has access to the specific reach of the specific stream involved and that
the landowner is not privileged to block access.
Colorado Revised Statutes section 30-30-102, passed in 1974, gives
the board of county commissioners a right of access to any natural
stream to remove obstacles for flood control purposes only, and then
under very limited and specified circumstances.Y This statute clearly
contemplates that the streams are private. Thus, while a variety of
implications may exist in the statutes discussed above, one cannot
reasonably read any of these statutes as granting a right in the public
to float through private property.
IV. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The Public Trust Doctrine declares that the state holds navigable
waters and the lands underneath them in trust for the people of the
state.5 This doctrine is rooted in ancient Roman law and evolved
under English common law into the concept of the public trust.5 6 The
original purpose of the doctrine was to preserve naviable waters for
the public for navigation, commerce, and fishing.
In National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
extended the doctrine to protect recreational and ecological values by
limiting diversions from non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters.
Of most interest to Colorado, however, is the California Supreme
Court's holding that water rights previously granted can be challenged
and reevaluated because of the Public Trust Doctrine. 9
Proponents of public access for floating and wading often cite
Montana's stream access law6 as an example Colorado should emulate.
In 1985, the Montana Legislature enacted its stream access law, which
provides that "all surface waters that are capable of recreational use
may be so used by the public without regard to the ownership of the
land underlying the waters. "6 The basis of the legislation was the
Public Trust Doctrine, as discussed in Montana Coalition for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran. In that case, the Montana Supreme Court
found no taking occurred because, under the Public Trust Doctrine
54. COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-30-102 (2000).
55. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
56. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983).
57. Id. at 719.
58. Id. at 719, 721.
59. Id. at 730; see Stephen H. Leonhardt & Brent A. Waite, The Public Trust Doctrine:
What It Is, Where It Came From, and Why ColoradoDoesn't (and Shouldn't) Have One, COLO.
WATER RESOURCES RES. INST., INFO. SERIES No. 78, 190, 205-07 (1995).
60. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1999).
61. Id. § 23-2-302(1).
62. Mont. Coalition For Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167-68 (Mont.
1984).
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and state constitution, any surface waters capable of use for
recreational purposes are available to the public for those purposes,
irrespective of streambed ownership."
64
Colorado has never applied the Public Trust Doctrine to water.
Consequently, there is no basis in Colorado for a stream access law to
ignore bed ownership and taking issues. As popular as the Public
Trust Doctrine may be with environmentalists, its application to water
use in Colorado is unlikely because of the potential adverse impact on
existing water rights under the prior appropriation system. 65
Recognition of the Public Trust Doctrine would place owners and
users of water at risk because a public trust would undermine the
priority system by subjecting existing rights to curtailment or
revocation. 6 Furthermore, in Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court
declined to apply the Public Trust Doctrine as a basis for a right to
float.61 One Colorado lawyer, in an article lamenting the lack of
environmental protection provisions in Colorado water law, titled the
public trust as "The Two Little Words That Can't Be Spoken."6
In 1994, 1995, and 1996, advocates of the Public Trust Doctrine
proposed a ballot initiative to amend Article XVI, section 5, of the
Colorado Constitution 69 to adopt the Public Trust Doctrine. 0 Each
time the initiative failed to qualify. The climate for the Public Trust
Doctrine in Colorado is hostile, and likely to remain so, because it is
widely perceived as antithetical to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Moreover, retroactive application or adoption of the Public Trust
Doctrine for water could itself raise the specter of takings problems.71
V. THE CONCEPT OF NAVIGABILITY
In any question of navigability, the preliminary step is to determine
whether to apply federal or state law. Federal law is used to determine
whether the federal government can regulate the waterway, whether
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction applies, and of most interest here,
to determine title to the stream bed. The term "navigable" has
different meanings for different purposes. As the Supreme Court has

63. Id. at 171.
64. See Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (Colorado Supreme Court has
never recognized the public trust doctrine with respect to water).
65. See generally GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in
Water Quality Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 855-56 (1989) (criticizing attempts to use
the Public Trust Doctrine to reduce existing water rights).
66. See Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 59, at 212-13.
67. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
68. Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and EnvironmentalProtection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.
70, 77 (1999).
69. Seesupranote8.
70. In re Proposed Initiative "1996-6," 917 P.2d 1277, 1278-79 (Colo. 1996); In re
Proposed Initiative "Public Rights In Waters II," 898 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Colo. 1995); In
re Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877 P.2d 321, 324 (Colo. 1994).
71. See Leonhardt & Waite, supra note 59, at 210-11.
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noted, "any reliance upon judicial precedent must be predicated upon
careful appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability'
was invoked in a particular case." n
For purposes of public use of waters, states may adopt different
and less stringent tests of navigability." Some states define navigability
for public use based on the state constitution or statutory law.74 Some
states recognize a right to float if the stream accommodates
recreational watercraft, that is "whatever floats your boat."75 Colorado,
however, has not adopted a definition of navigability for any purpose.
To the contrary, the Colorado Supreme Court long ago stated "[t]he
natural streams of the state are nonnavigable within its limits.""
Therefore, if a right to float through private property exists in
Colorado based on the concept of navigability, it must rest on federal
law.
A. FEDERAL LAW-NAVIGABILITY IN FACT

Uses of the term "navigable" in federal law can be confusing.
"Navigable" in the federal sense dictates whether the federal
government can regulate a waterway under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution," the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899,78 the Clean Water Act,9 or the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts."0
Federal uses of the term
"navigable" are best understood by considering the concept of
"navigability in fact" as originally defined by the United States
Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball."'
The issue in The Daniel Ball was whether the Grand River in
Michigan was navigable water within the meaning of the acts of
Congress regulating navigation.82 The Supreme Court disposed of the
English common law notion that only those waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide are navigable waters. After noting there are rivers
in the United States navigable for hundreds of miles above the
72. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171 (1979) (citation omitted).
73. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655
(1927)).
74. See, e.g., S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295,
1297-98 (Idaho 1974) (under Idaho statute, streams which will float logs over six
inches in diameter, or are capable of being navigated by oar or motor propelled small
craft are navigable); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961) (under
Wyoming's Constitution, title to all waters is in the state, and the state has an easement
for public right-of-way through natural channels).
75. See, e.g., Chris A. Shafer, Public Rights in Michigan's Streams: Toward a Modern
Definition of Navigability, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 9, 41 (1999).
76. In reGerman Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913).
77. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, ci. 3.
78. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1994).
79. Id. at §§ 1251-1387.
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
81. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
82. Id. at 558-59.
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influence of the tide, the Court held:
[t]hose rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water.

Thus, The Daniel Ball proscribes the test for navigability in fact for
public use. Courts apply The Daniel Ball test as the basic test of
navigability.'
B. NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

In defining "navigable waters of the United States," The DanielBall
Court stated:
[t]hey constitute navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued
highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other
States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such
commerce is conducted by water.85
Thus, interstate or international use or susceptibility of such use makes

a waterbody that is navigable in fact a "navigable water of the United
States."
Over time, the Supreme Court has expanded and clarified the
definition of "navigable waters of the United States" to include streams
which have been used in the past but are no longer used,86 or which
are susceptible of use, with improvements, to transport interstate or
foreign commerce. Thus, "navigable waters of the United States" is a
term of art defining the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts,
jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors

Act of 1899,8 and jurisdiction under other acts of Congress using the
term.
Although courts make conclusive determinations of
navigability, 9 the Corps of Engineers' administrative definition of
"navigable waters of the United States" reads as follows:
Navigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 563.
SeeUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940).
The Daniel Ball 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1921).
AppalachianElec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 407-08.
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1994).
33 C.F.R. § 329.3 (2000).

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 4

interstate or foreign commerce. A determination of navigability,
once made, applies laterally over the entire surface of the waterbody,
and is not extinguished bo later actions or events which impede or
destroy navigable capacity.
The Corps of Engineers classifies the Colorado River downstream of
Grand Junction, and the Navajo Reservoir, as a "navigable water[s] of
the United States."9 These classifications appear to be administrative
determinations as no court decisions to date so hold. No other
"navigable waters of the United States" exist in Colorado."
C. THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
"Navigable waters of the United States" are normally subject to the
navigation servitude.93
The navigation servitude is a dominant
servitude pursuant to which the United States may alter the stream or
do other things that would ordinarily be an invasion of private
property rights without payment ofjust compensation. 4 The Supreme
Court explained:
The dominant power of the federal Government, as has been
repeatedly held, extends to the entire bed of a stream, which includes
the lands below ordinary high-water mark. The exercise of the power
within these limits is not an invasion of any private property right in
such lands for which the United States must make compensation. The
damage sustained results not from a taking of the riparian owner's
property in the stream bed, but from the lawful exercise of a power to
which that property has always been subject.
The navigational
servitude expresses the notion that the
determination "whether a taking has occurred must take into
consideration the important public interest in the flow of interstate
waters that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting
public navigation. " 6 However, where private interests have made a
waterbody navigable for interstate commerce at considerable cost, the
federal government may not require that the waterbody be open to the
public without payment ofjust compensation.97
The term "navigation servitude" often is used incorrectly, as if it
were synonymous with a public right of access. Streams subject to the
90. Id. § 329.4.
91. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Sacramento Dist., Waterways within Sacramento

District

Regulatory

Boundaries,

http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/cespk-

co/regulatory/navigable.html.
92. Telephone Interview with Anita Culp, Albuquerque District, U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs (Jan. 8, 2001).
93. Se generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
94. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).

95. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592,
596-97 (1941).
96. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
97. Id. at 179-80.
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navigation servitude, that is "navigable waters of the United States," are
open for public use, unless they fall within the Kaiser Aetna type of
exception discussed in the preceding paragraph. 9 The converse,
however, does not necessarily follow. There are streams that may be
open for public use under state law" or intrastate waters navigable for
title purposes that are not "navigable waters of the United States"
because they are not used or susceptible of use in interstate
commerce."' Without the interstate commerce component, there is
no navigation servitude.' In any event, the navigation servitude is of
very limited applicability in Colorado because the only "navigable
waters of the United States" in Colorado are the Colorado River
downstream of Grand Junction and the Navajo Reservoir.
D. NAVIGABLE WATERS

In contrast to "navigable waters of the United States," the Clean
Water Act defines the term "navigable waters" as "the waters of the
United States."'0 2 Courts have construed "navigable waters" ve7y
broadly, holding intermittent streams to be "navigable waters.
However, a very recent Supreme Court decision may signal a retreat
from this broad interpretation. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court found the
Corps of Engineers' regulations defining "navigable waters" as applied
to some isolated ponds used by migratory waterfowl exceeded the
authority granted to the Corps under section 404(a) of the Clean
Water Act. 1 4 The regulation defined "waters of the United States" to
include a long list of intrastate waters "the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce. " "'
The Court found "nothing approaching a clear statement from
Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned°6 sand and
gravel pit," even though it was used by migratory waterfowl.'
The Corps' definition of "waters of the United States," that is
"navigable waters," for purposes of regulating the discharge of
dredged or fill material pursuant to section 404(a) of the Clean Water
Act,' deals exclusively with the Corps' jurisdiction under that Act.

98. Id. at 172-73.
99. See supra note 73.
100. See supra note 86.
101. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
103. Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding
occasional surface flow at times of heavy rainfall enough to be navigable); United
States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding stream located
entirely in one county navigable when it is not navigable in fact and transports no
goods).
104. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Couny v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.
675, 684 (2001).
105. Id. at 678 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) (1999)).
106. Id. at 684.
107. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
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Therefore, the Corps' definition has no applicability in determining
public access to water bodies.
E. NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE UNDER THE EQUAL FOOTING DOcTRINE

As new states joined the Union, each received title to the lands
underlying navigable waters under the Equal Footing Doctrine.' 8 The
Federal Government held such lands in trust for the future states, to
be granted to each new state upon admission to the Union on an
"equal footing" with the other states.'
The law is settled that lands
underlying navigable waters within each state belong to the state as
sovereign, and the state can use and dispose of them as it sees fit,
subject to Congress's paramount power to control the waters for
navigation and commerce."0 Consequently, if any streams in Colorado
meet the test of navigability for purposes of title, the state owns the
underlying land and the public would have access to the stream for
floating and other purposes subject to whatever regulations the state
imposes.
Whether a stream is navigable for the purpose of determining title
to the bed is a federal question."' In United States v. Holt State Bank, the
Supreme Court summarized the federal rule for determining whether
a body of water is navigable for title purposes.
The rule long since approved by this Court in applying the
Constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes
which are navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further that
navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such
use is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or
flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation,
but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its natural and
ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce."'

Note that the test of navigability for title purposes is The Daniel Ball
"navigability in fact" definition. However, the type of commerce
required to meet the navigability for title test is intrastate commerce. '
To determine navigability for title, the Court limits the finding of
navigability to the date of "admission of a State to the Union.""4 Also,
the test for navigability of a waterbody is not limited to evidence of
actual commerce, but to evidence of the susceptibility of useful

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981).
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926).
Id. at 55-56.
Id.at 56.
See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
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commerce.
The question of that susceptibility in the ordinary condition
of the rivers, rather than of the mere manner or extent of actual use,
is the crucial question.... The extent of existing commerce is not
the test. The evidence of the actual use of streams, and especially of
extensive and continued use for commercial purposes, may be most
persuasive, but where conditions of exploration and settlement
explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be
satisfactorily proved.

Thus, in deciding questions of navigability for title, the Supreme
Court limits the evaluation of navigability to (1) the time the state in
which the water is located was admitted to the Union, and (2) finding
the body of water was susceptible for useful commerce conducted in
customary modes of trade and travel. In doing so, the Court implicitly
requires that evidence of navigability be limited to both the type of
commerce and the type of watercraft that existed when the state was
admitted to the Union. In Utah v. United States, the Supreme Court
determined the Great Salt Lake was navigable since the Special Master
found the "Lake was physically capable of being used in its ordinary
condition as a highway for floating and affording passage to water craft
in the manner over which trade and travel was or might be conducted
in the customary modes of travel on water at that time." 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case
determining the navigability of the Gulkana River in Alaska, appears to
have expanded the limitation of useful commerce by allowing
recreational watercraft involved in the rafting industry to evidence
useful commerce." 7 The court noted, however, that both parties
agreed the principal uses of the Gulkana had always been recreational,
and evidence of "watercraft customary for the River's use at statehood
included powered boats with a load capacity of approximately 1,000
lbs."1
Considering this evidence, the court reasoned that "the
watercraft customary at statehood could have at least supported
commercial activity of the type carried on today, with minor
modifications due to a more limited load capacity and rudimentary
technology."" 9 Therefore, even though the court considered evidence
of commercial rafting in a navigability for title analysis, the type of
activity from which the commerce was derived both existed and was
supportable by the type of watercraft used on the Gulkana at the time
Alaska became a state in 1959. Such is probably not the case in
Colorado. It is very unlikely that any commercial recreational rafting
occurred in Colorado in 1876, when Colorado achieved statehood.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931).
Id. at 12.
Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 4

Another factor distinguishing the Gulkana River from the streams
flowing through private property in Colorado is that the Gulkana
flowed through federal public land. 20 The Gulkana River dispute
involved neither private parties nor private property. In contrast, if
courts were to relate back to 1876 the present day use of Colorado's
streams for recreational floating, and hold these streams navigable for
title purposes, the relation back would effectively divest riparian
property owners of property they and their predecessors have
possessed, used productively, and paid taxes on since the land was
settled and patented in the good faith belief they owned the beds of
the streams. Furthermore, such action would trivialize the whole
concept of navigability for title because many of the streams in
Colorado would qualify if present use for recreational boating could
be related back to 1876.
A widely held belief is that a stream's ability to float a log makes the
stream navigable. However, the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. held logs, poles, and
rafts that floated during high water insufficient evidence of
navigability. 2' The Court applied The Daniel Ball navigability in fact
test, adding,
[i] tis not, however,... "every small creek in which a fishing skiff or
gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed
navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navigable stream,

it must be generally
and commonly useful to some purpose of trade
22
or agriculture.'

To further place the standard for navigability for title purposes in a
local perspective, the Supreme Court has held some parts of the
Colorado and Green Rivers in Utah navigable for title purposes and
other parts of both rivers not navigable.' 2 - In determining whether a
useful channel for commerce existed, the Court considered evidence
of actual use, as well as the magnitude and timing of discharge (flow),
depth, gradient, rapids, and other obstacles to navigation. 24 The
reaches declared 125not navigable were those containing high and
dangerous rapids.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held no navigable streams exist
in Colorado. 126 Those cases, however, did not apply the navigability for
120. This distinction is apparent from the facts. The district court set aside the
conveyance from the United States to an Alaska native corporation. Id. at 1403.
121. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899)
(finding the Rio Grande not navigable throughout its course in New Mexico).
122. Id. at 698-99 (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 442 (1874)).
123. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1931).
124. Id.
at 77-81.
125. Id.at 80.
126. In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1914) ("The natural
streams of the state are nonnavigable within its limits."); Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P.
220, 222 (Colo. 1912) ("[Tlhe natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable
within its territorial limits."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. City & County
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title test proscribed by the United States Supreme Court in Holt State
Bank, or any other test for that matter.2 7 Other Colorado cases note in
passing that certain rivers are not navigable. 2 The United States
Supreme Court has also made such observations in passing.'2 Because
navigability of streams is a matter of general knowledge, courts can
and do take judicial notice of navigability or non-navigability of
streams in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, Stockman v. Leddy
and In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co. probably reflect the state of
general knowledge in Colorado in 1912 and 1914, respectively. At the
very least, they indicate that Colorado has not elected to adopt its own
definition of navigability. Furthermore, the Colorado Supreme Court
and other Colorado courts believe Colorado's topography does not
lend itself to rivers that are navigable in fact. While state ownership of
the bed of any stream in Colorado cannot be ruled out, such
ownership would have to be proven by specific facts on a case by case
basis, with each determination of navigability standing on its own
facts. 3 ' In any event, the State has not established title to the bed of
any Colorado stream at this time.
To summarize, with the possible exception of the Colorado River
downstream of Grand Junction to the Utah state line, there are no
navigable streams in Colorado under any definition that would allow
the public access to those reaches flowing through private lands. A
century and a quarter after statehood, Colorado has not adopted its
own definition of navigability for any purpose. Emmert is still the law of
Colorado. Nor is there any basis for a right to float through private
lands under federal law, with the possible exception of the reach of the
Colorado River discussed above. No reported court decisions have
applied any of the federal tests for navigability to any stream in
Colorado.

of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 16-17 (Colo. 1982) and Denver Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200, 204 (Colo. 1975).
127. See ln re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. at 6-10; Stockman, 129 P. at 222.
128. United States v. Dist. Court In & For the County of Eagle, 458 P.2d 760, 762
(Colo. 1969) (Eagle River); Hall v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 405 P.2d 749, 750
(Colo. 1965) (South Platte River); Smith v. Town of Fowler, 333 P.2d 1034, 1036
(Colo. 1959) (Arkansas River); Platte Water Co. v. N. Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711,
713 (Colo. 1889) (South Platte River).
129. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 585 (1922) (passing reference to
"Platte and other large western streams known to be unnavigable").
130. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 633 n.9 (1970) (referring
to district court's taking of judicial notice of relevant reaches of the Arkansas River);
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899)
(discussing limitations on the ability of courts to take judicial notice of navigability of
streams within their jurisdiction).
131. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 87 (1931); United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 403 (1940). These cases indicate that a court decision is
necessary, contrary to the position taken by at least one proponent of a general
unlimited right to float.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In 1979, the Colorado Supreme Court in Emmert reconfirmed that
the beds of streams flowing through private property in Colorado are
privately owned, and held that the public has no right to the use of
waters overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the
consent of the owner. Just prior to Emmert, the General Assembly had
defined "premises" for purposes of the criminal trespass statutes to
exclude the water overlying private lands. Then, in 1983, Attorney
General Woodard correctly opined that it is not a crime to float
through private property if the floater does not touch the bottom.
However, in that same opinion, Woodard confused the floating public
and property owners in stating that, in amending the criminal trespass
statute, the General Assembly had not authorized property owners to
prevent floating through their property. Woodard simply ignored the
constitutional right of a property owner to exclude others, which exists
independent of any legislative act. Nothing has happened since
Emmert to establish any right for the public to float through privately
owned lands. No reported court decisions declare any Colorado
stream navigable for title purposes, or for any other purpose. No
statute authorizes floating through private property. Floating through
private property remains a civil trespass and riparian landowners still
have civil remedies for trespass available to them.
The increasing popularity of floating with its attendant economic
benefits to boaters and the resulting impacts on private property rights
will inevitably compel the General Assembly to address the issue. In
doing so, the General Assembly must recognize the constitutional
limitations inherent in granting access to private property. If the
General Assembly is to enact a law opening streams flowing through
private lands to public use, it must provide for, and be prepared to
pay, just compensation.
Alternatively, and with far less cost to
taxpayers, it could provide incentives for obtaining voluntary
easements or licenses from the landowners. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes said: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire bya shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change."

132. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
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Across the western United States, many irrigators who receive water
developed by the Bureau of Reclamation s ("Bureau") federal irrigation
projects are using that water illegally by spreading it to lands not
authorized to receive it. This "waterspeading"is one of severalfactors
contributingto low flows in the Columbia and Snake River Basinslow flows That threaten the recovery of threatened and endangered
salmon species. Rather than rely on the Bureau to use its authority to
control water spreading, which the agency has failed to do in the last
two decades, perhaps the most promising strategy to stop water
spreading employs the procedural and substantive requirements of the
EndangeredSpecies Act ("ESA "). This articleexamines the alication
of those requirements to the illegal water spreading that the Hureau has
long ignored in the PacificNorthwest, assertingt e Bureau'sfailure to
stop water spreading is an agency action" under section 7 of the ESA
that "may affect" the survival and recovery of listed salmon. The
Bureau's fadlure to act violates affirmative duties under the
reclamationlaws, subsequently enactedfederal environmental laws and
the federal-tribal trust obligation. If the Bureau'sfailure to control
water spreadingfallsunder the purview of section 7, the agency may be
required to use its statutory authority to re-assert control over illegally
spread water in order to keep that water in rivers for endangered
salmon.
I. INTRODUCTION

Established in 1903 and skirting the Oregon-California border, the
Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge") complex was once
a collage of lakes, wetlands, forest, and grasslands, home to a diverse
array of fish and wildlife species, including endangered salmon.1
1. The "Klamath Marsh National Wildlife Refuge" actually consists of six separate
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Within two years of the Refuge's establishment, however, the United
States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") began to "reclaim" the lakes
and marshes of the Lower Klamath and Tule Lake areas, converting
them to "productive" agricultural lands. The Bureau appropriated all
available water rights in the Klamath River and Lost River and their
Oregon tributaries and began constructing a series of water diversion
projects.' Over the years, in conjunction with the Klamath projects,
the Bureau and water users have entered into over 250 water delivery
contracts.' The reclamation projects converted wetlands to lands
newly suitable for agriculture, and today, only one-quarter of the
historic wetlands remain.'
In September 2000, in order to protect endangered coho salmon
in the Klamath River and endangered Lost River and shortnose
suckers in Upper Klamath Lake, the Bureau ordered the Refuge to
seal off its refuge wetlands and pass the water flows through a canal
system directly to the Klamath River. This order was the result of
recent lawsuits in which the Ninth Circuit rejected irrigators' claims
that they were third-party beneficiaries to a 1956 contract between the
United States and the private dam operator who delivered stored water

wildlife refuges: Lower Klamath, Tule Lake, and Clear Lake Refuges in northern
California, and Bear Valley, Upper Klamath, and Klamath Marsh Refuges in southern
Oregon. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Refuge Histoiy: Klamath Basin National Wildlife
Refuges, at http://www.klamathnwr.org/history.html (last modified Jan. 17, 2001)
[hereinafter Refuge Histoy]. The refuges are all part of the National Wildlife Refuge
System. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
2. Act of Feb. 9, 1905, ch. 567, 33 Stat. 714 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 601
(1994)) (Klamath Project). For an environmental history of the Klamath Basin and
other reclamation projects in Oregon, as well as a pair of maps showing the extent of
the Klamath Project's reduction in wetlands and lakes, see WLLAM G. ROBBINS,
LANDSCAPES OF PROMISE: THE OREGON STORY 1800-1940, at 250-58 (1997). For an
overview of the Klamath Project with particular attention given to adjudication of
water rights in the Klamath Basin, see Peter G. Scott, State Certification of Inchoate Water
Rights on the Upper Lost River: A Prelude to the Klamath Adjudication, 13 J. ENvTL. L. &
LITIG. 475 (1998).
3. Klamath Water Users Ass'n v. Patterson, 15 F. Supp. 2d 990, 991-92 (D. Or.
1998) [hereinafter Patterson I]. See also Scott, supra note 2, at 479-80 (providing
legislative history of the Klamath Project).
4. Patterson 1, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
5. Refuge Histoiy, supra note 1, at 1. While the region remains one of the premier
stops along the Pacific Coast Flyway migratory bird corridor, it is a shadow of its
former self with respect to terrestrial species habitat. See id.
6. Beth Quinn, Water Cut Off to Klamath Refuge, OREGONIAN, Sept. 9, 2000, at Al.
Federal officials prevented water that would normally flow into the wetlands from
doing so, by instead diverting the water through canals directly to the Klamath River.
The Bureau decided to resume "limited flows" less than two weeks later, but refuge
officials said the flows were "too low to allow flooding of seasonal marshes that millions
of migrating birds use each fall." Beth Quinn, Water Again Flows to Refuge; Conflicts
Continue, OREGONIAN, Sept. 21, 2000, at El. Then, a week after that, the Bureau
announced it would be able to provide enough water to flood the entire 40,000-acre
refuge by the late-October peak of the bird migration season. Jeff Barnard, Managers
Find Way to Flood Lower Klamath Refuge, OREGONIAN, Sept. 29, 2000, at C3. The Bureau
claimed an early September storm, voluntary irrigation cutbacks by farmers, and
reservoir capacity provided enough water to resume refuge marsh flooding. Id.
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to the irrigators The irrigators argued that because of their alleged
third-party beneficiary status, the Bureau and the dam operator were
obligated to provide the full contractual amount of water to the
irrigators.8 Instead, the court concluded the irrigators were not
"intended third party beneficiaries," the Bureau could amend the 1956
contract with regard to the operator's rights and obligations to operate
the dam without the irrigators' consent, and the irrigators' water rights
"are subservient to senior tribal water rights and
to subsequent
legislative enactments by Congress, such as the Endangered Species
Act." 9 As a result, the Bureau ordered the Refuge to divert water flows
directly to the Klamath River, bypassing Refuge wetlands.
While the increased river flows were good news for the fish, the
water curtailments came at the expense of local irrigators who depend
on Bureau water diversions for crops, and the eight to ten million
migratory birds that pass through the Refuge's wetlands annually."0
On the surface, this choice seems like the quintessential Catch-22
situation, with no satisfactory solutions. In reality, however, many
similar situations involving water shortages for rivers and Bureau of
Reclamation projects are avoidable. The cancer that is eating into
many Bureau projects' water allocations across the Pacific Northwestand ultimately eating into Pacific Northwest streamflows-is the illegal
practice of "water spreading."
Water spreading involves the use of federal water on lands that the
Bureau has not authorized for such use." Federal water is water
developed under a federal irrigation project or water diverted or
delivered through federally built facilities. 2
Lands may lack
authorization to receive water from projects constructed and managed
by the Bureau because of the legislative provisions authorizing the
project," provisions of a water user's contract with the Bureau, the
7. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th
Cir. 2000) [hereinafter PattersonII], afg 15 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Or. 1998), cert. denied,
Klamath Drainage Dist. v. Patterson, 121 S. Ct. 44 (2000).
8. PattersonII, 204 F.3d at 1210.
9. Patterson1, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
10. This solution presents an interesting conflict between fish and other aquatic
species that need water instream to survive, and migratory birds that need water to
remain in the wetlands for their biannual migrations. Between irrigation water
withdrawals and reclamation and conversion of wetlands, both habitats rapidly
degraded beginning around the turn of the last century. As a result, the fish versus
migratory bird trade-off looms large today. See ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 250-53.
11. Reed D. Benson & KimberleyJ. Priestley, Making a Wrong Thing Right: Ending
the "Spread" of Reclamation Project Water, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 89, 92 (1994). The
Bureau defines water spreading as "the unauthorized use of federally developed
project water or facilities on lands not previously approved by Reclamation for such
use." Id. at 92 n.10 (quoting U.S. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, WATER SPREADING (Mar. 3,
1994)) (on file with author).
12. Id. at 92 (citing Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 371(d) (1988)). Benson and
Priestley also note that "[s]ome irrigators have repayment contracts with the Bureau
because they use federally built facilities to divert or deliver their water, even though it
is not 'project water."' Id. at92 n.12.
13. 43 U.S.C. § 371(d) (1994) ("'project' means a Federal irrigation project
authorized by the reclamation law"). Acts of Congress authorize such projects. See,
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statutory requirement that lands be classified by the Bureau as
irrigable, or state water law requirements." Water spreading may take
one of several forms, including: (1) irrigation of lands outside of
Bureau district or project boundaries; (2) irrigation within district or
project boundaries on lands classified by the Bureau as non-irrigable
or ineligible to receive water; (3) changing the nature or place of
project water without Bureau authorization; (4) receiving water
without obtaining a required state water right; or1 (5) irrigation of
more acres than the number authorized for service.
Not only is water spreading illegal, it is fundamentally unfair to
those who depend upon an adequate supply of precious western water,
including threatened and endangered salmonid and other Pacific
Northwest fish species." Water spreading is also responsible for
myriad serious and widespread environmental and social problems.
These problems include decreased water quantity and quality, altered
timing of return flows, significant losses of potential federal revenues
because irrigators use water for which they have not paid, and the
unfair result whereby unauthorized uses take water that could be
reallocated to junior appropriators or instream uses." A number of
solutions have been suggested to address water spreading, the most
obvious of which would be for the Bureau simply to assert the
authority it already has under the Reclamation Act'9 to stop the illegal
practice, secure control over illegally used water, and re-allocate that
20
water to instream uses.
Rather than rely on the Bureau to take actions it has consistently
resisted-presumably because "capture" of the Bureau by irrigators has
resulted in a long-standing preference for dam building and irrigation
that has resisted change -perhaps the most promising strategy to
stop water spreading employs the procedural and substantive
e.g., Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1994) (Central Arizona
Project at § 1521).
14. Id. § 485g (Classification of lands).
15. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 92.
16. See Nathan Baker, Water, Water, Everywhere, and at Last a Dropfor Salmon? NRDC
v. Houston HeraldsNew Prospects Under Section 7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act, 29 ENVTL. L.
607, 621 (1999).
17. Matters can be even more intricate, as evidenced in the Klamath Basin National
Wildlife Refuge complex where endangered bald eagles also vie for water in refuge
marshes as they prey on waterfowl during the winter. See Quinn, Water Cut Off to
Klamath Refuge, supra note 6, at Al. Part II of this article details the plight of
endangered salmon in the Columbia and Snake River basins, and the 1990s onset of
the "Endangered Species Act era" of salmon management. See also Michael C. Blumm,
Sacrificing the Salmon: A Legal and Policy History of the Decline of Columbia Basin Salmon
202-03 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 97-100; David M. Howitt, Oregon Water
Management: The Need to Combat Water Spreading and Some Proposalsfor the Future, 9 J.
ENVTL. L. & LrnG. 249, 257 (1994).
19. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-431 (1994) (as amended).
20. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 105-13. See infra Part V.D (Bureau
authorities to control water spreading).
21. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 91 (citing to MARc REIsNER, CADILLAC

DESERT (1986)).
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requirements of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")." Section 7 of
the ESA requires that federal agency actions must not "jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat." 3 If an
agency determines an action "may affect" listed species or critical
habitat, the agency must formally consult with either the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") or the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") .4 FWS or NMFS must then determine whether the action is
likely to jeopardize any protected species or adversely modify
designated critical habitat.25 Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from
making "irreversible or irretrievable commitment[s] of resources"
until either the FWS or the NMFS has made its determination. 6
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit held renewals of federal water delivery
contracts constitute "agency actions" under the ESA, triggering section
7 's procedural
and substantive requirements.
In 2000, the Ninth
Circuit held the Bureau retains control over its dams and has the legal
duty to direct dam operations to comply with the ESA and tribal water
rights. Because the Bureau has an affirmative legal duty to control its
federal water according to reclamation laws, subsequently enacted
federal environmental statutes, and senior tribal water rights, 9 the
Bureau's practice of allowing water spreading to continue unabated is
an "agency action" subject to section 7 consultation. If the ESA
extends to the Bureau's failure to control water spreading, the Act may
require the Bureau to use its statutory authority to re-assert control
over illegally spread water in order to keep that water in rivers for
endangered salmon.
This article examines the application of the procedural and
substantive requirements of the ESA to the illegal water spreading the
Bureau has long ignored in the Columbia and Snake River basins.
Part II briefly outlines the role of endangered salmon in Pacific
Northwest water use conflicts, and explains how ESA protection has
ushered in a new era of salmon management and protection. Part III
examines the establishment of the Bureau under the Reclamation Act,
the role of the prior appropriation doctrine in the Act, and the social
and environmental costs of water spreading. Part IV reviews the
procedural and substantive requirements of the ESA. Part V asserts
that the Bureau's failure to stop illegal water spreading is an "agency
22. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).

23. Id. § 1536(a) (2).
24. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.01(b), 402.14(a) (2000). In the case of anadromous salmon,
NMFS is the relevant wildlife agency in the consultation process.

25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (A).
26. Id. § 1536(d).
27. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).
Contract renewals occur somewhat infrequently, as repayment and water service
contracts may be fixed for periods of up to 40 years. See 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d), (e)
(1994). See also infra notes 64-65 (defining repayment and water service contracts).
28. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2000).
29.

See infra Part V.C.1.
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action" under the ESA that "may affect" the survival and recovery of
listed salmon, and therefore subjects the Bureau to the ESA's "no
jeopardy" and "duty to conserve" requirements. This article concludes
the ESA may be the most promising and readily available strategy to
control water spreading in the Pacific Northwest and "reclaim" water
for endangered salmon that need adequate instream flows to ensure
the survival of their species.
H. ENDANGERED SALMON: AN IMPERILED CULTURAL,
ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ICON
The cultural, economic, and political significance of salmon in the
Pacific Northwest has been described in great detail many times
before."
To place the issue in context, however, it is useful to
emphasize a few important points in the complex and often tragic
history of the salmon. Salmon have been at the very core of human
culture in the Pacific Northwest for as long as humans have lived
there." For Indian tribes, who for millennia have called vast reaches of
the Columbia and Snake River basins home, fishing for salmon went
beyond mere subsistence. Salmon permeated Indian culture and
spirituality, giving rise to traditions such as the springtime "First
Salmon Ceremony" and even causing some tribes to call themselves
"The Salmon People."32
As Euro-Americans' insatiable push westward filled the region with
increasing numbers of settlers, the settlers too became dependent on
the bountiful salmon runs. Columbia Basin salmon harvests exploded
in the nineteenth century,"3 and the growing non-Indian population
began to demand more and more Indian land to settle upon. The
Indians and settlers entered into the Stevens and Palmer treaties in the
1850s, ostensibly guaranteeing the Indians small land reserves and the
right to continue to harvest salmon "in common with" the EuroAmerican settlers at all "usual and accustomed" native fishing
grounds." Twentieth-century federal court decisions have interpreted
those treaty rights to give treaty tribes a range of guarantees, including
30. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 17, at 3-4; THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS: A
DOcUMENTARY HISTORY iv (Joseph Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds., 1996) [hereinafter
NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS]; ROBBINS, supra note 2, at 305; RICHARD WHITE, THE
ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER 89-92 (1995); CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST

175-218 (1992).
31. See, e.g., William G. Robbins, The World of Columbia River Salmon: Nature, Culture,
and the Great River of the West, in NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS, supranote 30, at 2.

32.

Blumm, supra note 17, at 3 (citing AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., UNCOMMON

CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKEISHOOT, PUYALLUP AND NISQUALLY INDIANS

3 (1970)).
33.

See, e.g., R.D. Hume, Salmon of the Pacific Coast, in NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS,

supra note 30, at 60-64 (discussing salmon canning business and prospects for further
development).
34. For a summary of the treaties and their "negotiation," see Stevens Treaty
Negotiations, in NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS, supra note 30, at 176-80, and the
accompanying commentary.
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the right to half of the harvestable salmon, a right of habitat
protection for the salmon runs, and easement rights to cross private
lands to harvest salmon at traditional fishing places."5
The twentieth century has seen the salmon resource become vastly
depleted from a range of human activities, including over-harvest,
water pollution from logging and grazing activities, reduced flows and
altered timing of flows from water withdrawals, manipulation of
Northwest stream hydrographs, biological degradation from a century
of hatchery fish introductions, and-the most devastating effect of
all-the explosion of dam-building for hydropower and storage
projects. 6 Numerous strategies have failed to solve the rapid decline
of salmon, from scientific and technological fixes such as hatchery
supplementation, barging and trucking, to legal fixes such as the
Northwest Power Act3 and the Pacific Salmon Treaty.3' Despite many
politicians' and agencies' greatest efforts, by the early 1990s, salmon
were far too imperiled to stave off the impending ESA listings. In
1990, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe petitioned to list Snake River
sockeye, and a coalition of environmental groups petitioned to list
Snake River chinook and coho runs.39 NMFS listed the sockeye and
two chinook species in 1992."o Today, twenty-six evolutionarily
significant units ("ESUs") of West Coast salmon and steelhead are
listed as threatened or endangered."
Adequate flow (water quantity), cold water, and spawning gravel
35. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 17, at 16-18, 286-93. Blumm refers to the servitude
across private lands that allows Indians to fish at their traditional fishing places as a
"piscary profit." Id. at 290. See also infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text for a
brief discussion of the Indian treaty fishing rights cases.
36. See generally Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon
Simultaneously: The Biological,Economic, and Legal Casefor Breaching the Lower Snake River
Dams, LoweringJohn Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River flows, 28 ENvTL. L. 997,
1006-09 (1998) (conditions of Snake River salmon and reasons for decline).
37. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
839-839h (1994).
38. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S.
No. 11,091.
39. Blumm, supranote 17, at 24.
40. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing of the Snake River
Sockeye Salmon as an Endangered Species, 57 Fed. Reg. 212 (Jan. 3, 1992) (codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 217); Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for
Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for Snake River Fall
Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (Apr. 22, 1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227).
41. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries, Endangered Species Act Status of
West
Coast
Salmon
&
Steelhead,
at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lsalmon/salmesa/pubs/lpgr.pdf (last updated June 20,
2000). An ESU is a species population that is "substantially reproductively isolated"
from other populations and represents an "important component in the evolutionary
legacy of the species." Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the
Endangered Species Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, (Nov. 20, 1991). The
term "species" in the ESA includes subspecies and "distinct population segment[s]."
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994). The ESU concept
represents NFMS's interpretation of the term "distinct population segment," for
purposes of anadromous fish. 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,612.
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are key to the survival and eventual recovery of these listed fish species.
For example, NMFS stated in its designation of critical habitat for
Snake River sockeye salmon that essential features of that critical
habitat include substrate, water quality, water quantity, water
temperature, water velocity, cover and shelter, food, riparian
vegetation, space, and migration conditions.4 2 Perhaps the key factor
implicated in water spreading is adequate flow because the amount of
water illegally used for irrigation could be returned to the rivers to
contribute to restoration of the flow levels the fish need to survive. In
flow
its 1995 proposed recovery plan, NMFS established minimum
41
objectives that were "likely to avoid high [salmon] mortality."
The upshot of the salmon listings of the 1990s was a major shift in
attention from the Northwest Power Act and the Pacific Salmon Treaty
to the ESA as the new "promise" for survival and recovery of salmon.
The ESA introduced a wider scope of inquiry regarding land
management activities, which in turn amplified to an unprecedented
level, the friction and conflict in the Northwest over declining salmon
populations.45 Historian Richard White once summarized the central
historical place of salmon in Northwest culture as follows:
In the beginning it had been salmon that had drawn humans
to the river. The places where the river's energy was greatest-at the
Dalles and the Cascades, and Celilo Falls, at Kettle Falls and Priest
Rapids-had concentrated the salmon when they returned to spawn,
and at these places fishermen, too, concentrated.

The energy

harvested and stored by salmon for theirjourney had become calories
that supported human life along the river. Salmon had knit together
and
the energy of land and sea; they had knit together human
46
nonhuman labor; salmon had defined the river for millennia.

Behind the ESA listings and the lawsuits seeking to protect salmon and
their habitat from a human-induced extinction, one must always bear
in mind the history that animates salmon issues today.
m. THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND THE RISE OF WATER
SPREADING
THE RECLAMATION ACT AND BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS

A.

In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation

Act, 47

which established

42. Designated Critical Habitat; Snake River Sockeye Salmon, Snake River
Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 58 Fed.
Reg. 68,543, 68,546 (Dec. 28, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226).
43. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMosPHERIc ADMIN., NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON app. F at F-10, F-12, F-13 (1995)
[hereinafter PROPOSED RECOvERY PLAN].

44. Blumm, supranote 17, at 23-24.
45.

Id.

46. WHrrE,supra note 30, at 89.
47. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-431 (1994) (as amended).
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the Bureau in the Department of the Interior.4 ' The Act's purpose was
to provide water for irrigation in the arid western states, and its social
and agricultural goals were part of a national policy of disposing of
western lands.4 9 As the Ninth Circuit observed, the Act's three primary
goals were "to create family-sized farms in areas irrigated by federal
projects... , to secure the wide distribution of the substantial subsidy
involved in reclamation projects and [to] limit private speculative
gains resulting from the existence of such projects." ° Although the
Desert Lands Acte' opened up much land to homesteading and state
prior appropriation laws allowed settlers to divert water and put it to
beneficial uses, the general scarcity of water resources remained a
problem." Because private irrigation efforts did not develop the
amount of water expected, Congress opted for federal construction,
ownership and operation of irrigationprojects, hoping to pave the way
for widespread settlement in the West.
Congress envisioned the Reclamation Act as impetus forJefferson's
agrarian ideal,54 and limited water deliveries to a maximum of 160
acres per "any one person."55 Enforcement, however, was never taken
seriously. In Congress's 1982 amendment of the Reclamation Act,57
the 160-acre limit was revised to require landowners who exceeded a
new 960-acre limit to pay "full cost" for Bureau water. 58 The 1982
Reclamation Reform Act also supplemented the purposes of federal
reclamation projects to include hydropower, industrial, and municipal
uses.59 Particular reclamation projects also provided for recreation,
fish and wildlife protection, flood control, and navigational benefits."
48. Id. § 373a.
49. See Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 803 (quoting United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1119
(9th Cir 1976).
51. Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-29 (1994) (as amended).
52. Even though Congress had opened up western lands for settlement, that action
alone could not solve the issue that was most critical to the western settler's survival:
procurement of water.
53. The western states also "lacked the means to finance the enormous systems of
dams, reservoirs, and canals needed to regulate and distribute water from the western
rivers and snow melt." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 802.
54. "The legislative history of the 1902 Act is replete with references to the antimonopoly and anti-speculation goals of the bill and to Congress's desire that the
federally subsidized water be used to create landholding patterns consistent with its
vision of an agrarian society of family-owned farms." Id.at 802-03 n.8.
55. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 375 (1994).
56. See, e.g., Paul S. Taylor, Calfornia Water Project:Law and Politics,5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1, 1 (1975); Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CAL. L. REv. 978, 978 (1964);
Excess Land Law: Secretary's Decision? A Study in Administration of Federal-StateRelations, 9
UCLA L. REv. 1, 1 (1962); The Excess Land Law: Pressure vs. Principle,47 CAL. L. REv.
499 (1959); The Excess Land Law: Execution of a PublicPolicy, 64 YALE LJ.477 (1955).
57. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat.1263 (1982)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to 390zz-1).
58. 43 U.S.C. § 390ee (1994).
59. Id. §§ 390-390b.
60. See section 3406(b) (2) of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and
Adjustment Act of 1992, which requires the Secretary of Interior to "dedicate and
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Today, seventeen western states have Bureau facilities, including 348
storage reservoirs, 59 hydroelectric power plants, over 250 diversion
dams, and over 200 projects.
The Bureau delivers about thirty
million acre-feet of water annually in the seventeen western states, over
eighty-five percent of which goes to irrigators. The remaining fifteen
percent is delivered to municipal, industrial, and other uses.
The original incarnation of the Reclamation Act allowed individual
irrigators to contract directly with the Bureau. Today, however,
irrigators receive water from delivery organizations such as irrigation
districts, water users' associations, or conservancy districts. '
The
delivery organizations enter into either repayment or water service
contracts with the Bureau. Under a repayment contract, the Bureau
delivers water to an irrigation district or similar organization in return
for scheduled payrnents reflecting a portion of the costs of the
individual project. Under a water service contract, the organization
instead agrees to pay a set annual rate for deliveries from the Bureau. 66
In short, despite a number of amendments and refinements over the
years, the basic goals and schemes of the reclamation laws remain
essentially the same today as when the Reclamation Act was enacted
nearly a century ago.

manage annually eight hundred thousand acre-feet of Central Valley Project
[California] yield for the primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and
habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by this title." Pub. L. No. 102575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390h to 390h-16
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999) & 16 U.S.C. 4601-31 to -34 (1994)).
61. U.S. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS, at 3-3 (1996);

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INVESTING IN THE FUTuRE: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 12
(1999), availableat http://www.usbr.gov/tcg/annrep98/ (last modifiedJune 20, 2000)
[hereinafter 1998 ANNuAL REPORT]; U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Dataweb, at
http://dataweb.usbr.gov/ (last modified Oct. 22, 2000). See also Reed D. Benson,
Whose Water Is It? PrivateRights and PublicAuthority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA.
ENvrL. L.J. 363, 366 (1997) (over 25,000 miles of canals and pipelines, over 37,000
miles of distribution laterals, and over 17,000 miles of drains) [hereinafter Benson,
Whose Water Is It?]. The term "project" means "any irrigation project authorized by
Federal reclamation law, or constructed by the United States pursuant to such law, or
in connection with a repayment or water service contract.... or any project
constructed by the United States through Reclamation for the reclamation of lands."
43 C.F.R. § 426.2 (2000).
62. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 364. The Bureau delivers water to
about ten million acres of irrigated land, which is about one-third of the total irrigated
acres in the West. 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 61, at 12.
63. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 371.
64. Id. at 387. Congress authorized the Bureau to contract with districts in 1922,
and then in 1926, required that all future contracts be made with irrigation districts
only. Id. SeeAct of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, § 45, 44 Stat. 636 (1926). "No water shall be
delivered upon the completion of any new project or new division of a project until a
contract or contracts in form approved by the Secretary of the Interior shall have been
made with an irrigation district or irrigation districts organized under State law ..
43 U.S.C. § 423e (1994).
65. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d) (requirements for repayment contracts) (originally
enacted as Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 1, 53 Stat. 1187).
66. Id. § 485h(e) (requirements for water service contracts).
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PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND THE RECLAMATION ACT

Because of the scarcity of water in the West, the prior
appropriation doctrine took root well over a century ago, requiring a
prospective water user to divert water and put it to beneficial use.6 ,
The doctrine originated from nineteenth-century mining customs,
under which miners diverted water from streams to flush out mineral
deposits."' The Reclamation Act followed the doctrine by requiring
the Bureau to allocate water according to state law-according to the
law of prior appropriation.69 Therefore, because western states have
asserted authority over the waters within their boundaries, federal
reclamation projects must obtain state water rights.
All western states employ some form of the prior appropriation
doctrine, which essentially revolves around the "first in time, first in
right" principle. The doctrine generally consists of a handful of rules:
(1) states control the use of water in the West; (2) older ("senior")
water rights have higher priority over more recently established
('junior") water rights; (3) water rights may be appropriated only for a
"beneficial use" and only enough water to satisfy that beneficial use
may be appropriated; (4) in addition to being tied to a particular
beneficial use, water rights are appurtenant to a particular place; (5)
new appropriations of water require a state water resources agency to
issue a permit; (6) a water user must obtain state approval to change a
point of diversion, a purpose of use or a place of use; and (7) water
users who fail to exercise their water
rights may lose those rights
71
through forfeiture or abandonment.
The appurtenancy requirement ranks as particularly significant in
the context of water spreading. The Reclamation Act declares: "The
right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall
be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the
basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."7 This appurtenancy
provision makes water spreading practices illegal. Such practices
include irrigating lands outside project boundaries, irrigating lands
classified as non-irrigable, irrigating without an appropriate state water
right, or irrigating an excess number of acres.

67. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 233-35. See also Charles F. Wilkinson, In
Memoriam, PriorAppropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v (1991) (whimsical account of

the birth and "life and times" of the doctrine).
68. Karen A. Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of
Restoring Streamflows, 27 ENVrL. L. 151, 154 (1997).

69. See Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
70. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supranote 61, at 372-75.
71. See Reed D. Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo: ProtectingEstablished Water Uses
in the PacificNorthwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation, 28 ENVrL. L. 881, 885-87
(1998) [hereinafter Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo]; WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
12.01 at 1-2 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 372.
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C. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COSTS OF WATER SPREADING

Water spreading is a simple legal concept, but the practice carries
with it serious and widespread environmental and social problems. 3
Environmentally, water spreading reduces water quantity, degrades
water quality, and alters the timing of return flows, affecting both
rivers and groundwater." Obviously, if the massive quantity of illegally
used water was made available for instream uses, such as fish and
wildlife habitat, such uses would reduce significantly the stress on
endangered salmon species. Irrigation return flows, also, cause serious
water quality problems in many parts of the West because these flows
carry salts, heavy metals, and other contaminants.75 The Bureau
determines the presence and extent of potential environmental
problems,
including "toxic
••
76 or hazardous irrigation return flows," when
it classifies land parcels.
If an irrigator spreads water to lands not
classified or considered by the Bureau, there is an increased risk of
polluted return flows that potentially can skew the assumptions upon
which the Bureau bases its water quality calculations and subsequent
management decisions.
Some observers have suggested that the most serious
environmental problem with water spreading is its cumulative effects
upon western rivers and streams.77 The hundreds of thousands of
acres of illegally watered land in the Pacific Northwest contribute to
low river flows that threaten the survival and recovery of salmon.78 As
of 1995, at least 184 of the individual fish and wildlife species either
listed or proposed for listing as threatened or endangered under the
ESA had habitat affected by Bureau projects and water service areas."'
The decline of over fifty surface water dependent listed fish species is
linked directly to irrigation withdrawals, with agricultural activities
cited in those species' Federal Register listing notices as a "factor in
decline" of the species." In its 1995 and 2000 proposed recovery plan

73. Baker, supra note 16, at 619-21. See also, Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at
97-100; Howitt, supra note 18, at 257.

74. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 99.
75. Id.

76. 43 U.S.C. § 390a (1994). This section sets conditions precedent to construction
of dams or reservoirs, and supply of water. It requires that the Secretary "shall certify
to the Congress that an adequate soil survey and land classification has been made and
that the lands to be irrigated are susceptible to the production of agricultural crops by
means of irrigation." Id. The surveys must include "an investigation of soil
characteristics which might result in toxic or hazardous irrigation return flows." Id.
77. See Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 100.
78. See id. Along with low stream flows from irrigation, other major factors
contributing to the demise of salmon are dams, logging, livestock grazing, urban water
pollution, genetic degradation, and predation. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 30, at 8990.
79. Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish
Versus Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 320-21 (1996) (citing U.S.
BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, PROPOSED ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION
RULES AND REGULATIONS 3-85 (1995)).

80. Id. at 328.
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for Snake River Salmon, NMFS called for the Bureau to "identify and
halt" water spreading on Bureau projects in the Columbia River
Basin.8 '
Water spreading also causes its share of social harms, most notably
to the "public fisc." Irrigators who use water on lands not authorized
to receive the water are paying less money to the Bureau than they
owe.83 While the Bureau has recognized it is losing money due to
water spreading, it has never taken any systematic efforts to estimate
how much it is losing. 4 One Bureau official, testifying before Congress
in 1992, estimated the federal government's losses resulting from
water spreading to be fifteen million dollars per year. 5 Other
estimates range as high as thirty-seven to forty-six million dollars for
the period 1984-1992. 86 Losses on this scale amount to an enormous
government subsidy for irrigators who take advantage of the Bureau's
less-than-stringent enforcement of its obligation to stop illegal water
spreading. In addition to social harm from a financial perspective,
allowing water spreading to continue is bad policy because the illegally
used water could be used for junior appropriators, instream rights,
reallocation by state water commissions, and other users who wish to
play by the rules.8 7
Despite these social harms, some irrigators argue water spreading
is actually "water saving."" These irrigators maintain that, rather than
wasting or stealing water, they are in fact conserving water through the
use of advanced irrigation technologies. 9 For example, some
irrigators have replaced "rill" irrigation systems that simply flood fields
with more efficient, computerized sprinkler systems. 90 Nevertheless,
the irrigators who apply this "saved" water to additional fields increase
their profits at the expense of fellow irrigators following the rules,
other potential water users (including instream uses), and ultimately
federal taxpayers.
Although the Bureau has been aware of the problem for a long
81. PROPOSED RECOvERY PLAN, supra note 43, at V-2-26. See infra Part V.E. for more
detail on the hydrosystem biological opinions' discussion of water spreading.
82. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 97.
83. Id. Although irrigators technically are using only the amount of water they pay
for, the fact they apply that water to lands ineligible to receive it for whatever reason
essentially gives the irrigators more benefit than they bargained for.
84. Id. at 98.
85. Id. (citing Hearing to Examine the Underminingof an Effective Civil Service: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1992) (statement of Bureau of Reclamation official Phillip
Doe)).
86. Paul Koberstein, Waterfor the Taking: Some IrrigatorsGet Loose with the Law, HIGH
COUNTRY
NEWS,
Oct.
31,
1994,
at
2,
at
http://www.hcn.org/servets/hcn.Article?article_id=640.
87. Howitt, supranote 18, at 257.
88. Koberstein, supra note 86, at 3-4.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. See also Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 95 (noting that open unlined
ditches which have been converted to lined ditches, pipe laterals, and sprinkler
systems have "conserved" additional water available to irrigators) (citation omitted).
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time, quantification of water spreading-geographically, by acre-feet of
water, or by reduction in streamflows-is difficult. The Bureau first
attempted to quantify the problem in 1983, estimating that 662,000
acres of unclassified lands were illegally receiving project waters in the
western states.91 Two-thirds of that acreage was located in the Bureau's
Pacific Northwest Region, while the remaining six regions reported
significantly lower acreages. Although the report recommended that
nearly four million acres of western land needed some classification
work, the Bureau seems to have made little progress determining the
In short, the
locations and extent of water spreading practices.
significant.
are
spreading
water
of
environmental and social costs
the
decline
to
contributing
factors
of
the
Because the practice is one
to
is
subject
spreading
water
of the salmon, one finds only fitting that
the procedural and substantive requirements of the law that attempts
to reverse this biological trend: the Endangered Species Act.
IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REQUIREMENTS
Congress passed the ESA in 1973, "to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved." 95 The ESA declares a national policy "that
all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve
endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."96 Courts
have long recognized that "examination of the language, history, and
structure" of the ESA "indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." 97 The
ESA achieves its goals primarily through two important provisions: the
section 9 "take" prohibition and the section 7 consultation
requirements.
A.

THE SECTION 9 "TAKE" PROHIBITION

The provision that breathes life into the ESA and provides the
statute's true muscle is section 9's take prohibition." Section 9 makes
91. Benson & Priestley, supranote 11, at 96.
92. Id. The Bureau provided no explanation why the problem occurred
predominantly in the Pacific Northwest. Id. See also Koberstein, supranote 86, at 1-2.
93. Section 485g directs the Secretary to classify or reclassify "as to irrigability and
productivity those lands which have been, are, or may be included within any project."
Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C. § 485g (1994).
94. Benson & Priestley, supranote 11, at 96-97.
95. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
96. Id. § 1531(c)(1).
97. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
98. Jason M. Patlis, Recovey, Conservation, and Survival Under the Endangered Species
Act: Recovering Species, Conserving Resources, and Saving the Law, 17 PUB. LAND &
REsoURcEs L. Rzv. 55, 57 (1996). Events in Idaho in October 2000 provide a related
example of the potentially all-encompassing reach of the take prohibition. The Idaho
Watersheds Project and the Committee for Idaho's High Desert mailed 60-day noticeof-intent-to-sue letters to over fifty ranchers, irrigators, and state and federal agencies
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it "unlawful for any person" to "take" any species listed as endangered
under the ESA.9 For threatened species, the Secretary of the Interior
has the discretion to prohibit takings or to issue regulations, called
"4(d) rules," that are "necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of [threatened] species. ""' ° The term "take" is broadly
construed to include any action that would "harm" a species.' ' The
Ninth Circuit has determined that "harm" includes habitat destruction
that could result in extinction of a species.0
Although conflicting
statements by the United States Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon'0 3 arguably undermined the
validity of the Palila holding, the Ninth Circuit has indicated it
interprets that case to be a complete affirmation of Palilabecause "five
Justices affirmed Palilain all respects."' 4
The goals of the ESA are twofold: first to stave off extinction of
species, and second to recover those species. In theory, the ESA strives
to render itself obsolete.'
Several commentators have observed that
although the ESA's requirements for recovery and conservation are
"vague and poorly defined," 6 the section 9 take prohibition
is what
truly saves species. As one commentator stated, "it is no coincidence
that the greatest success stories of the Act involve species that were
that divert water and dry up streams in southern Idaho. See Enviros Threaten Suit Over
Salmon, TMES-NEws (Twin Falls, Idaho), Oct. 8, 2000, at Al, available at
http://www.newslibrary.com/deliverccdoc.asp?SMH=285720.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1). The listing process is detailed in section 4. Id. § 1533.

100. Id. § 1533(d).
101. The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19) (1994). See also 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1999), 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2000);
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Definition of "Harm," 63 Fed. Reg.
24,148-49 (May 1, 1998). NMFS modifies FWS's regulation slightly by including
habitat modification that "actually kills or injures fish or wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, spawning, rearing,
migrating, feeding, and sheltering." Id. at 24,149.
102. Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1988).
103. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 695,
697 (1995) (upholding FWS's inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in
the definition of "harm").
104. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996)
(reaffirming that ESA protects listed species from harm caused by habitat modification
or destruction). While some federal court decisions prior to Sweet Home required a
showing of proximate causation to support a take violation, most, including the Ninth
Circuit's decisions, simply required "but for" causation. Justice Stevens' majority
opinion in Sweet Home acknowledged a split on this issue between the Ninth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit, and resolved the conflict by reversing the D.C. Circuit, despite
Justice O'Connor's statement in her concurrence that she would have overruled Palila
based on a proximate causation requirement. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 688, 695, 71214. See also Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 23 ECOLOGvL.Q. 1, 49-52 (1996).
105. The definition of "conservation" provides for "the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species
to the point at which the measuresprovidedpursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
106. Patlis, supranote 98, at 57.
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endangered or threatened as a result of takings that were prohibited
by section 9; species that have declined as a result of diffuse impacts
have been much slower to recover."107
B.

THE SECTION 7 CONSULTATION PROCESS

The ESA's other primary mechanism is the section 7 consultation
process." 8 Section 7 prohibits federal agencies from taking actions
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of those species' critical
To achieve this purpose, section 7 outlines a three-step
habitat.'
process for "any action authorized, funded, or carried out" by an
agency after a species is listed."0 First, the action agency must ask
either FWS or NMFS whether any endangered or threatened species
"may be present" in the affected area."' If so, the action agency must
prepare a biological assessment ("BA") to determine whether the
species is "likely to be affected" by the proposed action.12 Finally, if
the BA determines a proposed action is likely to affect a threatened or
endangered species, the action agency must formally consult with FWS
Formal consultation leads to a biological opinion
or NMFS."'
("BiOp") from FWS or NMFS, determining whether the proposed
action will "jeopardize the continued existence of""4 the species or
destroy or adversely modify a critical habitat."5
This section 7 process leads to a substantive result. If FWS or
NMFS makes a jeopardy determination, the proposed action cannot
go forward until the agency introduces mitigation measures that
reduce the adverse impacts of the project to the point of no
jeopardy.16 Even when the BiOp concludes the proposed action
would not jeopardize the species or its critical habitat, FWS or NMFS
107. Patlis, supra note 98, at 57. See also Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act
and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 277, 344-51 (1993).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1994).
109. Id. § 1536(a) (2).
110. Id. See also Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
112. Id. This determination may be part of the environmental assessment ("EA") or
environmental impact statement ("EIS") for the project, under the National
Environmental Policy Act. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
113. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994).
114. Id. § 1536(a)(4).
115. Id.§ 1536(b) (3) (A).
116. SeeThomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). In the BiOp, FWS or
NMFS must "suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives ["RPAs"] which [the
Service] believes would not violate [section 7(a) (2)] and can be taken by the Federal
agency... in implementing the agency action." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (3) (A). RPAs are
alternative actions "that can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended
purpose of the action, ... [and] the scope of the Federal agency's legal authority and
jurisdiction, that is economically and technologically feasible, and that the [Service]
believes would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of listed
species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
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may still suggest mitigation measures." 7 Although the action agency is
not required to adopt those measures, if the agency "deviates from
them, [it] does so subject to the risk that [it] has not satisfied the
standard of section 7(a) (2)."1 8
The end of the consultation process includes two key substantive
requirements. First, section 7 (a) (1) sets out a federal duty to conserve,
stating "[f]ederal agencies shall... utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species. "" 9
Conservation means using all methods possible-including "research,
census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance,
propagation, live trapping, and transplantation"-to return a species
to the point at which the measures provided in the ESA are no longer
necessary. I12
While the duty to conserve requirement uses the
mandatory word "shall," agencies still retain significant discretion in
terms of what "conservation" entails. 21 However, agency discretion
regarding what conservation steps are necessary to conserve a species is
not unlimited: the agency must at least show it has taken the proper
steps and engaged in a process designed to decide how it will fulfill its
statutory mandate.22 In short, the ESA equates conservation with
117. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 763.
118. Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted). See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, 898
F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990) ("while consultation with the FWS may have satisfied
the Navy's proceduralobligations under the ESA, the Navy may not rely solely on a FWS
biological opinion to establish conclusively its compliance with its substantive
obligations under section 7(a)(2)"). A recent district court case from Arizona
determined that the Bureau had violated section 9 where a "take" had occurred that
was attributable to a Bureau project. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
Nos. 97-0474 PHX-DAE & 97-1479 PHX-DAE (consolidated), slip op. at 38 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 26, 2000) (on file with author) (order granting in part and denying in part
plaintiff's Motion for SummaryJudgment and defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment). The district court also determined and that the Bureau was not exempt
from the "take" prohibition because the agency had failed to implement the RPAs
from the biological opinion. Id.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1) (1994). This conservation duty is also explicit in the
ESA's goals, where Congress states that "all Federal departments and agencies shall
seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species." Id. § 1531 (c)(1).
120. Id. § 1532(3) ("the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary").
121. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 26263 (9th Cir. 1984); Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1418 (stating the "Secretary is to be
afforded some discretion in ascertaining how best to fulfill the mandate to conserve
under section 7(a) (1)"); Paths, supra note 98, at 88-89; Houck, supranote 107, at 32728.
122. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). The
court stated:
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife Service ...
must do far more than merely avoid the elimination of protected species. It
must bring these species back from the brink so that they may be removed
from the protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so.
Id. at 170. The Fifth Circuit has elaborated on this requirement, holding that section
7(a) (1) places upon federal agencies a mandatory duty to conserve threatened and
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recovery-agencies must not only prevent jeopardy, but also recover
listed species to the point that ESA protection is no longer needed.
Second, the action agency has an independent duty to comply with
the no jeopardy requirement. Unless the action agency is granted an
incidental "take" exemption,"' section 7(a) (2) requires assurance that
a proposed action "is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat.",2 The test
for a finding ofjeopardy asks whether the action "reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of
both the survival and recovery of a listed species." 12' Therefore, for the
Bureau's failure to control water spreading to fall within the purview
of section 7, a plaintiff must establish that water spreading amounts to
(1) an "agency action," that (2) "may affect" listed salmon.
V. CONTROLLING WATER SPREADING VIA THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: WATER SPREADING AS AN
"AGENCY ACTION" THAT "MAY AFFECT" LISTED SPECIES
This section examines whether water spreading qualifies as "agency
action" that "may affect" listed salmon. The key to determining
whether the procedural and substantive requirements of the ESA apply
to water spreading lies primarily in examining whether the Bureau's
Section
practices qualify as an "agency action" under the ESA.
7(a) (2) states that agency action is "any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency."128 The regulations provide that section 7's
consultation requirements "apply to all [agency] actions in which
Thus, in
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control."'
order to qualify as "agency action" under the ESA, water spreading
must satisfy three elements: (1) federal agency involvement; (2) an
identifiable action; and (3) discretionary authority.13

endangered species, and that agencies must develop conservation programs for
specific species. Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir. 1998).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h).
124. Id. § 1536(a) (2) (emphasis added).
125. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000). See, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v.
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (1st Cir. 1982) (consultation
process "is not merely a procedural requirement").
126. A case filed in the District of Oregon includes a claim that the Bureau has
violated section 7(a)(2) "by failing to identify and halt the illegal use of water
delivered from federal water projects in the Columbia and Snake River basins, and by
failing to consult with NMFS on the effects of continued illegal water use on
endangered and threatened anadromous fish." Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 29, Trout Unltd. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 00-262 MA (D.
Or. filed Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with author).
127. See Baker, supra note 16, at 633.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994).
129. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03.
130. See Baker, supra note 16, at 627-28. Some debate surrounds whether the
discretionary element should be included in the definition of agency action. See infra
note 228.
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Courts have construed the term "agency action" broadly.'' The
term includes actions such as Forest Service land resource
management plans,' private actions under a nationwide Army Corps
of Engineers permit," Forest Service approval of private mining
plans, the sale of oil and gas leases on national forests, 35 and federal
dam projects already under construction. ' Prior to the promulgation
of the regulatory definition, the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill concluded the term "agency action" is
comprehensive.' s The Court stated:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in [section] 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all
federal agencies "to insure that actions authorized,funded, or carried out
by them do not jeopardize the continued existence" of an endangered
species or "result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species." This language admits of no exception.
If this broad construction continues and the ESA applies to the
Bureau's failure to control water spreading, the Bureau could be
required to re-assert control over illegally spread water to maintain an
adequate supply for listed salmon.
This section first considers the scope of Bureau actions that courts
have previously held to be "agency actions" under the ESA. The
discussion then turns to an examination of each of the elements of an
agency action and how the Bureau's failure to stop water spreading
satisfies each of those elements. Finally, the section concludes with an
examination of the evidence that water spreading "may affect" listed
salmon.
A.

THE SCOPE OF BUREAU OF RECLAMATION ACTIONS HELD TO BE
"AGENCY ACTIONS"

In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, the Ninth Circuit
held renewals of federal water delivery contracts constitute "agency
actions" under the ESA, triggering the procedural and substantive
s9 NRDC
requirements of section 7."
and fourteen other environmental
plaintiffs sued the Bureau in 1988, over agency water delivery contract

131. See Baker, supra note 16, at 628.
132. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 1994)
("[T] here is little doubt that Congress intended to enact a broad definition of agency
action in the ESA, and therefore that the [land resource management plans] are
continuing agency action.").
133. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 511 (10th Cir. 1985).
134. Baker v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 928 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D. Idaho 1996).
135. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1442-43, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

489 U.S. 1012 (1989).
136.
137.
138.
139.

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978).
Id. at 173.
Id (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998).
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renewals under the Central Valley Project in California, the nation's
largest federal water reclamation project. 4 ' The plaintiffs claimed the
Bureau had violated section 7 by failing to consult with NMFS on the
effects of the contract renewals on endangered Sacramento winter-run
chinook, and by making "irreversible and irretrievable commitment[s]
of resources."14 The district court agreed, ruling the Bureau violated
the ESA by renewing water contracts that amounted to irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources before completing the ESA's
4
formal consultation requirements."
Several irrigation districts appealed, arguing the contract renewals
were not "agency actions" under the ESA because the Bureau had no
discretion to alter the terms of the renewal contracts. 4 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, noting that regulations broadly define,
144 and courts broadly interpret,'5
the term "agency action." In
addition, federal reclamation law states the government must renew
the contracts on "mutually agreeable" terms, 46 and water rights are
based on the amount of project water available.'4 7 The court also
rejected the irrigation districts' argument that the Bureau lacked
discretion to alter the quantity of water delivered. 4 ' The court cited
O'Neill v. United States49 for the proposition that "an agency can deliver
less than a contractually agreed upon amount of water in order to
comply with subsequently enacted federal law." 15 Thus, the court
determined the Bureau had discretion not only to alter key terms in
the contract, but also to reduce the amount of water to be delivered if
necessary to comply with the ESA.' 5'
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit continued to define broadly the scope
of Bureau "agency actions" under the ESA. 52 In Klamath Water Users
Protective Association v. Patterson, the court held that after entering a
water delivery contract, the Bureau retained control over its dams and
had the legal duty to order dam operations to comply with the ESA
and tribal water rights.13 Irrigators argued they were third-party
140. Id. at 1124. SeeBaker, supra note 16, at 623.
141. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1128. "[I]rreversible and irretrievable commitment[s] of
resources" are prohibited by section 7(d). 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1994).
142. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1128.
143. Id. at 1125.
144. 50 C.F.R1 § 402.02 (2000) ("Action means all activities or programs of any kind
authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies....
Examples include, but are not limited to... the granting of licenses, contracts, leases,
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid.").
145. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173
(1978); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994)).
146. 43 U.S.C. § 485h-1(1) (1994).
147. See id. § 485h-1 (4).
148. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125-26.
149. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995).
150. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126.
151. Id.
152. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).
153. Id. The agency action in this case is the Bureau's management of the dam.
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beneficiaries to a contract between the Bureau and California Oregon
Power Company ("Copco"), which operated the dam and stored water
for delivery under the contract at issue.
The irrigators claimed, as
third-party beneficiaries to a contract made for their direct benefit,
they were entitled to enforce the contract's terms.' 5 Rejecting this
argument, the Ninth Circuit determined:
Although the Contract operates to the Irrigators'

benefit by

impounding irrigation water, and was undoubtedly entered into with
the Irrigators in mind, to allow them intended third-party beneficiary
status would open the door to all users receiving a benefit from the
Project achieving similar status, a result not intended by the
Contract.

The court also determined the contract unmistakably gives the
Bureau-not the dam operator-control over the dam."' Finally, as a
federal agency, the Bureau retains authority over the dam, with
responsibility and authority to direct dam operations in compliance
with the ESA and tribal water rights. This Bureau management of dam
operations is "agency action" under ESA section 7. 58 Thus, the
Bureau had discretionary authority, subject to the ESA, to establish a
new operating plan for the dam, requiring the dam operator to modify
flows to lower levels than called for under the operator's license with
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.'59
Whether water spreading qualifies as "agency action" under the
ESA, therefore, is framed with the preceding cases in mind. In order
to qualify as "agency action" under the ESA, water spreading must
satisfy the following three elements: federal agency involvement, an
identifiable action, and discretionary authority.

154. Id. at 1209. The United States and Copco entered into the initial fifty-year
contract in 1917, pursuant to the Reclamation Act. Id. Under the contract, Copco
would construct the dam and then convey it to the federal government. Id. In 1956,
the parties renewed the contract for a new fifty-year term. Id. Although the court
does not specify, it probably referred to the terms as fifty-year terms rather than fortyyear terms because it combined the ten-year "development" period with the forty-year
"long-term contract" period. See 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d), (e) (1994). See also supra note
27.
155. Patterson II, 204 F.3d at 1210. In 1992, FWS issued a BiOp that required
minimum elevations for Upper Klamath Lake to avoid jeopardizing the Lost River and
shortnose suckers. Id. at 1209. In addition, the Secretary of Interior recognized that
the Klamath, Yurok, and Hoopa Tribes held treaty fishing and water rights in the
basin. Id. In response to these obligations, the Bureau established a new operating
plan for the dam, which called for Copco to operate the dam at decreased flow levels.
Id. at 1209-10.
156. Id. at 1212.
157. Id. at 1212-13. The contract directs the dam operator to operate and maintain
the dam at certain water levels, and states that the Bureau may override the operator's
decisions. Id. at 1213.
158. PattersonII, 204 F.3d at 1213.
159. See icL at 1209-10.
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B.

FEDERAL AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN WATER SPREADING

ESA regulations define "Federal agency" as "any department,
agency or instrumentality of the United States."' 60 Section 7(a)(1)
directs federal agencies to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of
the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the
conservation of endangered species and threatened species." 6"
Section 7(a) (2) prohibitions on actions likely to jeopardize existence
of an endangered species include not only activities undertaken
directly by federal agencies, but also nonfederal actions involving
federal authorization or assistance. Of the three elements of agency
action, federal agency involvement is the easiest to establish. Although
water spreading generally occurs on private or leased lands, the water
applied is federal project water, developed under the reclamation laws.
In addition, administration of reclamation laws requires the Bureau to
develop and maintain federal reclamation
projects, producing water
62
that is ultimately illegally applied.
Two related counter-arguments might suggest that no federal
agency involvement exists with respect to water spreading.'6 3 First, one
may argue that delivery organizations such as water users associations
and irrigation districts-and not the Bureau-are actually delivering
water, so that the federal government has not "authorized, funded, or
carried out" illegal use of the water.'4 However, this argument fails
because the Bureau in countless instances delivers water to irrigation
districts well aware that some of that water is not used according to the
contract terms, and fails to stop the practice. 65 There is no question
that the Bureau is fully aware of water spreading practices throughout
its Pacific Northwest Region; the Bureau first formally recognized the
extent of waterspreading in 1983266 This situation provides a classic
example of an agency "authorizing" a practice by continuing to deliver
water under existing contracts, despite full cognizance of illegal
spreading of federally developed water. Authorization, of course, is
included in the definition of agency action.
A second closely related counter-argument suggests that individual
irrigators, not the Bureau, do the actual water spreading, with even
160. 50 C.F.R. § 450.01 (2000).
161. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1) (1994).
162. See, e.g., Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1994) (general authority of
Secretary of the Interior to carry out reclamation laws). See also discussion infra Part
V.C.I.a (Bureau duties under reclamation laws).
163. One may also frame these arguments in terms of the "identifiable action"
element of the agency action analysis. These arguments suggest that although a
federal agency is involved in the use of federal project water, the action of water
spreading itself is not undertaken by the federal agency. However, the federal "action"
with respect to water spreading is actually the Bureau's failure to act to control the
problem. See discussion infra Part V.C.
164. See Baker, supra note 16, at 633 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994)).
165. Id.
166. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAND
CLASSIFICATION AND EQUIVALENCY, 10-11 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 BuREAu LAND
CLASSIFICATION AND EQUIVALENCY REPORT].
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more tangential agency involvement than in the preceding
permutation of the argument. Again, although a private individual is
illegally using federal project water, the practice includes federal
involvement. Here, the Bureau authorizes project water use while fully
aware of the user's failure to comply with terms of water delivery
contracts and reclamation laws, and thus allows the practice to
continue by allowing continued water deliveries. This situation is
analogous to the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") failing to
control (and therefore "authorizing") nonpoint source water pollution
from livestock grazing on public lands. The BLM frequently fails to act
when individual ranchers with permits allow livestock to graze near
and in streams, resulting in nonpoint source pollution and water
quality standards violations expressly prohibited by the Clean Water
Act's federal facilities provision.
Similarly, federal agency
involvement (and action) in the BLM context occurs when BLM issues
or renews a federal grazing permit, fully aware that the resulting
nonpoint source pollution may violate the agency's duty to comply
with state water quality standards.1'6
C. THE IDENTIFIABLE AGENCY ACTION IN WATER SPREADING
ESA regulations define federal agency action as "all activities or
programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or
in part, by Federal agencies."1 69 Examples "include, but are not limited
to... the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-ofway, permits, or grants-in-aid; or... actions directly or indirectly
causing modifications to the land, water, or air."170 A number of
identifiable Bureau "actions" relate to water spreading, including the
Bureau's failure to stop the illegal practice (that is, inaction as action),
actual Bureau water deliveries, and water delivery contract renewals.
1.

Inaction as Agency Action: The Bureau's Duty to Act to Control
Water Spreading

The most readily identifiable Bureau action with respect to water
spreading involves the agency's failure to act. Failure to stop water
spreading is tantamount to the Bureau "authorizing" illegal use of

167. See Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollutionfrom Livestock GrazingAfter ONDA v.
Dombeck: Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 617, 665 (2000).
Section 313, the Clean Water Act's federal facilities provision, states:
Each [federal agency] (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or
(2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or
runoff of pollutants... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and
process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water
pollution.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
169. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(c), (d) (2000).
170. Id.
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project water.'
The Bureau's failure to stop water spreading also
qualifies as action that directly or indirectly causes modification to the
land, water, or air."2 Inaction by itself, however, is not enough.
Although the Bureau remains aware of the practice and has not acted
to control the problem, for inaction to be agency action that triggers
the requirements of section 7(a) (2), there must be an underlying duty
to act.'3 Thus, where agency action is actually a failure to act,7 there
4
must be a duty to act, coupled with discretionary authority to act.
This inaction, as "identifiable action" with respect to water
spreading, is analogous to an agency's "failure to act" in the context of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Inaction as action is also well
established in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA").176 For example, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit held the
Secretary of Commerce's failure to disapprove harvest management
plans prepared by the North Pacific Fish Management Council
("Council") 177 was a major federal action for NEPA purposes'
Under
the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Secretary of Commerce must review
harvest plans issued by the Council to ensure the plans comply with

171. See, e.g., Baker, supranote 16, at 633.
172. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
173. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 445 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the
Secretary's mandatory obligation, i.e., duty, under Magnuson-Stevens Act to review
harvest management plans prepared by North Pacific Fish Management Council);
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Comm'r, Food & Drug Admin., 740 F.2d 21,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When agency recalcitrance is in the face of a clear statutory duty or
is of such magnitude that it amounts to an abdication of statutory responsibility, the
court has the power to order the agency to act to carry out its substantive statutory
mandates.") (emphasis added); Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir.
1991) ("Administrative agencies do not possess the discretion to avoid discharging the
duties that Congress intended them to perform.").
174. That is, there must be a duty, coupled with some discretionary authority or
authorities the Bureau can exercise in order to satisfy the obligations imposed by its
duty to act. Part V.D infra discusses the Bureau's discretionary authorities with respect
to water spreading.
175. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") defines "agency action" as
"includ[ing] the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994) (emphasis
added). See, e.g., Florida Keys Citizens Coalition v. West, 996 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (S.D.
Fla. 1998) (holding reviewable under the APA the Army Corps of Engineers' failure to
maintain records of wetland acreage loss, failure to consult with FWS and NMFS, and
failure to consider secondary and cumulative impacts of applications for permits in the
East Everglades and Florida Keys wetlands).
176. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2000) ("Actions include the circumstance where the
responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or
administrative tribunals under the [APA] or other applicable law as agency action.").
177. The North Pacific Fish Management Council is one of eight councils
established under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which authorizes creation of the
councils under the Secretary of Commerce and requires the councils to develop fish
management plans that cover anadromous fish while they are in the ocean. Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998). The North Pacific Fishery Management Council oversees ocean fishing for
salmon in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and Pacific Ocean off of Alaska. Id. §
1852(a) (7).
178. Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 445.
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federal requirements-thus imposing a duty to act.'7 9 If the Secretary
does not disapprove of a plan, the plan takes effect.' 0 In that case,
although the Secretary had delegated authority over the ocean
harvests to Alaska since 1990, the Secretary retained the duty to review
the plans. 8 ' Because the Secretary did not disapprove the plans, they
became law.'82 Holding the district court erred when it concluded an
EIS was not required before the ocean salmon fishing under the plan
occurred, the Ninth Circuit stated "[i]t is clear from federal
regulations that federal inaction can count as federal action for
purposes of triggering the EIS requirement under NEPA." 8 The
court concluded the "Secretary's mandatory obligation to review the
plans prepared by the council or its delegate ... suffices to make his
failure to disapprove [a] major federal action. " '
With respect to water spreading, the Bureau has clearly
acknowledged the widespread occurrence of illegal water spreading,
but has failed to take any actions to stop the practice. Again, however,
it is not enough that the Bureau simply is aware of the practice of water
spreading and has not acted to control the problem. For inaction to
constitute an agency action that triggers the requirements of section
7(a) (2), the statute also requires an underlying duty to act, coupled
with the discretionary authority to act. There are three main sources
for the Bureau's affirmative duties to control water spreading: the
reclamation laws, subsequently enacted federal environmental laws,
and senior tribal water rights.
a.

Duties Under the Reclamation Laws

The reclamation laws, which regulate the development and use of
federal project water, guide the Bureau in its primary duties. 8 5 The
Bureau has developed the Reclamation program over the past century
pursuant to the authority of those laws. Chief among these duties is
the restriction on the use of federal project water. Section 383 of the
Reclamation Act states that the Secretary shall carry out the
reclamation program in conformance with state laws:

179. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1) (B) (1994) (after receiving a plan from the Council, the
Secretary "shall... immediately commence a review of the management plan.., to
determine whether it is consistent with the national standards ... and any other
applicable law").
180. Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A)-(B).
181. Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 445.

182. Id.
183. Id. (citing NEPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18).
184. Id.
185. The generally applicable reclamation laws, including the Reclamation Act of
1902, the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, and the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,
appear at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-573 (1994). The term "reclamation laws" also refers to
project authorizing acts and other statutes affecting individual projects. Note also that
in specific project authorizations, Congress may exempt a particular project from one
or more of the generally applicable reclamation laws. See Benson, Whose Water Is It',
supranote 61, at 417 & n.315.
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Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State
or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired
thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, shallproceed in conformity with such laws.

Further, section 372 states "[t]he right to the use of water acquired
under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of
the right."'8 7 In other words, the Reclamation Act obligates the Bureau
to fulfill a duty to provide water to users only if the agency insures the
project water rights are appurtenant to the land irrigated, and the use
of project water pursuant to those rights is limited to "beneficial use,"
and conforms to state laws.
In 1978, the Supreme Court interpreted section 383 to obligate the
Bureau to observe state law except to the extent that state law conflicts
directly with a specific provision of the federal reclamation laws.'
Following that precedent, the Ninth Circuit has determined the
Reclamation Act requires the Bureau to defer to state law for purposes
of determining beneficial use. The Ninth Circuit noted the "United
States' interest in the determination of a user's water duty, as declared89
by the statute, is to see that beneficial use is its measure and limit."
Therefore, although the Bureau itself does not determine what is a
beneficial use, it has the duty to ensure federal project water deliveries
are limited to beneficial use as defined under the state law applicable
to a particular project. As applied to water spreading, the Bureau must
assure that use of project water does not exceed the beneficial use with
respect to irrigation. Because beneficial use is one part of an
appropriative water right, the Bureau may, for example, fail to ensure
that project water deliveries are limited to beneficial use by allowing an
irrigator to irrigate lands not described in her water right.'90 The
Bureau's failure to stop the water spreading in this instance is an
"action" based on the Bureau's affirmative duty under the reclamation
laws.
In addition to the Bureau's duty to ensure that the application of
project water is limited to beneficial use, the Bureau also has a duty
under the reclamation laws to classify irrigable lands within each new
project.' This obligation elucidates a duty to ensure water is delivered
186. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 372 (emphasis added).
188. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672 n.25 (1978) ("specific
congressional directives which were contrary to state law regulating distribution of
water would override that law").
189. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 856 n.3 (9th Cir.
1983). SeeBenson, Whose Water Is It ?, supra note 61, at 418.
190. Recall, as is emphasized in section 372, that an appropriation is appurtenant to
the land on which it is used, i.e. the land specified in the water permit or certificate.
See also Howitt, supranote 18, at 258-62.
191. 43 U.S.C. § 462 ("irrigable lands of each new project and new division of a
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only to those lands classified as irrigable.'9 2 Irrigation districts also are
prohibited from delivering water to irrigators not eligible to receive
project water "under the certification or reporting requirements or
any other provision of Federal reclamation law."'
Related to this
obligation is the requirement that project water may not be delivered
for irrigation of lands held in excess of the acreage limitations 94
imposed by the reclamation laws "unless and until the owners thereof
shall have executed a recordable contract with the Secretary...
requiring the disposal of their interest in such excess lands within a
reasonable time." - In addition, the Bureau has a duty to fulfill its
contractual responsibilities, unless overridden by subsequently enacted
legislation.'" In the water spreading context, the Bureau cannot
"authorize" water deliveries to lands not classified as eligible to receive
project water and must hold its users to irrigation of only those acres
for which they have contracted, either with the Bureau directly or with
the water delivery organization.
b.

Duty With Respect to Subsequent Acts of Congress: Endangered
Species Act
The Bureau also has a duty to comply with subsequently enacted

project approved ... shall be classified by the Secretary with respect to their power.., to
support a family and pay water charges") (emphasis added). Also, irrigators or water
delivery organizations may request the Secretary to classify or reclassify lands "as to
irrigability and productivity." Id. § 485g(a). The reclamation laws require that
"[u] pon receipt of any such request the Secretary shall make a preliminary determination
whether the requested land classification or reclassification probably is justified," and
"[i]f the Secretary finds probable justification.., he shall undertake as soon as
practicable the classification or reclassification." Id. § 485g(d)-(e) (emphasis added).
192. Irrigable land means "land so classified by Reclamation under a specific project
plan for which irrigation water is, can be, or is planned to be provided, and for which
facilities necessary for sustained irrigation are provided or are planned to be
provided." 43 C.F.R. 426.2 (2000).
193. 43 C.F.R. § 426.19(h).
194. The 1902 Reclamation Act originally limited water delivery for irrigation to no
more than 160 acres of land. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1994) ("No right to the use of waterfor land
in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any
one landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be an
actual bona fide resident on such land.") (emphasis added). The Reclamation
Reform Act of 1982 increased that number to 960 acres. Id. § 390dd(1).
195. Id.§ 390ii(a).
196. See Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 420. See, e.g., Barcellos &
Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717, 731 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affid sub
nom. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court in
Barcellos stated that the government is not required "to continue to deliver water in
contravention of the water delivery contract, which defines the extent of the water
right. The disputed contract grants specified water rights. The government is
prohibited from breaching the terms of the contract." Id. The Ninth Circuit in O'Neill
affirmed and added that "[e]ven if the water service contract did obligate the
government to supply, without exception, 900,000 acre-feet of water, the district court
correctly held that Area I [users] would still not be entitled to prevail as the contract is
not immune from subsequently enacted statutes." 50 F.3d at 686. For further detail
on the ONeill case and the effect of subsequently enacted statutes, see infra notes 20307 and the accompanying text.
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federal environmental laws, including the ESA.'97 For example, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a Bureau decision to operate a project for the
benefit of listed fish and not to sell project water for municipal and
The court in that case affirmed the Bureau's
industrial purposes.'
duty to conserve listed species under the ESA, concluding section
7(a) (1) of the ESA requires the Bureau to "actively pursue a species
Similarly, the Bureau must comply with
conservation policy." l'
and environmental impact
NEPA's environmental
200 assessment
•
statement requirements.
Closely related to this duty is the Bureau's obligation to modify an
existing contract when a subsequent act of Congress requires some
change in contract terms2 0 1 The only exception is where a contract
"surrender[s] in unmistakable terms" Congress's "ability to amend,
alter or repeal the provisions of the Reclamation Act" and enact
subsequent legislation affecting the government's contractual
With respect to
arrangements under the reclamation laws.022
act in the
congressional
subsequent
is
a
there
salmon,
endangered
with
consult
Bureau
the
that
requirement
7
section
form of the ESA's
the
to
jeopardize
likely
not
are
actions
agency
federal
NMFS to ensure
modify
adversely
or
destroy
or
continued existence of listed species,
those species' critical habitat.
In O'Neill v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held the Bureau could
deliver less than the contractually agreed upon amount of water to
contract holders in California, in order to comply with subsequently
enacted federal law. °3 In that case, the Bureau could not deliver the
full contractual amount of water consistently with provisions of the
Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA") 20 -and the ESA. In
order to supply project water for fish and wildlife, the CVPIA mandates
that the Bureau provide 800,000 acre-feet (or roughly ten percent) of
Central Valley Project water annually to wildlife refuges, instream uses,
and instream flows.205 When NMFS issued a biological opinion stating
operation of the Central Valley Project, as proposed in 1993, was likely
to jeopardize Sacramento winter-run chinook salmon, the Bureau
197. See Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 420-22.
198. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 259-60 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
199. Id. at 262.
200. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1534 (E.D. Cal.
1991) (EIS required for rules to implement the reclamation program); Envtl. Def.
Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1979) (EIS required when water is
committed to a particular use through a water marketing program or contract).
201. See William H. Holmes & Gail L. Achterman, Bureau of Reclamation Contract
Renewal and Administration: When Is a Contract Not a Contract?, 41 ROcMY MTN.MIN. L.
INST. 23-1, 23-27 (1995).
202. Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 808 (9th Cir. 1990).
203. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995).
204. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390h to 390h-16 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) & 16 U.S.C. 4600-31 to -34 (1994)).
205. 106 Stat. at 4715-16.
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announced that, to comply with the mandates of the CVPIA and the
ESA, it would reduce its initial allocation of water to several contract
holders by fifty percent.206 The Ninth Circuit upheld the Bureau's
reallocation of water by adhering to a long-established doctrine that
supports subsequent revisions of contracts between the federal
government and private parties unless the2 7 government has
unequivocally surrendered its sovereign authority.
In the water-spreading context, section 7 of the ESA is a
subsequent congressional act requiring the Bureau to consult with
NMFS to ensure that federal agency actions are not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of listed salmon species, or destroy or
adversely modify those species' critical habitat. Just as the Ninth
Circuit in O'Neil affirmed the Bureau's decision to satisfy its duties
under the CVPIA and the ESA by reducing water deliveries, the
Bureau must also satisfy its section 7 duty to consult with NMFS on the
effects of water spreading on listed salmon. That is, the ESA requires
the Bureau to consult on its actions where, for example, the Bureau
has affirmative, on-going obligations under the reclamation laws such
as the duty to ensure that water is delivered only to lands classified as
irrigable.
c.

Duty With Respect to Senior Tribal Water Rights

Finally, the Bureau has a duty to control water spreading in such a
way as to fulfill the federal government's trust obligation to Indian
tribes. Indian tribes have two discrete and vitally important salmonrelated rights in the Columbia Basin: the right to take fish and a timeimmemorial water right. The federal-tribal trust relationship, whose
principles are often traced back to the Supreme Court's 1831 ruling in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,28 recognizes the sovereignty of Indian
nations runs concurrent with a federal fiduciary duty to Indian tribes.
This federal fiduciary obligation includes protection of the treatysecured fishing rights of the Pacific Northwest tribes. The "Stevens
treaty tribes"219 of the Columbia Basin were assured the right of "taking
fish" at all "usual and accustomed" places "in common with" EuroAmerican settlers. '0 This treaty language was interpreted by Judge
Belloni in the District of Oregon to mean a "fair share" of the

206. Baker, supranote 16, at 629.
207. O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686. See also Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage Dist.
v. United States, 158 F.3d 428, 438 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Because we are wary of
constructions that would give government contracts the force of indelible laws, we
assume that '[t] he sovereign's power to enact subsequent legislation affecting its own
contractual arrangements endures, albeit with some limitations, unless surrendered in
unmistakable terms.'") (citation omitted).
208. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 2, 15-16, 19-20 (1831)
(dismissing case brought by Cherokee Nation against state of Georgia for lack of
original jurisdiction, and recognizing tribes as "domestic dependent nations").
209. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
210. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 331-32 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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harvest,2 ' and then clarified by Judge Boldt in the Western District of
2
Washington to mean fifty percent of the harvestable salmon.
The fishing rights decisions are integrally tied to Indian water
rights in the Columbia Basin. Because of their unique sovereign
status, Indian tribes are not subject to state prior appropriation laws in
the same way as other western water users, causing a continuing
conflict between Indian tribes and the Bureau.213 Because of the
Indians' unique relationship with state and federal government,
federal courts developed a separate water law doctrine for Indian
tribes, known as the Winans Doctrine. In the 1905 case for which the
doctrine is named, the Supreme Court held the treaties with the
Columbia Basin Indians recognized tribal property rights in offreservation fishing grounds, regardless of state licenses or federal
homestead patents. ' Thus, rather than simply affording the Indian
tribes equal treatment with non-Indians, the tribes had secured a
perpetual servitude in the land that bound the federal government
despite future ownership of the land.
In short, the Indians tribes' physical access to their traditional
fishing places, coupled with the opportunity to take half of the
harvestable salmon, secured powerful and meaningful rights for the
tribes. The federal government has a duty to protect these rights,
which extends to the actions of the Bureau. In Klamath Water Users
Protective Association v. Patterson, the Ninth Circuit wrote, "[s] imilar to
its duties under the ESA, the United States, as a trustee for the Tribes,
has a responsibility to protect their rights and resources."21 5 Because
2 6
the Klamath Basin Tribes hold a "priority date of time immemorial,"
the Bureau, as controller of reclamation project dams, "has a
responsibility to divert the water and resources needed to fulfill the
Tribes' rights, rights that take precedence over any alleged rights of
the Irrigators."21 7 Thus, the court held the Bureau also has the duty to
1
If
direct dam operations to comply with tribal water requirements.

211. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969).
212. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343. For a detailed historical and legal discussion
of the Belloni and Boldt decisions, see Blumm, supra note 17, at 90-98.
213. JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. McCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES 143 (2d ed. 1996).
Indeed, from the Bureau's very first project in Nevada, and continuing to the present
day, Bureau projects have clashed with tribal rights across the West. Id.
214. United States v. Winans, 73 F. 72, 75 (C.C.D. Wash. 1896). See also Blumm,
supranote 17, at 81-83.
215. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).
216. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding Klamath
Basin Tribes hold implied water rights to support hunting and fishing rights
guaranteed by treaties).
217. PattersonII, 204 F.3d at 1214.
218. Id. Note the court's exact language:
Because Reclamation maintains control of the Dam, it has a responsibility to
divert the water and resources needed to fulfill the Tribes' rights, rights that
take precedence over any alleged rights of the Irrigators. Accordingly, we
hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Reclamation has
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the Bureau has an obligation to direct dam project operations in order
to comply with tribal water rights, then it is no great leap in logic to
assume the Bureau has the same obligation to control illegal water
spreading that infringes upon senior tribal water rights-especially if
those water rights are quantified.
In sum, the Bureau's failure to control water spreading of federal
project water-that is, the Bureau's inaction with respect to water
spreading-is an "action" subject to the procedural and substantive
requirements of section 7(a) (2). This "action" is coupled with three
distinct, affirmative duties which the Bureau is obligated to fulfill:
duties under the reclamation laws, duties under subsequently enacted
federal environmental laws, and duties with respect to the federaltribal trust relationship.
2.

Other Identifiable Actions Involving Water Spreading

Besides interpreting the Bureau's failure to act as an action, there
are other "positive" actions involved. Combined with the inaction
described above, the Bureau delivers water or renews contracts with
the knowledge that users are illegally spreading project water.
Knowledge of illegality by itself is not an action, but here, knowledge
coupled with water delivery or contract renewal is. Because the federal
reclamation laws, which are incorporated into any Bureau contract
with an irrigator or delivery organization, allow only specifically
authorized uses of project water, the term "action" subsumes the
Bureau's failure to stop illegal water spreading when the agency
delivers water or renews contracts.
a.

Bureau Water Deliveries

Courts have not yet decided the question of whether a Bureau
water delivery under an existing contract is an agency action. Some
commentators, however, have argued that it clearly falls under the
purview of section 7.V'9 In Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, the Ninth
Circuit held section 7 applies to ongoing agency actions such as the
land resource management plans ("LRMPs") in question! ° Even
though the chinook salmon at issue in Pacfic Rivers Councilwere listed
after the Forest Service had adopted the LRMPs, the court held the
the authority to direct operation of the Dam to comply with Tribal water
requirements.
Id. (emphasis added). Although the court states that the Bureau has the "authority" to
direct dam operations to comply with tribal water requirements, this clearly means a
duty to comply with those requirements. This reading is evident from the preceding
sentence where the court refers to the Bureau's "responsibility" to fulfill the federal
government's trust obligation, as well as the district court opinion the Ninth Circuit
affirms. The district court stated the irrigators' "rights to water in the basin... are
subservient to senior tribal water rights and to subsequent legislative enactments by
Congress, such as the Endangered Species Act." Patterson1, 15 F. Supp. 2d 990, 996
(D. Or. 1998).
219. See Baker, supra note 16, at 634-37.
220. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Forest Service still was required to consult with NMFS on the effects of
The Ninth Circuit
the LRMPs once the salmon were listed.22
action "because
agency
ongoing
emphasized that the LRMPs represent
even after
effect
the LRMPs have an ongoing and long-lasting
" 2 LRMPs are analogous to the Bureau's delivery of project
adoption.
water in that water delivery contracts set annual schedules for specified
quantities to be delivered for periods of up to forty years.22 Because
these forty-year contracts specify water delivery quantities, "subsequent
species listings may trigger consultation duties224long after the contracts
are entered into and long before they expire."
b.

Bureau Water Delivery Contract Renewals

Similarly, water delivery contract renewals are "actions" that,
combined with Bureau acknowledgement of illegal water spreading
within the contract area, may subject water spreading to the
requirements of section 7. The Ninth Circuit held in NaturalResources
Defense Council v. Houston that renewals of federal water delivery
225
Although the court's "agency action"
contracts are agency actions.
analysis focused on the discretionary authority element, contract
renewals are obviously "activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out" by the Bureau.226 Indeed, the regulatory
definition of "action" includes "the granting of... contracts."22 To
include water spreading as part of the action of contract renewal, one
must demonstrate the Bureau renewed a contract at the same time it
failed to control illegal water spreading in the contract area. Because
the Bureau is bound by several affirmative duties under the
reclamation laws, including, for example, the agency's obligation to
ensure the appurtenancy and beneficial use requirements are met, a
contract renewal can be an agency action that subsumes the Bureau's
failure to control illegal water spreading.
221. Id. at 1056.
222. Id. at 1053.
223. Baker, supranote 16, at 635.
224. Id. Note also that the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra
Club does not appear to affect this analysis. That case held that a generic challenge to
a forest plan, without any specific or concrete harm alleged, was not ripe for
adjudication. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 736-37 (1998).
However, the Court did state that harm- or site-specific challenges could include "a
challenge to the lawfulness of the present [forest] Plan if (but only if) the present Plan
then matters, i.e., if the Plan plays a causal role with respect to the future, thenimminent, harm." Id. at 734. The Court also noted that an LRMP would be subject to
challenge upon issuance if the plan "incorporated a final decision" that "could result
in imminent concrete injury," such as to allow motorcycles into a bird-watching area.
Id. at 738-39 (citation omitted). The water spreading that occurs under an existing
water delivery contract is analogous to the situation envisioned by the Court in which
the contract sets forth actual, specific decisions (as opposed to policies or broad
statements of intended actions) that could give rise to imminent harm if violated by
the practice of water spreading.
225. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1998).
226. Id.; 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2000).
227. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
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FEDERAL DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO CONTROL WATER
SPREADING

In addition to federal agency involvement and an identifiable
action, the Bureau must possess discretionary authority over an
"agency action." The Ninth Circuit affirmed a regulation
that states
the ESA does not apply when the agency lacks discretion to act for the
benefit of the species, because if the agency "lacks the discretion to
influence the private action, consultation would be a meaningless
exercise. " 28 The Bureau clearly has the discretionary authority to stop
illegal water spreading for the benefit of protected species. According
to Houston, the Bureau's water delivery contracts satisfy this
requirement because the Bureau retains discretionary authority when
it renews a contract with a delivery organization such as a water users
association or irrigation district.!
Under Patterson II, the Bureau
retains the authority to control its dams, making dam operations and
water delivery to irrigators subservient to ESA and senior tribal water
rights considerations. "
Similarly, the Bureau retains the discretionary authority to control
water spreading. This authority stems from a number of different
sources, ranging from the Bureau's authority to administer and
enforce the reclamation laws, 3' to promulgate regulations,2 ' and to
enforce contract provisions.233 The premise that the Bureau has the
responsibility and obligation to properly carry out the reclamation laws
and to stop practices that are illegal under those laws underlies each
source of Bureau discretionary authority to assert control over illegally
spread water and to stop water spreading.

228. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995). See 50 C.F.R. §
402.03 ("discretionary Federal involvement or control"); see also Strahan v. Linnon,
967 F. Supp. 581, 607 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[i]f the federal agency has no discretion to
modify the activity at issue to accommodate the mandate of the ESA, then the
consultation process would be pointless") (citation omitted).
Note that these
statements are not uncontroversial.
See Derek Weller, Limiting the Scope of the
EndangeredSpecies Act: DiscretionaryFederalInvolvement or Control Under Section 402.03, 5
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'y 309, 310-11 (1999). Both the statute and the
regulations appear to define "agency action" broadly. The statute defines the term as
"any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter
in this
section referred to as an 'agency action')." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). The
regulations define the term as "all activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies." 50 C.F.R1 § 402.02.
However, the regulations add an additional element to the definition by stating that
the requirements of section 7 "apply to all actions in which there is discretionary

Federal involvement or control." Id. § 402.03. Weller argues that section 402.03

effectively redefines the scope of an "agency action" by excluding any actions that can
be deemed nondiscretionary. Weller, supra at 310. Nevertheless, courts have generally
accepted this third element of "agency action" without question.
229. Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126.
230. PattersonII, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2000).
231. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 373 (1994).
232. See id. §§ 373, 390ww(c), 485i.
233. See id §§ 485h-1 to -6.
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1. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations
First and foremost, the Bureau may promulgate regulations
regarding the use of unauthorized water and the procedures the
agency will use to exert its authority and secure control of illegally
used water."" The Reclamation Act authorizes the Secretary of
Interior "to perform any and all acts and to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying
235 Most
out the provisions of this Act into full force and effect."
individual reclamation contracts also recognize the Bureau's authority
to promulgate regulations. 36 Nevertheless, the Bureau has never
promulgated regulations regarding water spreading. Certainly the
Bureau has the authority to make and enforce rules that address and
eliminate such an insidious practice which runs against clear
restrictions in the reclamation laws.
One obvious potential rule would simply direct that a user found
spreading project water to lands not authorized to receive such water
37
would lose the right to continue to receive that quantity of water.
Recognizing that project water "would not exist but for the fact that it
has been developed by the United States," the Ninth Circuit has stated
that project water "is not there for the taking (by the landowner
subject to state law), but for the giving by the United States. The terms
upon which it can be put to use, and the manner in which rights to
238
United States to fix."
continued use can be acquired, are for the

Thus, the Bureau could promulgate a regulation such as the one
suggested, and include it as a delivery contract term and condition.
2.

Authority to Attach Conditions to Delivery of Water

As the Ninth Circuit suggested in Israel v. Morton, the Bureau has
the authority, regardless of whether there is an explicit administrative
rule, to attach conditions to the delivery of the publicly subsidized,
federal benefit that it provides to water users.239 In 1958, the Supreme
Court held in Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v. McCracken that because the
United States had expended public funds to develop reclamation
projects, the Bureau could place conditions on receipt of project
benefits. 24 The Court stated it was "beyond challenge" that the federal
government could impose reasonable conditions "on the use of
federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges.... [T]he
Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives

234. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 105-06.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

43 U.S.C. § 373.
Benson & Priestley, supranote 11, at 105-06.
Id. at 108.
Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1977).
Benson, Whose WaterIs It?, supra note 61, at 411.
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-96 (1958).

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 4

thereof."24" '
As with water delivery, the Bureau retains the authority to change
the terms and conditions for receipt of project water.24 ' The Ninth
Circuit has upheld this authority in the context of applying the
provisions of the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act, 24 renegotiating water

service contracts to increase district payment obligations,N4 and
reallocating project water to meet instream needs, such as protecting
fish. 45 Of course, a fine line exists between a simple change in federal
policy and upsetting reasonably based expectations and interests in
federal water deliveries.4
3.

Authority to Allocate Water Among Eligible Users and Withhold
Water From Projects

The Bureau also holds the authority to allocate water among
otherwise eligible users.247 These discretionary allocation decisions
include determining how project water should be allocated among
different authorized purposes, such as municipal versus irrigation
uses,
allocation during drought conditions, and allocation for
prioritized tribal and environmental needs.250 In addition to the
authority to allocate, the Bureau also has the authority to withhold
water from projects for a variety of reasons,25' including water users'
failure to meet federal reporting requirements, 252 violation of projectspecific water use regulations, lack of a contractual right to receive
water, 254 or an unreasonable waste of project water. 255

The Bureau's

241. Id. at 295.
242. Benson, Whose WaterIs It?, supranote 61, at 413.
243. See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 821-25
(9th Cir. 1990); Peterson v. U. S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 813-14 (9th Cir.
1990).
244. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993).
245. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1995); Westlands Water
Dist. v. U. S. Dep't of
Interior, 850 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
246. Benson, Whose Water Is It?, supra note 61, at 413-14 (citing Madera Irrigation
Dist., 985 F.2d at 1400).
247. Id. at 415-16.
248. See, e.g., Central Ariz. Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Lujan, 764 F. Supp. 582, 591
(D. Ariz. 1991).
249. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 1507
(E.D. Cal. 1992), aFfd sub nom. Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667
(9th Cir. 1993).
250. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262
(9th Cir. 1984).
251. Benson, Whose WaterIs It?, supra note 61, at 414.
252. See United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487,
492 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (regarding reporting requirements of the Reclamation Reform
Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390ff).
253. See Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir.
1989).
254. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 878 F.2d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.
1989).
255. SeeYuma County Water Users' Ass'n v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 548, 549-50 (D.D.C.
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range of authority certainly anticipates the use of these discretionary
powers to control illegally spread water by allocating illegally used
quantities of water to other uses or withholding illegally used
quantities of water from delivery organizations or irrigators.
4.

Ordering Water Delivery Organizations to Cease Illegal Deliveries

The Bureau may also order its contractors-the water users
associations, irrigation districts, and other delivery organizations-to
cease illegal deliveries. Not only can the Bureau, as administrator of
the reclamation laws, order delivery organizations to abide by those
laws (so that the reclamation laws have "full force and effect"), but
individual irrigators must also certify, as a condition to receipt of
project water, compliance with the reclamation laws. 56 The Bureau
asserted this authority in 1993 by ordering the Umatilla Basin
to another district that did
irrigation district to stop delivering 5 water
7
not have a contract with the Bureau.
5.

Claiming Forfeiture of Illegally Used Water

illegally
The Bureau also has the authority to assert control over
258
Some
spread water by claiming the user forfeits such water.
contracts specifically state that if a district does not use any portion of
its contracted water for a given period of time, the district forfeits the
unused water and the Bureau has the right to deliver that water to
another user-presumably including instream uses. 9 Water use in
violation of contract provisions, especially use outside of project
6°
boundaries, may constitute a constructive failure to use that water.
The Bureau likely would have the authority to either adjust the
contract so that the user could legally use the spread water in the
previously unauthorized manner or place, or assert authority over the
illegally used water and re-allocate the water to another user or use. In
addition, the Reclamation Act adheres to the prior appropriation
doctrine, which asserts that water users who fail to exercise their water61
rights may lose those rights through forfeiture or abandonment.
Further, each of the Pacific Northwest states of Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, and Washington have statutes providing for forfeiture of
water rights if not used for a specified period of years without
1964).
256. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390ff (1994) (irrigators shall
furnish "certificate that they are in compliance with the provisions of this subchapter
including a statement of the number of acres leased, the term of any lease, and a
certification that the rent paid reflects the reasonable value of the irrigation water to
the productivity of the land"). See also 43 C.F.R. § 426.18 (2000) (landholder
information requirements).
257. See Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 106.
258. 1& at lo9.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Russell, supra note 68, at 155; Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo, supranote
71, at 887.
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adequate justification. 6 '
6.

Authority With Respect to Water Conservation

The 1982 Reclamation Reform Act requires the Secretary to
"encourage" consideration and incorporation of "prudent and
responsible water conservation measures in the operations of nonFederal recipients of irrigation water from Federal reclamation
projects, where such measures are shown to be economically feasible
for such non-Federal recipients."2 6' This water conservation provision
also requires that each district that has entered into a repayment or
water service contract "shall develop a water conservation plan which shall
contain definite goals, appropriate water conservation measures, and a
264
time schedule for meeting the water conservation objectives."
Although general in nature, this provision indicates the Bureau could
satisfy its duty to encourage ("shall... encourage") water conservation
by requiring districts to develop mandatory water conservation
measures and plans that specifically declare water spreading violative
of such plans. One district court looked to this provision in
determining NEPA required the Bureau to consider, in its adoption of
regulations implementing the Reclamation Reform Act, an alternative
that provided greater environmental benefits through water
conservation. 6 5
7.

Pursuing Remedies for Breach of Contract

Finally, the Bureau has the authority to stop water spreading by
pursuing remedies for breach of contract, including cessation of water
deliveries to unauthorized lands.2 6
A typical contract provision

262. IDAHO CODE § 42-222(2) (Michie Supp. 2000); MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-404(2)
(1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610 (1999); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.14.160 (West
2001). Oregon's provision, for example, states:
Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state. Whenever the owner of a perfected and developed
water right ceases or fails to use all or part of the water apropriated for a
period of five successive years, the failure to use shall estabish a rebuttable
presumption of forfeiture of all or part of the water right.
OR. REv. STAT. § 540.610(1).
263. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. § 390jj(a) (1994). "The Secretary
shall, pursuant to his authorities under otherwise existing Federal reclamation law,
encourage the full consideration and incorporation of... water conservation
measures." Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 427.1(a) (2000) (requiring consideration of "water
conservation measures inall districts and for the operations by non-Federal recipients
of irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) water from Federal Reclamation
projects") (emphasis added).
264. 43 U.S.C. § 390jj(b) (emphasis added).
See also 43 C.F.R. § 427.1(b)
(development of a plan).
265. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
The court stated, "[wihile the EA examines the economic effects of the four
alternatives considered, there is no discussion of the effect of water conservation. In
light of the express statutory language [of section 390jj], the absence of such an
alternative appears to be inconsistent with the Secretary's duty." Id.
266. Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 108.
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restricting a delivery organization's authority to deliver water outside
its boundaries states: "Water furnished to the Contractor pursuant to
this contract shall not be sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of for
use outside the Contractor's service area without prior written consent
of the contracting officer."267 In at least one case, irrigation districts in
Washington conceded that the Bureau could require them to stop
delivering water to irrigators who failed to comply with Bureau
regulations and requirements that were enforceable under the delivery
contracts .2
Some commentators, however, argue the Bureau's remedies for
breach of contract violations versus statutory violations are not
necessarily the same. In other words, the Bureau may not always have
the authority to order a cessation of deliveries, at least under breach of
contract theories. 269 This argument appears to be that, while the
Bureau may cease deliveries for unauthorized use outside of project
boundaries, the Bureau's ability to obtain a cessation of unauthorized
deliveries made outside of only the district's service area (but within
However, if the Bureau may halt
project boundaries) is limited.
unauthorized deliveries outside of both project and district boundaries,
then no good argument exists explaining why unauthorized deliveries
outside of district boundaries, but inside project boundaries, should
receive an implied special exemption from the general reclamation
statutory requirement that all uses of federal project water must be
authorized by the Bureau.27 ' Further, the contract provision above, for
example, clearly states the delivery organization must obtain Bureau
consent "for use outside the Contractor's service area," i.e. district
boundaries. That contract clause could not be clearer. Although the
argument against Bureau authority to cease unauthorized water
deliveries attempts to distinguish between statutory and contractual
remedies available to the Bureau, the bottom line is that, without
project authorization, contractual authorization, administrative
classification as irrigable, and satisfaction of state water rights, a district
has no right to deliver water to, and an irrigator has no right to use
water on, unauthorized lands.

267. Holmes & Achterman, supra note 201, at 23-15 n.47 (citing Contract Between
the United States and Stockton-East Water District Providing for Project Water Service
§ 10 (Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Contract No. 4-07-20-W0329) (Dec. 19,
1983)).
268. United States v. Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487, 492
(E.D. Wash. 1986).
269. Holmes & Achterman, supra note 201, at 23-14.
270. Id. at 23-15. The reclamation laws specifically provide for circumstances in
which the Bureau may have the authority to contract for deliveries outside of project
boundaries, including temporary rentals of surplus water for use on land excluded
from a project because it has been classified as unproductive or surplus water used for
purposes other than irrigation. 43 U.S.C. §§ 423, 521 (1994).
271. See 43 C.F.R. § 426.19(h) (2000) (directing districts to "[w]ithhold deliveries of
irrigation water to any landholder not eligible to receive irrigation water under the
certification or reporting requirements or any other provision of Federal reclamation
law and these regulations").
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In short, the discretionary authorities the Bureau may invoke to
satisfy its various duties in carrying out the reclamation laws are
myriad. One cannot argue that the Bureau "lacks the discretion to
influence" 2n the illegal spreading of federal project water. Therefore,
having established the Bureau's failure to control water spreading is an
"agency action" for purposes of invoking the requirements of section
7(a)(2), the discussion turns to the question of whether water
spreading "may affect" listed species.
E.

SHOWING THAT WATER SPREADING "MAYAFFECT" LISTED SPECIES

ESA consultation is mandatory when an agency determines its
proposed action "may affect listed species or critical habitat."2 73 As
discussed below, water spreading clearly "may affect" listed fish species
in the Columbia and Snake River Basins. Of course, many factors have
contributed and continue to contribute to the precipitous decline of
the salmon. 74 If federal resource managers choose to ignore one or
more of those factors, however, the burden to mitigate the problem
will continue to press on the remaining factors.
The best evidence and documentation that water spreading may
affect listed salmon comes from the federal government. Water
storage projects and irrigation withdrawals that decrease river flows
have perhaps the most devastating impact on listed salmon species. In
1993, NMFS designated critical habitat for Snake River salmon, and
stated water quantity was an essential element of listed salmon
conservation. 75

NMFS also noted that protection of critical habitat

would require "special management activities in areas outside the current
distribution of the listed species that have been determined to be essential
to the conservation of the species."2 76 In other words, actions well
beyond the banks of the streams of the Snake River Basin necessarily
impact the chances of recovery of listed salmon.

272. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995).
273. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d
1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
274. NMFS has stated that
[nlo single or primary factor could be identified as the primary cause for the
decline or as the primary source of mortality; but based on the combination
of factors affecting the continued existence of the species, NMFS determined
that the species were in danger of extinction or likely to become endangered
within the foreseeable future.
NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON
1994-1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE

PROGRAM
IN
1995 AND FUTURE YEARS 8 (1995)
at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lpublcat/docu/hydro-bo.htm
(last modified Dec. 11,
2000) [hereinafter 1995 BiOp].
275. Designated Critical Habitat; Snake River Sockeye Salmon, Snake River
Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 58 Fed.
Reg. 68,543, 68,545 (Dec. 28, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226).
276. Id. at 68,546 (emphasis added).
TRANSPORTATION
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1. The 1995 Hydropower Biological Opinion
In its 1995 biological opinion ("1995 BiOp") on the effects of the
Federal Columbia River Power System ("FCRPS") on endangered
Snake River salmon, NMFS concluded that, without modification, the
hydropower system would jeopardize listed species.2" The 1995 BiOp
discussed a number of reasonable and prudent alternatives FCRPS
agencies 278 should undertake to meet river flow objectives and avoid
jeopardy to listed salmon.2 " As an immediate action to improve the
chances of species survival, NMFS directed the FCRPS agencies to
"[i]mprove flows in the Columbia and Snake Rivers through additional
flow augmentation, and manage those flows on an in-season basis to
optimize fish survival."2 0 With respect to reclamation operations in
particular, NMFS directed that the Bureau
shall continue to provide the 427 thousand acre-feet (kaf) [annually]
of flow augmentation from the upper Snake River as identified in the
[Northwest] Power Planning Council's Strategy for Salmon in 1995a high probability
97, taking such actions as are necessary to ensure
211
of providing provision of that volume by 1998.
This 427 thousand acre-feet ("k.a.f.") represents the minimum
volume that the Bureau must provide. "The [Bureau] shall subsequently
secure an additional amount of water, in coordination with the states of
Idaho and Oregon, as may be necessary to further reduce human-caused
NMFS
mortality of endangered salmon in the Snake River."282
repeatedly emphasized this point by stating additionalwater for fish
flow augmentation is "essential to mitigate for disruption of the
Formal
natural runoff of the Columbia and Snake Rivers."28
consultation "shall be initiated" if the Bureau fails to make significant
84
is, both the 427 k.a.f.
progress "toward securing these volumes" M-that
flow augmentation, plus additional flows the Bureau secures through
285
other means.
277. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 67-69. The 1995 BiOp was produced as a result
of Judge Marsh's order in 1994, rejecting NMFS's no jeopardy determination for
Columbia River hydropower operations. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994).
278. The "FCRPS agencies" are all of the federal agencies that conduct hydropower
operations on the Columbia-Snake River system: Army Corps of Engineers, Bonneville
Power Administration, and Bureau of Reclamation. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 9.
279. Id,at 70-79.
280. Id. at 73. Hydropower operations have historically altered the Columbia and
Snake Rivers' hydrographs by storing the high natural peak flows of spring and then
releasing that stored water in the winter when energy demand is highest in the
Northwest. See also Blumm, supra note 17, at 119.
281. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 76.
282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. The BiOp explicitly suggests dry year leases, land fallowing and purchases of
storage space, but the list is not exclusive. Id. Securing illegally spread water certainly
qualifies as an "effective means" of acquiring water as well. See discussion infra Part
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Although the BiOp did not make explicit the quantity of
additional water needed to ensure survival and recovery of listed
salmon, NFMS referred to specified quantities in other plans. The
Northwest Power Planning Council plan called for an additional one
million acre-feet ("m.a.f.") annually, and the state and tribal Detailed
Fisheries Operation Plan called for an additional 1.5 m.a.f. beyond the
427 k.a.f. from the upper Snake River.286 NMFS did not provide its own
quantification of the amount of additional water necessary, but stated
it "agrees that additional augmentation volumes are essential in the
Snake River during low flow years and during the summer migration
period and that the [Bureau] should take all reasonable steps to secure
additional water."2 7 Finally, although FCRPS agencies are "technically
not bound" by the reasonable and prudent measures in NMFS's BiOp,
"an agency that attempts to proceed with an action in the face of a
critical FWS biological opinion will almost certainly be8 found to have
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law.",
2.

A Reasonable Step to Secure Additional Water: Eliminate Water
Spreading

Although the 1995 BiOp included only a short list of suggestionsdry year leases, land fallowing and purchases of water rights-for
possible actions the Bureau could take to secure additional amounts of
water for flow augmentation, several others certainly exist, including
the elimination of water spreading. As far back as 1983, the Bureau
itself recognized the problem in a land classification report, estimating
that 662,000 acres of unclassified lands were receiving project water in
western states, with two-thirds of that acreage in the Pacific
Northwest. 2 9 In a 1985 internal memorandum, the Bureau recognized
its monitoring and2revention policies with respect to water spreading
were "inadequate." A 1994 Office of Inspector General audit report
emphasized the Bureau had failed to control the problem since the
1985 study, and estimated 154,000 acres were receiving federal water
illegally.2' NMFS flatly called for the Bureau to stop the practice of
water spreading in the 1995 proposed recovery plan.
3.

The 1999 Snake River Biological Opinion

In 1999, NMFS issued a supplemental BiOp for operation and
V.E.2.
286. 1995 BiOp, supra note 274, at 76.
287. I&. (emphasis added).
288. Lone Rock Timber Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 433, 437 (D. Or.
1994). See also Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989).
289. 1983 BUREAU LAND CLASSMICATION AND EQUIVALENCY REPORT,supra note 166, at
10-11. See also Benson & Priestley, supra note 11, at 96 (citing the Report).
290. Memorandum from the Acting Commissioner, to the Regional Director 1 (May
17, 1985) (on file with author).
291. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, IRRIGATION OF INELIGIBLE
LANDS, BUREAu OF RECLAMATION, Report No. 94-1-930, 2, 6 (July 1994).
292. PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 43, at V-2-26.
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maintenance of the Bureau's Snake River projects above Lower
Granite Dam in eastern Washington2 3 The 1999 BiOp focused on the
Bureau's fulfillment of NMFS's reasonable and prudent measures
outlined in the 1995 hydropower BiOp.Y However, the 1999 BiOp
ignored the requirement that the Bureau secure water in addition to
427 k.a.f., focusing instead on the Bureau's efforts to meet that initial
requirement2 5 The only mention of water spreading appeared in a
small paragraph, stating "[t]he scale of water spreading at [the
Bureau's] projects covered by this Opinion is unknown.
Even
though the scale is ostensibly unknown, NMFS concluded, somewhat
contradictorily, that "the scale of water spreading is sufficiently small
that it does not adversely affect [the Bureau's] ability to supply" the
minimum 427 k.a.f. annually.2 7 Given the extensive recognition by the
Bureau and others of the extent of water spreading, the NMFS
statement that the scale of the problem is unknown in 1999 appears
somewhat disingenuous. In fact, even if the problem is of "sufficiently
small" scale, the Bureau still should use its authority to stop illegal
practices in order to gain even that "small" quantity of flow
augmentation beyond the minimum 427 k.a.f. required in the 1995
BiOp.
4.

The 2000 Hydropower Biological Opinion

Finally, in December 2000, NMFS released a biological opinion on
reinitiation of consultation on the long-term configuration of the
FCRPS.28 The 2000 BiOp sets out the hydrosystem and offsite
mitigation measures NMFS believes are biologically feasible and
implementable, sufficient to achieve maximum performance standards
without dam breaching, and sufficient to "result in a high likelihood of
survival and a moderate-to-high likelihood of recovery."2 Among the
actions recommended, NMFS states that the Bureau "shall provide
NMFS with a detailed progress report addressing possible instances
where [Bureau]-supplied water within the Columbia River basin is

293. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION OPERATIONS AND
MAINTENANCE OF ITS PROJECrS IN THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN ABOvE LOWER GRANITE DAM: A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS SIGNED ON MARCH 2, 1995, AND MAY 14, 1998
(1998), available at http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lpress/biopfina.html (last modified
Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter 1999 BiOp].
294. Id. at 6-8.
295. Id. at 11-12. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 17, Trout Unltd. v. Nat'i Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 00-262 MA (D. Or.
filed Feb. 17, 2000) (on file with author).
296. 1999 BiOp, supra note 293, at 29.
297. Id.
298. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINITIATION OF
CONSULTATION ON OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM,

19 BUREAU OF
9-69
(2000),
at
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/lhydrop/hydroweb/docs/Final/200OBiop.html
(last
modified Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter 2000 BiOp].

INCLUDING THE JUvENILE
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299. Id. at 9-53.
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being used without apparent [Bureau] authorization to irrigate
lands."3 0 The Bureau's report "shall indicate" how the agency will
identify and address such instances of unauthorized use-instances of
various forms of water spreading. 1 NMFS takes the position that
water spreading is not an agency action for purposes of section
7(a) (2), but leaves open the possibility that the Bureau must consult
on contract actions it takes against unauthorized water users:
Federal agencies are required to consult only on actions that are
"authorized, funded, or carried out by SUCh agency[.]" NMFS
recognizes that unauthorized uses of [Bureau]-supplied water are by
definition not "authorized, funded, or carried out' by [the Bureau].
As [the Bureau] works within the limits of its authority to address any
identified episode of unauthorized use of [Bureau]-supplied water,
NMFS recognizes that, in some instances,,,[the Bureau] will have to
take contract actions and consult on them. 0
In a separate section, NMFS describes how those consultations will
proceed, requiring the Bureau to report the nature and extent of
actual unauthorized use. 303
The 2000 BiOp also reiterates that Bureau projects across the
Columbia River Basin contribute to streamflow depletions during
juvenile salmon outmigration season, decreasing the frequency of
achieving the flow objectives needed to protect the fish." 4 To mitigate
this problem, NMFS states that "[b]efore entering into any agreement
to commit currently uncontracted water or storage space in any of its
reservoirs covered by this biological opinion to any other use than
salmon flow augmentation, [the Bureau] shall consult with NMFS
"'0' The
under ESA Section 7(a) (2).
Bureau must also consult with
NMFS before entering into any new contract or contract amendment
to increase the authorized acreage served by any irrigation district
receiving Bureau project water. 06 These consultations must identify
the "amount of discretionary storage or water being sought, the
current probability of such storage or water being available for salmon
flow augmentation, and any plan to replace the storage volume
currently available to salmon flow augmentation that would be lost as a
result of the proposed commitment." 7 In reviewing these Bureau
actions, NMFS will "ensure that there [will] be zero net impact from
any such [Bureau] commitment on the ability to meet the seasonal
flow objectives established in this biological opinion." 0

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 9-69.
Id.
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994)).
Id. at 9-68 to -69.
2000 BiOp, supra note 298, at 9-68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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NMFS concludes by stating "current rates of water deliveries
adversely affect survival conditions in the migration corridor" and
3 9
0
"further depletions should be avoided until recovery is achieved."
This statement, combined with NMFS's concern over unauthorized
use of Bureau project water, seems to indicate that NMFS has backed
off somewhat from its statement in the 1999 BiOp that the scale of
water spreading is "sufficiently small that it does not adversely affect
[the Bureau's] ability to supply" 10 minimum adequate streamflows. In
short, given the Bureau's historical failure to assert any control over
water spreading, combined with NMFS's requirements the Bureau
secure additional water to increase flows, report on unauthorized uses
of federal water and consult on contract actions that seek to increase
authorized acreage, little doubt exists that the Bureau's current water
spreading management practices (or lack thereof) "may affect" listed
Snake River salmon.
V. CONCLUSION
The ESA is the most promising and readily available strategy to
control water spreading in the Pacific Northwest and to "reclaim"
water for endangered salmon that need adequate flows to ensure
Although a pointed and unequivocal
survival of their species.
assertion by the Bureau regarding its widespread authority to control
water spreading would be the most direct route to address the
problem, history suggests such an assertion is unlikely. The ESA may
provide a more encouraging and direct route to securing immediate
habitat protection for many salmon species that teeter on the brink of
extinction. Although the Bureau has failed to act to stop illegal water
spreading practices using project water, the Bureau clearly has a duty
to do so. This affirmative duty to act stems from the reclamation laws,
subsequently enacted federal environmental laws, and the federal trust
obligation to protect reserved Indian treaty rights.
To fulfill its duties and control water spreading, the Bureau also
has a myriad of discretionary authorities, including: promulgating
regulations, attaching conditions to water deliveries, allocating water
among eligible users, ordering the cessation of illegal deliveries,
causing forfeiture of illegally used project water, adopting water
conservation measures and plans, and pursuing breach of contract
remedies. Coupled with the duty to control water spreading, the
Bureau's discretionary authority to do so makes the Bureau's failure to
control water spreading an "agency action" for purposes of ESA
section 7(a) (2). Because NMFS's biological opinions have pointed to
inadequate low flows as one of the critical threats to the survival and
recovery of Columbia and Snake River Basin salmon, the Bureau's
failure to control water spreading clearly "may affect" those listed
species. In short, the Bureau's failure to control water spreading is an

309. Id.
310. 1999 BiOp, supra note 293, at 29.
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"agency action" that "may affect" listed salmon, and therefore is
subject to the requirements of ESA section 7(a) (2).
As a final note, one should recognize that many factors contribute
to the decline of the salmon-albeit some far more significantly than
others-and many human land uses and other activities exacerbate
each cause of decline. Control of water spreading in order to provide
increased flows and decrease polluted irrigation return flows is but one
strategy that will contribute to the survival and recovery of listed fish
species. The Pacific Northwest is faced with a looming choice among
the methods it will pursue to save endangered salmon. The prime
example pits flow augmentation by stopping illegal federal water
deliveries in the Snake River Basin against breaching the four lower
Snake River dams. " ' Put in more pragmatic terms, this ultimate and
inevitable extractive resource choice pits irrigated Idaho farms and the
Idaho Power Company against the "ocean port" of Lewiston, Idaho,
and large aluminum companies that reap the benefits of cheap Pacific
Northwest electricity." ' One hopes the choice is made soon enough to
save the salmon.

311.
312.

SeeBlumm et al., supra note 36, at 1000.
See id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the
latest in a series of cases stemming from the massive general
adjudication of water rights in central and southern Arizona.' The
t
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areas involved, including the Upper Salt, Verde, Upper Gila, Lower
Gila, Agua Fria, Upper Santa Cruz, and San Pedro watersheds
("watersheds"),' encompass approximately forty-seven percent of the
state's land area and eighty-five percent of its population, including
the cities of Phoenix and Tucson.
The holding of the Arizona Supreme Court, referred to here as
Gila River Ii, addressed several unresolved issues with significant
implications for the affected watersheds, the State of Arizona, and the
arid West. First, the petitioners asked the court to decide whether
federal reserved water rights extend to groundwater.' Second, the
petitioners asked the court to decide whether a federal reserved water
right entitles the right-holder to greater protection from groundwater
pumping than state law provides to state water rights-holders. In an
unanimous decision, the court answered both questions in the
affirmative, taking a strong position on a question left unanswered in
federal water law jurisprudence.6 In addition, the decision may alter
the balance of political and economic power between Indians and
non-Indians in Arizona and the West by recognizing Indian ownership
of a significant portion of the West's most precious commodity-water.
Sections II and III of this note introduce water rights and examine
the development of federal and Indian reserved water rights in the
surface water context and the, so far, limited forays into the
groundwater realm. Section IV reviews the history of the Gila River
general adjudication as it pertains to the recent holding in Gila River
IIZ Section V analyzes the holding in Gila River III and reviews the
legal and policy justifications put forward by the Arizona Supreme
Court. Section VI discusses the arguments of the petitioners who
sought United States Supreme Court review of the Arizona decision
and the implications of the Court's decision to deny their petitions.
Finally, Section VII discusses the future of the Gila River general
adjudication, realistic implications for securing Indian water rights,
and the promise of alternative resolutions, particularly negotiated
settlements.

1. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) [hereinafter Gila RiverIII].
2. Id. at 742.
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. United States, 989
P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (No. 99-1388) [hereinafter Phelps Petition].
4. See Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 741.
5. Id.
6. As discussed in Section III below, United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,
beginning with Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), has defined federal
reserved rights to surface water. The Supreme Court has not addressed directly the
extent to which federal water rights extend to groundwater supplies.
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H. STATE-BASED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINES
A.

SURFACE WATER DOCTRINES

Allocation of surface and groundwater rights is generally the
province of state law. In the surface water context, two main doctrines
prevail: riparian rights and prior appropriation.7 The riparian water
rights doctrine dominates in the eastern half of the country where
water is more readily available. The riparian doctrine relies on a
reasonable use standard, and in times of shortage, calls for all users to
reduce consumption proportionately.8 Application of somewhat
amorphous, reasonableness-based standards has been practical, in
part, because supplies of water in most riparian states are plentiful and
disputes over water supplies have, in general, been few. 9
Prior appropriation for surface water dominates in the arid
western states, and operates on the theory of "first in time, first in
right." Historically, western states have favored prior appropriation
because it is relatively simple to adjudicate and tends to promote
The doctrine prioritizes
development of water resources.
appropriators based on the first date of beneficial use, so the earliest
(most senior) rights-holder is entitled to a greater level of protection
When supplies run short, the doctrine
than those that follow."
protects the rights of the most senior holders and later appropriators
(juniors) may have their supplies restricted or cut off altogether to
ensure flow to senior holders." While historically favored, modern
prioritization of water rights using this approach raises concern as
water law doctrine pits agricultural and tribal appropriators with
century-old priority dates against relative newcomers-burgeoning
urban populations in Arizona and other western states.
B.

GROUNDWATER DOCTRINES

In the groundwater context, five water rights doctrines have
developed and their application varies by state."

7.

For a more extensive discussion of the riparian and prior appropriation water

rights doctrines, seeJOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURcES: CASES
& MATERIALS (3d ed. 2000). While most states have adopted the riparian or prior

appropriation doctrine to govern surface water allocation, some jurisdictions, like
California, recognize elements of both the riparian and prior appropriation systems.
See id. at 295-309.
8. Id. at 9.
9. For a brief overview of water resources across the United States, see id. at 2-9.
10. For examples of statutory appropriation and beneficial use provisions, see ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-141 (B), 45-151 (West 2000).
11. See SAX ET AL., supra note 7, at 98-99.
12. For a more detailed review of the development and application of groundwater
law doctrines, see id., at 359-85. For a state-by-state review of groundwater law, see
Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Groundwater Laws, 30 TULSA
L.J. 123 (1994).
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1. Absolute Ownership
The absolute ownership groundwater doctrine (also known as the
capture rule) maintains that a landowner holds an absolute right to
pump groundwater under his or her property, regardless of the effects
on water levels. In reality, modern applications of the absolute
ownership doctrine exist within the context of state or local permitting
structures, thus the doctrine regulates pumping practices to some
extent. 3
2.

Prior Appropriation

The prior appropriation groundwater doctrine mirrors the surface
water system, granting pumping rights to the most senior user and
protecting those rights against encroachment by later users.
3.

Correlative Rights

The correlative rights groundwater doctrine most closely mirrors
the surface water riparian doctrine, allowing reasonable use in "fair
and just proportion" by overlying landowners on their land. This
doctrine allows for the exporting of water to other tracts if surplus
supply is available. 4
4.

Reasonable Use

The reasonable use groundwater doctrine similarly restricts
landowners to reasonable usage, but more rigidly restricts application
to the overlying tract (exports are generally prohibited).
5.

Restatement Approach

The liability-based doctrine defined in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts holds parties that unreasonably harm other groundwater users
liable in tort. 5
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS
State water rights systems, which consist of various combinations of
the water doctrines described above, are generally applicable to
anyone seeking a water right including individuals, corporations, and
government entities. However, when a federal entity seeks to establish
a water right on federally reserved property, such as tribal reservations
or national parks, a distinct water right outside of the relevant state
system may apply. Federal reserved water rights, as the name implies,
are water rights reserved for federal uses outside of a state water rights

13. In Texas, for example, the courts have upheld the application of the capture
rule subject to local regulatory controls. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of
America, 1 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. 1999).
14. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
15. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
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system. 6 Congress's power to "reserve" water rights stems primarily
from the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article I, section 8 of the
United States Constitution. 7 While the logical connection between
surface water and commerce is more direct, the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that Congress's power to regulate commerce
extends to groundwater supplies as well." Particularly in the arid West,
the specter of previously unexercised water rights outside of the
prevailing state system is serious, with far-reaching implications for
existing and future users.
A.

THE WNTERSDOCTRINE

Until recent decades, it was rare for Congress, or the President
exercising delegated congressional power, to address the question of
water rights when reserving lands for federal purposes such as parks,

9
In the absence of express
military reservations, or Indian lands.'
legislative reservations of water rights, the Supreme Court recognized
"implied" reservations of water rights carrying the force of federal law.
In the landmark case of Winters v. United States, the Court first
established that the federal government impliedly reserved sufficient
waters to "supp ort the purpose" of the reservation when setting aside
In Winters, the reservation in question was the 1888
federal lands.
Fort Belknap Indian reservation in Montana as set aside by treaty."
Noting that "[t]he lands were arid and, without irrigation, were
practically valueless," the Court in Winters established that the federal
government had the power to "reserve the waters and exempt them
from appropriation under the state laws" and that the priority date for
the rights should be traced to the May 1888 treaty.2 To that end, the
federal government could enjoin non-Indian diversions of water
upstream of the reservation to secure sufficient water resources to
make the downstream tribal lands viable.
While Winters was a revolutionary holding with significant potential
impacts on states containing Indian lands, more than fifty years passed
before the Supreme Court addressed critical questions regarding the

16. Federal uses include those water uses on withdrawn federal lands such as
national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 7, at
782-815. Federal uses also include waters used on Indian lands for which the federal
government acts as a trustee. Id. at 848.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941,953-54 (1982).
19. The Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was one of the first pieces of federal
legislation to reserve waters specifically to fulfill the purposes of the Act. 16 U.S.C. §§
1271-1287 (1994). Executive Orders that withdraw federal lands under Federal
Antiquities Act authority, including the 1996 order creating the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument, also have addressed the issues of water needs.
Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1996). See SAX ETAL., supra note 7, at 812-14 for
additional examples of federal legislation addressing water rights and a discussion of
the uncertain scope of these express reservations.
20. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
21. Id. at 567-68.
22. Id. at 576-77.
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potential extension of implied rights to non-Indian federal
reservations and methods for quantifying reserved federal rights. In
1963, the Court ruled unequivocally in Arizona v. California that
implied water rights extend to all federal land reservations, not just
Indian lands.2 In addition, the Court in Arizona v. Caliorniaupheld a
method for quantifying Indian water rights based on "practicably
irrigable acreage" ("PIA"), operating under the assumption that the
primary purpose of most reservations was to support an agricultural
Indian community."
In light of the size of tribal land holdings in
many states, the PIA standard acknowledged significant Indian water
rights. For example, in the Gila River adjudication, tribal interests
claim 2.8 million acre-feet of water per year (surface and
groundwater)." By way of comparison, the typical annual surface
water supply in the entire Gila River Basin is approximately 1.3 million
acre-feet per year. 6 The approximately 1.5 million acre-feet difference
would come, in theory, from groundwater supplies.
As in Winters, the Arizona v. Calfornia dispute concerned surface
water allocations, making no mention of groundwater. Even today,
ninety-two years after the Supreme Court decided Winters, the Court
has yet to address squarely the issue of implied rights to groundwater.
The closest the Court has come to addressing the groundwater
question is its holding in Cappaert v. United States.2 In that dispute,
regarding the Devil's Hole underground pools at Death Valley
National Monument, the Court avoided the question of implied
groundwater rights by declaring that the pool in question was surface
water governed by the Winters doctrine. 8However,
the Court in
Cappaert did address the fact that the diversion of groundwater
through pumping of wells adjacent to the National Monument
threatened the Devil's Hole pools. The Court held "the United States
can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion
is of surface or ground water."" While the Court did not recognize an
implied federal right to groundwater, it did recognize federal authority
to regulate pumping of groundwater that interfered with surface
waters under federal control. Significantly, the Court also recognized
federal authority to reach beyond the borders of the federal reservation
to limit withdrawal of groundwater by other parties acting under state
law. Commentator Charles Meyers noted Cappaertlaid a "foundation
for extensive and disruptive federal claims to groundwater. " 'o
23. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). United States v. Dist. Ct., 401

U.S. 520, 523 (1971) extended this holding further to encompass "any federal
enclave."
24. Arizona v. California,373 U.S. at 600-01.
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.5, Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v.
United States, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (No. 99-1389) [hereinafter SRVWUA Petition].

26. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
Charles J. Meyers, FederalGroundwaterRights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States,
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APPLICATION OF THE WNTERs DOCTRINE IN OTHER FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS

Other federal and state courts have shown greater willingness than
the United States Supreme Court to expressly address the issue of
implied federal rights to groundwater. The Ninth Circuit holding in
the Cappaert case, later vacated by the Supreme Court, reasoned that
the implied rights doctrine should extend to groundwater."1 The court
noted that, while the Winters and Arizona v. Californiacases dealt only
with surface water, the "reservation of water doctrine is not so
limited."32 Other courts in the Ninth Circuit have reached similar
findings as to groundwater. The United States District Court for the
District of Montana, in Tweedy v. Texas Co., ruled that, even though
Winters addressed surface water,
the same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that
surface waters had been reserved would apply to underground waters
as well. The land was arid-water would make it more useful, and
on the surface of the land or under it
whether the waters were found
3
should make no difference.
Furthermore, in Shamberger v. United States, the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada held that state water regulations could
not encumber federal rights to pump groundwater on a naval
ammunition depot.34 When use of groundwater was necessary to
achieve the purpose of the naval reservation, the federal government
clearly had an implied right to groundwater despite the fact the
legislation reserving the land made no mention of water rights.
This willingness to extend Winters to groundwater is by no means
unanimous. In 1988, the Wyoming Supreme Court faced the issue in
its consideration of the Big Horn River system general adjudication
and refused to extend the Winters doctrine to groundwater rights."
While the court acknowledged groundwater and surface water are
often interconnected and "[t]he logic which supports a reservation of
surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports
reservation of groundwater," it noted, "nonetheless, not a single case
applying the reserved water doctrine to groundwater is cited to us." 36
The court found the Tweedy holding unpersuasive and concluded that
Tweedy "did not recognize a reserved groundwater right."" Finding no
strong precedent to extend federal implied rights to groundwater, and
in light of the significant implications such a holding would have on
13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 377 (1978).
31. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. Id.
33. Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
34. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 610-11 (D. Nev. 1958).
35. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988).
36. Id. at 99.
37. Id. at 100.
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water rights under state law, the Big Horn court was unwilling to make
new law.
IV. ARIZONA WATER LAW
Under Arizona's general adjudication statute, adjudications are
intended to determine the "extent and relative priority of the water
rights of all persons in the river system and source."38 While highly
complex, formal adjudication of rights provides certainty and security
for rights holders and resolution for long-standing disputes among
parties with competing claims to water. As the plain language of the
statute indicates, the Arizona legislature intended that adjudications
include all parties with claims to water rights, including individuals,
corporations, government entities (local, state, or federal), Indian
tribes, and any other entities. 9 Likewise, the general terms "river
system and source" encompass all appropriable waters (i.e., those
surface waters in the state subject to the prior appropriation doctrine)
and "all water subject to claims based upon federal law."40
A. HISTORYOF THE GILA PRRADJUDICATION

The Salt River Valley Water Users Association ("SRVWUA") filed
the original petition for the Gila River adjudication pursuant to state
law in 1974 . The issue for SRVWUA and the thousands of other
water users in the affected watersheds was simple: there was not
enough water to go around. Determining how to divide the available
water was, and continues to be, an exceedingly complicated task. In
the twenty-six years since the adjudication began, the geographic scope
of the adjudication has expanded to include seven watersheds.
Approximately 849,000 summonses were sent to potential claimants
and, as a result, more than 24,000 claimants have filed over 66,000
claims to water rights.4 2 Over the same period, judicial proceedings
begun in state court were transferred to federal court and then back to
state court.43 Much of the early judicial wrangling focused on two
issues: inclusion of tribal interests and procedural management of the
case.
As the parties were still defining the scope of the adjudication in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the question whether the state courts

38. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-252 (A) (West 2000).

39. Id. § 45-251.
40. Id. § 45-251(7).
41. For a review of the procedural history of the original case, see In re Rights to the

Use of the Gila River, 830 P.2d 442, 444-45 (Ariz. 1992) [hereinafter Gila River].
42. The case is seemingly so complex that even the two parties filing writs of
certiorari to the Supreme Court do not cite the same number of claims and claimants
filed in the case. Phelps Petition, supra note 3, at 5, notes that 24,000 claimants have
filed more than 66,000 claims. SRVWUA Petition, supra note 25, at ii, suggests that

more than 27,000 parties have filed over 77,000 claims.
43. For a review of the complicated proceedings leading up to the current phase of
the adjudication, see United States v. Super. Ct., 697 P.2d 658, 664 (Ariz. 1985).
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had valid jurisdiction over tribal interests in the watersheds was still
unclear. In response to the summonses, several tribes exerted claims
to water rights and, subsequently, Arizona required the tribes to file
claims to join the state proceedings. Not wishing to become part of
the general adjudication, the tribes petitioned the federal courts,
arguing the Arizona courts lacked jurisdiction due to the tribes'
sovereign immunity. 44 Resolution of the sovereign immunity questions
hinged on the interpretation of the McCarran Amendment, which
provides a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity in suits
involving the adjudication of water rights.45 A series of cases tried this
question, culminating in the United States Supreme Court decision in
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, which expressly extended McCarran
Amendment authority to Indian water rights held in trust by the
United States.46 To that end, the Gila River general adjudication joined
the tribal claims to water rights and extended the Arizona courts'
authority to all claims held by private parties, state and local
governments, and federal interests (both Indian and non-Indian).
The current phase of the Gila River adjudication focuses on six
issues identified by the Superior Court in pretrial orders. 47 The
Arizona Supreme Court granted a request for interlocutory review of
these issues in December 1990 and, the holdings in its three Gila River
opinions have addressed four of the six issues.4 ' The holding in the
second Gila River adjudication,4 9 which addressed Issue Two, is
particularly relevant to the deliberations in Gila River III.
Unlike most western states that apply the doctrine of prior
appropriation to both surface water and interconnected groundwater

44. Id.
45. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). Also known as the "McCarran Amendment," section
666 waives sovereign immunity when the United States is the defendant in a state or
federal water rights action. In Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court limited the
McCarran Amendment's application to general adjudications. See 372 U.S. 609, 618
(1963).
46. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 566 (1983).
47. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted the following six questions for review:
1. Do the procedures for filing and service of pleadings adopted by the trial
court in its Pre-trial Order Number 1 comport with due process under the
United States and Arizona Constitutions?
2. Did the trial court err in adopting its 50%/90 day test for determining
whether underground water is 'appropriable' under A.RS. § 45-141?
3. What is the appropriate standard to be applied in determining the
amount of water reserved for federal lands?
4. Is non-appropriable groundwater subject to federal reserved rights?
5. Do federal reserved rights holders enjoy greater protection from
groundwater pumping than holders of state law rights?
6. Must claims of conflicting water use or interference with water rights be
resolved as part of the general adjudication?
Gila RiverIII, 989 P.2d 739, 742 n.2 (Ariz. 1999).
48. In Gila River I, 830 P.2d 442, 455-56 (Ariz. 1992), the Arizona Supreme Court
addressed Issue One and upheld, against a due process challenge, the Superior
Court's methods of notifying the vast number of parties in the case.
49. See generally In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila
River Sys. & Source, 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993) [hereinafter Gila RiverI1].
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sources, Arizona maintains a bifurcated system that applies the prior
appropriation doctrine to surface water and the reasonable use
doctrine to groundwater. A common law distinction exists between
"percolating" groundwater (i.e., deeper groundwater supplies)
and
near-surface groundwater or "subflow." 0 Historically, Arizona courts
have defined subflow as "those waters which slowly find their way
through the sand and gravel constituting the bed of the stream, or the
lands under or immediately adjacent to the stream, and are themselves
a part of the surface stream.
This common law distinction between
subflow and other forms of groundwater greatly complicates allocation
of water rights because, in reality, there are no easily discernible
methods for differentiating between subflow and percolating
groundwater. As the Gila River III court noted, this fact has not
escaped most other jurisdictions in the West. The Gila River III court
made clear that most other states applying prior appropriation to
surface water have "[c]onform[ed] their law to hydrological reality"
and apply a unitary management system of prior appropriation for
surface water and groundwater.52
Hydrologic reality notwithstanding, the Arizona Supreme Court
reviewed the efficacy of the bifurcated water rights system in the 1993
Gila River II case and upheld the admittedly "narrow concept of
subflow." 3 The court noted that "[t] he Arizona legislature has erected
statutory frameworks for regulating surface water and groundwater
based on Southwest Cotton," and held it was essentially too late to
overrule the established practice.54 Therefore, while Arizona's prior
appropriation system continues to allocate surface and subflow waters,
reasonable use governs the allocation of percolating groundwater. As
a result, parties with appropriated rights to surface water or subflow
are unable to protect their water rights against parties whose pumping
of percolating groundwater depletes their appropriable surface water
supply. As long as the party pumping groundwater conforms to the
relatively loose confines of the reasonable use doctrine, appropriated
rights-holders have little protection under state law. 5
Considering the Arizona general adjudication of water rights
statute defines "river system and source" to include all water subject to
prior appropriation," the Gila River II decision further complicates
matters. By limiting application of the general adjudications to waters
subject to prior appropriation, the state statute effectively exempts
percolating waters from inclusion in the general adjudications. The
50. Id
51. Gila River III, 989 P.2d at 743 (quoting Maricopa County Mun. Water
Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. S.W. Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 380 (Ariz. 1931)).
52. Id. at 744.
53. Gila River II, 857 P.2d at 1247.
54. Id. at 1243. For further discussion of Arizona's bifurcated water rights system,
seeJohn D. Leshy &James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet,
20 ARIz. ST. LJ. 657 (1988).
55. Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 749.
56. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-251(7) (West 2000).
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involvement of federal interests complicates the issue still further. As
the Gila River III court observed, "[t]he rub is that, in order to
adjudicate and quantify water rights based upon federal law, the
Arizona courts must afford federal claimants the benefit, when state
and federal law conflict, of federal substantive law."57 With respect to
the surface waters in the watersheds, federal law is clear-the Winters
doctrine impliedly reserved water rights for Indian and non-Indian
federal reservations. With respect to percolating groundwater in the
watersheds, however, federal law is uncertain.
V. THE G/LA RIVER MILITIGATION
The Gila River III litigation addressed two of the six questions set
for interlocutory review by the Arizona Supreme Court.5 1 Issue Four
asked if federal reserved water rights extend to groundwater not
subject to prior appropriation under Arizona law.59 Issue Five asked if
federal reserved water rights holders enjoy greater protection from
groundwater pumping than holders of state-based water rights. 60 The
Arizona Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative.
A. ISSUE FOUR
In Gila River III, the Arizona Supreme Court began by considering
the lower court's finding that federal reserved water rights apply to
non-appropriable
percolating
groundwater
in
addition
to
appropriable surface water and subflow.6
"According to the trial
court, federal law establishes a reserved right to groundwater, if and to
the extent that groundwater ma be necessary to accomplish the
purpose of a federal reservation."6 Acknowledging that other federal
and state courts have split opinions and that no previous court has
squarely settled the issue, the Gila River III court first reviewed the
development of the federal reserved rights doctrine to assess the
efficacy of applying federal rights to groundwater.
Drawing from the United States Supreme Court cases on federal
reserved water rights noted in Section III, the court identified a series
of doctrinal "guideposts" to support its holding. From Winters, the
court drew the fact that one could not make arid Indian lands
habitable without an accompanying reservation of water.6 ' From
Arizona v. California, it drew the notion that one could not possibly
believe that the parties who created the Indian reservations, Congress
and Indian leaders, did not intend to provide water-especially in

57. Gila River III, 989 P.2d at 744-45 (citing Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983)).
58. Id. at 742.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 742-43.
62. Id. at 745.
63. Gila River II, 989 P.2d 739, 746 (Ariz. 1999).
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regions with no flowing surface streams." From Cappaert, the court
drew the recognition that surface water and groundwater are integrally
linked, suggesting that federal reserved rights law would "decline to
differentiate" between the two sources of water."
The Gila River M court went on to say:
[T] he cases we have cited lead us to conclude that if the United
States implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to reserve
sufficient unappropriated water to meet the reservations' needs, it
must have intended that reservation of water to come from whatever

particular sources each reservation had at hand. The significant
question for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not
whether the water runs above or below the ground but whether it is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.

In its holding, the court rejected petitioners' two main arguments
in support of state water law. First, the court rejected a claim, based
on United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., that it "should decline to extend68
the doctrine to groundwater out of deference to state water law."
Kimbell Foods found that a state court could legally apply state law as a
rule of decision in an analysis of federal rights as long as such an
application would not "frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs."" While the Gila River III court acknowledged a tradition of
congressional deference to state water law, it distinguished federal
reserved water rights from the federal loan programs at issue in Kimbell
Foods. Noting that federal reserved water rights were clearly an
exception to congressional deference and that federal rights to water
were supreme, the court rejected the notion that it could "withhold
application of the reserved rights doctrine purely out of deference to
state law."70 The court stated, "[r]ather, we may not defer to state law
where to do so would defeat federal water rights.01
Petitioners argued as well that deference to state law would not
defeat federal water rights. To the contrary, they argued that
Arizona's reasonable use standard for groundwater allocation would
provide all parties with an equal right to pump "as much groundwater
as they can put to reasonable use upon their land."7 For support,
petitioners cited Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, which held that state
and federal courts may adopt state law where "[t]here was no
reason.., for the beneficiaries of federal rights to have a privileged
position over other[s]."" In the instant case, however, the court
64. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)).
65. Id.at 747.
66. Id.

67. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
68.
69.

Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 747.
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.

70. Gila River II, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999).
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 747-48
73. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 674 (1979); Gila RiverII, 989 P.2d
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rejected both the suggestion that the reasonable use system protected
federal groundwater rights and the proposition that federal rights are
not privileged. The court cited evidence that, under Arizona's
reasonable use system, groundwater consumption rates had far
surpassed recovery rates and depleted the groundwater resource.'4
Further, the court noted that some Indian reservations "have been
entirely 'dewatered' by off-reservation pumping." 7 In sum, the court
refused to accept the notion that deference to Arizona's
groundwater
76
allocation system would protect federal water rights.
While the court debunked petitioners' main arguments, it also
limited the scope of its finding in favor of federal and Indian
interests. 7 First, it made clear that individual tribes do not have an
automatic reserved right to groundwater. The court noted a federal
reserved groundwater right could only be found where other waters
are insufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.
Determining the purpose of the reservation and assessing the
sufficiency of available sources of water are fact-specific inquiries
courts must make on a reservation-by-reservation basis.78 Second, the
court refused to impose a generalized standard that future courts
could use to determine the purpose(s) of a reservation and, in turn,
the extent of the federal groundwater right. The court opted again to
rely on a case-by-case review of the pertinent treaties, legislation, or
Executive Orders that formed the reservation. 9 Based on this
reasoning, the court rejected an Indian claim that tribal groundwater
rights should extend to all groundwater under the reservation. The
court noted that the Supreme Court "has rejected tribal claims to an
'untrammeled right' to exploit scarce natural resources.""0
B.

ISSUE FIVE

With regard to Issue Five, the trial court in Gila River III held
"federal reserved rights holders are entitled to protection from any offreservation groundwater pumping that 'significantly diminishes' the
amount of water available to satisfy the purpose of the reservation. " 8
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld this finding, drawing on two
elements from the United States Supreme Court holding in Cappaert.
(1) "determination of reserved water rights is not governed by state law
but derives from the federal purpose of the reservation;" and (2) "the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether
at 747-48.
74. Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 748.
75. Id. (citing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct.

660, 665-66 (1986)).
76. Id. at 748.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978)).
79. Id. at 748-49.
80. Gila RiverIII, 989 P.2d 739, 749 n.10 (Ariz. 1999) (quoting Washington v. Wash.
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 684 (1979)).
81. Id. at 743.
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the diversion is of surface or groundwater."82 The Gila River III court
held federal right holders do enjoy greater protections from
groundwater pumping than holders of state-based rights.83 The federal
government may invoke federal substantive law to protect its
groundwater from subsequent diversion, at least to the extent
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.
The court rejected an argument by proponents of state water law
that Arizona's 1980 Groundwater Management Code ("Code")
provides adequate protection for federal water rights interests within
the state." The Code, honored by the Ford Foundation and Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government as one of the nation's ten
most innovative programs in state and local government, established a
series of controls to stabilize and more efficiently allocate the state's
groundwater resources. 8 The Code's provisions include the creation
of four (later increased to five) Active Management Areas ("AMAs")
that focus on the areas of the state with the most severe groundwater
overdraft problems.
Controls within AMAs include permits for
groundwater withdrawals, limitations on new irrigation, requirements
to meter and report pumping levels, and fees on groundwater
pumpers-all intended to help the state achieve a renewable "safe
yield" groundwater supply by the year 2025. The Gila River III court
noted that, while the Code provides increased protection for
groundwater supplies within AMAs, there are no protections for
federal reservations located outside the AMAs." As a rule, it would be
impossible for anyone to guarantee an appropriate level of protection
for a specific reservation without a case-by-case review of how state
management programs would protect water rights on that federal
reservation."
Just as the Gila River III court limited its holding on Issue Four, it
also limited its Issue Five holding. Specifically, the court rejected the
suggestion that the case law requires a "zero-impact standard of
protection for federal reserved rights."0 Under such a standard,
federal rights holders could theoretically enjoin any groundwater or
surface water withdrawals that could have a negative impact on their
water rights. Relying on Cappaert and United States v. New Mexico, the
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 749 (quoting Cappaertv. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143, 145 (1976)).
Id. at 750.
Id.

85. Id. at 749 n.13.
86. For a discussion of the development and scope of the Arizona Groundwater
Management Code, see Philip R Higdon & Terence W. Thompson, The 1980 Arizona
Groundwater Management Code, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J 621 (1980) or visit ARIz. DEP'T OF
WATER RESOURCES, OVERVIEW OF ARIZONA'S GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT CODE, available
at http://www.adwr.state.az.us/AZWaterInfo/groundwater/code.html.
The Ford
Foundation/Harvard
Innovation
Award
is
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/innovations/winners/gmcaz86.htm.
87. SeeARiz. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, supranote 79.
88. Gila River II, 989 P.2d 739, 749 n.13 (Ariz. 1999).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 750.
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court noted that federal reserved water rights are limited to amounts
necessary to achieve the primary purposes of the reservation. Any
injunctions to curtail actions by outside parties must be "appropriately
tailored to minimal need."9 To that end, the court rejected a tribal
petition to enjoin immediately all pumping that would affect the
groundwater supplies beneath reservation land. The court responded
that, until federal reserved rights for individual reservations are
it is unclear "which if any of the tribes are entitled to such
quantified,
92
relief."
C.

CONCLUSIONS IN GILA RIVER III

The Arizona Supreme Court's conclusions in Gila River III
acknowledged the complexity of adjudicating water rights on such a
massive scale and, in particular, while operating under Arizona's
bifurcated water rights system. 9' The court acknowledged that, while a
bifurcated water rights system may make sense within the context of
state law, federal law does not allow the state to limit the extent of
federal rights. The court proposed that, in order "[t]o solve the
conflict and uncertainty that reserved rights engender, we must
quantify them, for we may not ignore them." 94 The court reflected
further:
In the scheme of priorities, the claims of the federal government...
and of the Indians rank high. While the amount of water actually

used by these entities may have been negligible until recent times, the
magnitude95of the right to use water on these lands has been far from
negligible.
VI. PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Salt River Valley Water Users Association and the Phelps
Dodge Corporation each filed petitions for writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court in February 2000 requesting review of
the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Gila River III. Both the Salt
River Valley Water Users Association petition ("SRVWUA petition")
and the Phelps Dodge Corporation petition ("Phelps petition") argued
that the Gila River III holding was misguided, with serious and
immediate implications for the on-going Gila River adjudication
9 6 and
for all efforts to adjudicate or negotiate water rights in the West.
The petitioners' main legal arguments challenged the Arizona
Supreme Court's refusal to apply state groundwater law to the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 749 n.12.
Id. at 750.
Gila River III, 989 P.2d 739, 750 (Ariz. 1999).
Id. (quoting United States v. Super. Ct., 697 P.2d 658, 663 (Ariz. 1985)).
See SRVWUA Petition, supra note 25, at 10, 14-15; Phelps Petition, supranote 3, at
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determination of federal water rights. On a procedural level, they
argued that the Gila River III court violated Winters and New Mexico by
establishing the existence of federal groundwater rights prior to an
individual determination of the purpose of each reservation. "
Further, they proposed the holding creates a previously unrecognized
principle of federal common law-that Winters guarantees federal
interests a supply of water rather than giving them a
"nondiscriminatory right of access to a shared resource." 9" Petitioners
also contested the Arizona court's reading of Kimbell Foods, arguing
that no sufficient conflict exists between federal policy and state law in
this instance to preclude application of state law to determine the
extent of federal water rights." Finally, petitioners attacked the
Arizona court's treatment of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe and argued
(1) no need exists for a nationally uniform standard on federal
groundwater rights; (2) application of state law would not frustrate
federal objectives as feared; and (3) creation of federal law would
significantly disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law
in Arizona and other states.'00
Both petitioners reinforced their case-based arguments with a
number of other claims intended to garner the attention of the high
court. From a policy perspective, they argued the Gila RiverIIIholding
frustrated a long-standing federal preference, both legislative and
judicial, for deference to state water rights law."'
Drawing on
preferences for intentionalist theory of judicial interpretation, they
argued the nineteenth century Congress that created many
reservations could not have intended to reserve groundwater
supplies-a largely unknown and unrecoverable resource at that
time.'02 Further, they maintained the establishment of guaranteed
federal rights would produce absurd and unintended results by
creating new conflicts among federal water rights holders, and pitting
Indian and other federal interests against one another in competition
for a limited water supply.' 3 Petitioners also focused on the extended
scope of the potential federal reserved water rights, noting the
97. Phelps Petition, supra note 3, at 14-15.
98. Id. at 17. Arguably, however, there is a clearly recognized principle from
Winters that federal reserved water rights are superior to state rights and exempt from
state appropriation systems. See discussion, supra Section III; see also supra text
accompanying notes 16-18.
99. Phelps Petition, supra note 3, at 17-22. Arguably, however, the nature of the
conflict in Gila River III is similar to Winters-a dispute between state and federal
parties each claiming rights to a limited supply of water. If so, then the Gila River III
conflict, like Winters before it, would appear sufficient to warrant preclusion of state
law and invocation of implied federal reserved water rights.
100. See id. at 18-23, for a review of the Wilson arguments and a discussion of the
potential economic disruption in Arizona.
101. Id. at 26. The Amid Curiae brief, submitted by the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, Montana Farm Bureau Federation, Idaho Farm Bureau Federation, and
Northwest Mining Association in support of the petitioners in the Phelps and SRVWUA
Petitionsfor writs of certiorari, reinforced these arguments.
102. SRVWUA Petition, supra note 25, at 27.
103. Id. at 20-23.
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establishment of federal rights that could grant Indian tribes control
of most of the groundwater in the state of Arizona, would simply be
unreasonable."" Finally, they argued the United States Supreme Court
should eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the scope of federal
rights and resolve the direct conflict between the Gila River III and the
Wyoming Supreme Court's Big Horn decision.105
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GILA RIVER IIIDECISIONS IN ARIZONA

On June 19, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied both
the Phelps and SRVWUA petitions for writ of certiorari. In doing so,
the Court let stand the Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation of the
nature and extent of federal reserved rights to groundwater and
ensured that, unless and until the Court sees fit to address the issue in
a later case, questions of federal reserved rights to groundwater will be
played out on a state-by-state basis. Certainly, the decision not to hear
the Gila River III case will have repercussions in Arizona, with the
potential to dramatically shift the balance of power and equity in water
rights.0 6 The Supreme Court's decision not to rehear the case hands
in Arizona, and potentially other states, a major
tribal interests
17
victory.

Under the Gila River III holding, Arizona recognizes a superior
federal interest in groundwater supplies based on an individualized
review of a reservation's purpose and subject to certain use limitations.
This superior federal interest in groundwater, when quantified using
the PIA standard set out in Arizona v. Calf[ornia, may result in
significant allocations of water to tribal interests in the state. Unlike
the surface water context, where "paper rights" to surface water are
often of little or no use due to the lack of infrastructure to transport
water and put water rights to practical use, groundwater is usually
more accessible, requiring little more than a well and pump to
In the
distribute water for agricultural or domestic uses.10 8
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 12; Phelps Petition,supra note 3, at 28.
106. See Paul Davenport, Supreme Court Rules Tribes Have Extra Water Protection,ARIZ.
REPUBLiC, Nov. 21, 1999, at B6; Howard Fischer & Maureen O'Connell, Court Rules for
Indians in Suit Over Ground Water Rights of Arizona Cities, Mines Deemed Secondary, ARIZ.
DAILYSTAR, Nov. 20, 1999, at IA.
107. In light of the arguments of the petitioners and amici curiae in favor of state's
rights and federal deference, the Supreme Court's response is somewhat ironic. By
denying certiorari, the Supreme Court deferred to the state interpretation of water
rights. Interestingly, the state interpretation subjugates state-based water rights to
those of the federal government.
108. One has yet to see how federal water rights would translate to usable water
allocations or money. Despite tacit approval from the Supreme Court, lower court
challenges to efforts to transfer water rights from state-rights holders to federal-rights
holders could considerably delay final resolution. Challenges against critical decision
points to determine the purposes of the reservation and assign detailed groundwater
allocations to specific reservations will likely arise in situations where any new federal
water allocations come directly out of the hands of former state-rights holders.
Negotiated settlements, see discussion infra Section VII, may present the most realistic
option for resolving water rights disputes. For a discussion of efforts to negotiate a
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groundwater context, therefore, increased water rights are more likely
to lead to increased water supply. Along with potentially increased
rights to water, Gila River III provides added security for federal and
Indian water rights holders. In light of the Supreme Court holding in
Cappaert, the combined effect of the Gila River III and Cappaert
holdings will grant federal groundwater rights holders in Arizona the
ability to curtail public or private off-reservation uses that have a
negative impact on their groundwater supplies. While courts in
Arizona are likely to carefully scrutinize both the purposes of the
reservation and the level of outside groundwater interference, the
specter of federal rights looms large over groundwater-dependent
parties adjoining or in the vicinity of federal reservations.
B.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE GILA RIvER IDECISIONS OUTSIDE OF
ARIZONA

One must note the fact that Arizona's bifurcated system of
groundwater rights is the exception and not the rule among western
states.'" Most western states apply the prior appropriation doctrine to
groundwater and recognize federal rights based on seniority of use.
While many federal and Indian groundwater reservations date back to
the early 19th century, most western state law systems determine the
relative seniority of the water right based on the right-holder's date of
first use of the water supply." ° In light of the fact that many federal
and Indian water rights claims are based on relatively modern first
uses, the Arizona Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of federal
reserved water rights and the superposition of federal rights over
seniority-based state rights takes on even greater significance.
Recent evidence from Montana, a prior appropriation state,
indicates that its courts are also willing to extend federal reservations
to groundwater. In Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, the
Montana Supreme Court denied the requests of state and private
parties for permits to withdraw groundwater from tribal lands."'
Noting that the Montana Constitution protects existing water rights
"whether adjudicated or unadjudicated," the court, holding that
the
Montana Constitution protects tribal rights to groundwater against
subsequent appropriators, reinforced the distinction2 between stateappropriated rights and federal reserved water rights."
While age-old tribal rights to groundwater may fare well in some
prior appropriation states, tribal rights may not fare well in others. If
water rights settlement in the Gila River Basin, see discussion infraSection VII.A.
109. See SRVWUA Petition,supra note 25, at 26 n.19.
110. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 7, at 382; see also Elizabeth Checchio &
Bonnie G. Colby, The Contextl for Indian Water Settlements, in WATER LAW: TRENDS,
PoucIEs, AND PRAcncE 179, 182-83 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond
eds., 1995).
111. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244, 250 (Mont.
1999).
112. Id.
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the Wyoming court continues to follow the Big Horn holding discussed
in Section III.B, the court will limit the scope of federal reserved rights
to include surface waters alone. The Big Horn decision relied heavily
on the fact that no court had established a federal reserved right to
groundwater. The Arizona and Montana Supreme Courts have now
clearly acknowledged federal rights to groundwater, and further
evidence exists that the Supreme Court finds such an interpretation
acceptable. One still does not know, however, how the Arizona,
Montana, and United States Supreme Court actions will influence
Wyoming and other prior appropriation states.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE GILA RIVER ADJUDICATION
Regardless of the recent developments in the Gila River III
litigation, one thing is clear-the tedious general adjudication process
has failed to provide a timely resolution to water rights disputes in the
watersheds, whether they involve surface water or groundwater. Even
after the resolution of the remaining questions before the Arizona
Supreme Court in the Gila River general adjudication, decades will
likely pass before the adjudication process produces final water
allocations among private, state, and federal interest-holders. When
and if the court completes a final quantification of rights, the
implementation of a final decree will undoubtedly raise countless
challenges. The pressures of the burgeoning population of the region
will only heighten the complexity of efforts to draw the decades-old
adjudication to a close.
Additional questions will likely arise regarding the effectiveness of
the United States, as trustee, in its representation of Indian interests.
Commentators have lamented the lack of proper legal representation
and the United States' derogation of its duty to enforce Indian water
rights, particularly in light of the federal government's role as overseer
of the country's vast western reclamation projects."3 In his discussion
of the issue, Lloyd Burton cites "deep-seated institutional ambivalence
(some say 'conflict of interest')" intended to prevent enforcement of
the Winters doctrine in favor of Indian water rights." 4 Such
institutional ambivalence may explain why crucial questions regarding
tribal groundwater rights have received only passing discussion in the
nearly thirty-five years since Arizona v. California first defined the
potentially massive scope of Indian water rights.
A. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADJUDICATION MODEL
In light of the delays, lingering uncertainties, and potential
systemic inequities, the promise of alternative methods of dispute
resolution becomes increasingly attractive. Two main alternatives,
113. See Jessica Bacal, The Shadow of Lone Wolf: Native Americans Confront Risks of
Quantificationof TheirReserved Water Rights, 12 U. BRIDGEPORTL. REv. 1, 27 (1991).
114. See Lloyd Burton, American Indian Water Rights in the Future of the Southwest, in
WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHWEST 153, 158 (Zachary A. Smith ed., 1989).
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legislation and negotiation, each have their share of proponents.
Aside from relatively rare Supreme Court opinions, federal
legislation is the only vehicle for achieving consistent national policies
to define the scope of federal and Indian rights. In the legislative
arena, however, congressional action to date rarely has been consistent
except in one regard-Congress's repeated deference to state water
law.' While Congress clearly has authority to override state law and to
reserve quantities of both surface and groundwater for federal uses, it
only reluctantly prescribes broad national remedies
because
6
sensitivities over water rights in the West are extreme.1
Despite a history of congressional inactivity, proposals for
congressional action continue to surface. Burton suggests that two
types of legislation have arisen repeatedly:
1) bills submitted by western states' rights advocates to legislatively
terminate the Winters Doctrine and extinguish all Indian claims to
waters now in non-Indian use; 2) bills submitted by civil rightsoriented advocates for the federal adjudication of Winters Doctrine
claims, with-where necessary-termination of non-Indian rights and
reassignment of those rights to the tribes." 7

Each of these proposals has potential drawbacks. The first proposal
would override nearly a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
significantly undermine the economic and social viability of many
tribal lands. The second proposal would exact significant economic
and social upheaval on non-Indian populations with, undoubtedly,
considerable political repercussions. For these and other reasons, no
comprehensive legislation to effectively protect Indian water rights has
come to pass and none appears likely in the near future. "'
In recent decades, however, Congress has made progress using a
third alternative discussed by Burton-"case-by-case legislative
settlements of disputes between specific southwestern tribes and their
non-Indian neighbors."" 9 Recent congressional actions have ratified
more than a dozen privately negotiated settlements among Indian
communities and their non-Indian neighbors in at least seven western
states.'20 Tribal, state, and private parties to the negotiations have
successfully tackled a wide variety of issues, taking into account varying
social and economic interests and geologic settings when allocating
115. See Daniel McCool, Water and the Future of Non-Indian Federal Lands in the
Southwest, inWATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHWEST 113, 128 (Zachary A. Smith ed.,

1989).
116. Id. at 116. The McCarran Amendment, discussed supra note 45, is a rare
exception to Congress's reluctance to pass sweeping water rights legislation. In recent
years, Congress has used its reservation powers to expressly reserve water rights when
identifying specific federal reservations such as national monuments. For a discussion
of these actions, See SAX ET AL., supranote 7, at 812-14.
117.

See Burton, supranote 114, at 165-66.

118. Id. at 166.
119. Id.
120.

See Checchio & Colby, supra note 110, at 180-81.
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and quantifying water rights.' Parties to the negotiations can also use
congressionally ratified settlements, which carry the force of federal
law, to establish water management policies and water supply control
mechanisms.
Burton and others have suggested ways to enhance the success of
negotiated settlements, including the establishment of a federal-state-22
Indian commission to develop models and facilitate negotiations.
Allocation of federal funding, or private funding funneled through a
water use surcharge, could further enhance the potential for
negotiated settlements by helping to ameliorate the economic impacts
on non-Indian parties and speed the transfer of water rights from
Even with such incentives, highly political and
willing sellers."
technically complex negotiations in the context of groundwater rights
Among all available solutions, congressional
will be necessary.
ratification of locally negotiated settlements is the most promising
option on the water rights horizon.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the legal wrangling over the specific questions presented in
Gila River III may be over, the outcome of the larger general
adjudication effort is far from clear. In Arizona, the recent actions of
the state courts and the United States Supreme Court may alter the
historical balance of water rights, at least on paper. One still does not
know how further interpretation in the Arizona courts will translate
these paper rights into actual allotments of groundwater for federal
interests-particularly when any new groundwater withdrawals by
Indian or other federal interests must come at the expense of another
party. And, one still does not know how other western jurisdictions
will react to the precedent set in Arizona.
The decisions in Gila River III may affect, directly or indirectly, the
balance of water and power throughout the arid West. At the very
least, the Gila River III litigation has proven that courts take seriously
any potential federal claims to groundwater, a fact likely to prompt an
increasing number of non-Indian water2 4 users and rights-holders to
seek negotiated water rights settlements.'

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 179-82.
See Burton, supra note 114, at 171-72.
Id. at 171-73
Checchio & Colby, supra note 110, at 188.
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I. WORLD WATER CRISIS
The organizers of the second World Water Forum, held at the
Hague, March 17 to 22, 2000, are to be congratulated for successfully
focusing the international community's attention on the world's water
problems. That a serious water crisis will occur appears certain: nearly
450 million people in 29 countries face water shortage problems now
and this is expected to increase to 2.5 billion people by 2050. In
addition, over a billion people do not have access to safe drinkinq
water and sanitation is minimal for half the world's population.
Responding to this compelling challenge, politicians from around the
world adopted a declaration, entitled MinisterialDeclarationof the Hague
on Water Security for the 21st Century, advocating integrated water
resources management. Supplemental to this, the World Water Vision
moves forward with the assistance of a new institutional mechanism,
the Frameworkfor Action.5 While we applaud this effort, one important
factor is overlooked and under-utilized in the formulation of the
global response: water law.
H. RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS
Approximately 6000 people converged on the Hague, including
159 delegations for the parallel Ministerial meeting. The attendees
were spoiled for choice when it came to papers, presentations, and
Unfortunately, the quality of some of these
entertainment.
presentations left much to be desired and detracted from the overall,
general high calibre of the meeting. For example, the World Water
Council's ("WWC") World Water Vision Report, Making Water
Everybody's Business,' and the World Commission for Water's ("WCW")
World Water Vision Report, A Water Secure World,7 both failed to
accurately reflect the international law governing transboundary
watercourses. Green Cross International's National Sovereignty and
InternationalWatercourses report somewhat mitigated this shortcoming.
The WCW commissioned the report, which not only favourably refers
to the United Nations ("UN") 1997 Watercourses Convention, but also
2. Press Release, World Water Council, The World Water Gap: World's Ability to
Feed Itself Threatened by Water Shortage (Mar. 20, 1999), available at
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/press.htm (last visited June 11, 2001).
3. Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, TOWARDS WATER SECURrIY: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ACTION (2000), available at http://www.gwpforum.org/Library.htm (last visited June
11, 2001) [hereinafter FRAMEWORKFORACrlON].
6. WORLD WATER COUNCIL, WORLD WATER VISION: MAKING WATER EvERYBODY'S

BUSINESS (2000), available at http://www.worldwatervision.org/vision.htm (last visited
June 11, 2001).
at
World,
Secure
Water
Reports, A
Council,
Water
7. World
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/reports.htm (last visitedJune 11, 2001).
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accurately discusses relevant international water law.8 While it is
difficult to imagine a report adding anything innovative to the state
sovereignty issue, its strength stems from reference to positive case
studies and succinctly accurate statements on international water law. 9
The report correctly emphasizes that "the management of
international watercourses should be determined less by the
traditional notion of 'restricted sovereignty' than by a positive spirit of
co-operation and effective interdependence." °
The Global Water Partnership's Framework for Action document,
while incomplete in its discussion of international water law, contains
positive elements that hold hope for the future." For example, it
ightly emphasizes the need for legal development and regulatory
frameworks for the local, regional, and international implementation
of water security.'2 The Framework for Action also calls for the
development of institutional mechanisms and shared waters
agreements in all major river basins by the year 2015." The document
aligns itself with the recommendations in the Green Cross Sovereignty
Report, which calls on States to actively pursue the adoption of both
the UN Watercourses Convention and the equitable and reasonable
utilization principle. 4 However, some obvious confusion exists in the
Frameworkfor Action that is not present in the Green Cross report, such
as the former's reference to the "no-harm rule" as the primary rule
governing international waters. 5 International water law entitles and
obligates riparian States to use their international watercourses
equitably and reasonably. This rule is codified in Article 5 of the UN
Watercourses Convention.' 6 This is not a "compromise" principle, as
the Framework for Action states," but a codified rule of customary
international law.

8.

GREEN CROSS

INTERNATIONAL,

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

AND

INTERNATIONAL

WATERcOURSEs (2000).
9. Id. at 65-98. Case studies discussed include the Ganges, the Aral Sea, the
Senegal, the Danube, the Mekong, the Mahakali, the Tigres-Euphrates, and the Nile
Basins.

10. Id. at 18.
11.

FRAMywoRK FOR ACTION, supra note 5.

12. Id. at 31-35.
13.

GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, TOWARDS WATER SEcuRIY: A FRAMEwORK FOR

AcnON,

ExEcuTIvE
SUMMARY
(2000),
available
at
http://www.gwpforum.org/Library.htm (last visited June 11, 2001) [hereinafter FFA
ExEcUrIvE SuMMARY]. "Mechanisms between riparian states in all major river basins
should be developed and shared waters agreements formulated by 2015." Id. at 4.
14. FRAMEWORK FOR ACTON, supra note 5, at 33.

15. Id. at 32.
16. United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/51/869 (1997), reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 700, availableat http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nnavfra.htm (last visited June
11, 2001) [hereinafter 1997 UN Watercourses Convention]. The United National
General Assembly passed the resolution containing the 1997 UN Watercourses
Convention by a vote of 103 in favour, 3 against and 27 abstentions.
17. FFA ExEcurnvE SUMMARY, supra note 13.
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I. MINISTERIAL DECLARATION: "WATER SECURITY IN THE
21ST CENTURY"
One of the most important documents from the Hague meeting is
This instrument identifies the main
the Ministerial Declaration.
challenges to achieving water security: meeting basic needs; securing
food supply; protecting ecosystems; sharing water resources; managing
risks; valuing water; and governing water wisely." Endorsing the "water
security" goal, the Declaration identifies, as a primary concern, the
need to share water resources "through sustainable river basin
management or other approaches." 2 The Ministers pledged to set
targets and strategies for attaining water security, but, unfortunately,
did not adopt targets at the conference.
Interestingly, the Declaration commits governments to working
with all stakeholders to develop rules and procedures addressing
liability and compensation for damage to water resources resulting
The Declaration lists issues the
from dangerous activities.2
international community must confront at the local, national,
It calls on the Global
regional, and international levels.
Environmental Facility to expand work on national management
plans, which have a beneficial impact on international waters.2
However, one major shortcoming of the Declaration is its failure to
In addition, the
mention the UN Watercourses Convention.
Declaration fails to endorse the WCW's and the Frameworkfor Action's
vision. Some of the delegates attributed these shortcomings to a lack
of authorization from their governments. Delegates received both
reports only at the meeting; they did not have adequate time to
consult with their governments.
IV. WATER LAW: WHAT RELEVANCE?
A number of possible explanations exist for the fact that water law
was either absent, inaccurately represented, or had limited presence at
the meeting: (i) it bears little or no relevance to the world's water
problems; (ii) it is considered too adversarial or controversial to adopt
as an integral part of the solution; or (iii) it is not clearly understood.
From our experience, the latter appears to be the primary reason."
Hopefully, the international community can overcome this obstacle
before the meeting of the Third World Water Forum, scheduled for
2
the year 2003 in Kyoto, Japan.2

The January 2002 meeting in Bonn

1

18. Ministerial Declaration, supranote 1.
19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. From meetings with Donor agencies, and consultations with governments, as
well as discussions with participants of the Dundee annual international and national
water law and policy seminar, a concern of public and private sector stakeholders has
been a lack of information and understanding of international water law.
24. See The 3rd World Water Forum, available at http://www.worldwaterforum.org
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and the 2002 mid-year Rio-plus-10 meeting may offer choice
opportunities to correct the inadequacies of the Hague.
One move in the right direction is the recognition of the role that
water law and lawyers can play in the management of the world's water
resources. The Hague meeting underscored the importance of such
recognition when it announced that this year's Stockholm Water Prize
was awarded to South Africa's Professor Kader Asmal, an eminent
lawyer, for his work as the Minister of Water Resources. Professor
Asmal was the driving force behind both the adoption of the
comprehensive water code in South Africa and the drafting and
completion of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
Protocol on Shared Watercourses. Professor Asmal has also brought
water to more than three million South Africans during his tenure as a
minister.
Water law, whether national or international, is relevant at all
stages of water resource development and management. One can
identify the following three critical stages:
1. Legal entitlement. Authorities must identify all stakeholders and
devise a mechanism for securing their entitlement. Without these two
elements, one cannot enforce access to the resource.
2. Framework for allocation. Once the appropriate authorities
decide what uses to permit, they must devise a framework for
allocation. Ideally, this framework must be flexible, yet predictable,
and capable of enforcement.
3. Compliance, dispute avoidance and dispute settlement. Once the
authorities establish a framework for allocation, it is important that
they put mechanisms in place to monitor and enforce compliance with
that regime. Also, mechanisms for avoiding and peacefully settling.
disputes are of the utmost importance.
For each stage, it is critical that the implementing agency adopt an
interdisciplinary approach. Hydrologists, engineers, and economists
might identify option ranges for the indicators of each stage, but a
legal framework will provide the parameters for implementation and
ensure the arrangement's stability.
V. THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION: WHAT VIRTUES?
Some of the documents, presentations, and discussions at the
World Water Forum criticized the UN Watercourses Convention on
numerous counts. Many of these criticisms were unfounded and could
serve only to undermine the global attempt to ensure the peaceful
(last visitedJune 11, 2001).
25. Dublin + 10, referring to the to Dublin Principles adopted in 1992, which
advocate integrated water resource management - IWRM. The Dublin Principles are

available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/law/water (last visited June 11,
information about the international freshwater conference discussing
principles, see http://www.water-2001.de (last visited June 25, 2001). For
about the Rio + 10 conference, see http://www.johannesburgsummit.org
June 25, 2001).

2001). For
the Dublin
information
(last visited
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sharing and protection of transboundary waters. The Convention,
adopted on May 21, 1997, was open for signature until May 20, 2000.6
Presently, it has fifteen signatories and seven ratifications. Contrary to
the views of many noted "experts," the Convention did not require
thirty-five ratifications by May 20, 2000 in order to come into force. As
with many other global international treaties, the UN Watercourses
Convention will come into force upon acquiring the necessary number
of ratifications. 7 This could occur at any time and, in fact, is a feasible
possibility. However, even if the Watercourses Convention never
enters into force, it already has generated considerable influence on
States. This influence is apparent in the drafting of new agreements or
the diplomatic negotiations between States regarding their shared
watercourses. For instance, the drafters of the Southern African
Development Community Protocol on Shared Watercourses have
rewritten the protocol to include the main provisions of the
Additionally, the International Court of Justice
Convention.
underscored the Convention's importance when it referred to a
number of its provisions within the Gabcdkovo-Nag maros case, a dispute
between Hungary and Slovakia over the Danube. In any event, many
of the substantive rules contained in the Convention reflect customary
international law, which binds all States regardless of entry into force
of the UN Convention.
Another ill-founded criticism voiced at the Hague meetings was
that the Convention failed to meet environmental imperatives,
The
including the new mantra of "sustainable development."
Convention's purpose is to provide a framework for States to define
their relations concerning transboundary waters, not to design an
environmental conservation package that includes international waters
as part of the scheme. In fact, the principle of equitable and
reasonable use, along with the mechanisms for oj9erationalizing it,
incorporates the notion of sustainable development. In addition, this
provision allows decision makers to consider all relevant factors in the
overall assessment of what qualifies as a legitimate use. It is clear that
sustainable development and environmental protection and
conservation are relevant factors to be considered in particular
circumstances.
The suggestion that the Convention is weak because it does not
require that all existing watercourse agreements be consistent with its

26. 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supranote 16, art. 34.
27. 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supranote 16, art. 36.
28. Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Development
at
available
Region,
(SADC)
Community
http://www.sadcwscu.org.ls/protocol/protocol.htm (last visited June 11, 2001).
29. Case Concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)
(Sept. 25, 1997), reprinted in part in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1997), case excerpts available at
http://www.icj.law.gla.ac.uk (last visitedJune 11, 2001).
30. Article 5 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention uses the term "sustainable
utilization." Article 24.2.a requires a watercourse State to consult to "plan the
sustainable development" of an international watercourse.
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provisions fails to recognize the consequences of such a proposition.
This requirement would declare some 3000 existing watercourse
agreements void upon the Convention's adoption, resulting in
unnecessary chaos and confusion. Moreover, it is unlikely that the
General Assembly of the United Nations in May 1997 would have
adopted the Convention if it had included provisions to this effect.
The Convention provides a model upon which to base negotiations for
change-relevant to agreements requiring modification.
The strongest element of the Convention is its procedural
mechanisms. These mechanisms provide predictable and pragmatic
guidelines by which States can lawfully develop their international
waters.
This is especially important for States that share an
international watercourse for which no agreement exists. Participation
in the UN Watercourses Convention could enhance the opportunity
for co-operation as well as attract international financing for the
development of the water resources within the entire basin.
Although the UN Watercourses Convention is not a perfect
instrument, it goes a long way toward providing States with a useful
framework that facilitates the peaceful development of shared
watercourses through substantive and procedural rules. On the
substantive side, it places all States on a level playing field. This
permits each state to put forth its case based on all factors relevant to
its particular needs, emphasizing the equality of riparian States'
rights.3
It also includes protective provisions regarding the
ecosystem."
On the procedural side, the Convention has many
strengths. It offers States pragmatic mechanisms, including exchange
of information, consultations, establishment of joint mechanisms,
notification for planned measures, and other means aimed at avoiding
disputes and attaining agreeable solutions.3
VI. THE WAY FORWARD: EMBRACING WATER LAW AS PART OF
THE RESPONSE
The Third World Water Forum will take place in Kyoto, Japan, in
2003, most likely following a format similar to the Hague meeting.
Hopefully, water law will play a more prominent role leading up to the
next meeting. To achieve water security, it is important to follow an
approach involving "co-operation between different kinds of water
users, and between those sharing river basins and aquifers, within a
framework that allows for the protection of vital ecosystems from

31. 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 16, arts. 5, 6. This does not
necessarily mean equality of share of the waters. For interpretative commentary, see
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in
Y.B.I.L.C., vol. II, pt. 2, at 88 (1994).
32. 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 16, arts. 7, 20-24.
33. 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 16, arts. 3,4,8,9, 11-19, 30, 32,
33.
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pollution and other threats."14 The means for achieving such
cooperation will originate from a number of sources, with politics
playing an important role at all stages. However, once authorities
agree upon the parameters for cooperation, water law is essential to
sustain the cooperation.
Globalization marks the current era, with transnational acts of
global commerce blurring national boundaries. What are the rules of
law that apply to transactions in this arena that affect water resources?
At the national level, the legislature needs to resolve similar issues
when revising national legislation. Equally, law plays an important role
in private sector participation and privatization. Each of these very
different scenarios impacts directly on water resources; water law could
determine the terms on which stakeholders are ensured equitable and
sustainable access in all events.
Good practices
concerning
integrated
water resources
management require input from all disciplines, including the law. As
one authority put it, "to achieve water security, water must be made
everybody's business.""'

34. FFA ExEcuTivE SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 1.
35. The Forum Chairman, HRH The Prince William of Orange, Opening Speech
at World Water Forum (Mar. 17, 2000).

PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
The Water Law Review is please to present the following interview
with one of the great water lawyers, public servants, and teachers of
our time-John A. Carver, Jr., to whom we proudly pay tribute in this
issue. Chip Cutler, one of John Carver's former students, had the
privilege to interview Professor Carver, whereby we learn of his
incredible life and career as a water lawyer, public servant, and
teacher. On behalf of the Editors, Mr. Cutler, and our readers, I
sincerely thank Professor Carver for his time and candid insights. I
hope all who read this interview thoroughly enjoy it.
Kris A. Zumalt, Editor-in-Chief
Interviewer: Good morning Professor Carver, I'd like to begin with
your childhood history. You were born and raised in Idaho, and I was
wondering how western water law has changed since you were a boy?
Professor Carver: I was a boy growing up in Idaho in the 1920s. I
spent summers on my grandfather's irrigated farm. "Turning the
water" into the fields and rows was one of the chores. I was very well
aware of how important water was. I was unaware of water law as such,
but I did know that my grandfather had water rights and that they were
as important to him as his land rights. The neighbors who shared the
same ditch also had water rights and occasionally there was conflict.
How has it changed? Obviously much has changed. The law has
changed, and water use has changed, but how those farmers feel about
their water rights hasn't changed. Many of the water rights have been
sold.
Interviewer: Is Idaho's experience similar to Colorado's, in terms
of development replacing many of the historical farms?
Professor Carver: Idaho has more water than Colorado has. As I
used to tell you in class, what kind of water law you have depends on
how much water you have. I think there are more pressures to shift
uses in Colorado from farms to municipal and industrial uses.
Interviewer: Professor Carver, how did you become interested in
natural resources work, and water in particular? Was it a conscious
choice, or were you just sort of nudged in that direction?
Professor Carver:

My interest in natural resources, and in
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particular in water, was accidental in many ways. I was not aware
growing up of the separate field of water law. In those simpler times
youngsters aspired to be lawyers, not corporation, criminal, or water
lawyers. I did grow up in an agricultural area and I did know those
were the problems that lawyers, like my father, were involved with.
Interviewer: Speaking of your father, he was blind, but he
overcame this adversity to work as a United States Attorney for the
State of Idaho for twenty years, and later a trial judge. Was it primarily
his influence, or were there others who influenced your career path?
Professor Carver: I remember wanting to become a lawyer from my
earliest days. I suppose my father was an important part of that. As
the time went on, as I finished college, I started an administrative
career in the government. After finishing law school I returned to the
law.
Interviewer: I've always wondered how one would cope with
blindness practicing law and preparing for trial?
Professor Carver: Growing up with him his children weren't much
aware that he was handicapped in any way. He had studied under a
lawyer, and after passing the bar shortly after I was born, opened an
office doing collections and that sort of thing, and quite soon was
elected county prosecutor. He had a partner some of the time who I
suppose made some difference, but he didn't regard his as any kind of
a handicapped situation at all. He prepared cases, and when I was
about ten years old, I can remember going to the law library with him,
where he'd tell me exactly how to use the West key system and find
cases. He was active in Democratic politics and when Roosevelt was
elected became a United States Attorney. Of course as a U.S. Attorney
you had secretaries and assistants, things like that, but he did his fair
share of the work. He used to present cases to the Grand Jury and try
cases and so on.
Interviewer: So you were indoctrinated in the practice of law at a
young age.
Professor Carver: I don't know about the practice of law, but I was
aware of what lawyers did and how things went in the community and
so on. I moved on to, you might call it, more structured work than
involved in private practice.
Interviewer: When did you discover your interest in politics and
working in the federal government?
Professor Carver: Those are two different questions. I was
interested in politics because my father was. In 1936, he ran for the
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Democratic nomination for the United States Senate, unsuccessfully,
but I drove him all over the state of Idaho in that campaign. I was
imbued with politics. I went to Washington, D. C. after that campaign
where I got a job working for a Senate Committee. I was then 18. I
got into non-political government in 1940 through a civil service
examination, and was in civilian personnel administration for the War
Department until 1947.
I quit my governmentjob to open a solo practice in Boise in 1947.
I was for a time an Assistant Attorney General, and I got back into
politics by helping Frank Church, a fellow Boise lawyer, in his
successful campaign for the Senate in 1956, and I became his
Administrative Assistant. In 1960 1worked in the Kennedy campaign.
Interviewer: How did you become involved with the Kennedy
campaign, as his Michigan campaign coordinator?
Professor Carver: I was acquainted with Ted Sorenson, Kennedy's
Administrative Assistant. After Kennedy was nominated I got a call
from Bob Kennedy. The interview was odd. He said, "What do you
know about Michigan?" I said, "Absolutely nothing." He said, "Well,
you're our man." The general idea was that there were really two
Democratic parties in Michigan, and they wanted someone who was
not tied up with either side.
Interviewer: Were you effective, bringing the two sides together?
Professor Carver: Well I was rewarded by the Kennedy
administration with a sub-cabinet appointment as Assistant Secretary of
the Interior, and we did carry the state.
Interviewer: What were your first impressions of young John
Kennedy?
Professor Carver: Well I met him in Boise when he was just first
elected to the Senate. He was a very impressive guy. He was in his first
term, I asked what it was like being Senator, and he said, "it's the most
corrupting job in the world." He was a very personable and able. I
didn't know him personally very well; I did know a lot of the people
who were very close to him quite well. I was a great admirer.
Interviewer: His brother Robert?
Professor Carver: Well, he was one tough cookie. I liked him a lot,
but he was pretty no nonsense in terms of what we were trying to do at
the time, running a successful election. I wasn't involved at later times,
after he was a Senator and running for President himself. I was on the
Federal Power Commission, so I wasn't involved in any later
campaigns.
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Interviewer: What was your role in Johnson's '64 campaign?
Professor Carver: As a part of his administration in the Interior
Department I could defend or support what Interior was doing. I
accompanied Johnson on one of his western campaign swings. I went
to a number of different states and again just kind of talking up the
administration or the particular Congressman that we happened to be
interested in, that sort of thing. I was trying to make it clear to the
various user and other groups in the West that the administration was
a fair and good administrator of the public lands.
Interviewer: In your Idaho practice you concentrated on timber
and mining law issues; when did you shift to water, and why?
Professor Carver: I don't think I ever really shifted to water. I
don't remember having a water case. Working with Frank Church
involved many water issues. This was especially true of the 1956
campaign for election to the Senate because there was pending at the
time competing projects for the development of the Hells Canyon
stretch of the Snake River. The federal proposal was to build a high
dam, and the competing proposal was for several low dams to be built
by the Idaho Power Company. An issue in the campaign, charges that
Church would give away Idaho water rights. Water rights were an issue
in Church's later efforts for a wilderness bill and for designation of a
part of the Salmon River country as wilderness. Frank would never be
part of any movement to take away vested water rights. These were
political issues that required me to become knowledgeable about water
rights and water law.
Interviewer: How did you first meet Frank Trelease?
Professor Carver: I don't remember precisely, but I think he and I
were on a program of the University of Wyoming at Trail Lake up by
Dubois, Wyoming. I worked with him a number of times thereafter
when I was on the advisory commission to the Public Land Law Review
Commission. He was a principal author of the Commission's water
rights studies.
Interviewer: What role has the environmental movement of the last
century played in the evolution of water use and water law?
Professor Carver: A very, very broad question. At the turn of the
twentieth century, a hundred years ago, the liberal progressive
movement was split. John Muir and others favored preservation, but
other "progressives" favored public power development. Conservation
and dam building were synonymous ideas to some. Later in the
century, dams became the antithesis of conservation. A movement
favoring recreation made water recreation a desirable public objective,
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aligned with the conservation movement. More recently the two onetime allies have become mortal enemies. Great conservation leaders,
like Stewart Udall, are now decried for building dams like Glen
Canyon. This to me seems very odd, but we are accustomed in this
country to judge past actions by today's standards.
The National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Water Act,
and all the other environmental laws in the last third of the last
century, have had a tremendous impact on water law. The federalism
pattern of governing in this country has changed. Things once
regarded as strictly state matters have now have become national
matters, and paradoxically the states are able to frustrate programs of
the national government.
Interviewer: What brought about the change from prioritizing big
storage and hydroelectric power generation projects to conservation
and theories of more efficient use?
Professor Carver: The change is a function of population. The
conservation movement in the late 60s and early 7 0s got the people
thinking about it. It came to a real head when Carter became
President, and issued a "hit list" of water projects. He tried to stop the
whole pattern of western water development. He wasn't entirely
successful and a good many more water projects were later completed.
But there hasn't been anything of major significance in the last twentyfive years. The Endangered Species Act represents the high water
mark of this national concern. Most of this developed during the
Nixon administration. He has such a terrible reputation, but that's
when it all came to a head.
Interviewer: Do you think today we can reconcile hydroelectric
power generation with aquatic habitat preservation?
Professor Carver: There is really no way to reconcile the two. If
you're going to build big dams, you're going to have an impact on
aquatic habitat. You can mitigate the impact, but there are going to be
some losses. The problem that I see is that you can't turn the clock
back. You can't tear out the dams in the Northwest to revive the
salmon fisheries.
You can't have two objects occupying the same space at the same
time. That was the whole problem with the so-called multiple use
mantra of the last century. You felt that with semantics you could solve
the land-use problem. There must be trade-offs. That doesn't mean
we can't do it better, but we fool ourselves if we think everything is
going to come out.
Interviewer: In your opinion, what is the appropriate future role
for the federal government in western water administration?
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Professor Carver: Its role in western water administration is the
same as its role in western development generally. The federal
government was source of capital of last resort, for building the
railroads and building water projects such as Hoover dam and Glen
Canyon dam, projects too big for private enterprise. That role is
largely gone; maybe it's completely gone. The last big one was the
Central Arizona Project, which was the price paid for getting some sort
of peace on the Colorado River. But now the federal government's
role is almost entirely that of regulator through the Clean Water and
Clean Air, Toxic Waste and other programs. It fixes national priorities
as against the individual and regional pressures. The Supreme Court
and the Congress have both made it very clear that we're going to stick
with state administered property systems involving water, and that
states can have conservation programs in terms of the interstate export
of water, as in the Nebraska Court's Sporhasedecision. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and others have emphasized in recent years a countermovement, which says that Congress really intended the states to have
more and more control, in terms of let's say putting conditions on the
operations of federal dams, like in the New Melones case in California.
Interviewer: Last year, the College of Law, for its Carver Lecture,
hosted Interior Secretary Babbitt, and he discussed management of
public land and parks on a regional watershed basis, effectively
realigning state and agency management boundaries that have been
established for decades. Do you see that as a successful management
policy?
Professor Carver: In the 1950's there was a book called Ten Rivers
in America's Future, or something like that, which rather specifically
developed this regional watershed approach, so its not a new idea.
John Wesley Powell emphasized it as a way of dealing with the
management of the water. No, I don't see any chance for that policy
gaining any more headway. Today's dominant political forces are
much too narrowly focused for anything that broad to develop. The
main problems now are domination of policies by urban interests, so
that any kind of macro change in management is just out of the
question. If former Secretary Babbitt wants to talk about it, fine; he
didn't make any progress on it, and I don't think anyone in office now
is even thinking about making any progress on it.
Interviewer: Do you see further compartmentalization of
management as opposed to more cooperative agency management of
the public lands?
Professor Carver: The era when I was Assistant Secretary of the
Interior enjoyed a better relationship with the users than any
administration since, in my opinion. In my view cooperation really
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depends on the kinds of people that you put in charge of these
programs and on the general philosophy under which the managers
work. What seems to dominate most policy questions now is an "us
versus them" orientation rather than a cooperative one. Maybe that
will change, but I don't see it changing. As I saw it, the people who
have the most interest in wise management of the range were the
users, because if the range is depleted then they're out of business. It
was a hard thing to sell because the general idea is that the users are a
bunch of robbers and rapists that are trying to despoil our natural
resources. There's a terrible habit in this country of looking back and
finding scapegoats in the past for what we see as evils today. It just
doesn't wash. The people running the government, most times, are
doing the best they can. I don't see anything getting any better,
because the pressures are greater.
With this instantaneous
communication and these open meetings and so on, you don't have
any chance to work things out. We've come to the point where we
personalize legitimate public issues, not only personalize them. We
blame Gale Norton for programs she probably hasn't even had a
chance to look at yet. Legitimate public issues are obscured.
Interviewer: Can we reconcile federal and state water interests?
Professor Carver: We obviously can reconcile them if you take the
position that the dominant sovereign, which is the federal sovereign,
can do whatever it chooses to do, that is, whatever the Congress says. A
true reconciliation will come when we treat this Constitutional
Supremacy principle as a financial problem rather than as a legal
problem. That means that if the federal government properly chooses
to take the rights of existing water users, it should pay for them. Social
costs of new policies should not be dumped on a particular class of
user by some legal interpretation of what they thought was a water
right, now its just a privilege and can be taken away at will. I see
reconciliation coming in the form of a broader view of what people are
entitled to be paid for if they are disrupted in their established and
legally recognized uses.
Interviewer: Professor Carver, does the theory of "fair allocation"
have a place in western water administration?
Professor Carver: The only place where I think you get any
meaning for the term "fair allocation" is that it is a term like the one
the Supreme Court invented in interstate water allocation-"equitable
apportionment". "Equitable" means whatever the Supreme Court
decides and fair allocation is subject to the same semantic problem.
What's fair allocation? Who decides? The process must inspire
confidence and have finality.
If by fair allocation you want to say that municipal uses are better,
are superior to agricultural uses, I say that's fine, but if you're going to
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displace an agricultural use, you've got to pay the social cost of it.
That's the way our prior appropriation system works.
Interviewer: Where do Winters doctrine tribal water rights fit in the
new geography of conservation driven water management? And in
that regard, the Interior Secretary's trust responsibility?
Professor Carver: I'll take the last part of your question first. When
I was involved in the business, the Interior Department's trust
responsibility enabled the Interior Department to in effect decide what
was best for the Indians. The change that has come is that the Indians
now have their own lawyers, and they can and do get to court. Trust
responsibility is now more consonant with conventional trust law. I
know when I was in the Interior Department, I was looking after the
rights of the Indians, and a different Assistant Secretary for the Bureau
of Reclamation was looking after the interests of the Bureau of
Reclamation and its water users. We had the same Solicitor's Office on
both sides of the controversy. That was a questionable arrangement.
Any kind of nonsense about "Chinese walls" was just that. I think that
doesn't happen now. The tribes are well represented, so that the trust
responsibilities are judicially supervised.
Problems still persist, however, because there isn't any Indian
reservation in this country that doesn't have intermingled private
interests right on the reservation. In Washington, Idaho and other
states you have this conflict between the Indians' claim to control
water within the reservation boundaries and the citizens of the state,
and the water administrative agency of the state insisting that their
responsibility for the allocation of water is not restricted, except to the
extent that the Indians have or are determined to have their water
rights. In other words, that the non-Indians can have their water rights
administered by the state agency. So, I don't see that problem
resolved or even getting any closer to resolution because the Supreme
Court has said that under the McCarran Act if you have a general
water adjudication, you can do it in the state courts. The problems
that the state courts have with that are almost insurmountable because
an Indian water right is not limited to the beneficial current use, as is a
normal appropriated water right. State courts thus face the problem
that when you get through with an adjudication, whatever it may say, at
some time in the future the Indians may come along and successfully
say that our rights are better because they're older, and the fact that
we haven't used them is immaterial. I don't think you'll ever
successfully get the Indians to fully quantify their rights in that respect,
or if you quantify them, you'll quantify them at a number which will
have the same effect as what I've just said. That's being solved in some
states; in Montana they're trying to figure it out by agreement, and in
Utah they're trying to figure it out with leases and that sort of thing.
Ultimately the problem is irresolvable. A riparian right and an
appropriation right just don't fit with each other. Indian rights are
more like riparian rights than they are like appropriated rights, even
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though we call them appropriated rights with a date and amount and
so on. Itjust doesn't work that way.
Interviewer: What about federal wilderness reservation impacts on
vested water rights, an example being the Snake River Basin
Adjudication in Idaho?
Professor Carver: Those Idaho cases were a clear example of
problems we have spoken of. I was working for the Senate when the
Wilderness Bill was passed, and to my certain personal knowledge,
there would be no wilderness system if it had not been agreed and put
in the legislation that vested water rights would not be taken, under
any kind of implied reservation doctrine. Nevertheless the legislative
history and the legislation was, in the Idaho case, parsed again and
reasonable judges, not having been there, came to a split decision as to
what the Congress in 1964 intended. I don't think we're yet at any
point where any vested rights are going to be taken, but the federal
government never gives up. If they can get those water rights without
paying for them, then they think they've done a good job for the
federal government, and the fact that they may have done a bad job
for the government generally seems to be another issue.
Interviewer: Do you see an ever-increasing congressional role in
western water administration?
Professor Carver: Not directly, not in the same sense that we had it
in the past. I foresee no more Upper Colorado River Storage Project
acts, and no more general reclamation or power-oriented
development. On the other hand the federal role with non-water
programs, such as the Endangered Species Act, give the federal
government an increasing role.
Interviewer: Should Upper Colorado River Basin water users be
worried about continued Lower Basin population growth?
Professor Carver: If they have any confidence in the 1963 Arizona v.
California decision they shouldn't be worried. At least not the same
kind of worry which led to the Colorado River Compact negotiations
in the 1920s. The shares of the respective states have been judicially
fixed, and claims upon water by virtue of prior appropriation, that is
first putting it to beneficial use, are unlikely. On the other hand, that
isn't to say you won't get some kind of equivalent problem that will be
played out within a state. For instance, the normal appropriation
process might be used in Colorado on the basis that use elsewhere is
beneficial under our law. So far that's been a no-no in Colorado, but
the effort persists.
Interviewer: How do we protect Colorado's unique natural and
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cultural environments while accommodating future growth?
Professor Carver: Just deal with it as a political process. You win
some and you lose some. To go back to what I said earlier, the only
way that you'll ever successfully get a reconciliation is a recognition
that if you're going to impose unusual costs on a particular segment of
the population you've got to compensate them. If it's worthwhile for
us not to have sprawl development, then we've got to figure out some
way to, at least to some extent, prevent the owners the land which is
capable of being so developed from being singled out for adverse
treatment. That doesn't mean that I favor the exploiter who has gone
out and on a speculative basis bought the land. But for sure, some guy
who has been a farmer for seventy years on the plains should not be
singled out for separate treatment simply because we have a new
growth policy.
Interviewer: Can prior appropriation and judicial administration of
water rights survive the pressures of municipal domestic use and
environmental preservation?
Professor Carver: I think the City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co.
case shows that they can. I think that's a classic example of all the
forces being brought to bear-the long planning horizon, the
concerns about the environment and the imposition of conditions, all
of those kinds of things. The final upshot of that case is that you had
some adverse effects on some kinds of existing users, but nevertheless
in terms of the integrity of the system, the prior appropriation system
was maintained.
On the other hand if you believe that the Colorado Supreme
Court's most recent decision involving Aurora's attempt to get water
out of that Union Park project-I believe that decision was something
of a blow to the prior appropriation system, at least as I have
understood it. That case says, in effect, that we're not going to import
any more water even though it isn't now being used. The Court
looked at language of a federal statute to conclude that Congress
intended that a priority for the federal government. Congress said just
the opposite. I'm very critical of that decision, in terms of the way I
think the prior appropriation system ought to work. The way I think it
ought to work is that if there is no water there to be appropriated, that
will come up at the time when you start interfering with senior water
rights. But to say in advance that there is no water available is to take
upon oneself the power to modify the prior appropriation system. The
beauty of the prior appropriation system was that the seniors were
always protected; they didn't need any extra protection. But then you
come along with environmental interests, who have not appropriated
the water but who assert these values, and that's legitimate.
Nevertheless your question is, is the prior appropriation system being
fundamentally changed, and the answer is yes it is. It is in many major
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ways. It is now being changed over what we understood it to be fifty
years ago. Then if I wanted to appropriate water out of a stream, I'd
divert and apply it to a beneficial use, and if I interfered with
somebody else's use, they called the river and I was subordinated to
their use. If I wanted to risk my money on only using the water every
twenty-five years, I could do it. Now big brother is looking after you,
and saying "that isn't a very good investment." Well, what the hell,
Aurora thought it was a good investment.
Interviewer: In your mind, how can we better administer
groundwater and surface water in Colorado?
Professor Carver: That is such a complicated issue because of the
various kinds of groundwater that have been legislatively defined. We
have a mixture of legal definitions and hydrology definitions, which
don't lead to easy administration. In 1983 when the Colorado
legislature tried to deal with this on an ad hoc basis, they did a good
thing, but they got farther and farther away from any kind of
conjunctive administration of the total water situation in Colorado.
Interviewer: Do you think it's advisable then to maintain separate
administrations for groundwater and surface water?
Professor Carver: As of now I'd say it's advisable to keep that up,
because doing anything else would be so disruptive that I don't think
we could do it. There isn't any state in the West that doesn't have this
problem in one way or another. Arizona and Idaho are at the opposite
ends of the spectrum in terms of how much water they've got, but they
have equivalent problems in terms of the way they try to deal with the
problem of developing water. Such as in handling a groundwater
mining situation at the same time that you're dealing with a renewable
surface flow or recharge amount in the connected aquifers. So it's a
mess; there's no question about that. I don't see it getting any better.
Interviewer: What's your opinion of proposals to import water to
the West from the Great Lakes?
Professor Carver: Total nonsense. We've had those proposals to
take water from Canada, and the Snake River Basin and move it to
California. I don't care how much water any particular area has,
they're not going to peaceably agree to applying that water to needs
however great they are of Southern California or anywhere else. One
modification one might make to that is that with proper incentives
they might do it, but those types of incentives are a long way into the
future. They're not going to take water from the icebergs of
Antarctica, or the glaciers of Alaska. You know they've had all these
goofy projects for years and years, and the engineers have fun with
them, and maybe sometime they'll get to them, but I don't think they

Issue 2

PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE

will in any time frame I care to deal with.
Interviewer: How can we more effectively educate people about
better water use?
Professor Carver: Any time you use these terms like "better" or
"fairer" I bridle, asking better in whose judgment? It is an unspoken
proposition here that there must be some right answer somewhere.
The better use of the water was once to build huge dams; otherwise it
was wasting to the sea. Now the better use is to let it flow untrammeled
to the sea. So you can't get me to get into any argument about better
use. If you want to talk to me about less wasteful uses or greater
efficiency, then I'm all for that, but if your making some kind of a
political or social judgment about better then I'm obviously against it.
Interviewer: How then can we educate the public, municipalities,
our representatives, state administrators, water lawyers, water courts to
help them prioritize making more efficient, and less wasteful use of
water?
Professor Carver: Well that's a battle. In Denver when I first got
here, there were no household meters. Water was a kind of free use.
That has changed. Another way to educate is to improve the
knowledge of how water is being used, and use that as your starting
point. The other is to get the correct analysis of the true cost and the
market values involved and things tend to adjust themselves. But you
can't talk to people about being efficient if there's no meter in their
house, and even if there's a meter in their house you can't talk about
being efficient if you're subsidizing that water and giving it to them for
less than cost, less than the true cost. So that's the starting point. I
don't think pedagogy is the answer, telling them about water law or
anything like that is going to work. It's kind of like gasoline prices.
Interviewer: Have we learned the necessary lessons administering
the interstate distribution of Colorado River water to create an
effective system of interstate water delivery and administration?
Professor Carver: Whether we've learned the lessons or not, if
you're talking about interstate water such as that in the aquifers, then
we've got a long way to go. If you're talking about the efficacy of the
compacts and agreements, we've got a long ways to go there, too. If
you're talking about the efficacy of Supreme Court decisions, if you
believe in Arizona v. California,well then that's the law of the river and
that's that. But if whether you stepped back from it and said that was
the right way to allocate the stream in terms of the present or the
future, I'm not sure you'd agree. I wouldn't agree that building
swimming pools in Phoenix or Tucson, at the enormous cost that it
costs us to do that was a wiser thing to do than to let California to
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continue to use and pay for that water for high value agricultural
products in the Imperial Valley. But those things can even out over
time, costs can be internalized, so you have to face every day with
whatever the situation is that day.
Interviewer: What professional or personal advice can you give the
water law and natural resources community?
Professor Carver: I'm not very good at giving advice. I don't think
that anyone should be dealing with water administration until he
becomes thoroughly imbued with its history. I think that's absent in
pedagogy and it is absent in administration. Too many people are
unwilling to step back to the time of John Wesley Powell and work
forward to see what water development has meant to this West. That's
a blank wall to them, and we wouldn't have the problems that we have
here because we'd be a desert if we hadn't figured out the ColoradoBig Thompson project, or built the Boulder Canyon Dam and the
Arrow Rock Dam up in Idaho and things like that. We wouldn't have
the problems because there wouldn't be any people here. Now that
the people are here, it's feckless as far as I'm concerned to say the
whole problem is because of the greedy farmers using up the water or
because of these wasteful practices or whatever. As if somehow or
other you can zero in on some group and blame them. So my advice is
to study a little history.
Interviewer: Is there anything else you'd like to address before we
close?
Professor Carver: Well there's one thing you didn't ask me about,
that is the twenty-some year continuous relationship I've had with
water law, as I've taught the subject. I know that I've enjoyed the
process, and I think generally the students have benefited from it. I'm
kind of a throwback in terms of teaching water law, just as Trelease's
casebook is a throw back. I like to deal with it in terms of the
perspective that I've gotten of it over my lifetime, rather than the
perspective as an administrative law problem of particular proportions.
I think the basic thing is to figure out what's best for the country and
then allocate the water accordingly. So I would suppose that in you
and others who have had my courses, there ought to be something that
would indicate that I've been at least moderately successful.
Interviewer: Absolutely.

WEBSITE REVIEWS
The Website Reviews section of the Water Law Review is intended to
provide an overview of useful websites for attorneys, practitioners,
students, jurists, and other professionals interested in water law and
water-related issues. For clarity, each website review refers to links
within the reviewed website as "inlinks," or as providing the ability to
"inlink." Each review also refers to links outside the reviewed website
as "outlinks," or as providing the ability to "outlink."
by The
maintained
http://www.wateriowledge.colostate.edu;
Colorado Water Research Institute and Colorado State University.
http://www.waterknowledge.colostate.edu
website
The
("Waterknowledge" or "site") is a useful site for both water lawyers and
laypersons who want to increase their knowledge of Colorado's
waterways and water laws. Upon first accessing the site's homepage,
the user is given the option to select from several different links.
The first link is Cool Water Facts on Colorado water. This link
contains more than fifty facts about Colorado water. The facts on this
link are primarily historical, geological, and geographical. Examples
include: the largest reservoir in Colorado is the Mesa Reservoir; less
than 1% of water treated by public water systems is used for drinking
or cooking; at 256 feet, Grand Lake is the deepest lake in Colorado;
and the most acidic snow in the Rocky Mountain region falls in
northern Colorado near the Mount Zirkel Wilderness Area. The Cool
Water Facts link provides outlinks to the U.S. Water News, the Colorado
Water Research Institute,and the American Rivers websites.
The second link is an Overview of Colorado water. Overview inlinks
to information on (1) the hydrologic cycle; (2) the geologic
description; (3) river channels, sediment, and runoff; (4) Colorado
water history; (5) terms and definitions; and (6) Colorado climate.
Each of these inlinks sub-links to more specific treatment of these
topics. This Overview of Colorado water provides enough general
information to familiarize a newcomer with the intricacies of Colorado
water terminology, rights, and law. Yet, the overview is specific enough
that an experienced water attorney will find it useful as well.
The third link, Sources, Uses, Management and Conservation of
Colorado water provides in-depth information on the "how, when, and
where" of water in the state. One of the inlinks provides statistical and
factual data on each of Colorado's major river basins, including total
inflow and outflow, major tributaries, water quality, and a map of the
basins. Another inlink provides the user with a chart on total water
withdraws and deliveries for different purposes in each of Colorado's
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basins. In addition, one will find inlinks to the various water resources
within the state, the different uses and consumptive uses in the state
and each basin, and outlinks to water conservation sites.
The fourth link is Aquatic Organisms, Wetlands, Water Quality, and
Environmental Water Law. This link inlinks to basic information on the
different species of fish and aquatic insects in the state, descriptions of
the four types of wetlands in the state, and surface water quality. This
link also has outlinks to many of the federal environmental protection
laws including the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the
Endangered Species Act, among others.
The fifth link is Water Administration. This link contains four
inlinks. The first inlink provides descriptions, addresses, and oudinks
to federal, state, and local agencies that have jurisdiction over
Colorado's water resources. The second inlink supplies information
on the different diversions and water projects in Colorado, including
maps, volume, and the fourteen hydroelectric power plants operated
by the Bureau of Reclamation. The third inlink describes interstate
water compacts to which Colorado is a party. The fourth inlink
outlinks to information on how to obtain a water right, a guide to new
well permits, filing fees for new applications, and contact information
for the seven Colorado water courts.
The final three links from the site's homepage are inlinks to (1)
frequently asked questions regarding Colorado water rights and law;
(2) information on the recovery efforts for the Greenback Cutthroat
Trout; and (3) information on Colorado watershed protection efforts.
Each of these three links has inlinks taking the user to more in-depth
treatment of each topic.
Finally, the site's homepage has three outlinks to (1) a children's
website maintained by the Colorado Water Resources Research
Institute; (2) the USA Today Hydrology website; and (3) the U.S.
Geological Survey Water Sciencefor Schools website.
Overall, the Waterknowledge website provides a wealth of useful
information for both laypersons and water attorneys. The site is user
friendly, and the links fairly describe the information contained
within. Much of the data is simply a compilation from many legal and
non-legal water sources. The website provides an efficient way to find
information on almost any water topic. It is a site that should be
"bookmarked" for future reference.
Adam B. Kehrli
http://www.werf.org; maintained by the Water Environment Research
Foundation.
The website http://www.werf.org ("WERF" or "site") is an
interactive website for those interested in water quality research
programs, and in advancing science and technology in the water
quality industry.
WERF is geared primarily toward keeping
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subscribers, volunteers, and others interested in water quality
informed of ongoing research activities in the field. One focus of the
site and the Water Environment Research Foundation ("Foundation")
is the recruitment of municipalities, industrial organizations, and
corporations to get involved in addressing current wastewater research
needs and forecasting future directions for water quality.
Users can access WERF either as a subscriber or visitor. This
website review focuses mainly on how to access it as a visitor. The
Visitors Gallery link provides useful general information on the
Foundation. The Visitors Gallery link also provides useful information
on how to subscribe to the Foundation and to the Foundation's
numerous newsletters and journals. This link offers outlinks to water
quality websites, wastewater-related government agencies, associations,
research groups, and news sites. The Visitors Gallery link also provides
an inlink to the Foundation's most comprehensive program, its
research program. The Our Research Program Areas link provides
subscribers with the ability to search a database of projects to find a
specific research program or area. Another way to search for ongoing
research is to inlink to one of the four broad research categories.
These research categories include collection and treatment, human
health, watersheds and ecosystems, and water reuse and bio-solids.
The second link on WERF's homepage is Research Programs. This
link establishes an "information network" for subscribers to
communicate through the website and exchange information on
ongoing research and projects. The Foundation utilizes this network
to provide timely updates on the availability of final reports and
products, workshops and subscriber meetings, funding for research,
significant interim research findings, and information from other
organizations. The information network also includes a topical list
service, which allows anyone, including non-subscribers, to sign up to
receive regular e-mails on topics such as bio-solids management, water
reuse, and watershed management.
The third link from the WERF homepage is Publications.
Publications allows individuals to read or subscribe to newsletters and
journals published by the Foundation. Members and non-subscribers
may read Progress, the quarterly newsletter, from the website. Progress
gives updates on current research projects, award recipients, and indepth reviews of current problems facing the wastewater management
industry. This part of the site provides a helpful forum to understand
the more technical aspects of water quality, and how this may relate to
water law issues. Two other Foundation publications, WERFindingsand
WERF Reports, are available to WERF subscribers only. WERFindings
summarizes research findings of ongoing projects and WERF Reports
provides the complete research report.
The fourth link from the WERF homepage is Requestsfor Proposals.
This link contains information on how to submit a research proposal.
Since the Foundation manages only research projects, it strongly
encourages proposals from entities qualified to undertake complicated
research. Individual organizations or teams of researchers from
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utilities, universities, industrial and commercial firms, and the
government conduct most of the research. This link also solicits
research for specific objectives that the Foundation defines. An inlink
provides access to forms and instructions for research proposal
submittals.
The fifth link from the WERF homepage is News and Happenings.
This link provides updates on recent WERF announcements, water
quality research news, and upcoming events. This link also contains
four inlinks. The first inlink provides a summary of recent Foundation
and subscriber research and happenings. The second inlink is a list of
organization projects seeking participants from the water quality
industry. This inlink also gives a short description of these projects
and allows anyone interested to e-mail the participant-seeking
organization. The third inlink is an events calendar noting upcoming
Foundation-sponsored symposia and conferences. The fourth inlink
provides monthly Foundation press releases and press releases from
the last two years.
WERF outlinks to Cleanwater Central and the Water Environment
Federation ("WEF") websites. By registering as a guest or becoming a
member of the Cleanwater Central website, users gain access to more
water quality research databases. WEF is another in-depth website
dedicated to the preservation and enhancement of the global water
environment. WEF hosts North America's largest conference, WEF's
Technical Exposition and Conference ("WEFTEC"), on water quality
and wastewater treatment technology and issues. WERF subscribers
can download the latest information from WEFTEC from the WERF
website.
Overall, the WERF website is a useful tool for those interested in
the technical aspects of water quality control. The website provides a
scientific-based foundation for improving water quality around the
world through research and education. This site would be most
helpful to a company or municipality looking for ways to improve their
water quality technology. Lawyers with limited or no water quality
knowledge may find certain areas of the site confusing, simply because
of the technical nature of the information provided. Yet, the website is
a useful tool for learning more about the issues likely to affect water
law in the future.
M. Elizabeth Lokey

BOOK NOTES
JEFFREY S. ASHLEY AND ZACHARY A. SMITH, GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln,

Nebraska (1999); 319 pp; $50.00; ISBN 0-8032-4276-X, hardcover.
Groundwater Management in the West details the current and future
status of groundwater management in nineteen western states on a
state-by-state basis. Jeffrey Ashley and Zachary Smith provide extensive
statistics covering demographics, growth, geography, and climate.
They discuss current groundwater management practices, state law
controlling such practices, and the political factors influencing the
future quality and availability of these states' groundwater.
The book divides the West into four regions: Pacific Coast, Rocky
Mountain, Great Plains, and Southwest. Each region begins with a
brief overview, and proceeds to a detailed discussion of each state
within that region.
In Section One, Pacific Coast Region, the authors discuss Alaska,
The authors
California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.
concentrate their discussion on the mainland states of California

(Chapter Two), Oregon (Chapter Four), and Washington (Chapter
Five). Saltwater intrusion affects all of these states. In addition,
mountain ranges block and wring moisture out of weather systems
coming off the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, the mainland states
generally receive a disparity of rainfall between their eastern and
western sections. Further, these states generally receive a majority of
their precipitation as snow, a factor that influences water availability
during the growing season. Finally, the mainland Pacific Coast states
have developed most available surface water, and therefore must rely
on groundwater for future growth. All of these factors contribute to
challenges the region will face in managing groundwater in the future.
The authors conclude Alaska (Chapter One) and Hawaii (Chapter
Three) have a bright future regarding groundwater. Both states
receive ample rainfall and have implemented effective management
strategies to ensure future groundwater quality and availability. The
primary challenge facing both states is saltwater intrusion.
In the Pacific Coast Region section, the authors also address
California's, Oregon's, and Washington's heavy population growth,
which has increased pressure on groundwater quality and availability.
Since the states have developed most surface water, they have relied on
groundwater more, depleting the resource. California's primary
management challenge is the consistent application of laws. The state
relies heavily on local management, which has resulted in inconsistent
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application of regulations.
Although Oregon has an effective
management structure in place, the state has restricted funding, and
may see enforcement decrease due to those restrictions. In all three
states, agriculture uses a large percentage of water relative to its
economic impact. If these states are to continue growing without
groundwater supply interruptions, they must restrict agricultural use of
groundwater and redirect groundwater use towards municipal needs.
In Section Two, the Rocky Mountain Region, the authors discuss
Colorado, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Wyoming. The authors again
recognize agriculture's declining impact on state economies as a
significant management challenge facing these states. Both Utah
(Chapter Nine) and Colorado (Chapter Six) allow water right transfers
to some degree. Thus, these states may be better equipped to manage
this change. Idaho (Chapter Seven) and Montana (Chapter Eight) are
situated well for the future. Both states expect to experience little or
no population growth and currently have an adequate groundwater
supply. Montana's most pressing problem is quality. Although the
problem is still in its infancy, the authors anticipate contamination
problems if Montana does not implement changes soon. Septic tanks,
shallow injection wells, storage tanks, mining, and mine drainage all
threaten Montana's groundwater. Montana must protect groundwater
before the problem worsens. Finally, Wyoming (Chapter Ten) is
situated perhaps the best to plan for the future. The state has
completed extensive water supply research, appears well informed of
its current situation, and is taking steps to anticipate future supply
problems.
In Section Three, the Great Plains Region, the authors discuss
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. With the possible
exception of North Dakota (Chapter Thirteen), Ashley and Smith
point to these states' heavy agricultural reliance as the most important
factor affecting their futures. Although the Great Plains states
generally have an adequate groundwater supply, pesticides and other
farming and ranching chemicals threaten the resource. Kansas
(Chapter Eleven) has allowed large-scale groundwater mining with
minimal management.
However, Kansas recently restricted
agricultural use of groundwater in order to gain control of the
problem. The authors conclude the Great Plains region is well
situated for the future, assuming the states continue to closely monitor
and manage groundwater use.
In Section Four, the Southwest Region, the authors discuss Arizona,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Very low precipitation,
warm temperatures, and rapid population growth characterize the
region. These factors strain groundwater supplies. The states in this
region must manage conflicts between competing interests. Although
extremely dry, Arizona (Chapter Fifteen) has aggressively managed its
water supplies and seems to be well situated for the future.
Conversely, Nevada (Chapter Sixteen) has seen significant
groundwater overdrafting.
The authors believe Nevada's water
officials permit overdrafting for immediate economic gain and rely on
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the future development of additional water sources. As the nation's
fastest growing state, Nevada must secure additional water sources if it
is to sustain its growth.
New Mexico (Chapter Seventeen) and Texas (Chapter Nineteen)
have allowed groundwater mining, resulting in significant
overdrafting. The authors believe both states now realize their
policies' implications and now monitor the situation more closely.
Oklahoma (Chapter Eighteen) has experienced downturns in two
primary water users: the oil and gas industry, and agriculture.
Although the downturn has hurt the state economically, it has proved
beneficial to its groundwater supply. In addition, Oklahoma now
closely monitors and manages its groundwater.
The authors have exhaustively reviewed the groundwater status of
nineteen western states. GroundwaterManagement in the West offers an
insightful look at groundwater problems facing the arid west.
Brian L. Martin
DAVID CARLE, DROWNING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA'S WATER CHOICES
AT THE MILLENNIUM, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut
(2000); 235pp; $45.00; ISBN 0-275-96719-0, hardcover.
Projections of future water demand lead to water development.
Water development leads to population growth. Population growth
leads to increased demand for water and new projections. According
to David Carle, California is drowning its dream through this cycle. In
Drowning the Dream, Carle presents his theory that water development
in twentieth century Southern California negatively transformed
California's environment and thereby the quality of human life. Carle
asserts this transformation and its consequences were the result of
human choices. His text analyzes the history of California's water and
population, the choices to bring in water, and the effects of those
choices. Carle suggests an alternative for the next millennium.
Drowning the Dream begins with an overview of California's history.
Carle describes the early Southern California landscape populated by
grizzly bears and the greatest concentration of Native Americans on
the continent. It touches on the years of Spanish exploration and
settlement, and then on American settlement. Carle narrates events
that expanded California's population and impacted its environment,
such as the gold rush, statehood, the railroad, real estate interests, and
the citrus boom.
In Parts Two through Four, Carle analyzes past water developments
from the Eastern Sierras, the Colorado River, and Northern California
and their effects. Carle observes that each of the three projects
followed the cycle of projection, growth, demand, and projection.
In Chapter Six, Carle first describes the layout of the Sierra
Nevadas, the people in this area, and the effect of water transfers on
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the residents of Owens Valley. In Chapter Seven, Carle analyzes Los
Angeles' acquisition of water from Owens and Mono Lakes in the
Sierra Nevadas. Los Angeles voters first approved the purchase of
water rights and the aqueduct to deliver the water in 1905. Public
approval was obtained through the government's scare tactics, severe
warnings of water shortages, and population increases. Carle asserts
the population of Los Angeles grew from 220,000 in 1905 to just under
2 million in 1950 as a direct result of Eastern Sierra water. In Chapter
Eight, Carle wonders whether Southern California realized its
development would lead to negative impacts on the environment and
the quality of life. Finally, Carle considers a Los Angeles without Sierra
Nevada water in Chapter Nine.
In Chapter Ten, Carle discusses another cycle that occurred when
the Metropolitan Water District ("MWD") of Southern California
campaigned in 1931 to obtain Colorado River water. The campaign
put out an image of water shortage as the desert waiting to reclaim the
cities. Carle describes MWD's acquisition and diversion of Colorado
River water through the Imperial Valley. This process included
disputes and negotiations with the Imperial Irrigation District, seven
states, and Mexico. Colorado River water flowed into Southern
California in 1941. The addition of Colorado River water tripled the
population of Los Angeles, San Diego, Orange and Ventura counties
by 1970. By 1999, MWD provided sixty percent of the water to
approximately 18 million residents in Southern California. Eventually,
Southern California's diversion from the Colorado River far exceeded
its interstate compact allotment, giving rise to more demand. In
Chapters Eleven and Twelve, Carle addresses the relationships among
population growth following World War II, air pollution, and water
development.
In Chapter Thirteen, Carle describes the landscape of Central and
Northern California. Carle considers Southern California's final water
development in Chapter Fourteen.
To remedy the perceived
imbalance of water supply and demand within the state, water was
shifted to Southern California from the rest of the state. Carle
described the project's promotion and its effect on urban expansion.
The water development was "feeding Southern California's addiction
to growth." Carle notes California's urban interests are again seeking
new water sources. Apparently, too much water was still not enough.
Carle asserts the three projects share the mindset of continuous
water development to supply growing populations. The projects also
share the stigma of having caused disturbing effects on both the
environment and human life, not only in the area from whence
California took the water, but also in the urban regions of Southern
California. Carle points to such effects in Chapters Nine, Twelve, and
Fifteen.
In Part Five, Carle considers California's options for water sources,
assuming the development mindset does not change. Using today's
choices, urban California could either convert water away from its
farms or its environment. The author, dissatisfied with both of those
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possibilities, offers his suggestions. What must occur, according to
Carle, is a change in the development mindset. Instead of developing
water for projected populations, as has occurred throughout
California's history, California must place a moratorium on water
development and stabilize its population. This solution can be
achieved by following four suggestions. First, California must visualize
stability and attain a state of CALMBY: Cherish and Love My Back
Yard. Second, California must live within water limits in drought years.
Third, California must stop converting farm and environment water to
urban use. Finally, California must support local and global efforts
toward population stabilization.
Carle believes California has a choice regarding its water future. In
the new millennium, the state can continue along its historic path or it
can make changes to stop drowning the California dream.
Sara Wagers
A MOMENT ON THE EARTH, Penguin Books
New York (1995); 745pp; $14.95; ISBN 0-14York,
Publishing, New
015451-5, softcover.

GREGG EASTERBROOK,

A Moment on the Earth challenges the traditional pessimistic
conceptions of how to address environmental conditions. Gregg
Easterbrook, a contributing editor to The Atlantic Monthly magazine,
recalls his experiences covering environmental issues and the progress
that has been made over time, especially in the western world.
Easterbrook rejects the "doomsday" prognosticating of many
environmental activists and commentators, and suggests we adopt a
new philosophy of environmental optimism as a society.
A Moment on the Earth opens with an introduction discussing
modern attitudes about environmental conditions and an explanation
of how the book will progress. First, Easterbrook looks critically at the
way man views his image in nature and how nature views its image with
man. Next, after establishing the symbiosis between nature and man,
Easterbrook analyzes a number of environmental conditions (water in
particular) and assesses the impact of man. Finally, Easterbrook
introduces an environmental philosophy where actions consider the
needs of both man and nature, instead of pitting the demands of
either interest against one another.
In the first section, The Long View: Thinking Like Nature, Easterbrook
criticizes the relationship that traditional environmental advocates
have created between man and nature. Easterbrook argues that man is
not separate from nature, nor is man a special threat to nature.
Easterbrook sees the intellect of man as nature's greatest ally, and
refutes the notion that the so-called "natural condition" of the world
was better without the human fingerprint. Easterbrook contends the
natural world has no problem with a dam, factory, or urban sprawl. A
bird, fox, or deer will adapt to the new condition, but man condemns
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his own presence. Easterbrook maintains the natural world fears not a
doomsday, but the gradual effect of a growing problem. Thus, if man
can recognize his own place in nature and make decisions in light of
his own gradual influence, both man and nature benefit. Easterbrook
concludes nature will persist after man is gone.
Therefore,
Easterbrook argues our focus should be on how we can prolong our
time with nature.
In the second section, The Short View: Thinking Like People,
Easterbrook addresses a number of the most pressing environmental
concerns, and provides a brief history of each. Easterbrook looks
specifically at pollution and the measures man has taken to remedy
this problem. Easterbrook notes that the quality of water throughout
the United States improved in the nineties. In addition, the quality of
the nation's water should continue to improve with increasing
governmental regulation. According to the Environmental Protection
Agency, less than two percent of all American river miles contain
harmful contaminants. Plus, contaminated rivers show fewer levels of
particulates than ever before. Easterbrook argues the current political
climate rejects any news of environmental progress in favor of focusing
on negativity. Easterbrook attributes the state of environmental
negativism to modern liberalism's refusal to acknowledge that
environmental problems can be fixed, and modern conservatism's
refusal to acknowledge the degree to which environmental problems
exist.
In the third section, The Green Future: People and Nature Learning to
Think Together, Easterbrook introduces a philosophy of ecorealism.
Ecorealism is a system of decision-making that assesses the impacts of
man's actions on nature, and the impact of natural conditions on man.
Easterbrook argues man's intellect can prepare a programmatic system
of action that benefits man in the short term, and man and nature
together in the long run. Ecorealism frowns upon the pessimism of
the past in favor of focusing on assessing the gradual affects of man's
actions to predict future harm. Easterbrook denounces modern
environmentalists as another interest group fighting for a piece of the
pie.
Easterbrook advocates incorporating issues such as water
management into mainstream decision-making. Instead of looking for
the correct state of nature, man should be looking for the best possible
state for man and nature at that moment in time.
Easterbrook's commentary is thought provoking and well
prepared. Unfortunately, concerning some issues, Easterbrook does
not see the trees for the forest. Easterbrook ignores the state of
American political culture and attributes problems to environmental
politics that are apparent throughout the political system. Easterbrook
also focuses on the aggregate success in the area of water quality,
which ignores micro issues that affect thousands of people.
Easterbrook does not address problems with water quantity.
In sum, Easterbrook writes an insightful, easy to read book about
the fundamental tenants behind the environmental movement, and
how these beliefs shape the way our society addresses environmental
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Easterbrook makes a convincing argument that the
concerns.
doomsday predictions and pessimism of the past may be the Achilles'
heel of the environmental movement. In addition, Easterbrook
provides thoughtful suggestions on how man and nature can interact
and progress into the twenty-first century.
PatrickNackley
SHARIF S. ELMUSA, WATER CONFLICT: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, LAW AND
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WATER RESOURCES, Institute for Palestine
Studies, Washington, D.C. (1997); 362pp; $29.95; ISBN 0-88728268-7, hardcover.
Disputes over scarce water resources rage in the arid Middle East.
However, there are no systematic assessments of these conflicts that
address water quality and quantity, the ability to develop available
resources, water related economic policies, and future need. Water
Conflict attempts to provide this type of assessment for the PalestinianIsraeli water dispute. In this book, Sharif Elmusa, a Palestinian,
analyzes the political economy of the water conflict between Israelis
and Palestinians, and suggests how it may be resolved on the basis of
equity and mutuality. Water Conflict also provides a comprehensive
source of information on the water sector of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
Chapter One discusses in detail the available water resources of
geographic Palestine-Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, and
examines the topographic, climatic, and hydrologic factors that
determine them. The resources are divided into two categories:
groundwater aquifers and surface water. The author examines all the
components of the resource categories, including individual streams,
wadis, and aquifers.
Chapter Two examines the control, supply, and distribution of
municipal water resources. The book focuses on the sub-standard
conditions Palestinians face (such as an insufficient, polluted water
supply and the unavailability of piped water to nearly one-fifth of the
population) as a result of severe restrictions imposed by Israelis. Also,
the author discusses developments in the water infrastructure since the
signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, and efforts at
improvement by international "donors."
Chapter Three consists of three parts: the economics of water use
in households and agriculture, "extended" water use balance, and
demand projections. The author's primary argument is that the lowincome level of Palestinians cannot explain their low level of water use.
Thus, a latent, unsatisfied water demand in both the municipal and
agricultural sectors exists. Data presented in the economic section
supports this contention. In the second part of Chapter Three, the
author proposes that the standard water balance, which includes only
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the irrigated sector, be extended to include the rain fed sector, as well
as the water used for trading foodstuffs. Finally, Chapter Three
contrasts water use projections from several analysts and discusses the
inherent difficulties in making such projections.
Chapter Four provides the meat of the book and analyzes the
issues raised by the first three chapters. Specifically, Chapter Four
addresses six issues: (1) the land-water nexus; (2) the maldistribution
of water rights and the water use gap between the two sides; (3) the
Israeli settlers' encroachment on Palestinian water resources; (4)
Israel's control of water institutions and legal mechanisms; (5) out-ofbasin water transfers; and (6) future management of common water
resources. In order to illustrate these issues, the author compares
water conditions in Israel and Israeli settlements with those of the
Palestinians. Additionally, Chapter Four addresses the Israelis' and
Palestinians' changing perception and ideology of water, and how this
change affects the general conflict.
Chapter Five addresses how the conflict described in Chapters One
through Four might be resolved equitably and cooperatively. The
author argues the international law doctrine of "equitable
apportionment" provides the best guide for resolving the water
conflict. This doctrine weighs factors such as prior use, social and
economic needs, and capability to obtain alternative resources to
ensure fairness. International law also advocates joint management of
shared resources. By applying these principles of international law,
the author argues that Palestinians are entitled to a greater share of
the water resources and should play a larger role in their management.
Makayla A. Shannon
BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO
ALLOCATE WATER IN CALIFORNIA; Island Press, Washington,

(2000); 19 6pp; $60.00; ISBN 1-55963-712-9, softcover.

D.C.

Rivers of Gold presents a plan for water allocation in the state of
California using market-based theories. Specifically, the book focuses
on the effort to reallocate developed portions of water from
agricultural use to urban and environmental uses in California. Also,
it generally examines the other arid western states. The author
provides a framework on how to better accommodate the needs of
markets and communities by using detailed case studies of water
market transactions and the institutional design issues associated with
them.
In the Introduction, Haddad presents the problem of Owens Valley
circa 1913. Officials from Los Angeles convinced Owens Valley
farmers to unwittingly sell their land and water rights to the city.
Subsequently, the once prosperous valley floundered.
Haddad
demonstrates what can happen to an agricultural community when it
surrenders water rights to a "thirsty, growing city."
Although
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California has since taken measures to prevent such an incredible
event from happening again, current trends suggest that a further
significant reallocation of water from agricultural to urban regions is
likely to occur. Haddad suggests this new "era" of water reallocation
would benefit from a market-based approach.
Chapter One, The Water-Reallocation Challenge in California and the
West, provides an overview of the state's water-supply challenge. It
begins by surveying the state's evolving circumstances of hydrology and
demography, as well as the legal doctrines that define water rights in
California. A full picture of the state's water circumstances emerges
when Haddad introduces the historical, political, social, economic,
and ecological perspectives that come to bear on California's waterHaddad compares these challenges to the
supply challenges.
conditions of four other western states: Arizona, New Mexico, Texas,
and Colorado.
Chapter Two, Why Markets are the Institution of Choice for Water
Reallocation, focuses on the theory of market mechanisms. By defining
the terms market and institution, the chapter answers the question of
what kind of market should be established. Further, it describes the
forms markets take and why they take those forms. Ultimately,
Haddad concludes the original theory of market-based water transfers
in California, advocating a statewide market (the California Model
Water Transfer Act), was 'Just too grand." Rather, in order for a water
market to succeed, Haddad suggests the feasibility of a market theory
must take into consideration the different perspectives of the people
affected by the market.
Chapter Three, Political, Legal, and Cultural Challenges to Water
Markets, continues where Chapter Two left off. Specifically, it looks at
three characteristics of markets as applied to water reallocation.
Haddad asserts that if these factors are ignored, this oversight could
spell disaster for institutional reform of the state's water allocation
problem. First, the chapter examines the political nature of water
markets. Second, Haddad examines the importance of aligning
market reforms with historical trends. Finally, the chapter looks at the
power of markets to adapt quickly without conscious oversight.
Haddad suggests that creating an efficient water market in California is
nearly impossible without taking into consideration these three
essential characteristics.
In Chapter Four, Lessons from California'sExperience with Short-Term
Water Markets, Haddad explores California's numerous water-market
experiences in short-term regional trading. These experiences lay a
foundation for the design of long-term market transfers. Long-term
transfers historically have not been successful in the state. The chapter
chronicles two specific examples of successful short-term transfers: the
state-sponsored Drought Water Bank, and the water-trading activities
of the Westlands Water District. The chapter concludes by analyzing
the few similarities and many differences of long-term water markets.
Chapter Five, Shotgun Wedding: The Imperial Irrigation
District-Metropolitan Water District Water Conservation Agreement, is the
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first of three consecutive chapters examining long-term transfer
market examples.
This chapter surveys the water conservation
agreement between the two water districts in the chapter's title. While
it is the leading example of one of the few long-term trading success
stories, the agreement was "exceedingly difficult to make happen."
The agreement should not be used as a model because it was difficult
to implement. However, Haddad suggests that valuable lessons can be
learned from the agreement in creating successful long-term market
institutions.
Chapter Six, Timing was Everything: The Palo Verde Irrigation
District-Metropolitan Water District "Two-Year Test Land Fallowing,"
presents another water transfer that is dependent on the transfer's
contract. However, the agreement in this chapter avoided many of the
contracting risks associated with the agreement examined in Chapter
Five.
The success of the agreement suggests that fallowing
arrangements in California may be a feasible way to achieve long-term
transfers. However, these agreements involve many of the same
complexities that made the success of the water-transfer agreement
outlined in Chapter Five difficult.
Chapter Seven, Water Ranching: The Devil's Den Water District-Castaic
Lake Water Agency Combined Land Purchaseand Water Transfer,outlines a
more simplistic agreement between the two parties. The agreement
here, rather than horizontal in nature, was vertical. The two parties
joined together to form a single entity, and then transferred water
internally. In this respect, the agreement was similar to the Owens
Valley problem that began the book. However, Haddad reveals key
differences here that distinguish the Devil's Den agreement from the
"dark episode in California's water history." The author concludes,
"future land purchase agreements should be judged on their own
merits."
Chapter Eight, Getting to a Market: Lessons and Design
Recommendations, offers the lessons of California's experience in water
markets as considerations for future efforts. The chapter offers twelve
original recommendations that "should guide future efforts to
reallocate water from rural to urban areas." The chapter concludes by
illustrating the importance of cooperation between rural and urban
areas, and identifies where water marketing reallocation plans in the
western states would work.
Rivers of Gold offers insightful and meaningful solutions to the
present problem of water reallocation in California and the western
United States. It chronicles many of the pitfalls that have encumbered
California's attempt to create successful water markets, and explains
how to make these markets work. The book contains many useful
diagrams, charts, and illustrations. The book also includes a full
subject index, and four appendices, each of which expands on topics
covered in the book.
Adam B. Kehrli
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GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES, Kluwer Law

International, The Hague, The Netherlands (2000); 999pp;
$245.00; ISBN 90-411-9819-9, hardcover.
Dividing the Waters is the second text in an international and
national water law and policy series. This series focuses on the general
nature of interstate water resource disputes within the United States.
Sherk intends to give students, administrators, and legislators a
thumbnail sketch of important litigation, legislation, and interstate
compact resolutions. The author's goal is to assist in the peaceful
resolution of water resources conflicts both nationally and
internationally.
Part One, Introduction, provides an overview of the text and
reinforces the author's purpose to provide an understanding of how
the United States has solved various interstate water resource disputes.
This part also provides guidance for future national and international
water resource disputes.
In Part Two, The Litigation Option, Sherk discusses the first option
the United States employed to solve various water resource disputes,
litigation. This part analyzes how United States Supreme Court
decisions from the last 100 years have shaped water resource use
between the various states. This part also discusses the development of
the "equitable apportionment" doctrine through a review of case law,
and describes the factors considered under the doctrine when
resolving interstate disputes. Part Two concludes with a brief
description of the relevant substantive and procedural requirements
involved in water resource litigation in the Supreme Court.
Part Three, The Legislative Option, discusses the ability of the United
States Congress to enact laws under the Commerce Clause to resolve
water disputes between states. This part describes the legislative
option as controversial because Congress has typically deferred to the
states regarding water management decisions. However, Congress may
use federal legislation in the future to protect national interests in
water resources as water resource disputes and federal control of rivers
increase. Nevertheless, this part states that Congress has acted only
twice to apportion interstate waters through legislation (the Colorado
River and the Truckee and Carson Rivers).
Part Four, The Compact Option, discusses how individual states that
share an interstate water resource have agreed to allocate and use this
resource. This part describes the different types of compacts enacted
in the past for various purposes, including water allocation, pollution
control, planning and flood control, and multipurpose use. Sherk
discusses the issues involved typically in compact negotiation, and the
issues that are of particular concern to upper basin and lower basin
states.
Part Five, The Ecology of Options, discusses the inter-relationship
between the litigation and legislative options for water resource
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dispute resolution.
Initially, Sherk discusses how congressional
legislation, including the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water
Act, affected existing compacts and agreements. Next, he analyzes
how subsequent litigation has affected existing compacts and
agreements. Specifically, this part describes how the United States
Supreme Court interpreted different compacts to include or exclude
items not specifically mentioned in the compacts. Finally, the author
discusses how states entered compacts and agreements in response to
collateral litigation to prevent such decisions from harming their
interests.
In Part Six, The Conclusion, Sherk summarizes the text and restates
that he intends for this book to assist in conflict resolutions
concerning water resources. Sherk concludes that because states will
seldom "live happily ever after," states should focus on conflict
management to avoid water resource problems before they arise.
Dividing the Waters is a valuable resource for students,
administrators, or legislators as a basic guide to issues surrounding
pending interstate water resource litigation and future interstate water
resource management decisions. In addition, this text contains
extensive appendices of relevant case law, compacts and agreements,
and legislation. This text is a great starting point for further research
and analysis with respect to water resource conflict resolution.
William H. Fronczak
MITCHELL G. WILLIAMS, ED., LAND SURVEYS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS

American Bar Association, Chicago,
Illinois (2d ed. 2000); 266pp; $99.95; ISBN 1-57073-742-8,
softcover.
AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS,

Land Surveys compiles twenty-five educational articles written by
twelve different professionals on law and land surveying. The book
offers a comprehensive view of the technical and practical issues
surrounding land surveys, as well as the relationship between lawyers
and surveyors. Most important to the water lawyer, several articles
examine land surveys in the context of water boundaries and
environmental issues.
Part I, Land Surveys: An Introduction,presents the core concepts and
practical necessities of accurate land surveys. This section is relevant
especially to lawyers as it provides a survey checklist with explanations
that accompany each important requirement, and examples of
standard forms. Also, an article in this section provides instructions on
how to read, interpret, and write land descriptions in an effort to
minimize confusion. Another article identifies the many sources of
errors in old measurements. The final article aids the attorney in
evaluating surveys and survey information.
Part II, Certifications and Codes of Practice, outlines the minimum
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standard detail requirements for a certified land tide survey as adopted
by the American Land Title Association and the American Congress
on Surveying and Mapping. These requirements provide explicit
This
information regarding surveys involving water boundaries.
section presents several articles dedicated to examining the role of the
survey certificate in real estate transactions, the certification process,
and the interaction between the lawyer, client, and surveyor. These
articles include several examples of survey certificates with
explanations and guidelines. Another article in this section compiles
the statutes, regulations, and trade association standards that various
state and federal agencies have promulgated or adopted as minimum
surveying standards for land title boundary surveys. This article is a
great resource for many practitioners.
Part III, Surveys and Title Insurance, discusses the relationship
between title insurance and surveys with an emphasis on the survey
exception and coverage litigation. One article in this section promotes
the use of an appropriate code of practice for land surveying, in order
to inform fully the lawyer and the client of the scope of the surveyor's
work. Finally, another article addresses the future of mortgage loan
surveys and stresses the importance of a survey of property before a
purchase.
Part IV, Licensing and Liability, analyzes the licensure and
responsibilities of land surveyors under various state licensing boards.
Part IV reviews several national and local standards of care for title
research of record documents by land surveyors. The responsibilities
of the lawyer and the surveyor are distinguished. In addition, another
article in this section contrasts the purpose of the record research for
the title searcher with the purpose of a record research for the land
surveyor. A final, interesting article examines possible surveyor
liability relating to tree encroachments with an emphasis on case law.
Part V, Other Legal Issues, provides an overview of surveying issues
pertaining to water boundaries in the western states as exemplified in
prominent case law. The purpose of Part V is to aid attorneys'
understanding of what a survey of a water boundary entails and to help
evaluate the surveyor's product. This section discusses the location of
high water marks as the boundary line between public and private
ownership, with a focus on developing definitions in federal and state
case law. In addition, an article in this section provides a guide to
problems with gaps and overlaps in legal descriptions of land based on
principles from Illinois case law and statutes. Another article examines
the surveyor's role to identify wetlands and environmental hazards and
to assist attorneys to mitigate environmental concerns. A final article
presents the historic and legal significance of the controversy
surrounding the location of the center of a section. Additionally, this
article provides a practical procedure to recognize and handle such
problems.
Part VI, Surveying Techniques, provides a single article that
introduces the global positioning system ("GPS"). It describes the uses
and benefits of GPS to real estate lawyers in surveying and mapping
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applications.
Land Surveys offers a vast amount of information concerning the
law and land surveys. It is a great resource for general information
and a starting point for research. Most of the articles have detailed
footnotes, bibliographies or references, and useful appendices. It is a
practical guidebook for any land-use lawyer.
Vanessa L. Condra

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding the Army Corp of Engineers' ("Corps")
regulation defining "navigable waters" to include intrastate waters, as
clarified and applied to the petitioners' landfill site, pursuant to the
Migratory Bird Rule, exceeded the authority granted to the Corps
under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act).
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC"), a
consortium of twenty-three suburban Chicago municipalities, selected
for their baled nonhazardous waste disposal an abandoned sand and
gravel pit mining site. The site included excavation trenches that had
evolved into scattered permanent and seasonal ponds. Since the
project would involve filling these ponds, SWANCC contacted the
United States Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to determine if section
404(a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") required it to obtain a federal
landfill permit.
Section 404(a) authorizes the Corps to regulate the discharge of
fill into "navigable waters," which the statute defines as "the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas."
The Corps
promulgated 33 C.F.R. section 328.3(a)(3) ("the regulation"), which
defined "navigable waters" to include intrastate waters, the use or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.
Applying the regulation, the Corps initially concluded that it had no
jurisdiction over the site.
However, after the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed
the Corps of reported observations of migratory bird species at the site,
the Corps reconsidered and ultimately asserted jurisdiction over the
balefill site under the Migratory Bird Rule. In relevant part, the
Migratory Bird Rule states that section 404(a) extends to intrastate
waters "which are or could be used by migratory birds that cross state
lines." In November 1987, the Corps formally determined that the
seasonally ponded, abandoned gravel mining depressions located on
the SWANCC project site, while not wetlands, did qualify as "waters of
the United States" under the CWA because: (1) the proposed area was
an abandoned mining site; (2) the water areas and spoil piles had
developed a natural character; and (3) migratory birds which cross
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state lines used the water areas as habitat.
Although SWANCC secured the required water quality certification
from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps refused
to issue a section 404(a) permit. The Corps denied the permit on
three grounds. First, the Corps found SWANCC had failed to establish
that its proposal was the least environmentally damaging, most
practicable alternative for disposal of nonhazardous waste. Second,
SWANCC's failure to set aside sufficient funds to remediate leaks
posed an unacceptable threat to the public's drinking water supply.
Finally, the Corps found that the impact of the project upon areasensitive species was unmitigatable since a landfill surface could not be
redeveloped into a forested habitat.
SWANCC filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act in the
Northern District of Illinois challenging both the Corps' jurisdiction
over the site and the merits of its denial of the section 404(a) permit.
The district court granted summary judgment to the federal
respondents on the jurisdictional issue, and SWANCC abandoned its
challenge to the Corps' permit decision. On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, SWANCC renewed its attack on the Corps' use of the
Migratory Bird Rule to assert jurisdiction over the site. The appellate
court held that under the "cumulative impact doctrine," Congress had
the authority to regulate such waters. The court reasoned that the
cumulative effect on interstate commerce of the destruction of
migratory bird habitat was substantial because millions of Americans
annually spend over a billion dollars to hunt and observe migratory
birds. Furthermore, the appellate court held the CWA reached as
many waters as the Commerce Clause allows, and thus, the Migratory
Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA. SWANCC
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted
certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court found the Corps had interpreted section
404(a) to cover the abandoned gravel pit at issue because migratory
birds use it as habitat. The Court concluded the CWA does not fairly
support the Migratory Bird Rule in this case. The Court explained
that it previously held in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
that the Corps had section 404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands that
actually abutted a navigable waterway. Unlike the wetlands in Riverside,
the Court found the ponds on the SWANCC site were not adjacent to
an open waterway. Thus, the Court found Riverside inapplicable.
Next, the Court turned to the text and legislative history of the
CWA. The Court found the Corps' original interpretation of the CWA
inconsistent with its current one. Specifically, the Court noted that the
Corps' 1974 regulations defined section 404(a)'s "navigable waters" to
mean those waters of the United States, which are subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, and have been, presently are, or may in the future
be susceptible to use for interstate or foreign commerce. However, the
Corps argued that three years later, Congress approved an expanded
definition of "navigable waters." The Corps asserted that, in July 1977,
it adopted a regulation that defined waters of the United States to
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include isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters that are not part of a
tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the
United States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate commerce. The Corps contended that Congress's failure to
pass a proposed house bill overturning the Corps' 1977 legislation,
which extended its jurisdiction in CWA section 404(g) to waters "other
congressional
than traditional navigable waters," indicated
acquiescence to the Corps' interpretation of the CWA.
The Court
The Court found this argument unpersuasive.
number of
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actions or inactions of the 1977 Congress and the intent of the
Congress in passing section 404(a) too attenuated. Accordingly, the
Court concluded the Corps failed to make the necessary showing that
the failure of the 1977 house bill demonstrated Congress's
acquiescence to the Corps' 1977 regulation or the Migratory Bird
Rule.
The Court also found section 40 4 (g) unenlightening. After
reviewing section 40 4 (g)'s language, the Court stated the text gave no
indication of what the "other than traditional waters" might be. Thus,
the Court concluded that section 404(g) failed to conclusively
determine the construction a court should place on the term "waters"
defined elsewhere in the CWA.
Finally, the Corps contended the Court should give deference to
the Migratory Bird Rule, since Congress did not address the precise
scope of section 404(a) with regard to nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters. The Court explained that where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court would construe the statue to avoid such problems,
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
The Court reasoned that allowing the Corps to extend federal
jurisdiction over ponds falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would
seriously impinge the states' traditional and primary power over land
and water use. Finding no express congressional intent for section
404(a) to reach abandoned sand and gravel pits, the Court declined to
extend administrative deference.
The Court reversed and held the CWA did not permit the Corps to
extend its section 404(a) jurisdiction over "navigable waters" to
isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located within two Illinois
counties, because they serve as habitat for migratory birds.
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion. The dissenting
opinion stated that power to regulate commerce among the several
states includes the power to preserve natural resources that generate
such commerce. The dissent found migratory birds, and the waters on
which they rely, were such resources. Furthermore, the dissent
explained that the protection of migratory birds was a well-established
federal responsibility. Therefore, the dissent found no merit in
SWANCC's constitutional argument and would have affirmed the
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judgment of the court of appeals.
Kris A. Zumalt

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Baker v. Coxe, 230 F.3d 470 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding substantive due
process and equal protection rights were not violated when neither a
legitimate government purpose in delaying the issuance of a land use
permit existed, nor an exercise of free speech violation existed, when
the delay was not the result of retaliation).
In May 1991, Plaintiffs, John and Susan Baker ("Bakers"), applied
for a permit to build a pier on land they owned and operated as a tree
farm on Clark's Island in Plymouth Harbor, Massachusetts. The pier
would enable equipment unloading in furtherance of the tree farm
operation. Clark's Island served as a major nesting area, or heronry,
for several varieties of sea birds. The Army Corps of Engineers was in
the process of preparing to issue the permit when Jay Copeland, an
environmental researcher for Natural Heritage, objected.
Natural Heritage felt the proximity of the nesting area to the
Bakers' tree farm would disrupt the heronry, thus causing the birds to
abandon their nests. After the issuance of a notice-and-comment
period, Natural Heritage contacted an ornithologist, Dr. Katharine
Parsons, who was familiar with the island. Parsons informed Copeland
of her concerns about the land use and of her suspicions that the land
was merely a "tax dodge." Parsons also told Copeland of Mr. Baker's
opposition to 1989 legislation that, if enacted, would have classified
Clark's Island as an Area of Critical Environmental Concern
("ACEC"), subjecting it to use restrictions. Copeland and others'
subsequent visit to the island revealed the heronry was essentially
destroyed.
After contact with other agencies and some investigation into the
Bakers' operation, Natural Heritage filed a formal opposition to the
permit application, asserting the pier construction would significantly
contribute to the destruction of a major natural resource. Further,
Natural Heritage successfully collected ten citizens' signatures to
initiate environmental review under the Massachusetts Environmental
Policy Act. After Natural Heritage filed the required forms, the
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs ("EOEA")
issued a decision requiring the Bakers to file an Environmental Impact
Report ("EIR"). After litigation concerning the scope of the EIR, the
Army Corps of Engineers issued the permit to the Bakers in 1997, and
the Bakers built the pier.
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This suit followed. The Bakers alleged, among other things, that
Massachusetts EOEA officials-namely, Trudy Coxe, Thomas French,
Jay Copeland, Patricia Huckery, Bradford Blodget, Jane Mead, Susan
Tierney, and Janet McCabe (collectively "EOEA officials") -violated
the Bakers' substantive due process and equal protection rights
("Count I"), and First Amendment rights for retaliation in the exercise
of free speech ("Count VII") by delaying the permit issuance. The
district court dismissed Count I for failure to state a claim, and granted
summary judgment concerning Count VII in favor of the EOEA
officials.
The First Circuit affirmed both decisions. Regarding Count I, due
to the nature of the governmental conduct, the court found that
substantive due process and equal protection claims regarding local
land use permits were essentially the same inquiry. The court declared
that even an arbitrary denial, absent either a gross abuse of power that
shocked the conscience, invidious discrimination, or legally irrational
action, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court
determined the Bakers' three alleged instances of official misconduct
did not breach this constitutional barrier. In each instance, the EOEA
performed a legitimate government purpose by reviewing the permit
application, and the Bakers suffered no adverse action from the
alleged misconduct.
Regarding Count VII, the court noted that delay of an application
for a land use permit in unjustifiable retaliation for expressions of
political views violated the First Amendment if a plaintiff established
three elements: (1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) he was
qualified for the permit; and (3) the delay was in retaliation for the
The First Circuit focused on only the last
disfavored speech.
requirement, as did the district court. The court acknowledged the
speech at issue involved Mr. Baker's opposition to the ACEC
legislation in the Massachusetts legislature, two years before the Bakers
However, only defendants
filed their pier permit application.
Copeland, Huckery, French, and McCabe knew of Mr. Baker's
opposition to the legislation, thereby making the evidence of
retaliatory motive insufficient. Further, the protected speech occurred
More
two years before the review of the Bakers' application.
importantly, even if Mr. Baker had made a prima facie case, Coxe had
a nonretaliatory reason for opposing the permit-the tree farm's
impact on the heronry, not the pier's impact on the heronry. The
court found the district court's reasoning appropriate, and the Bakers'
claims of errors non-meritorious. As such, the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision.
Adam B. Kehrli

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding groundwater quality monitoring company was not liable
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under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act as an operator, arranger, or transporter, and was not
liable for breach of warranty and negligence).
Since 1961, Defendants, Conoco, Inc. and Condea Vista Chemical
Co. ("Conoco/Vista"), have owned the Lake Charles Chemical
Complex ("Complex") in Westlake, Louisiana. In 1968, Conoco began
managing ethylene dichloride at the Complex. As a result of historic
releases and migration, the ethylene dichloride contaminated the
Complex's subsurface to a depth of twenty feet, including the
Complex's shallow groundwater zones. The Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality ("LDEQ") required Conoco to investigate and
address the ethylene dichloride contamination under state
groundwater protection laws, and federal and state solid waste laws.
LDEQ also required Conoco to install a groundwater monitoring and
assessment program pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA").
Geraghty and Miller ("G&M"), a groundwater quality monitoring
company, entered into a contract with Conoco, and Vista as a thirdparty beneficiary, under which G&M was to assess contamination
beneath several suspected source areas at the Complex. G&M
installed fifty monitoring wells by July 1985.
By May 1988,
Conoco/Vista suspected potentially serious technical and physical
deficiencies in three of the monitoring wells, and expressed concern
that such deficiencies were aggravating the contamination. With
approval from LDEQ Conoco/Vista plugged and abandoned four
deficient wells in 1989. In 1990, G&M and Conoco/Vista entered into
the Groundwater Wells Interim Agreement ("Interim Agreement"),
requiring the parties to agree upon criteria to determine whether the
remaining wells were properly installed, which wells needed to be
removed, and who would bear the costs. The parties were unable to
agree on the criteria.
Thus, Conoco/Vista retained other
environmental consulting firms to continue the groundwater
assessment program. In 1993, Conoco/Vista plugged, abandoned, and
replaced the remaining G&M wells.
In 1997, G&M filed this CERCLA action seeking compensation
from Conoco/Vista for G&M's past and future response costs.
Conoco/Vista counterclaimed seeking relief under sections 107 and
113 of CERCLA. G&M dismissed its original complaint and moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Conoco/Vista's counterclaim was
time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
G&M. In addition, the district court held Conoco/Vista's common law
causes of action filed in 1993 were barred by the Texas statute of
limitations. Finally, the district court held G&M was not a "covered
person" under CERCLA.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed four issues.
The issues before the court were: (1) whether the district court
erroneously entered summary judgment without giving Conoco/Vista
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notice and an opportunity to respond; (2) whether the six-year statute
of limitations barred Conoco/Vista's CERCLA contribution claim; (3)
whether G&M was liable under CERLA as an operator, arranger, or
transporter of hazardous materials; and (4) whether the district court
correctly entered summary judgment on Conoco/Vista's state
common law counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, breach of
warranty, and negligence.
First, the court stated that although the district court erred by not
observing the notice requirements of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, consideration of summary judgment without giving
Conoco/Vista notice and hearing was harmless error. The court
declared Conoco/Vista ultimately had an opportunity to be heard on
all of the issues. In addition, the court found the district court's postsummary judgment consideration and ruling cured any procedural
defect.
Second, to determine whether the six-year statute of limitations
barred Conoco/Vista's CERCLA contribution claim, the court had to
decide whether Conoco/Vista's response actions at the Complex
constituted "remedial" or "removal." The court categorized the initial
placement of monitoring wells as removal activities. Thus, the court
concluded the statute of limitations did not bar Conoco/Vista's
counterclaim for CERCLA contribution.
In order to prevail in a CERCLA contribution action,
Conoco/Vista had to show that G&M was a "covered person" under
the statute. CERCLA's definition of a "covered person" includes
owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters of hazardous
substances. The court held G&M was a "covered person." However,
because the facts concerning the degree of G&M's control over the
monitoring wells was in dispute, the court held summary judgment
declaring G&M was not an "operator" was premature. The court
remanded the issue of whether G&M was an "arranger" to determine if
and how the hazardous waste was moved by G&M at the Complex.
The court found G&M was not liable as a "transporter" under
CERCLA, because no evidence existed to show G&M had moved the
ethylene dichloride to another facility or site.
Third, the district court found the Texas statutes of limitations
barred all of Conoco/Vista's state common law counterclaims.
Conoco/Vista asserted their claims were timely by virtue of the relation
back doctrine and the Texas discovery rule, and because the parties
agreed to toll the statutes as part of the Interim Agreement. The Fifth
Circuit, however, held the Interim Agreement was ambiguous and
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue.
The court then looked at whether the statute of limitations had
expired for each of the state law claims. The court held the Texas
statute of limitations for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
fraud was four years, and for negligence it was two years. The court
rejected Conoco/Vista's argument that the discovery rule applied, and
stated that both the four- and two-year statutes of limitations applied to
the breach of warranty and negligence claims. The court remanded
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the claims of fraud and breach of contract to the district court,
because disputed facts existed concerning when Conoco/Vista
discovered or should have discovered the injury.
Sommer Poole
Miss. River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2000)
(affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment, and holding the
Army Corps of Engineers' Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for the Mississippi River Mainline Levee Enlargement and
Berm Construction Project satisfied NEPA requirements).
Conservation groups brought this appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit after the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted Westphal's motion
for summary judgment. At issue was whether the Army Corps of
Engineers' ("Corps") Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
("SEIS") satisfied the National Environmental Policy Act's ("NEPA")
requirements for the Mississippi River Mainline Levee Enlargement
and Berm Construction Project ("Project"). NEPA required that the
SEIS adequately consider cumulative impacts, mitigation issues, and
project alternatives. The Fifth Circuit stated it must set aside any
action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. The court determined the
SEIS did satisfy NEPA.
Under the Project, the Corps was to build and maintain 139
separate flood control measures along the Mississippi River. The
project would take thirty-three years to complete.
The Corps
completed the Project's SEIS in July 1998. The SEIS analyzed four
alternatives. The first alternative, the Nonstructural Option, required
that the government seek to reduce and reimburse for existing
damages. The second alternative, the Landside Borrow Choice,
required the Corps use a levees' landside soil for the projects. The
third alternative, the Traditional Method, required the Corps use a
levees' riverside soil. Finally, the Avoid and Minimize Plan required
the Corps to obtain either landside soil from willing sellers or use
riverside land if landside soil was not reasonably available. The Corps
selected the Avoid and Minimize alternative and further chose not to
purchase landside soil, instead using riverside land. A dispute arose
because the Mississippi River Basin Alliance and other conservation
groups (collectively, "Conservation Groups") believed the Corps
should take material from the levees' landside.
The appellate court first reviewed the Corps' cumulative impact
analysis to determine if it was arbitrary. The Conservation Groups
argued the Corps' analysis was arbitrary in that it directly contradicted
relevant evidence. Further, the Conservation Groups claimed the
Corps avoided a cumulative impacts analysis by claiming compensatory
mitigation resolved the issue. Finally, the Conservation Groups
claimed the Corps gave the impression the Project was benign, when it
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was not. The court, giving the Corps' decision substantial deference,
ruled the cumulative impact analysis was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court of appeals next considered whether the Corps'
mitigation analysis was sufficient. The Conservation Groups argued
the Corps' mitigation analysis was insufficient. Specifically, the
Conservation Groups disputed the Corps' claim that the project's
cumulative effect would be nonexistent and all impacts would be fully
compensated through mitigation. The Conservation Groups argued
the potential impacts, should mitigation fail, were much greater than
the Corps conceded. To support their position, the Conservation
Groups pointed to mitigation efforts' frequent failure and the Corps'
current mitigation backlog. The court agreed that the Conservation
Groups made valid points in questioning the probability of
mitigation's success. However, the court determined the Corps'
evaluation was thorough enough to survive NEPA's process-oriented
requirements and survive the arbitrary and capricious review standard.
Finally, the appellate court considered whether the Corps
The Conservation Groups
adequately evaluated all alternatives.
argued the Corps did not. In particular, the Conservation Groups
claimed the Corps dismissed the Landside Borrow alternative after
only a preliminary screening. Further, the Conservation Groups
asserted the Corps' selection was misleading because the stated priority
of the Avoid and Minimize alternative was to use landside material.
However, the Corps abandoned that option and chose, instead, to use
the alternative riverside land for material. The court acknowledged
that under NEPA the Corps must rigorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives. The Corps stated it rejected the
Landside Borrow alternative because the option conflicted with the
Project's purpose-farmland protection. The conflict existed because
costs to acquire landside land were excessive, and Project sponsors and
residents objected. The court affirmed the district court's summary
judgment and held the Corps' analysis was rigorous and thorough, was
not arbitrary and capricious, and, thus, did not violate NEPA.
Brian L. Martin
SIXTH CIRCUIT
M/G Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 234 F.3d 974
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding Water Quality Insurance Syndicate's
("WQIS") request for summary judgment should be affirmed because
it needed neither to defend nor indemnify M/G Transportation
Services, because its underlying insurance claims were based
exclusively on the False Claims Act, not the Clean Water Act).
Former employees filed a complaint against M/G Transportation
Services ("M/G") alleging M/G (1) knowingly falsified records in
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order to hide Clean Water Act ("CWA") violations, and (2) knowingly
falsified records in order to conceal, avoid, or decrease its duty to pay
the United States for fines and clean up costs. M/G settled the dispute
with the former employees and requested a defense and indemnity
from its insurer, Water Quality Insurance Syndicate ("WQIS"). WQIS
refused to indemnify M/G, which prompted M/G's suit against WQIS
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
The district court granted WQIS' motion for summary judgment
because M/G's underlying claim asserted no CWA violations, but was,
instead, based entirely upon the False Claims Act ("FCA"), which was
not covered by M/G's insurance plan. M/G appealed the dismissal
and asserted a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning
whether the underlying claim was covered within the insurance plan.
M/G also argued the district court should have granted its summary
judgment motion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court and held WQIS did not breech its duty to defend and
indemnify M/G in its qui tam action brought under the FCA. The
appellate court reviewed the grant of summary judgment and
recognized it should affirm only if no genuine issue of material fact
existed. The court examined first WQIS' duty to defend.
The court explained that WQIS had a duty to defend when the
complaint stated, or arguably stated, a covered claim, or that the
complaint was so vague, ambiguous, nebulous, or incomplete that a
claim may have existed. The court found M/G's former employees'
based their complaint on neither a covered claim nor an arguably
covered claim, and was not ambiguous or incomplete. The court
based its decision on the fact that the complaint stated two counts
exclusively under the FCA, the complaint made no claims for liability
based on the CWA, the settlement agreement with the employees
expressly reserved CWA liability for the United States, and the CWA
did not contain a qui tam provision that allowed private citizen suits for
clean-up costs. Thus, the court of appeals held the former employees'
complaint stated claims exclusively under the FCA, resulting in WQIS
having no duty to defend M/G.
The Sixth Circuit also rejected M/G's argument that WQIS had a
duty to defend M/G under the sudden and accidental discharge
portion of the insurance policy. The court rejected this argument
because the employees' complaint stated both that M/G had a regular
practice of knowingly dumping and that M/G was convicted of a crime
against the United States for knowingly discharging pollutants.
Accordingly, the court held M/G's conduct was inconsistent with
accidental spillage and the provision did not cover M/G's conduct.
Finally, the appellate court rejected M/G's argument that WQIS
had a duty to indemnify. The court rejected this argument because
the duty to indemnify was contingent upon liability under the policy.
The evidence showed liability was predicated solely on the FCA, not
under the policy. Thus, WQIS was under no duty to indemnify M/G.
The court of appeals found M/G based its complaint exclusively
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on the FCA, not the CWA, and, thus, failed to state a claim covered
under the insurance policy. Because M/G failed to state a claim
covered within the insurance plan, WQIS did not breech its duty to
defend or indemnify M/G in its qui tam action. Accordingly, the court
affirmed WQIS' summary judgment motion and denied M/G's request
for relief.
Kirstin E. McMillan
United States v. Jolly, No. 99-5700, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29907 (6th
Cir. Nov. 20, 2000) (holding, under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
failure to timely challenge an administrative order precluded judicial
review of that order and the district court did not abuse its discretion
in the assessment of penalties and injunction, where a history of
noncompliance and disregard for regulation procedures existed).
Peter E. Jolly appealed a partial summary judgment against him for
violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"). In 1977, Jolly and
his associates formed the JAF Oil Company ("JAF"). JAF owned and
operated eighty-nine injection wells on oil and mineral leases in
Easton Field, Hancock County, Kentucky. Eventually, Jolly became
JAF's sole shareholder, officer, director, and employee. In 1985, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") informedJAF that the wells
did not comply with the SDWA or the Underground Injection Control
program ("UIC"). In 1988, JAF filed for bankruptcy but continued to
operate the wells. In 1992, the EPA issued an administrative order
("AO") to remedy JAF's violations. Jolly continued solely to operate
the wells under the name Strategic Investments Incorporated ("SI").
In 1995, the United States filed a civil enforcement action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
againstJAF, SI, andJolly to enforce the AO. The district court granted
partial summary judgment to the government on claims thatJAF failed
to meet the AO compliance deadlines. Under state-law veil piercing
theories, the court held Jolly individually liable for the JAF and SI
violations. Additionally, the court held SI liable for failing to reply to
EPA's request for information. Finally, the district court held JAF, SI,
and Jolly liable for failing to comply with SDWA and UIC regulations.
The court granted the government's injunctive request to shut down
the wells, and issued a $500,000 civil penalty to each defendant. Jolly
appealed.
The first issue Jolly raised on appeal was whether EPA denied Jolly
due process when they issued the AO. Under SDWA section 3000h2 (c) (6), the court of appeals did not reviewJolly's compliance with the
AO because Jolly failed to appeal the issuance of the AO. Section
3000h-2 authorized EPA to issue an AO and required the agency to
notify Jolly of his right to request a hearing. The hearing granted Jolly
the right to dispute the order's compliance requirements. Jolly failed
to request a hearing. Once the AO became final, Jolly had another
thirty days to appeal the AO in federal district court. Jolly again failed
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to appeal the AO. Therefore, the court precluded Jolly from
challenging the validity of the AO. The court stated Jolly's failure to
exhaust his judicial review opportunities cost him consideration of his
due process claims. Additionally, the preclusion of judicial review
disallowed the court from considering his second issue of whether
there was a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of an underground
drinking water source.
The third issue Jolly raised on appeal was whether the district court
abused its discretion in administering the injunction and civil
penalties. Jolly argued the penalties were excessive in light of his
financial hardship and history of family medical problems. He also
argued the injunction was unwarranted because he did not violate UIC
regulations requiring a response for information. The government
stated the penalties were not an abuse of discretion givenJolly's history
of noncompliance and explicit disregard of the regulations.
Additionally, the government argued Jolly provided insufficient
evidence to support economic hardship. The court examined the
enforcement provisions of the SWDA. The SWDA provides that a
violator of the UIC program may be assessed penalties of up to $25,000
a day. The provisions also state that a failure to reply to a request for
information could result in an injunction. Jolly claimed he never
received the information request. EPA presented evidence that they
attempted to deliver the information. Federal Express returned letters
sent tojolly's and SI's listed addresses as undeliverable. However, EPA
successfully sent a fax to Jolly and received a fax confirmation. The
court therefore presumed Jolly received the request and did not
respond.
The appellate court next examined the factors considered in
assessing a civil penalty for violations of an AO. These factors
included: 1) the seriousness of the violation; 2) the economic benefit
resulting from the violation; 3) history of violations; 4) good faith
efforts to comply; and 5) the economic impact of the penalty on the
violator.
The court affirmed the district court's assessment of
penalties. The court found Jolly's history of bad-faith noncompliance
in excess of seven years, his refusal to accept notices, his avoidance of
liability through the transfer of assets from JAF to SI, and the
seriousness of the violations were well within the discretion of the
lower court's issuance of penalties.
Jon Hyman
NINTH CIRCUIT
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9thCir.
2000) (holding environmental organizations' members showed
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing on the
organizations to survive summary judgment on the standing issue).
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Ecological Rights Foundation ("ERF") and Mateel Environmental
"environmental
(collectively,
Foundation
("Mateel")
Justice
organizations") sued Pacific Lumber Co. ("Pacific Lumber") pursuant
to the Clean Water Act ("CWA") citizen suit provision for violating its
1992 and 1997 General Permits. The district court granted Pacific
Lumber's summary judgment motion on the ground that the
The
environmental organizations lacked standing to sue.
environmental organizations appealed the standing ruling. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded the
district court's approach to standing was not consistent with Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw, which was decided after the district court
judgment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found the environmental
organizations had Article III standing.
Pacific Lumber operated two facilities, Yager Camp and the
Carlotta sawmill, in Humboldt County, California. Yager Creek flowed
through Yager Camp, a 150-acre site that included a truck wash
operation, a composting area, and log storage decks. The sawmill,
located downstream of Yager Camp, occupied approximately seventy
acres and included truck shops, an aggregate crusher, and log storage
decks. Yager Creek flowed into the Van Duzen River, which emptied
into the Eel River, which in turn emptied into the Pacific Ocean about
twelve miles from Pacific Lumber's facilities. The facilities were
subject to the CWA and compliance with the 1992 and 1997 General
Permits, which regulated pollutant discharges into California's waters.
Members of ERF and Mateel used Yager Creek for recreation. In
particular, two individuals, Christopher Hinderyckx, a Mateel member,
and Frederic Evenson, an ERF member, used Yager Creek for
recreational activities, such as swimming, snorkeling, and fishing.
However, they alleged possible pollutant discharges from the Pacific
Lumber facilities impaired their enjoyment and continued use of the
creek.
The environmental organizations' standing depended upon
whether Hinderyckx and Evenson could allege an "injury in fact" that
would give them standing in their own individual right. The district
court found the members' contacts with Yager Creek too sporadic and
attenuated. Furthermore, the district court found that none of the
environmental organizations' affiants lived sufficiently near the creek
or regularly used the creek for recreational or aesthetic purposes. The
environmental organizations appealed. On review, the Ninth Circuit
rejected such an inflexible approach based on Laidlaw.
The Ninth Circuit noted that Laidlaw involved a similar citizen suit
under the CWA. In Laidlaw, several environmental organizations
brought suit, alleging violation of a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit at a Laidlaw Environmental Services
("Laidlaw") hazardous waste incinerator on the banks of South
Carolina's North Tyger River. Several of the plaintiff organizations'
members filed declarations detailing the injury they had or would
suffer because of suspected river pollution. While some of the
members lived within two miles of the incinerator, another lived
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twenty miles away. Some members indicated they had used the river
for recreational purposes, while Laidlaw's alleged pollutant discharge
deterred others from such activities. The United States Supreme
Court held these individuals had stated injuries to their aesthetic and
recreational interests sufficiently specific enough to allow standing.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, under Laidlaw,
individuals could establish "injury in fact" by showing that their
aesthetic or recreational enjoyment would suffer if the area became
environmentally degraded, without demonstrating that they live within
some geographical proximity. The Ninth Circuit stated this flexible
approach was the only approach consistent with the nature of the
aesthetic and recreational interests that typically provided the basis for
standing in environmental cases.
In response, Pacific Lumber alternatively argued that the
environmental
organizations lacked standing
because they
demonstrated neither actual environmental harm to Yager Creek nor
the company caused any such harm. However, the Ninth Circuit
declared that the district court correctly recognized the threshold
question concerning citizen standing under the CWA, which was
whether an individual could show she had been injured due to
concerns about environmental law violations, not whether she could
show that actual environmental harm existed. The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that a CWA citizen suit did not need to prove harm
because any violation, even those that were purely procedural, was
subject to suit.
Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate actual
environmental harm in order to obtain standing would compel a
plaintiff to prove more to show standing than she would have to prove
to succeed on the merits.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held the
environmental organizations had standing to sue.
John A. Helfch
Natural Res. Def. Council v. S.W. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding (1) Natural Resources Defense Council had standing
and gave proper notice to Southwest Marine pursuant to the Clean
Water Act; (2) Southwest Marine committed continuing violations;
and (3) proper remedies against Southwest Marine included an
injunction and civil penalties).
Southwest Marine operated a shipyard on San Diego Bay. In order
to repaint ships, Southwest Marine first blasted off the old paint with
copper particles.
Then they repainted the ships with a paint
containing compounds toxic to aquatic marine life. Southwest Marine
then discharged the waste from the repainting procedure into
adjacent water. Studies of the adjacent water indicated it contained a
high level of the same materials found in the waste. Southwest Marine
held permits for pollutant discharge and storm water runoff from
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California's Regional Water Quality Control Board and State Water
Resources Control Board. To obtain the permits, California required
that Southwest Marine create and implement plans limiting the
pollutant discharge into the surrounding water.
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), among others,
sought an injunction to force Southwest Marine to prepare adequate
plans and comply with its plans and permits. More than sixty days
prior to filing its suit, NRDC sent a notice letter to Southwest Marine.
After receiving the notice letter, but before NRDC filed its complaint,
Southwest Marine revised its plans. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of California issued an injunction and civil
penalties against Southwest Marine. Southwest Marine appealed that
decision and contested the court's jurisdiction based on NRDC's lack
of standing, inadequate notice, and an erroneous finding of ongoing
violations. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The court of appeals first determined NRDC met the standing
requirements to gain standing under the Clean Water Act's ("CWA")
citizen enforcement provision. The court recognized an association
had standing to sue on behalf of its members, where members
otherwise had individual standing and the organization's interests are
germane to the purpose. First, NRDC demonstrated an injury in fact
existed because its members used the affected area, and the CWA
violation lessened the area's aesthetic and recreational value. Second,
the injury was traceable to the violation, since a causal connection
existed between the discharged waste and the absence of marine life in
the area around the shipyard. Finally, the injury was redressable. To
establish redressability when seeking injunctive relief, a plaintiff must
show continuing violations. The court found NRDC had adequately
established continuing violations by Southwest Marine. Therefore, the
court concluded NRDC had standing.
The court of appeals next considered the district court's
jurisdiction. The court noted that in order to obtain subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the CWA, a plaintiff must give notice to an
alleged violator. Notice must be sufficiently specific to inform the
alleged violator of the wrong, so the violator can take corrective
actions to avoid a lawsuit. NRDC argued its notice focused on
Southwest Marine's failure to prepare and implement adequate plans.
Southwest Marine argued NRDC did not refer to a specific provision in
the plan. However, the court noted Southwest Marine added specific
provisions to its plan only after it received the notice letter. The court
held the CWA did not require NRDC reference a specific provision
that did not exist at the time it gave notice. Therefore, the court
found the notice was sufficiently specific.
Southwest Marine also argued the alterations it made following the
receipt of the notice rendered the notice inadequate. However, the
court concluded the notice was adequate as of the date it was given to
the violator. The court reasoned that an otherwise proper notice
letter was not defective when a defendant subsequently prepares a new
plan. The court held the notice was adequate, although Southwest
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Marine altered its plans subsequent to the notice. Therefore, the
court concluded the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction
over NRDC's citizen enforcement suit.
The court of appeals then considered another aspect of the district
court's subject matter jurisdiction-continuing violations. The Ninth
Circuit stated that a court has jurisdiction over citizen suits where a
plaintiff makes a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent
violations. To establish a good-faith allegation, a plaintiff must prove
either that violations continued after the filing of a complaint or a
continuing likelihood of recurrence existed. Moreover, the court
explained that such violations were ongoing until no real likelihood of
repetition existed. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court
found Southwest Marine neither made inspections nor kept inspection
records. Also, the district court concluded Southwest Marine
maintained poor housekeeping during the action. As the district
court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the appellate court
upheld both the district court's determination that ongoing violations
occurred and its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court of appeals found the district court's
injunction against Southwest Marine was proper. Southwest Marine
argued the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion because
requirements in the injunction were not contained in either the
permits or the plans. The court of appeals declared the district court
had broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief. While the district
court could enforce violated standards, it could not impose measures
that were either wholly unrelated to the violation or would override
the permit's terms. The court concluded the requirements imposed
by the district court were consistent with and complementary to the
existing requirements.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found the civil penalties imposed against
Southwest Marine were not excessive. The appellate court noted that
once a court concluded a CWA violation existed, civil penalties were
mandatory. Therefore, the district court properly considered the
offense's seriousness, the violation's benefits, any history of violations,
good faith efforts, and the possible effect of the penalty before it
imposed a fine of $1,000 per day of violation. The court also noted
that the district court found Southwest Marine could offset the penalty
by the cost of physical alterations. Because the civil penalty could be
zero, the Ninth Circuit concluded the penalties were not excessive.
Sara Wagers
United States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 429 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding incidental or occasional fishing by an Indian tribe's
ancestors did not meet the "usual and accustomed" standard to
establish fishing rights under treaty provisions).
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In 1970, the United States and several western Washington Indian
Tribes sued the State of Washington and others. The plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce off-reservation fishing
rights the Indian tribes had reserved when they entered into treaties in
the mid-1850s. The dispute involved the area of Washington west of
the Cascade Mountains and north of the Columbia River drainage
area, including the American portion of the Puget Sound watershed,
the watersheds of the Olympic Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor
watershed, and the offshore waters adjacent to those areas. After an
extensive trial, in 1974 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington adjudicated the treaty-reserved fishing rights of
several tribes in a lengthy opinion known as the Boldt Decision.
Subsequent to that decision, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe
("Muckleshoot") sought to open commercial fisheries west of the City
of Seattle in an area of Puget Sound beyond Elliott Bay. In response,
the Puyallup, Suquamish, and Swinomish Indian tribes ("Tribes")
returned to district court in 1998 with a request for determination that
the Muckleshoot's usual and accustomed fishing area did not include
areas outside Elliott Bay according to the Boldt Decision. The district
court granted the Tribes' motion for summary judgment, limited the
Muckleshoot's usual and accustomed fishing area to Elliott Bay, and
enjoined the Muckleshoot from fishing the saltwater outside the bay.
The Muckleshoot appealed.
On appeal the case turned on Judge Boldt's finding that, prior to
and during the time the Muckleshoot's ancestors entered into the
Treaty of Point Elliott and Treaty of Medicine Creek, their usual and
accustomed fishing places were primarily in Duwamish drainage rivers
and "secondarily in the saltwater of Puget Sound." The Muckleshoot
argued the text was unambiguous, because "Puget Sound" has a wellunderstood, common geographical meaning. The Tribes countered
the phrase was ambiguous when examined in the context of the
evidence before Judge Boldt. The Tribes contended Judge Boldt
could not have intended to include the expansive area the
Muckleshoot claimed as part of their usual and accustomed fishing
waters.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the broad term "Puget Sound" was at odds with the evidence in
the Boldt Decision record. The evidence included ethnographic data
and anthropological reports. From this evidence, the court concluded
the Muckleshoot were upriver people who primarily relied on
freshwater fishing for their livelihoods. Nothing in the evidence
indicated the Muckleshoot's ancestors had established any saltwater
fishing sites beyond Elliott Bay. The record did find the Muckleshoot's
ancestors engaged in some trolling for salmon when they descended
the rivers to get shellfish on the beaches. However, their descent was
restricted to the Duwamish River drainage, which empties only into
Elliott Bay, because the Puyallup Tribe had exclusive territorial rights
to river drainages leading to other parts of Puget Sound. Thus, any
excursions by the Muckleshoot's ancestors beyond the bay were
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incidental and occasional. Therefore, such activities did not meet the
"usual and accustomed" standard the Boldt Decision used
to
adjudicate fishing grounds under the provisions of the treaties. Based
on these findings, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Tribes.
Kathryn S. Kanda

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. Tosco Ref. Co., No. C 00-0248, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1161 (N.D. Ca. Jan. 26, 2001) (holding environmental
organization's suit alleging Clean Water Act violations was moot
because National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit
violations could not reasonably have been expected to recur after
permit limits were revised and defendant sold refinery).
Tosco Refining Co. ("Tosco") owned and operated a refinery near
Martinez, California ("Avon refinery"). In 1993, Tosco obtained a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
from the California State Water Resources Board and the Regional
Water Quality Control Board ("Regional Board") in order to discharge
pollutants from the Avon refinery into the navigable waters of the San
Francisco Bay. The Regional Board amended the permit in 1995 and
again in February 2000, setting a limit for the allowable discharge of
dioxins to a monthly average of 0.14 picograms per liter ("pg/l"). On
June 21, 2000, the Regional Board again amended the effluent
limitations for dioxins, raising it to 0.65 pg/l. On August 31, 2000,
Tosco sold the Avon refinery to Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp.
("Ultramar"), and transferred the refinery's NPDES permit.
Community for a Better Environment ("CBE") alleged Tosco
discharged dioxins from the Avon refinery at levels that exceeded 0.14
pg/l in violation of the NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). CBE also asserted Tosco violated its dioxin monitoring,
sampling, and reporting requirements established by the permits.
Finally, CBE contended Tosco's dioxin emissions from the Avon
refinery smoke stacks violated the California Water Code, and that the
violations of the California Water Code and the CWA constituted an
unfair business practice in violation of the California Business and
Professions Code. Tosco filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting the June 21, 2000 amendment to the permit's dioxin effluent
limit and Tosco's sale of the Avon refinery eliminated Article III
subject matter jurisdiction and rendered CBE's suit moot. CBE filed a
cross motion for summary judgment.
The court determined Tosco bore the burden to establish CBE's
suit was moot by showing it was absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably recur. Tosco asserted it was absolutely
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clear, given the new permit limit and the transfer of the facility and the
permit, that the court could not reasonably expect Tosco would violate
its permit in the future. Relying on Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
EnvironmentalServices, Inc., the court determined post-complaint events
might moot claims for civil penalties. The court still had to determine
whether, in this case, civil penalties would deter future violations. CBE
alleged civil penalties would deter Tosco from future CWA violations
because the company operated other refineries managed by the same
staff that assisted Tosco in efforts to comply with the Avon refinery
permit. The court disagreed with CBE, and noted, that given the
structure and procedural requirements of the CWA, CBE could not
rely on allegations of violations at other Tosco facilities to demonstrate
civil penalties would deter Tosco from future violations.
The court granted Tosco's motion for summary judgment after
noting the revision of the permit's limit, the sale of the facility, and the
transfer of the permit made absolutely clear that one could not
reasonably expect Tosco's permit violation to recur. Thus, the court
held no prospect civil penalties would deter future violations.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo.
2000) (granting United States' motion for partial summary judgment
and denying defendant facility operator's motion for partial summary
judgment, noting: (1) EPA "overfiling" was not inappropriate under
the circumstances; (2) United States' suit was not barred by res
judicata or laches; and (3) defendant, as a facility operator, was
required to post financial assurances).
Beginning in 1968, Richard Lilienthal operated an electroplating
business in Denver, Colorado under the name Power Engineering Co.
("PEC"). The processes employed by PEC produced thirteen waste
streams containing more than 1000 kilograms of waste per month.
The materials present in these streams included a number of toxic
substances as identified by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), including hexavalent chromium.
RCRA authorizes Colorado to administer hazardous waste
programs and monitor production and treatment facilities to insure
compliance with RCRA's effluent standards.
The Colorado
Department of Public Health and the Environment ("CDPHE")
oversees the program.
In 1986, PEC notified CDPHE that its
operations were generating certain hazardous wastes but failed to
indicate its discharge of hexavalent chromium. In 1992, CDPHE
discovered these releases had contaminated groundwater on and
outside of PEC's property. About one year later, PEC informed
CDPHE that in addition to the wastes it had initially reported, PEC was
emitting five additional hazardous wastes.

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 4

CDPHE served PEC with a compliance order demanding that their
operation conform to federal and local regulations. When PEC failed
to meet the terms of the order, CDPHE sued in Colorado state court.
Although CDPHE had authority to demand financial assurances for
remediation from PEC in the proceeding, it declined to seek them.
Because CDPHE failed to obtain financial assurances from PEC, the
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") instituted its own
suit in the federal courts against PEC and Lilienthal individually.
PEC moved for partial summary judgment in response to EPA's
complaint. PEC argued the EPA had engaged in unlawful "overfiling"
and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the action. PEC's
overfiling argument relied primarily on Harmon Industry, Inc. v.
Browner. In Harmon, the Eighth Circuit found an EPA enforcement
action to be improper because a state action against the same
defendant regarding the same matter was pending when the EPA
brought suit. The Eighth Circuit maintained that under the RCRA,
"the Federal Government can initiate an action... only if...
the
authorized state fails to initiate an enforcement action." The Eighth
Circuit therefore dismissed the government's claim.
In response to PEC's overfiling argument, the district court
concluded the Eighth Circuit incorrectly decided Harmon. The district
court asserted that courts cannot preclude an EPA enforcement action
merely because an authorized state has also sought judicial
enforcement of a regulation. The court noted the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation was flawed because under its reasoning, all EPA
enforcement actions would be precluded in cases where a state filed
suit regardless of whether the EPA's cause of action duplicates the
state action. In accordance with its RCRA interpretation, the district
court determined RCRA did not prohibit the EPA action against PEC.
The district court also denied PEC's motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of res judicata. The court ruled the doctrine
did not apply because the EPA did not exercise the requisite control
over CDPHE in the state court action and the EPA action was a fully
independent action.
PEC also advanced a number of defenses in response to EPA's
motion for partial summary judgment: (1) the financial assurances
sought by the EPA were not required because PEC was no longer in
violation of RCRA; (2) the progress PEC had made in cleaning up
contaminated soil and water precluded the imposition of an
injunction; and (3) the doctrine of laches barred the EPA's action.
Lilienthal also argued independently that for the purposes of
applicable Colorado regulations, he was not an owner of the PEC
facility.
The court first addressed whether demanding financial assurances
from PEC would be proper. Noting that "[n]othing within RCRA's
'cradle-to-grave' regulatory scheme indicates that owners
and
eperators [sic] of hazardous waste facilities are exempt from providing
financial assurance requirements before remediation," the court held
the EPA was permitted to obtain financial assurances from PEC.
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Under the ruling, EPA could obtain such assurances for past RCRA
violations regardless of whether PEC was acting in violation of the
statute at the time EPA filed its complaint.
The court also found PEC's "tremendous progress" argument
unpersuasive. PEC believed that because it had taken substantial steps
toward remediating the contaminated soils and groundwater, the EPA
could not establish irreparable injury occurred necessary to warrant an
injunction. The court first noted that because PEC had not provided
the financial assurances demanded by the EPA, PEC was in current
violation of RCRA. Citing Tenth Circuit authority, the court found
that "[w]hen the evidence shows that the defendants are engaged
in... practices prohibited by statute.., irreparable harm to the
plaintiffs need not be shown."
PEC's laches argument rested on the premise that because the
government did not act against PEC at an earlier time, the EPA had
abandoned its right to do so. Recognizing an exception to the laches
doctrine exists where the government seeks to protect a public
interest, PEC opined that the EPA's suit served a government, rather
than a public interest. Rejecting this assertion, the court reasoned that
if PEC were not to provide remediation costs, the government would
be forced to do so; these costs in turn would be passed to the public.
Because a public interest was therefore at stake, PEC's laches
argument could not stand.
Lilienthal individually asserted the final response to EPA's motion
for partial summaryjudgment. Lilienthal argued he was not in fact the
operator of the PEC facility. The court disposed of this argument by
simply applying the wording of Colorado regulations to pertinent facts
regarding Lilienthal's holdings. At the time the EPA brought its
action, Lilienthal was president of PEC and owned over half its stock.
According to PEC employee testimony, Lilienthal also made all the
relevant decisions regarding PEC's environmental compliance. The
court recognized other courts have used different tests to determine
whether to consider an individual as an operator for RCRA purposes.
However, the court declined to decide which test courts should apply
since Lilienthal would be considered an operator under each of them.
Jason S. Wells
Burke v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.D.C. 2001)
(granting summary judgment motion in favor of the Environmental
Protection Agency where a violator of a discharge permit questioned
the agency's decision to debar him from business with the
government).
From 1989 to 1998, Burke was the president and sole shareholder
of ACMAR Regional Landfill, Inc. ("ACMAR"), which owned and
operated ACMAR Regional Landfill ("the landfill") located in
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Alabama. The landfill accepted residential and industrial waste, and
bordered a tributary of the Cahaba River, a source of drinking water
for the residents of Birmingham, Alabama. The Alabama Department
of Environmental Management issued a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit to the landfill, which authorized the release
of landfill storm water runoff that did not contain leachate, a liquid byproduct produced in landfills. Leachate results when precipitation or
other fluids mix with contaminates in the waste creating a biological
reaction that renders the fluid harmful. In February 1998, an
information was filed against Burke charging him with a violation of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama for negligent discharge of leachate
into the Chahaba River tributary in 1993. Burke pled guilty and
received a fine and prison sentence, with a one year supervised release
if he continued his relationship with the landfill. ACMAR pled guilty
to charges of fraud and illegal operation of the landfill and
subsequently received a fine. Burke sold the landfill in March 1998.
In August 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
Suspension and Debarment Division debarred Burke from
participating in any federal assistance program and from contracting
with the federal government for five years. The EPA exercised its
discretion in debarring Burke to protect the public interest and ensure
the agency conducted business with only responsible persons. The
EPA concluded Burke's criminal conviction provided just cause for
debarment, and Burke did not provide sufficient mitigating factors or
remedial measures to show debarment was unnecessary. Burke filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking an injunction against the EPA in reference to the debarment
order, and declaratory relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act. Burke argued the EPA's decision to debar him was arbitrary and
capricious given the statutory requirement for debarment, and the
mitigating factors and remedial measures surrounding his offense.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
In reviewing the decision to debar Burke, the court stated the
standard of review was not to determine if the decision was proper, but
to determine whether the EPA had acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner looking at the entire administrative record. The
court held the EPA acted within its discretion given the evidence and
granted summary judgment for the EPA.
First, the court addressed Burke's claim that the EPA's
interpretation of the CWA debarment provision constituted an abuse
of discretion. Burke argued the relevant sections of the debarment
provision neither specifically enumerated nor generally addressed the
nature of his offense, but rather referred to business integrity. The
court concluded Burke's actions raised considerable questions about
his business integrity and the EPA's interpretation of the provision was
reasonable.
Next, the court addressed Burke's argument regarding the
mitigating factors and remedial measures surrounding his debarment.
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Burke argued the mitigating factors surrounding his offense made
debarment unnecessary, as he did not represent a business risk, and
these mitigating factors made his five-year debarment period excessive.
Burke maintained his offense was a single act and not a pattern of
offenses, making him less of a business risk in future relationships.
The court explained that the scope of its review was to decide whether
the EPA acted reasonably given the facts in the record, and that the
EPA had discretion in making its decision. The court held, given the
nature and circumstances of Burke's offense, that EPA's decision to
debar him for five years was not an abuse of discretion.
PatrickNackley
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 237 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding section 509(b) (1) of the Clean Water Act determines venue,
notjurisdiction).
In April 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
promulgated regulations, known as the "Cluster Rules," pertaining to
the paper mill and pulp industry. The Cluster Rules include both
effluent limitation guidelines under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and
Several
emission standards under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
environmental groups, including the National Wildlife Federation
(collectively, "NWF"), filed a petition for review of the CWA portion of
the Cluster Rules in the Ninth Circuit. Various paper producers
(collectively, "Industry petitioners") filed a petition for review of the
same portion of the Cluster Rules in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits transferred the Industry
petitioners to the Ninth Circuit, where the court consolidated their
petition for review with NWF's claims. Industry petitioners then
motioned to dismiss NWF's petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Without ruling, the Ninth Circuit transferred the case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
CWA section 509(b) (1) provided the basis for the Industry
petitioner's lack of subject matter jurisdiction argument. This section
states that review of an administrator's action in promulgating any
effluent standard may be had in the "Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person
resides or transacts business which is directly affected by such action."
Industry petitioners argued the phrase "resides or transacts" was
jurisdictional and only one of the NWF petitioners resided or
transacted business in the Ninth Circuit. Industry petitioners asserted
that because NWF's one valid petitioner lost standing, or its claim
became moot, nine months after NWF's petition was filed, NWF's
remaining petition should be dismissed. NWF countered that the
"resides or transacts" language referred to venue, and argued venue
was properly established.
In analyzing Industry petitioners' and NWF's arguments, the court
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first looked to previous interpretations of similar language. In Texas
Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, the court noted it had previously
interpreted CAA's analogous provision as determining venue. In Texas
Municipal, the court held the mandatory language of the analogous
provision as to where a petitioner may "file" supported the conclusion
that the provision pertained to venue. The court noted the best
reading of "resides or transacts" language was as providing a choice
among circuits, and not the power of a specific circuit court to hear a
claim. Relying on this assertion and legislative history, the court
inferred the congressional purpose of the provision was to divide the
cases among the circuits.
The court next considered CWA section 509(b) (1) in light of its
decision in Texas Municipal. The court agreed that the language at
issue provided a choice among circuits and not the power of a
particular circuit to hear a claim. The court acknowledged that
section 509(b)(1) contained no exclusive language in contrast to the
language at issue in Texas Municipal In Texas Municipal, the relevant
CAA section stated a petition for review may be filed only in the
specified circuit. Here, such classifications were absent. Instead,
section 509(b)(1) expressly permitted "review of any enumerated
claim in whichever circuit an interested person resides or transacts
business."
Therefore, the court concluded section 509(b) (1)
determines venue, notjurisdiction
The court then considered the different remedies for improper
venue versus improper jurisdiction.
A claim brought in the
inappropriate jurisdiction is dismissed; a claim brought in the
inappropriate venue is transferred to the proper court. The court
reasoned that section 509(b) (1) evidences a broad grant of appellate
authority because every interested person challenging an enumerated
action has a court in which to obtain review. Interpreting section
509(b) (1) to pertain to venue comported better with this broad grant
of authority, as a simple transfer of the case to the proper court
preserves a petitioner's ability to obtain review. Accordingly, the court
held section 509(b) (1) must pertain to venue.
The court specifically addressed Industry petitioners' arguments
within the context of its previous statements. Industry petitioners
argued the court's rationale in Texas Municipal should not apply
because, in that case, CAA's provision limited the petitioner's ability to
challenge an agency's action in a particular court. Contrarily, Industry
petitioners asserted CWA limited a court's ability to review such a
petition.
The court described this argument as "exceptionally
unconvincing."
The court concluded section 509(b) (1) clearly
directed petitioners where to file, and neither explicitly addressed
courts nor used the term jurisdiction.
Industry petitioners next argued different courts have found other
provisions included in section 509(b) (1) pertained to jurisdiction.
The court determined this argument was contrary to its Texas
Municipal holding. In Texas Municipal, the court found the fact that
the CAA judicial review provision included jurisdictional restrictions
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was "not determinative" of whether or not the section pertained to
venue.
The court noted the CWA's legislative history was unclear and not
unequivocal as to whether section 509(b) (1) pertained to jurisdiction
or venue. However, Industry petitioners did not raise this argument.
The court concluded that even if they had, it would not have found
such an argument persuasive.
The court held section 509(b) (1) determines venue, not
jurisdiction. Because venue objections could be waived and Industry
petitioners conceded proper venue was no longer an issue, the court
denied Industry petitioners' motion to dismiss.
SarahE. McCutcheon
Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. EPA, 237 F.3d 681 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
the provision of the Clean Water Act that establishes the computation
of time for filing a notice of appeal determines whether the notice is
timely and not the federal rules of procedure).
Slinger Drainage ("Slinger") installed drainage tiles over a fiftyacre area that resulted in the discharge of pollutants into a wetland.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") subsequently filed an
administrative complaint against Slinger alleging a violation of section
301 (a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for failure to obtain a permit
before discharging pollutant into a wetland. The Administrative Law
Judge found Slinger liable and imposed a civil penalty of $90,000. The
Appeals Board upheld the fine, and Slinger brought this action to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The court ruled it had no jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits
because Slinger failed to timely file the notice of appeal. Under the
CWA, Slinger had thirty days to file its notice of appeal beginning on
the date the Appeals Board issued its order. Slinger filed its notice a
day late under the CWA provision. Slinger argued the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 26(a) ("Rule 26(a)") governed how
courts should compute the thirty-day period, and not the CWA.
Under Rule 26(a), the day the court issued its order is not calculated
in the time period, and Slinger's appeal would have been filed on
time.
The court held Rule 26(a) did not apply when Congress has
specified a particular method of counting in the statute itself and there
is no indication of a contrary congressional intention. The court
dismissed Slinger's appeal because the CWA clearly established the
computation of time.
Spencer L. Sears
United States v. A.J.S., Inc., No. CIV.A.00-0263-C, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17388 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 2000) (denying summary judgment
motion concerning a mortgage foreclosure due to the existence of
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demonstrated disputed issues of material fact regarding the impact of
fresh water release onto the mortgaged property, thereby leading to a
defense of equitable estoppel).
AJ.S., Inc. ("AJ.S.") defaulted on its United States Government
("Government") mortgage payments. The Government claimed no
factual dispute regarding AJ.S.'s obligation to pay and filed a summary
judgment motion, thus allowing the Government to foreclose on the
mortgage. In response, AJ.S. argued that because its inability to pay
resulted directly from Government misrepresentation within the loan
agreement's Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), this fact
estopped the Government from mortgage foreclosure.
The EIS stated the release of fresh water from the Caernarvon
Fresh Water Diversion Project ("the Project") would neither adversely
affect nor impact the mortgaged property. AJ.S. relied on the
Government representations and took the proceeds from the loan to
develop an oyster habitat, plant oyster seedlings, and construct a reef
on the Project leases. However, the fresh water flow was greater than
the EIS anticipated and the value of the oyster leases plunged.
Accordingly, AJ.S. proffered the affidavits of two witnesses as
corroboration of its defense. Furthermore, plans to depose the
witnesses were in place at the time the Government filed the summary
judgment motion.
The court found AJ.S. demonstrated disputed issues of material
fact concerning its defense of equitable estoppel. Therefore, the court
held the Government's attempt to dispose of the case prior to the
depositions was premature and denied the summary judgment motion.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
L.B. Corp. v. Schweitzer-Mauduit Int'l, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.
Mass. 2000) (holding, unless the parties were in commercial
transaction, Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A was inapplicable
to claims arising from: (1) subsurface pumping of a well that caused
damage to the adjacent property's building; and (2) unfair or
deceptive business practices).
L.B. Corp. ("L.B.") brought a diversity action seeking
compensatory damages in the amount of $400,000 from SchweitzerMauduit
Corp.
("Schweitzer")
and
Kimberly-Clark
Corp.
("Kimberly"). In 1984, Kimberly sold the Valley Industrial Park, a
fifteen-acre parcel, to L.B. Kimberly's subsidiary, Schweitzer, owned
the Valley Mill Landfill adjacent to the Valley Industrial Park. L.B.
claimed improper pumping of a Kimberly well ("Well No. 5") in 1993
caused its buildings to subside twelve inches and resulted in repeated
costly repairs between 1995 and 1998. In 1997, the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection informed L.B. that volatile
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organic compounds ("VOCs") contaminated its well water. L.B.
brought suit in Massachusetts federal district court, and claimed
Kimberly and Schweitzer illegally disposed hazardous material into the
landfill. Kimberly sought partial summary judgment on L.B.'s first
eight complaints.
First, Kimberly argued a three-year statute of limitations barred
L.B.'s claims. In 1996, L.B. stated the buildings' worth was zero.
Kimberly argued L.B.'s failure to sue for damages prior to 1996 barred
the current claim. The court disagreed, and stated that L.B. had a
right to sue. The court held the damages incurred in the years prior
to 1996 did not bar L.B. claims for damages sustained after 1996.
Second, Kimberly moved for summary judgment on count seven.
L.B. claimed the operation of Well No. 5 exceeded the state safe yield
requirement. Under Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A, sections
2 and 11 ("Chapter 93A"), a violation will occur if the operation
constitutes an unfair or deceptive business practice. The court stated
Chapter 93A was a consumer protection law concerning transactions,
and not a general protection against unfair business practices. The
court found Chapter 93A did not apply because the complaint
concerned the illegal pumping of a well, and not unfair or deceptive
Because L.B. and Kimberly were not in a
business practices.
transactional relationship, the court held L.B. failed to state a claim for
which the court could grant relief.
In count eight, L.B. asserted two claims under Chapter 93A. First,
L.B. asserted Kimberly's failure to disclose the possible groundwater
L.B. produced an
contamination violated Chapter 93A.
Environmental Protection Agency preliminary assessment, a former
Kimberly employee's statement, and an inter-office memorandum as
evidence that, at the time of the sale of Valley Industrial Park,
Kimberly knew VOC's might have contaminated the groundwater.
Kimberly argued the non-disclosure did not harm L.B. Additionally,
Kimberly argued the harm was not foreseeable because it had not
drilled any wells until after the sale. The court ruled a violation of
Chapter 93A would occur if Kimberly knew of actual contamination,
and its disclosure of the contamination would have led L.B. not to buy
the property. The court concluded L.B.'s evidence did not amount to
actual contamination of the parcel. The court also determined
Kimberly knew of, at most, a potential contamination. However,
without evidence of actual and present contamination, Kimberly was
not subject to a Chapter 93A violation. As a result, the court granted
Kimberly's motion for partial summary judgment on this claim.
L.B.'s second claim of count eight stated that Kimberly caused the
contamination of L.B.'s groundwater in violation of Chapter 93A. The
court also granted Kimberly's motion for partial summary judgment
because no commercial transaction regarding the contamination
existed. The court found Kimberly had no actual knowledge that the
land was contaminated at the time of the sale. Therefore, Kimberly
had not sold L.B. contaminated land. The evidence showed the
contamination occurred after Kimberly purchased the land and drilled
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the wells. The court determined the action did not trigger Chapter
93A because contamination occurred subsequent to the commercial
transaction.
Finally, L.B. sought to impose strict liability against Kimberly for
the subsidence of its buildings that resulted from the overpumping of
Well No. 5. Kimberly contended the subsurface pumping could not
result in strict liability. The court agreed and granted summary
judgment in favor of Kimberly. The court explained that removal of
lateral support by excavation might trigger strict liability, but in this
case, the act was subsurface pumping and not excavation. In cases of
subsurface pumping, the court stated negligence is the appropriate
legal standard.
In conclusion, the court held the statute of limitations precluded
two of the counts, decided three of the Chapter 93A counts in favor of
Kimberly, and denied all others motions for partial summary
judgment.
Jon Hyman
United States v. Michigan, 122 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(ordering the Army Corps of Engineers to accept dredged materials
from Conner Creek at its Pointe Mouillee Confined Disposal facility at
Lake Erie).
The State of Michigan instigated an action after the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") refused to accept Conner Creek dredged material
at the Corps' Pointe Mouillee Confined Disposal Facility ("Point
Mouillee"). The court issued an order compelling the Corps to accept
Conner Creek's dredged materials.
Pursuant to a 1974 agreement with the United States, Michigan
constructed a confined disposal facility at Point Mouillee, Lake Erie.
The disposal facility contained dredged materials from the Detroit and
Rouge Rivers. In 1977, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") sued Michigan, the Detroit Water and Sewerage
Department ("DWSD"), and all communities and agencies under
contract with DWSD for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The
parties submitted and the court approved a Consent Judgment. Later,
in 1997, DWSD reported violations of its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit to the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality ("MDEQ"). As a result of the violation, MDEQ,
DWSD, and other parties to the original Consent Judgment entered
into a Second Amended Consent Judgment again approved by this
court. The Second Amended Consent Judgment required DWSD to
dredge sediment from Conner Creek. Point Mouillee was the only
reasonable option for disposal of the dredged material. MDEQ,
DWSD, and the Corps attempted negotiations concerning the
deposition of the dredged materials into Point Mouillee, but were
unable to agree. The issue were: (1) whether the disposal facility's
acceptance of Conner Creek dredged material was a new use of Point
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Mouillee; (2) whether the Corps required a new indemnification
agreement for the project; and (3) whether immediate action was
required.
On the first issue, the Corps argued the deposition of Conner
Creek sediment was a new use of Pointe Mouillee because it
constituted environmental dredging, while the Corps used Pointe
Mouillee for navigational dredging. Since the original project did not
contemplate environmental dredging, the Corps argued that EPA
must complete a new Environmental Assessment ("EA") for Pointe
Mouillee. The court stated that the River and Harbor Act of 1970
("Act") and the 1974 agreement creating Point Mouillee governed its
use. The court concluded neither the Act's language nor the 1974
agreement precluded Pointe Mouillee's use for non-navigational
dredging. Accordingly, the court found disposal of Conner Creek
material did not constitute a new use of Point Mouillee.
The second issue addressed whether the project required a new
indemnification agreement. The Corps argued Michigan must sign a
new indemnification agreement before the Corps could accept the
material. The original agreement contained a "hold harmless" clause,
which protected the federal government from damages caused by
construction, operation, and facility maintenance. The court ruled
the "hold harmless" clause sufficiently protected the United States
government from any liability connected with the site's operation, and
no further assurances were necessary.
The third issue was whether the Corps must act immediately. The
Corps argued no need existed for immediate action since dredging
was not scheduled to begin until 2002. DWSD argued it must have the
issue concerning the disposal site finalized by November 22, 2000, in
order to qualify for the State Revolving Fund. DWSD argued that, in
the absence of this funding, its ratepayers would incur an additional
$40,000,000 in additional interest charges. For this reason, DWSD
asserted the Corps must act immediately. The court agreed and ruled
the monetary deadline required immediate action.
The court ruled in favor of DWSD and MDEQ on all issues and
ordered the Corps to act immediately and accept Conner Creek
dredged material.
Brian L. Martin
Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001) (holding:
(1) Madison's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim
was improperly raised and failed under substantive due process review;
(2) Madison failed to show the Montana Stream Access statute was
irrational and arbitrary and had no conceivable public purpose
relating to public welfare; and (3) both statute of limitations and res
judicata violations ultimately barred all of Madison's claims).
Harvey and Doris Madison, among others, (collectively "Madison")
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brought this claim in federal district court to enjoin permanently
Defendants, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, among
others, (collectively "FWP") from enforcing the Montana Stream
Access Law. The Montana Stream Access Law allows public use of all
surface waters capable of recreational use up to the high-water mark of
privately owned streambeds, regardless of ownership of the underlying
land. The law allowed for public use of the Stillwater and Ruby Rivers
and O'Dell Creek-waters adjacent to Madison's land. Madison
challenged the law, asserting it violated his substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and, alternatively, under
federal law. Madison's second claim asserted the statute violated his
due process rights because it was void for vagueness, and, therefore,
illegal. FWP filed eight motions to dismiss challenging Madison's
claims.
The United States District Court for the District of Montana
analyzed the Montana Stream Access Law pursuant to the Montana
Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and relevant case law. The
court cited Montana Supreme Court precedent that affirmed the
public's right to use state-owned water for recreation as a narrowly
confined public easement over the bed and banks of privately owned
streams. The court also cited Montana Supreme Court precedent to
affirm the constitutionality of the statute. The court then analyzed
FWP's eight motions to dismiss and sustained each one.
The first motion to dismiss concerned whether the Taking Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, and not the Fourteenth Amendment as
argued by Madison, was the basis of Madison's complaint. The court
agreed with FWP that the complaint was founded in the Taking Clause
and cited Ninth Circuit authority to apply the Taking Clause test
instead.
FWP's second motion to dismiss concerned whether, under the
Taking Clause test, the stream access laws were rationally related to a
legitimate state interest and were, therefore, a valid exercise of police
power. The court distinguished two taking cases raised by Madison.
The court stated the cases Madison raised involved the taking of
private property rights and not an interest in publicly owned surface
waters that cross a streambed. The court concluded Madison failed to
meet the Taking Clause criteria and failed to state properly such a
claim.
FWP's third motion to dismiss asserted Madison failed to show the
absence of public purpose within the Stream Access Law as required
under a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
Under this test, Madison had to prove both that the legislature had no
rational reason to enact the law and no intent to advance a public
purpose. The court determined Madison had failed to show the
statute had no public purpose. The court found FWP raised several
rational reasons to support the law.
FWP's fourth motion to dismiss concerned (1) whether the
Montana Stream Access Law's failure either to permit or to proscribe
portage around natural barriers violated the vagueness doctrine; and
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(2) whether the law's definition of "high-water mark" was vague. First,
the court stated Madison's claim intended to challenge the
legislature's failure to enact a law, not to challenge vagueness. Second,
the court held Madison failed to show the definition of high-water
mark was so vague that men of common intelligence had to guess at its
meaning. Accordingly, the court affirmed FWP's fourth motion to
dismiss.
FWP's fifth motion to dismiss concerned whether the claim
violated the statute of limitations. The court found Madison missed
the three-year general tort statute of limitations deadline by
approximately twelve years. The court rejected Madison's claim that a
Thus, the statute of
continuing violation exception applied.
limitations barred Madison's claim.
FWP's sixth motion to dismiss asserted res judicata barred
Madison's claims. Because one of the Madison's co-parties was
previously involved in a suit challenging the same law under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the court decided res judicata barred
Madison from raising the same claim on the same grounds.
FWP's motion to dismiss argued the Full Faith and Credit Clause
required that the court honor a previous adjudication of the
constitutionality of Montana's Stream Access Law, therefore, barring
Madison's claims. The court found that two of the Madison co-parties
received virtual representation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
through participation in an earlier adjudication. Thus, the court held
resjudicata barred Madison's claim based on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
FWP's final motion to dismiss concerned whether the RookerFeldman Doctrine ("Doctrine") barred federal district court review of
Montana Supreme Court cases. Under the Doctrine, a federal district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final state supreme
court decisions or constitutional claims intertwined with state court
decisions. The court held the Doctrine barred Madison from seeking
federal appellate review in this federal district court and granted the
motion to dismiss.
The court sustained all of FWP's motions to dismiss and dismissed
Madison's complaint with prejudice.
ChristineEllison
D'Agnillo v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., No. 89 Civ. 5609
(CSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000)
(holding alleged deficiencies in the City of Yonkers' environmental
assessments for a housing development were not sufficient to: (1)
grant an injunction to withhold United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development funds for the development; (2) grant an
injunction to stop construction by the City of Yonkers; (3) declare the
environmental assessments invalid; or (4) declare the City of Yonkers
must conduct another area-wide environmental assessment).
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In the fall of 1999, the City of Yonkers ("City") had three sitespecific environmental assessments ("Site-Specific EAs") and one areawide environmental assessment ("Area-Wide EA") prepared for its new
housing development sites. The United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") required such Environmental
Assessments ("EAs") in order for the City to receive federal funding.
All four EAs resulted in findings of no significant impact ("FONSIs").
The City published the results in March 2000, along with notices of the
City's request for HUD funds.
John D'Agnillo objected to the four EAs and their FONSIs. The
City responded to his objections in June 2000, finding them
nonmeritorious. D'Agnillo filed a motion with the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, asking the court
to: (1) enjoin HUD from dispersing funds for the three sites; (2)
enjoin the City from beginning construction on those sites; (3) declare
that the EAs and FONSIs violated the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA") and HUD regulations; and (4) declare the City must
conduct another Area-Wide EA before beginning construction. To
support these requests, D'Agnillo alleged that: (1) the City failed to
make the EAs publicly available; (2) the Area-Wide EA was incomplete
because, given its date relative to the three Site-Specific EAs, the AreaWide EA did not incorporate their findings; (3) the Area-Wide EA was
incomplete because it failed to mention the location of parkland
donated to the City; and (4) the Area-Wide EA did not properly
evaluate the cumulative effects of a site containing wetlands.
First, the court found the EAs were publicly available to D'Agnillo.
Although D'Agnillo was allegedly unable to obtain copies of some of
the EAs at the local library, the City mailed copies to him at his
request. The court felt that by mailing the EAs to D'Agnillo, the City
had attempted in good faith to comply with NEPA's public availability
requirements. Moreover, the court found that even if the City had
failed to comply with these requirements, such failure did not warrant
the injunctive and declaratory relief D'Agnillo requested.
Second, the court found the Area-Wide EA was complete because
its publication date pre-dated those of the three Site-Specific EAs.
Although the Area-Wide EA, which included the findings of the three
Site-Specific EAs, pre-dated them, the court felt this conflict did not
have the meaning ascribed by D'Agnillo. In particular, the court
found the three Site-Specific EAs were available in draft form when the
Area-Wide EA was being prepared. In addition, all four EAs went
through simultaneous revisions until they were finalized. The court
concluded these findings indicated the Area-Wide EA took the results
of the three Site-Specific EAs into account. Moreover, D'Agnillo had
not alleged any specific shortcomings in the Area-Wide EA to indicate
it was incomplete and, therefore, the court should invalidate it.
Third, the court found the Area-Wide EA was not incomplete for
failing to mention the location of parkland donated to the City.
According to the court, the purpose of the Area-Wide EA was to
discover what detrimental effects the housing project would have on

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

the environment. The court reasoned that adding parkland to the
area would have only a benign effect on the environment and,
therefore, a failure to specify its location could not undercut the
conclusion of the Area-Wide EA. Moreover, D'Agnillo failed to
explain why the location of the parkland had to be included in the
Area-Wide EA.
Fourth, the court found that even though the original Area-Wide
EA failed to evaluate impacts on wetlands located in one of its site
areas, such failure did not warrant another area-wide EA. The court
found the City did not issue a FONSI for this site because of the
presence of wetlands. Instead, the City had commissioned a more
comprehensive environmental impact statement ("EIS") to evaluate
any impacts to the wetlands. Although the Area-Wide EA contained a
statement indicating no wetlands would be affected by the
development project, this factual inaccuracy was due to prior court
orders on the scope of the Area-Wide EA. In order to correct this
inaccuracy, the court indicated the Area-Wide EA would have to be
updated. However, the court felt that because the wetlands area was a
self-contained environmental matter, failing to discuss it in the AreaWide EA was not grounds for its invalidation, a new area-wide EA, or
an injunction to prevent construction by the City.
Fifth, the court found D'Agnillo had no basis to seek to enjoin
HUD from dispersing funds to the City. According to the court, HUD
could withhold funds only if it rejected a potential recipient's
environmental findings on limited procedural grounds spelled out in
its regulations. The court found the deficiencies alleged by D'Agnillo
in the EAs did not fall within these HUD regulations.
For the reasons stated, the district court denied D'Agnillo's
motion.
Matthew j Costinett
N.W. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Blue Heron Paper Co., No. 00-1201-KI, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17848 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2000) (holding: (1)
environmental group's activities created sufficient constitutional
standing to bring suit against a paper mill under the Clean Water Act
based on allegations that the mill harmed fish populations in the
Willamette River; and (2) Oregon Revised Statute section
468.025(1) (b) regulating discharge of wastes into state waters created
no private cause of action to enforce the statute, but damages could be
sought by pleading the claim as a common-law tort).
Blue Heron Paper Co. ("BHPC") operated a recycling mill that
discharged high-temperature wastewater into the Willamette River.
Northwestern Environmental Defense Center ("NEDC") sued BHPC
under both the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Oregon statutes. NEDC
alleged high-temperature water release adversely affected fish in the
river and the rights of NEDC members who fished those waters.
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NEDC further alleged heat discharges from the mill by BPHC's
predecessor, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. ("Smurfit"), violated the terms
of a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit.
BHPC argued the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim under the
CWA. BHPC claimed NEDC failed to allege constitutional standing
requirements, specifically a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact
fairly traceable to the challenged actions of BHPC. Further, because
NEDC alleged only specific violations by Smurfit in its complaint,
NEDC failed to provide BHPC sufficient notice under the CWA.
Finally, BHPC argued NEDC had no cause of action under Oregon
Revised Statutes section 468.025 (1) (b), as no provision created private
enforcement of the statute.
The court found NEDC's complaint alleged sufficient injury-in-fact
based on the group's professed interest in the health of fish in the
Willamette River. The court found NEDC also provided BHPC
sufficient notice, as NEDC's complaint specifically alleged BPHC
violated the CWA by discharging waste heat into the river.
Information regarding Smurfit's prior, identical operation merely
clarified NEDC's allegations. BHPC argued NEDC's notice did not
allege specific dates on which BPHC violated the CWA, and was
therefore insufficient. However, BHPC took possession of the mill on
May 9, 2000, and NEDC sued on June 26, 2000. Thus, the court found
the notice effectively alleged BPHC's violations within a relatively short
time, and was therefore sufficient.
The court dismissed NEDC's claims under Oregon Revised Statute
section 468.025(1) (b) because, where a statute is silent on private
enforcement rights, a court considers private claims only when
necessary to carry out state policies.
In this case, Oregon's
Department of Environmental Quality enforced the statute, thereby
precluding NEDC's claims. The court granted NEDC leave to amend
its complaint, and to plead the claim as a common-law tort.
Alan Curtis

STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Equilon Enters., L.L.C. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g granted, 21 P.3d 758 (Cal. 2001) (holding:
(1) dismissal of plaintiff oil company's action against consumer group
under California's "SLAPP" statute was proper where consumer
group's notices of intent to sue under Proposition 65 (formerly know
as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986) fell
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within the type of speech or right to petition protected by the "SLAPP"
statute; and (2) declaratory relief was not appropriate since oil
companies were unlikely to prevail on their claims, and Consumer
Cause was absolutely privileged).
On October 14, 1998, Consumer Cause gave notice of its intent to
sue Shell Pipeline Corp. ("Shell"), Texaco, Inc., the state Attorney
General, the Los Angeles County District Attorney, and the Los
Angeles City Attorney for alleged violations of Proposition 65, formerly
known as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of
1986. The purpose of Proposition 65 was to allow members of the
public to sue water polluters because government investigation and
prosecution were perceived as ineffectual or inadequate. Consumer
Cause's notice asserted that since October 9, 1994, seventy-eight
specified Shell and Texaco gas stations in Los Angeles and Ventura
Counties had been polluting local groundwater by discharging
benzene, lead, and toluene into the soil beneath their facilities.
Rather than seek clarification of the Proposition 65 notice, Equilon
Enterprises, L.L.C. ("Equilon")-the successor-in-interest to Shell and
Texaco, Inc.-filed a lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief
against Consumer Cause on December 17, 1998. Equilon sought a
judicial declaration that Consumer Cause's Proposition 65 notice
failed to comply with notice requirements of the California Code of
Regulations. Equilon also sought to enjoin Consumer Cause from
filing a Proposition 65 enforcement action. Defendant Consumer
Cause asked the court to strike Equilon's complaint because it violated
the statutory prohibition on "SLAPP" suits. The trial court dismissed
Equilon's action and Equilon appealed.
The court held that (1) the notice sent by Consumer Cause under
Proposition 65 fell squarely within the type of constitutional speech or
right to petition protected by the SLAPP statute; and (2) a reasonable
probability that Equilon would prevail on its claims did not exist.
The applicable California law states a lawsuit that effectively
curtails a person's right to petition or free speech is subject to a special
motion to strike. The court acknowledged that the moving party must
meet two requirements, if it files a special motion to strike. First, the
court must determine whether the moving party satisfied its burden of
showing the lawsuit fell within the class of suits covered by California
Civil Procedure laws. Second, the court must determine whether the
party bringing the suit established a likely probability that it would
prevail on its claim.
Regarding the first requirement for a special motion to strike, the
court stated that a party invoking SLAPP statute protection must show
that it made a statement against its opponent either (a) in connection
with an issue of public interest; or (b) in connection with a legislative,
executive, judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, regardless of whether the statement concerned an
issue of public interest. The court held Consumer Cause satisfied the
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threshold requirements.
First, the court determined Consumer
Cause's notice addressed a health issue that constituted a matter of
indisputable public interest and significance because the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act concerned the quality and
safety of the state's drinking water supply. Second, the court found
the notice was part of a proceeding, as authorized by law, because the
mandated sixty-day notice was generated in connection with the
proposed lawsuit, which constituted an official proceeding.
The court held Consumer Cause satisfied the second requirement
to secure a dismissal under the special motion to strike. The court
determined Equilon had not established a probability that it would
prevail on its claim. Equilon claimed Consumer Cause did not serve
notice on the proper parties and the notice did not provide sufficient
specific information for each gas station regarding the nature of the
alleged discharge and the identification of the alleged drinking water
sources. The court, however, concluded declaratory and injunctive
relief were not proper remedies for a party who received a Proposition
65 notice of intent to sue. The court found Equilon could have raised
a deficient notice defense to an enforcement action, and the
Proposition 65 notice was absolutely privileged. The court asserted
that allowing Proposition 65 private enforcers to be sued before they,
themselves, decide to bring suit would seriously undermine the goals
of the state initiative. The court noted that such "chilling effect"
would thwart the goal of public participation and prevent some citizen
and environmental groups from alerting government officials of water
pollution violations.
The court affirmed the lower court's decision because (1)
Consumer Cause established a prima facie case that it was sued by
Equilon after exercising its First Amendment right to petition the
government in connection with a public issue-conduct protected by
both California law and the SLAPP statute; and (2) the oil companies
were unlikely to prevail on their claims. Additionally, the court stated
that Consumer Cause could bring a motion in the trial court to
recover the attorney fees and costs incurred while appealing this case.
Sommer Poole
CONNECTICUT
McNee v. Town of Newton Conservation Comm'n, No.
CV000338817S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3178 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 27, 2000) (holding an inland wetlands agency has discretion to
determine whether to conduct a public hearing before issuing a
permit, and a decision to issue a permit is not rendered void by the
agency's failure to provide notice to nearby landowners nor by
applicant's failure to obtain a discharge permit prior to the agency's
decision).
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In November 1999, Excelsior, Inc. ("Excelsior") filed an
Commission
Conservation
Newton
the
with
application
The activities
("Commission") to conduct regulated activities.
included building a new residential road across a watercourse and
modifying the channel of an intermittent watercourse. After the town
engineer, health director, fire marshal, and the Commission's
conservation officer reviewed Excelsior's plan, the Commission
unanimously approved the application in February 2000. Mary
McNee, the abutting property owner, appealed the Commission's
decision to the Connecticut Superior Court.
McNee first asserted the decision was contrary to law because the
Commission failed to abide by its own regulations. Specifically, she
contended the proposed activity met the regulatory definition of a
"significant impact activity," and, therefore, state law required the
Commission to conduct a public hearing before making its decision.
The relevant statute states the agency "shall not hold a public hearing"
unless: (1) the proposed activity will have a significant impact on
wetlands or watercourses; (2) a petition signed by at least twenty-five
persons requesting a hearing is filed with the agency; or (3) the agency
finds a hearing would be in the public interest. Because a petition was
not submitted, the court held the Commission had total discretion to
determine whether to hold a hearing. Furthermore, the court found
the record contained more than substantial evidence to support the
Commission's decisions to grant the application, and to do so without
a public hearing.
McNee claimed the Commission had the responsibility to regulate
the subdivision's water supply prior to granting the application. The
court ruled McNee failed to provide authority to support her claim.
McNee contended the Commission failed to provide required
notice to Olmstead Water Supply Co. ("Olmstead"), which owned
property within 200 feet of the proposed project. The court found
McNee failed to provide any law or facts to support this claim. The
court stated, even if personal notice was required, only Olmstead, not
McNee, had standing to raise this issue. The court also held any
failure to give such notice did not create a jurisdictional defect that
would render the Commission's decision void.
Finally, the court rejected McNee's claim that the Commission
should have required Excelsior to obtain a discharge permit. The
court held state law contains no provision that would have required
Excelsior to obtain a permit before application to or decision by the
Moreover, the Commissioner of Environmental
Commission.
Protection, not the wetlands agency, has jurisdiction over whether and
when a discharge permit is required.
Because the court concluded that McNee failed to prove the
decision was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion, the court
dismissed the appeal.
Kathryn S. Kanda
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FLORIDA
City of Tallahassee v. Thompson Trust, 771 So. 2d 587 (Fla.Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding neither a property owner's riparian rights in, nor
common boundary line with, property subject to annexation created
"affected party" status and, thus, the owner lacked standing to
challenge the annexation ordinance).
The City of Tallahassee ("City") annexed 109 acres of land
pursuant to a petition by all owners within the annexed area. TheJ.R.,
Sr., and J.M. Thompson Trust ("Trust") challenged the annexation at
issue based upon both lack of notice regarding the annexation and
lack of representation at the public hearing. As a result, the circuit
court granted final summary judgment in favor of the Trust. The City
appealed the judgment, arguing the Trust lacked standing, as it did
not constitute an "affected party" under Florida law. The Trust,
however, claimed standing as an "affected party" due to its riparian
rights in the annexed lake and common boundary line with the
annexed area.
The First District Florida Court of Appeal considered whether
riparian rights in a lake created standing to challenge annexation of
property with sixty-six feet of water frontage on the lake. The court
viewed riparian rights not as proprietary in nature, but rather as a
benefit to the riparian owner. Thus, the Trust's benefit remained in
tact in light of the annexation. Therefore, the court found that
annexation of the lake did not constitute a taking of the Trust's
riparian rights and, thus, the Trust did not establish itself as an
"affected party."
The Trust also argued that since it shared a common boundary
line with the annexed area, it was within the annexed area. However,
the court rejected this line of reasoning due to lack of authority.
In conclusion, the court held that the Trust was not an "affected
party" under Florida law and lacked standing to challenge the
annexation ordinance. Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit
court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the City.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
Fla. Cities Water Co. v. Fla. PSC, 778 So. 2d 310 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding the Florida Public Service Commission's use of average
annual daily flow in calculating the "used and useful" portion of
company's wastewater treatment plant for inclusion in the utility's rate
base was proper based on competent and substantial evidence, even
though the calculation was inconsistent with prior agency policies).
In an appeal from an order of the Florida Public Service
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Commission ("FPSC"), the Florida Court of Appeal heard arguments
regarding rate-making criteria implemented by FPSC in connection
with Florida Cities Water Co.'s ("FC") wastewater treatment
operations. At issue was the proper means of calculating which
portions of the utility's operations were "used and useful" as public
services and entitled to inclusion in the utility's rate base.
Construction costs incurred by private utilities were subject to
reimbursement under a rate structure based on the percentage of a
utility's total operations that were "used and useful" in a public service
capacity. FPSC and FC agreed to calculate the "used and useful"
portion of FC's wastewater treatment operation by comparing
customer demand with plant treatment capacity, dividing actual
demand by the plant's permitted design capacity. Both parties also
agreed plant capacity was 1.25 million gallons per day based on
average annual daily flow. FPSC calculated customer demand based
on average annual daily flow, yielding a seventy-nine percent "used and
useful" figure for FC's facility.
FC further argued FPSC should use the average daily flows in a
maximum month in the numerator, in accord with FPSC's past
practice and contended this method accounted for the plant's capacity
to handle peak flows. Under this method, FC's facility achieved a 100
percent "used and useful" capacity. FC argued FPSC's method of
calculation would prevent it from recovering its investment costs in the
facility. The court found FPSC's calculation inconsistent with prior
agency policy and remanded, and required FPSC to provide
evidentiary support for the policy shift.
FPSC conducted evidentiary hearings and heard testimony from
three professional engineers. All three experts suggested time periods
representing customer demand should be the same as those used to
determine maximum plant capacity. FC calculated plant capacity
based on annual, rather than monthly terms. Thus, FPSC concluded
annual average daily flows were the appropriate means of ascertaining
the "used and useful" portion of FC's wastewater operations.
The court found FPSC's evidentiary record supported use of the
annual daily flow in making the "used and useful" computation. The
court rejected FC's claims, and noted average daily flow calculations
did not ignore average daily flow during the peak month, but included
the peak month along with average daily flows from the other eleven
months. Further, FC's plant had the ability to handle peak flows of up
to 2.5 million gallons per day, twice the agreed annual average daily
flow. Therefore, using average daily flow in the peak month would
overstate the percentage of FC's yearly plant operations for ratemaking purposes.
Finally, the court noted its role was not to evaluate evidence
submitted in support of FPSC's decision, but to consider whether
substantial and competent evidence supported FPSC's decision. As
such evidence was present, the court affirmed FPSC's order.
Alan Curtis
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Millender v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 774 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding the continuing tort theory and the Dickinson
stabilization doctrine affect the running of the statute of limitations to
render action for injunctive relief and damages timely).
In 1975, the Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT")
rerouted the Carrabelle River channel in order to build a new bridge.
Ferris G. and Margaret Millender, and Millender & Sons Seafood Co.
(collectively, "Millender") were located within blocks of the new bridge
and soon found their property eroding. Among initial efforts to retard
erosion, Millender constructed a seawall that successfully hindered the
erosion. After eight years of litigation, another state agency forced
Millender to remove the seawall in 1993. As erosion continued,
Millender sued FDOT for injunctive relief, full compensation, and
damages in 1993. In a 1994 deposition, Millender described his
damages to include destruction of the docks, buildings, and ice
machines that were necessary to the operation of his seafood business.
The trial court found FDOT's river channel realignment caused
Millender's property to erode, but held the statute of limitations
barred Millender's action against FDOT. Millender appealed.
The Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the trial court's decision
based on the continuing tort theory and the Dickinson stabilization
doctrine. The court reviewed Florida case law that recognizes the
continuing tort theory's vitality. The court stated injunctive relief
could redress FDOT's continuing tort against Millender. The court
also held Millender's action was timely since the statute of limitations
in a continuing tort action runs from the time of the last tortious act.
In addressing the Dickinson stabilization doctrine, the court cited
the United States Supreme Court opinion that holds the statute of
limitations for inverse condemnation runs from the time "the situation
becomes stabilized." The Supreme Court noted that under such
diverse circumstances where the source of the claim is continuous, the
uncertainty of damage and the risk of resjudicata requires the court to
avoid procedural rigidities. Thus, this court found Millender justly
waited until the consequences of state agency action "so manifested
themselves that a final account may be struck." Millender's cause of
action accrued when another state agency prevented Millender from
protecting his property from the erosion caused by FDOT's actions.
FDOT argued that since federal case law created the Dickinson
stabilization doctrine and no Florida court had applied it, the court
could not utilize the doctrine in the state context. The court held this
argument was incorrect. The court stated a sound federal doctrine is
not barred from application in an appropriate case under state law.
Moreover, the court cited a Florida district court of appeal that had
also approved the federal case and applied the Dickinson stabilization
doctrine reasoning to support its decision. Thus, the court held the
statute of limitations barred Millender's action and remanded the
cause for consistent proceedings. The court also certified to the
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highest court the question pertaining to whether the Dickinson
stabilization doctrine applies in an appropriate Florida case.
Vanessa L. Condra
S.W. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte County, 774 So. 2d 903 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding district rules involving water use permits
(1) were a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, (2) granted
the water management district valid discretion, and (3) were not
vague).
Southwest Florida Water Management District and the
Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida (collectively, the
"District") challenged a comprehensive order of the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ"), invalidating several existing and proposed District
On cross-appeal, Pinellas County
rules and agency statements.
("Pinellas") challenged several portions of the rules upheld by the
ALJ's order. The court reversed the orders considered on appeal and
affirmed the orders considered in the cross-appeal.
The District proposed rules and agency statements governing the
water use permitting process under its jurisdiction in the Southern
The 1972 Florida Water
Water Use Caution Area ("SWUCA").
373 of the Florida statutes
Chapter
in
codified
("Act"),
Act
Resources
The Act grants
rights.
water
("Chapter 373"), governs Florida
("DEP") to
Protection
Environmental
authority to the Department of
state, with
the
of
the
waters
conserve, protect, manage, and control
management
flexibility and discretion to delegate powers to water
districts. The Act includes provisions for reviewing district rules and
agency statements.
Several of the District's existing and proposed rules and agency
statements, which governed the issuance of Water Use Permits
("WUP"), were in dispute. Chapter 373 of the Act stipulated proposed
water use must: (1) be reasonable-beneficial; (2) not interfere with any
presently existing legal water right use; and (3) be consistent with the
public interest. The District had authority to adopt reasonable rules
pursuant to its water use permitting duties to implement this threeprong test. The DEP had exclusive authority to review those rules.
The District proposed a fourteen-point criteria test that a WUP
applicant must meet in order to fulfill Chapter 373's three-prong test.
The ALJ invalidated the District's proposed fourteen-point test,
finding it conflicted with the balancing approach articulated in the
state Water Policy Rules, the former authority governing WUP criteria.
The court reversed, holding, under Chapter 373, DEP had exclusive
authority to review whether rules are consistent with Water Policy
Rules.
The ALJ invalidated the rule that allowed an applicant to meet
WUP conditions by mitigating adverse impacts. Under the existing
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rule, the permittee must mitigate adverse impacts to existing legal uses
and environmental features to the District's satisfaction. The ALJ
found the District's unbridled discretion lacked meaningful basis for
review. The court reversed the order. Citing the plain meaning of
mitigation, the court found that because the District determined what
constituted an adverse impact, it certainly had the professional
judgment to determine what mitigated an adverse impact. Where a
determination is site-specific and scientific, as with mitigation, the
exercise of professional judgment is appropriate and acceptable.
The ALJ invalidated the proposed portion of the rules that
required applicants to investigate feasibility for reclaimed water use
and reuse where economically, environmentally, and technically
feasible (the "feasibility rule"). The ALJ found the requirement lacked
statutory authority.
The court reversed the order under the
reasonable-beneficial use component of the three-prong test of
Chapter 373. Although the ALJ agreed the concept of reuse is implied
in reasonable-beneficial use, he found Chapter 373 implicitly limited a
district's ability to require reuse to situations where it can be shown
that reused water is available. The court rejected the argument,
finding authority in the Act's language. The court held the Act did
not limit the District's authority under a reasonable-beneficial use test
but allowed the District to presume reclaimed water is available to a
WUP applicant under certain conditions.
The ALJ further challenged the feasibility rule as an invalid
exercise of delegated legislative authority because the Florida statute
granted the feasibility determination to the applicant. The court
rejected the argument, finding the ALJ's interpretation inapplicable.
The court concluded it was illogical for a statute to provide the District
with authority to require reuse feasibility investigation without
granting authority to require reuse where reclaimed water use was
reasonable-beneficial and in the public interest.
The ALJ also invalidated the feasibility rule for vagueness and as a
grant of unbridled discretion to interpret the terms "economically,
environmentally, and technically feasible." Following precedent, the
court held it must read the terms for their common and ordinary
meaning and explained that terms are vague where men of common
intelligence must guess at their meaning. A further test requires
analysis of the objectives and purposes of the statute's enactment. The
court defined each term pursuant to these guidelines and held that
site-specific or individual applicant-specific considerations prevent the
District from articulating more refined criteria. Thus, the court
reversed the ALJ's invalidation of the feasibility rule.
The ALJ invalidated portions of District rules that required
investigation of desalination feasibility and implementation. The ALJ
found an invalid exercise of delegated authority because the rules were
unconstitutionally vague and vested unbridled discretion in the
District. The court rejected the ALJ's argument, citing the District's
authority to implement Chapter 373. The court also reversed the
vagueness challenge, citing its holding that the terms "economically,
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environmentally, and technically feasible" required a site-specific
determination and use of professional judgment.
The final appeal the court considered and reversed involved the
ALJ's finding that Chapter 373 granted the District authority to issue
water use permits only for "consumptive use of water." The District
rules required a wholesale public supply customer to obtain a separate
permit for quantities beyond amounts used for consumption. The
court's determination hinged on the definition of water for
consumption. The court affirmed the District's authority to require
wholesale public supply customers to obtain a separate permit to effect
conservation requirements.
In its cross-appeal, Pinellas challenged the ALJ's failure to
invalidate the requirement that water supply utilities adopt a "waterconserving rate structure." Pinellas argued the District lacked statutory
authority. The court agreed with the ALJ, finding consideration of a
utility's conservation efforts, including rate structure, appropriate in
determining water allocations and applying the reasonable-beneficial
test. The court held rate autonomy does not imply exemption from
permitting requirements under Chapter 373 and affirmed the ALJ's
validation of the rule.
Note: The court substituted this January 4, 2001 opinion for its earlier
opinion of September 1, 2000. In this later opinion,the court noted
two minor points. First, where the court's September 1 opinion held
the proposed regulation applied to wholesalers did not intrude into
contracts of public supply permittees and wholesale customers, the
substituted opinion declined to rule on this issue. Second, the
substituted opinion affirmed that where any portion of the Florida
Water Act conflicts with any other state law, the Florida Water Act
controls and, thus, here section 373.223(1) would control over section
153.11(1) (b).
ChristineEllison
S.W. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d
594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding Southwest Florida Water
Management District exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule
granting certain exemptions from environmental resource permitting
requirements).
South Shores Partners, Ltd., ("South Shores") applied to the
Southwest Florida Water Management District ("District") for a permit
to develop a 720-acre tract of land. The property had an existing canal
system adjacent to Tampa Bay ("Bay"). As part of the project, South
Shores proposed to build a connecting waterway between the canal
system and the Bay. The Save the Manatee Club feared the proposed
waterway would cause an increase in powerboat traffic into the Bay,
resulting in boat traffic endangering both the manatee and its habitat.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 4

One of the factors that the District considered when deciding to
issue a permit was the impact a proposed development would have on
wildlife. South Shores argued it was not required to obtain a permit.
South Shores based its argument on a Florida Administrative Code
provision that exempted projects from applying for permits where they
received prior approval.
Save the Manatee Club petitioned the Division of Administrative
Hearings to invalidate the rule. The Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ")
concluded the relevant sections in the rule neither implemented nor
interpreted any specific power granted by the applicable enabling
statute. Thus, the ALJ declared the provision was an invalid exercise of
legislative power. The District appealed.
The court reviewed the enabling statute to determine whether it
granted specific powers or duties to the District that would authorize
the rule. The enabling statute granted the District authority to issue
environmental resource permits according to the statutory criteria
established in the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972. The statute
limited exemptions from the permitting requirements to those that
did not allow significant adverse impacts on the environment. The
court determined the exemption in the regulation was not based on
the absence of a potential impact on the environment, but rather was
based on prior approval. Because the statute did not provide specific
authority for an exemption based on prior approval, the court agreed
with the ALJ and held the rule invalid.
Dawn Watts
Wentworth v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 771 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding notice must be duly published or otherwise
provided to all substantially affected persons before a party can rely on
a Department of Environmental Protection permit grant).
Appellant, George Wentworth, appealed an Amended Final Order
of the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") partially
granting his request for permission to build a boat dock over sovereign
submerged lands. Wentworth's property bordered the Indian River
Lagoon, where he wished to build both a dock and access pier through
the lagoon's mangroves. The lagoon was a State Aquatic Preserve, an
Outstanding Florida Water, and subject to special water quality
protection, permitting requirements, and DEP oversight.
Wentworth applied to DEP for a "noticed general permit" and the
agency consent required to build on sovereign submerged lands. The
"noticed general permit" was a pre-approved grant of authority,
until
and unless DEP notified Wentworth otherwise within thirty days. DEP
sent Wentworth notice of agency action and consent to use the
sovereign submerged lands. However, DEP did not send such notice
to Wentworth's neighbors.
In its consent letter, DEP notified
Wentworth that neighbors or other substantially affected parties may
request an administrative hearing contesting the permit within twenty-

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

one days of notice. Wentworth was to give notice through general
publication in a newspaper or through personal receipt of written
notice. Wentworth failed to provide such notice. DEP also noted that
an administrative hearing could lead to rejection of a permit.
The court examined whether Appellees, Wentworth's neighbors,
received substantial notice of the dock construction to satisfy due
process. The court recognized the neighbors only received notice
when Wentworth actually began construction. The court stated that
while agency proceedings may be "free-form decisions," agency rules
must grant affected parties a clear "point of entry" to challenge agency
proceedings. The court held the neighbors did not receive adequate
notice and were denied a "clear point of entry" until they had actual
notice when construction began.
The court stated due process applied to all parties and the
neighbors had a right to challenge the permit upon notice at any time,
as a substantially affected party. The court also held Wentworth could
not justifiably rely on the finality of a DEP permit grant until he had
fully and fairly given notice.
ChristineEllison
IDAHO
In re SRBA, 20 P.3d 693 (Idaho 2001) (holding appellant landowners
failed to prove conditions beyond the control of the water right holder
caused the abandonment and forfeiture of water).
Between 1973 and 1984, Gerald Storer owned and farmed real
property ("Storer property") appurtenant to water rights 34-00600 and
34-00606. In 1976, Storer changed from irrigating the land from Alder
Creek, the source of the water, to irrigating by sprinkler. Storer
purchased an irrigation system, drilled a well in the northeastern
portion of the property, and plowed in all but one of the irrigation
ditches on the eastern side of the property. In 1984, Storer transferred
the property and the appurtenant rights to the Farmers Home
Administration ("FHA"). FHA leased the property for the next ten
years to various people. During this time, the property was irrigated
for only a few weeks in 1990 through the irrigation ditches located on
the property. Yet, due to Alder Creek's lack of water and broken
irrigation equipment, the owners irrigated only twenty-five acres.
The 1990 irrigation ended when the watermaster diverted the
Alder Creek water above the property onto his land. In 1991 and
1992, the watermaster's son, Shane Rosenkrance, leased the property
and used Alder Creek water on his own land rather than on the Storer
property.
On May 27, 1992, a director's report recommended the water
rights appurtenant to the Storer property be discontinued based on
abandonment and/or forfeiture. The United States, through FHA,
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filed objections to the report. Prior to any hearings on the objections,
the United States sold the property by sealed bid auction in 1995 to
John and Maeta McCray without the appurtenant water rights.
The McCray's took the United States' place in the subcases and
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the property had been
irrigated in both 1985 and 1990. On February 27, 1998, a special
master appointed by the SRBA District Court, determined the water
rights on the eastern portion of the property had been abandoned
when Storer filled in the ditches and installed the sprinkler system.
The special master also held the water rights for the entire property
had been forfeited due to nonuse, but excluded the twenty-five acres
irrigated in 1990. Finally, the special master concluded Shane
Rosenkrance's use of Alder Creek water on his own property in 1991
and 1992 did not constitute water rights resumption on the Storer
property. The special master gave her report to the SRBA District
Court Judge, who adopted the recommendations entirely. The
McCrays filed their notice of appeal on September 17, 1999.
The McCray's alleged conditions beyond the control of the water
right holder caused the abandonment or forfeiture.
Wrongful
interference with a water right or failure to use the water because of
circumstances over which the water right holder has no control is a
defense to forfeiture. According to the McCray's, the 1990 irrigator
wanted to irrigate more than the twenty-five acres, but could not
because of lack of water and the watermaster's wrongful diversion of
the water to his own land. The special master concluded that the
watermaster's actions did not wrongly interfere with the water rights
because the 1990 irrigator failed to call for the water when he
discovered Alder Creek water was no longer flowing to his property.
In addition, the special master relied on testimony from the 1990
irrigator that the property was not set up for gravity irrigation, and
therefore, could not have been irrigated.
The Idaho Supreme Court applied a substantial and competent
evidence standard and affirmed the district court's decision that water
rights 34-00600 and 34-00606 were abandoned and forfeited to all but
twenty-five acres. The court also rejected the McCray's argument that
Shane Rosenkrance resumed the water rights because they failed to
prove that any water was put to beneficial use anywhere other than on
Rosenkrance's property.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
MISSOURI
Chance v. Pub. Water Supply Dist., 41 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding detachment of property from Public Water Supply District
No. 16 ("District") was proper under applicable Missouri statutes,
federal statutes were inapplicable, and detachment would not have a
significant adverse effect on the remainder of the District).
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Scott and Janice Chance decided to divide their property into two
lots. Their home was on one lot served by the City of Independence's
("City") water system. Both the City and Public Water Supply District
No. 16 ("District") had water mains next to the second lot. Due to the
poor condition in which the District left their property after installing
a six-inch water line, the Chances decided to seek service for the
second lot from the City. The City refused to serve the second lot
unless they petitioned for detachment from the District. The District
challenged the Circuit Court of Jackson County's order that the
Chances' property, located in that county, be detached from the
District. The main issues were whether detachment from the District
was proper, whether the City could legally supply the water, and
whether the detachment would adversely affect the rest of the District.
The Missouri Court of Appeals held the circuit court did not err in
detaching the Chances' property from the District, because the federal
statute the District relied on did not apply. The District argued a
federal statute protected it from detachment because it was a
participant or party to a $5 million loan from the United States
Department of Agriculture. The court found the loan was a new
project loan that was not made to the District. Therefore, the statute
was not applicable and did not protect the District from detachment of
the Chances' property. In the absence of that protection, Missouri
statutes provide that voters residing in the District's territory may
petition the circuit court for detachment. Therefore, the City's supply
of water to the property was proper under established statutory
interpretation. The court also held the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the detachment did not to amount to a
significant adverse effect on the remainder of the District.
The District argued it had an exclusive right to supply water to the
Chances' second lot. The court disagreed and found that under
another Missouri statute, cities may supply water to properties inside a
water district's territory. As a result, the District did not have an
exclusive right to supply water.
Finally, the District argued the Chances failed to prove detachment
would not have an adverse effect on the remainder of the District, as
required under relevant Missouri statutes. The court again disagreed,
and decided that one residential water connection does not generate
enough income to amount to a significant adverse effect on the
remainder of the district.
Willow Morrow
Willamette Indus. v. Clean Water Comm'n, 34 S.W.3d 197 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding Willamette Industries' petition should be denied,
pending exhaustion of administrative remedies, because the permit's
special conditions did not constitute rulemaking, and, thus, were not
an exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine).
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Willamette Industries ("Willamette") filed a petition for
Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary
Injunction, and Permanent Injunction against the Missouri Clean
Water Commission ("Commission"), the Commission's chairman, the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") and MDNR's
director, claiming the new applicable conditions to its storm water
permit were illegal and unauthorized. The Cole County Circuit Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order, prompting MDNR and the
Commission, among others, to file a motion to dismiss. The motion
alleged Willamette failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The
circuit court dismissed Willamette's petition without prejudice, due to
Willamette's failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies.
The court concluded Willamette was required to exhaust its
administrative remedies because no exception to the Exhaustion of
Remedies Doctrine covered its petition. Willamette appealed the
dismissal.
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, affirmed the
circuit court's dismissal of Willamette's petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. However, the court of appeals based its
decision upon a different reason. The court recognized that when
administrative remedies were available, parties must exhaust such
remedies. The court's rationale was that agencies have special
expertise and a more fully developed factual record when parties
pursue agency channels of relief. The court also noted administrative
relief was not required when either the administrative agency lacked
authority to grant the relief sought, the agency's relief was inadequate,
the issue presented was entirely constitutional, or requiring
administrative remedies resulted in either undue prejudice or
irreparable harm.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal because Willamette's
petition did not fall under any statutory exception. The court
concluded that all the statutory exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement dealt with were actions attacking the validity of rules.
The court explained that a rule was a statement of policy of general
application and future effect, without regard to specific facts. A rule
was not a determination, decision, or order in a proceeding before an
agency where legal rights, duties, or privileges were determined after a
hearing. Because Willamette's permit was site-specific and of general
application, it did not constitute a rule.
Since Willamette's
conditioned permit was not a rule, the court held none of the
exceptions covered the permit and, thus, the Willamette petition was
subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements.
Accordingly, the court denied Willamette's petition, pending
Willamette's exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
Kirstin E. McMillan
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MISSISSIPPI
Cox v. F-S Prestress, Inc., No. 97-CT-01547-SCT, 2001 Miss. LEXIS 4
(Miss. Jan. 18, 2001) (holding a change in the course of a river due to
an act of avulsion instead of accretion did not affect tide to disputed
land).
Cox and F-S Prestress, Inc. ("Prestress") had conflicting claims of
ownership to seventeen acres of land located on the Bouie River. The
deeds giving each of these parties title of record described the river as
the boundary of their properties. Prestress acquired title to the lands
west of the river and Cox acquired title to the lands east of the river.
The peninsula containing the disputed land lay east of the river until
the river created a new main channel that separated the peninsula
from the formerly contiguous lands to the east. The disputed land was
now situated west of the river channel. This land was not readily
accessible and was occasionally used for timber growing. Cox cut
timber from the disputed land in 1993. Prestress then sued in Forrest
County Chancery Court to quiet title to the land and to seek damages
for the timber cutting.
The trial court determined the decisive issue was the process by
which the river changed its channel. After hearing testimony from a
professor of geography and a neighbor who observed the river
changing, the court determined the river changed its course due to
accretion. Thus, the trial court held Prestress had acquired title to the
disputed land that now lay west of the river and awarded damages for
Cox's timber cutting. The trial court did not decide Prestress' claim of
adverse possession. Cox appealed and the Court of Appeals of
Mississippi affirmed the lower court, but split on whether to grant the
petition for rehearing. The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted
certiorari.
Cox argued the lower courts misapplied the laws of Mississippi and
incorrectly decided the boundaries of the disputed land changed by
accretion. The supreme court reviewed the applicable case law. Most
importantly, the court cited that when a stream is the boundary
between properties, the boundary shifts with the gradual changes in
the stream. In contrast, if the course of the stream changes suddenly,
then the boundary remains fixed to the location of the stream prior to
the change. Accretion involves the gradual change in the course of a
stream. Avulsion involves the sudden or rapid change in a stream's
boundary. A presumption of accretion exists depending on the
contour of the land, length of time involved, and location and
direction of the river. However, this presumption is negated where, as
in this case, the river moves at right angles to the former channel. The
court further stated the law of accretion and avulsion is based on
public policy. The rationale for the law of accretion is to give a
riparian owner the benefit of access to water. The rationale for the law
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of avulsion is to mitigate the hardship of a change in title resulting
from a sudden movement of a river.
The court noted this case involved a novel fact situation in which
some facts illustrated accretion and other facts illustrated avulsion.
The court found it important that the new main channel formed very
rapidly after the peninsula was cut off and that the disputed land
existed in the same form before and after the change in the course of
the river. The court noted that in circumstances such as this, both
federal and state case law recognize an exception to the generalized
definitions of accretion. This exception is analogous to the "island
rule" in which a boundary once established on one side of the island
by a river channel remains at its original position even though the
main channel shifts to the other side of the island. Ultimately, the
court concluded the Bouie River changed its position relative to the
disputed land by an act of avulsion. Therefore, title to the disputed
land remained with Cox and the court remanded the case for an
adjudication of Prestress' claim of adverse possession.
Vanessa L. Condra
NEBRASKA
Hagan v. Upper Republican Nat'l Res. Dist., 622 N.W.2d 627 (Neb.
2001) (holding landowners and irrigators had standing to challenge
settlement agreement between defendant hog farmer and the Upper
Republican Natural Resources District because the agreement gave
defendant access to water from the same aquifer underlying plaintiffs'
lands).
During the time period relevant to this action, the Upper
Republican Natural Resources District ("District") adopted a
moratorium on new well construction. The plaintiff irrigators and
landowners (collectively, the "Irrigators") applied for a variance to use
underground water for crop irrigation. The defendant hog farmer
applied for a variance to use underground water to operate its "hog
confinement facilities."
Both variance applications requested
underground water from the same aquifer. The District denied the
Irrigators' variance, but agreed to a settlement that gave the hog
farmer use of underground water as applied for originally.
Irrigators filed a petition for declaratory relief asking that the
settlement agreement between the District and the hog farmer be
declared ultra vires. The district court denied the petition, and found
the Irrigators had no standing to bring the claim because they could
allege no injury different than that shared by the general public. The
appeals court reversed, and the hog farmer appealed to the Nebraska
Supreme Court.
The court acknowledged that while the public owns groundwater,

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

the overlying landowner has a right to use that groundwater. The
court found the Irrigators' allegations of injury from aquifer depletion
stated a cause of action. As overlying landowners, the Irrigators'
allegations were sufficient to give them some legal or equitable right,
title, or interest in the subject of the controversy. In addition, their
petition alleged direct injury as a result of the settlement agreement,
and not merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. Therefore, the court held the Irrigators' had standing to bring
their suit and directed the district court to reinstate the petition.
Susan P. Klopman
NEVADA
Turnipseed v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 13 P.3d 395 (Nev.
2000) (holding the ThirdJudicial District Court erred in refusing a
preemptive challenge to change both the presiding judge and the
venue because it improperly interpreted applicable judicial rules and
statutory law).
This case involved numerous applications to appropriate water
from the Truckee River in Churchill County, Nevada. Among the
applicants were the two parties present in this case, the TruckeeCarson Irrigation District ("District") and the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of Indians ("Tribe"). The Tribe brought this action, requesting
the Nevada Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the
Third Judicial District Court to grant a preemptive challenge as
authorized under applicable judicial rules. Additionally, the Nevada
State Engineer, R. Micheal Turnipseed, ("State Engineer") petitioned
the supreme court to reverse the district court's denial of his motion to
change the venue.
On May 31, 1994, the State Engineer held a hearing to determine
whether to grant various water applications to appropriate water from
the Truckee River. As part of this hearing, the State Engineer
considered a motion from Corkhill Bros., Inc., ("Corkhill") to
intervene in the proceedings as an interested party. The State
Engineer denied both the Corkhill's intervention motion and the
District's applications to appropriate water from the Truckee River.
Subsequent to the decision, the District and Corkhill filed separate
petitions with the district court, challenging the State Engineer's
decisions and requesting the district court stay the State Engineer's
actions. The district court consolidated the cases (upon motion from
the State Engineer) and granted both petitions, remanding the
District's application to the State Engineer for further review.
On November 24, 1998, the State Engineer issued a final order
denying all but the Tribe's applications to appropriate water from the
Truckee River. Since the District's applications were a part of the
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denial, the District and Corkhill filed a petition with the district court
requesting both ajudicial review of the State Engineer's decision and a
stay of the State Engineer's Order. This case was assigned to the
Honorable Judge Blake. After learning of this judicial assignment, the
Tribe filed a preemptory challenge to remove Judge Blake. At the
same time, the State Engineer filed a motion with the district court
requesting a venue change to Washoe County, because the water rights
at issue affected only water in Washoe County, not Churchill County.
The district court denied both motions. The Tribe and the State
Engineer petitioned the supreme court for review.
The supreme court, after accepting and consolidating both the
Tribe's and State Engineer's petitions, reviewed the judicial rules to
determine when a party's preemptory challenge was authorized. The
judicial rules indicated preemptory challenges were available to a
party, if (1) the pending action was not an appeal from a lower court;
or (2) the judge had not made a ruling or commenced a hearing in a
specific matter.
First, the supreme court determined whether this district court
action constituted an appeal from a lower court. The District
contended the adjudicatory proceedings with the State Engineer
qualified as a lower court. The supreme court disagreed. The court
indicated that even though courts give deference to State Engineer
decisions, the State Engineer (and other administrative agencies) were
not defined under applicable statutes as a lower court. Additionally,
the supreme court noted the preemptory challenge supported the
determination because, typically, parties want judicial review of agency
decisions without bias.
Second, the supreme court considered whether Judge Blake had
either already made a ruling or commenced a hearing in this matter,
thereby preventing the Tribe from arguing for a preemptory
challenge. The District contended that in 1994 and 1995, the Tribe
was a party in interest, andJudge Blake ruled on issues concerning this
action. The supreme court, again, disagreed. The supreme court
determined that under statutory law any person aggrieved by a State
Engineer order or decision may have judicial review. The supreme
court determined the two actions by the State Engineer in this case
were separate. One action was a decision as to whether to include the
District in the applicant pool (original denial of the District's
application), and the other action was a decision as to who was entitled
to the water (the final order issued in 1998).
Since the supreme court determined the preemptory challenge
should have been granted, it also vacated the district court's order
denying the State Engineer's motion to change venue. The supreme
court concluded Judge Blake had lost the power to do anything else in
the case, except transfer the proceedings to another judge.
William H. Fronczak
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NEW YORK
Higgins v. Vill. of Orchard Park, 716 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (holding the trial court improperly denied property owners'
injunction and summary judgment motion because the property
owners had established nuisance as a matter of law).
In April 1995, Village of Orchard Park ("Orchard") entered an
agreement with Richard and Ruth Higgins to alleviate flooding caused
by Orchard's discharge of water onto the Higgins' property. The
agreement decreed that Orchard would install a drainage channel
through the Higgins' land, which connected to a natural drainage
ditch located on adjoining property. However, the adjoining property
owner objected, resulting in Orchard stopping the channel on the
Higgins' land and, instead, installing a drainage gate.
The Higgins brought suit in June 1998, alleging, among other
things, negligence, breach of contract, continuing trespass, and
nuisance. The Higgins also sought an injunction to enjoin Orchard
from continuing to discharge surface water onto their property. The
trial court denied both the injunction and Higgins' summary
judgment motion concerning the nuisance action. Additionally, the
trial court denied the Higgins' motion to add causes of action for
inverse condemnation or de facto taking, abuse of process, prima facie
tort, and violations of the Higgins' Equal Protection rights. Orchard
moved to dismiss the negligence and breach of contract actions as
time barred, and to dismiss the continuing trespass and nuisance
action because the Higgins' alleged failure to state in their complaint
that they had complied with relevant law. The trial court denied the
dismissal motions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division
reversed the trial court's denial of Orchard's dismissal motions with
regard to the negligence and breach of contract actions, finding such
actions were time barred. The appellate court also found the Higgins
had established, as a matter of law, that Orchard unreasonably created
a drainage channel that moved water from one portion of the Higgins'
property to another. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that
once Orchard installed the drainage channel, it knew flooding had
resulted. Thus, the appellate court held the trial court erred both in
denying the Higgins' summary judgment motion on the private
Moreover, the
nuisance claim and in denying the injunction.
appellate court found the trial court erred in denying the Higgins'
motion seeking leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action
for inverse condemnation or a de facto taking. However, because the
other causes of action the Higgins wished to add either lacked merit or
were insufficiently pled, the appellate court declared the trial court
properly denied those causes of action.
Finally, the Higgins alleged Orchard's building inspector's
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building permit denial was arbitrary and capricious. The appellate
court found that Higgins' proper remedy was to challenge the
building inspector's action through a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and,
thus, converted the action to the proper proceeding.
Makayla A. Shannon
LaSala v. Terstiege, 713 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding
the Town of Babylon failed to meet the burden of proof to establish
good title to land situated under the water of Great Neck Creek).
The Town of Babylon ("Town") appealed an order from the
Supreme Court of New York, Suffolk County granting Anthony
LaSala's motion for summary judgment. The Town also appealed the
same court's order dismissing the Town's counterclaim regarding title
to land situated under the water of the Great Neck Creek ("Land").
LaSala originally brought the action to quiet title to the Land. In
order for the Town to prevail, it was required to show possession and
good title, and, according to Real Property and Proceedings Law
("RPAPL") article 15, could not rely on the weakness of the LaSala's
title, to prevail. The Town asserted it possessed superior title to the
Land based on grants issued by Colonial governors in 1666, 1688, and
1694. The Town also asserted no conveyance to an individual existed.
The earlier conveyances granted the Town title to all land lying under
tidewaters. Therefore, the Town needed to prove Great Neck Creek
was defined as tidewater.
LaSala provided the court with an unbroken chain of title dating
back to 1831. Each conveyance granted title to land "bounded on the
east by Great Neck Creek" or "with title running to the center of Great
Neck Creek."
The court stated the Town failed to show Great Neck Creek was
considered tidewater. Therefore, the Town failed to meet its burden
of proof. The court further asserted LaSala's title fell within the scope
of an earlier holding. The previous court found, in the absence of
express language in the conveyance, the title to a non-tidal stream is
presumed to extend to the center of that stream.
The court, in reviewing all documents and evidence, determined
the supreme court properly granted LaSala's motion for summary
judgment, and validated LaSala's title to the Land.
Lynne Stadjuhar
Water Auth. of W. Nassau County v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 714
N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding the statute of limitations
barred the civil action instituted by the Water Authority of Western
Nassau County for damages to real property caused by ground water
contamination).
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This case involved a claim by the Water Authority of Western
Nassau County ("Water Authority") against Lockheed Martin Corp.
("Lockheed") for damages sustained to its real property from ground
water contamination caused by operations at Lockheed's facility, which
was adjacent to the Water Authority's property.
In 1994, the Water Authority investigated the feasibility of
purchasing a portion of the Jamica Water Supply Co. ("Jamica"),
located in Nassau County. On May 26, 1996, after negotiations the
previous year, the Water Authority purchased Jamica's assets in Nassau
County, which included the land in this action and a water treatment
facility located on the land. Subsequently, the Water Authority hired
an engineering firm to analyze the ground water contamination at and
around the water treatment facility. In August 1998, the engineering
firm reported both that ground water contamination existed and the
Lockheed facility-adjacent to such property-was the source.
On December 30, 1998, the Water Authority commenced this
action in the Superior Court of Nassau County against Lockheed for
damages to its real property from the ground water contamination.
Lockheed filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the relevant statute of
limitations barred the action. The superior court denied Lockheed's
motion, and Lockheed appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of
New York, Appellate Division, Second Department.
The supreme court determined that, contrary to the Water
Authority's contention, the three-year statute of limitations had
expired. The three-year statute of limitations commenced from the
date the Water Authority discovered the injury or from the date, when
through reasonable diligence, the Water Authority should have known
of the injury, whichever occurred earlier. The supreme court found
the property purchased by the Water Authority in 1996 had been
contaminated since 1989, and Jamica built the water treatment plant
to remove such contamination. The supreme court also determined
the Water Authority should have discovered the contamination
problem in 1994 "through reasonable diligence" during its feasibility
study conducted that year. However, the supreme court also noted
that even if the Water Authority did not find out about the
contamination in 1994, it should have definitely discovered the
contamination problem in the fall of 1995, when negotiations to
purchase the Jamica's assets included the water treatment facility.
Therefore, the supreme court concluded that when the Water
Authority commenced this action in December of 1998, the three-year
statute of limitations had run because the Water Authority should have
known of the contamination at least by the fall of 1995.
Additionally, the supreme court dismissed the Water Authority's
claim that its action was timely commenced under the extension
provision of the statute of limitations. The supreme court determined
the extension provision was inapplicable because sufficient technical,
scientific, and medical knowledge used to determine the cause of
contamination existed during the relevant time period.
William H. Fronczak
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OHIO
Coffier v. Dorcik, No. 3009-M 2000, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5540
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2000) (holding the Court of Common Pleas
abused its discretion when the court failed to enjoin an encroachment
to restore the natural flow of water on a parcel of land).
Matthew and Elizabeth Dorcik purchased a parcel of land in
Hinkley, Ohio. Because a gas easement limited where they could build
their barn, they sought and obtained a local zoning variance for their
sideyard setback. The Dorciks mistakenly relied on a 1990 survey to
determine the location of their property line.
Rosemary Collier and Alan Junke (collectively, "Collier") had their
property surveyed in 1994. The survey revealed sixty feet of the
Dorcik's barn encroached on the Collier's property by as much as four
feet at one corner. A concrete pad outside of the barn also
encroached on the Collier's property.
Due to the Dorcik's
construction projects, the natural terrain, and each party's efforts to
divert the flow of water, water accumulated on each property.
Collier sued the Dorciks seeking injunctive relief to have the
Dorcik's encroachment removed and to restore the natural flow of
water on their property. They also sought damages for the Dorcik's
interference with the use and enjoyment of their property. The
Dorciks counterclaimed for damages stemming from Collier's alleged
obstruction of the flow of water from their property.
The trial court entered a $5000 damage judgment for Collier, a
$5001 judgment for the Dorciks, and ordered the Dorciks to remove
the concrete pad from Collier's property. Collier appealed and raised
fourteen assignments of error.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio determined it did not have
jurisdiction to address the zoning variance challenge, and Collier
should have raised this challenge through an administrative appeal.
Collier's first two assignments of error pertained to the trial jury's
view of the property in question. Collier had not provided the court
with a record of the facts, and the court records did not indicate an
objection by Collier to the jury view. Thus, it was impossible for
Collier to demonstrate any error, much less one that seriously affected
the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
process. Therefore, the court overruled the first two assignments.
Collier's third assignment of error stated the trial court erred in
failing to order the Dorciks to remove the barn from Collier's
property. Collier argued Matthew Dorcik's trial testimony and his
prior deposition testimony were inconsistent, and these inconsistencies
clearly indicated the trial testimony was evasive, deceptive, and false.
Because the trial judge believed Matthew Dorcik's testimony, the
appellate court deferred to the trial court's factual finding that the
Dorciks did not intentionally build their barn over the property line.
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In unintentional encroachment cases, courts balance the parties'
equities and weigh the relative conveniences and comparative injuries
to each party that would result from granting or refusing to grant
Because an encroaching structure affects a
injunctive relief.
landowner's possessory rights, potentially forever, courts hold the
encroacher has the burden of establishing injunctive relief would be
oppressive.
Absent injunctive relief, Collier would forever lose the ability to use
that portion of their property. On the other hand, there was little
evidence that removing the encroachment would cause the Dorciks
undue hardship. The potential hardship to the Dorciks did not
outweigh the infringement on the property rights of Collier. Thus, the
court held the trial court abused its discretion and sustained the third
assignment of error.
Collier's fourth assignment of error argued the trial court erred in
awarding the Dorciks damages. Collier contended an award of
damages to the Dorciks was against the manifest weight of the
evidence because they failed to establish Collier caused the damage.
Collier argued the evidence demonstrated the Dorciks caused their
own damage by building a mound that obstructed the water flow on
their property. Yet, it was undisputed that before the Dorciks built a
mound on their property, Collier built a mound on their property.
The drainage inspector opined the Collier's mound blocked the flow
of water on the Dorcik's property. The Dorciks did not remove the
mound, nor did they take other steps to facilitate the natural flow of
water on their land. Therefore, the court could not say the jury erred
in concluding Collier caused the water flow damage to the Dorcik's
property. Thus, the court overruled the fourth assignment of error.
The court overruled Collier's ninth, thirteenth, and fourteenth
assignments of error. Collier did not object to evidence at trial, nor
articulate legal requirements to establish the claims, thus waiving
rights to an objection. Also, the court found no merit in Collier's
tenth assignment of error stating the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant their motion for a new trial.
Collier's eleventh assignment of error declared the trial court had
to review the trial transcript before it could rule upon their
duty
a
motion for a new trial. Case law has stated when the trial court was
able to determine the issues based on its memory of the proceedings,
the trial court committed no error by not reviewing the trial transcript.
Hence, the court overruled this assignment of error.
Collier's twelfth assignment of error contended the trial court
erred in entering judgment on the jury verdict because of an
improperly altered jury interrogatory. The court overruled this
assignment of error, concluding Collier suffered no prejudice because
the alteration had no impact on the jury's answers to the
interrogatories or on the verdict.
Nicole C. Anderson
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Smith v. City of Avon, No. 99CA007319, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5435
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000) (affirming Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas' decision that the addition of a water line constituted a
special benefit to landowner's property because none existed prior to
the water line improvement).
The City of Avon ("City") installed a water main on Avon Road and
assessed the improvement to the landowners abutting Avon Road
based on proportionate benefit. Georgette Smith owned property that
abutted Avon Road.
Smith argued the assessment was invalid, and filed suit to enjoin
the City from enforcing the assessment. The Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas determined an injunction was unwarranted, the water
line improvement on Avon Road benefited Smith's property, and the
amount assessed did not exceed the statutory limitation.
Smith raised two assignments of error for review by the Court of
Appeals of Ohio. Under the first assignment of error, Smith argued
the water line did not benefit her land because the property was not
buildable and because the nature of the land remained the same.
Smith had the burden of proving her property received no special
benefit from the improvement by clear and convincing evidence. The
evidence on record did not support the conclusion that Smith's land
was not buildable. The court reasoned there is no requirement that
an improvement must better the landowner's property to the extent
that the landowner desired in order for an improvement to constitute
a benefit for purposes of imposing a valid assessment. Property
improved by the addition of a public water line that serves private
property, where no such service existed before, constitutes a special
benefit to the land. Smith's appraiser testified at trial that no water
line existed on Smith's property prior to the City's water line
installation and the improvement benefited the property.
Accordingly, the court held the trial court's decision was based on
competent, credible evidence, and the trial court did not err in
finding Smith did not meet her burden in establishing the
improvement did not benefit her land.
In the second assignment of error, Smith argued the trial court
erred in finding the assessment appropriate. Smith argued the
assessment exceeded one-third of the property value. The City based
the land's market value on purchase offers received after the water line
installation. Smith insisted it was improper to use the purchase
agreements in evaluating whether the City's assessment exceeded onethird of the value of her property. The court agreed. The Ohio
Revised Code mandated the determination of assessments should
occur on the date of the assessing ordinance. Yet, the court held
Smith failed to meet her burden of proof because Smith failed to
present any evidence of the property's value at the assessment date.
Thus, the court overruled the second assignment of error.
Nicole C. Anderson
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OREGON
Envtl. Quality Comm'n v. City of Coos Bay, 14 P.3d 649 (Or. Ct. App.
2000) (holding the Environmental Quality Commission improperly
imposed civil penalties for discharging sewage sludge without a permit
based upon an incorrect interpretation of state statutory law).
The City of Coos Bay ("City") operated a sewage disposal system
and treatment plant, which partially treated sewage and then pumped
it through a pressure pipeline to a sludge lagoon for further
treatment. The City had a National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit to operate the sewage disposal system. The
NPDES permit specified effluent limitations for waste discharged from
the system. In September 1996, the pipe between the treatment plant
and the sludge lagoon ruptured, spilling partially treated sewage
The Environmental Quality
sludge into nearby tidal wetlands.
Commission ("EQC") issued an Order imposing civil penalties against
the City for, among other things, discharging sewage sludge without a
permit in violation of state statute. The City sought review of the
Order.
On appeal, the City argued the statute did not apply because it
prohibited discharges only from a sewage disposal system without a
permit, and the City had obtained a NPDES permit for its sewage
disposal system. The City contended that a separate provision of the
statute covered the violations of permit terms, which it agreed it did
violate. EQC argued any discharge in violation of the conditions of a
permit was an "unpermitted" discharge. Accordingly, any discharge in
violation of a permit was a discharge "without first obtaining a permit."
The Oregon Court of Appeals noted the specific provision of the
statute said nothing about violations of the specific terms and
conditions of a permit and did not prohibit discharges in violation of
particular permit conditions. The statute only averred that before any
discharge from a sewage disposal system occurred, the operator of the
system had to obtain a permit. The court further noted that a separate
provision of the statute addressed violations of the terms and
conditions of a permit. The court held EQC's construction of the
provisions of the statute was redundant. Consequently, the court
reversed that part of the Order that imposed penalties for discharging
sewage sludge without a permit.
Dawn Watts
PENNSYLVANIA
Shanmoski v. PG Energy, 765 A.2d 297 (Pa. 2000) (holding: (1)
violation of a statute designed to protect a particular class of individual
is negligence per se; (2) an "Act-of-God" does not preclude liability for
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negligence if such negligence was a substantial factor in the resulting
damages; and (3) calculation of damages, particularly delay damages,
must be adequately documented for explanation of determination).
Appellees, Stephen and Dorothy Shamnoski, owned property
located along the banks of Springbrook Creek in Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania. Appellants, PG Energy, owned and operated three water
supply dams located upstream from the Shamnoskis' property ("Dam
System"). On September 27, 1985, Hurricane Gloria hit Luzerne
County. Severe flooding and overflow of Springbrook Creek destroyed
completely the Shamnoskis' real and personal property.
The Shamnoskis filed suit claiming PG Energy's negligent
maintenance and repair of the Dam System caused the flooding and
subsequent loss of property. The trial court agreed and awarded
damages to the Shamnoskis. Evidence presented at trial indicated the
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") notified PG Energy on several
occasions of serious deficiencies in its Dam System and it subsequently
classified the Dam System as a high hazard reservoir pursuant to the
Dam Safety and Encroachment Act ("Act"). The Corps advised PG
Energy to maintain twenty-four hour surveillance of the Dam System
during periods of unusually heavy rain. Evidence presented at trial
indicated no surveillance of the Dam System occurred after 2:30 p.m.
on the date the Hurricane struck.
On appeal, PG Energy made several arguments against liability.
First, PG Energy argued it did not breach any duty owed to the
Shamnoskis or other downstream residents. Second, PG Energy
argued any negligence on its part was not the cause of the Shamnoskis'
damages.
Third, PG Energy argued the trial court abused its
discretion in accepting evidence of damages that resulted in an
incorrect damage award.
With respect to PG Energy's first argument, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania noted section 693.13 of the Act required PG Energy to
maintain the Dam System in a safe operational condition and to notify
certain authorities located downstream of the Dam System of any
condition that would threaten safety, life, or property. Further, the
court noted PG Energy had an emergency action plan in place that
imposed a duty to warn downstream residents and municipalities
under the same circumstances prescribed by the Act. The court
determined the hurricane was an event requiring notification and, as
such, PG Energy owed a duty to downstream authorities and residents
pursuant to the Act. The court determined violation of the Act
constituted negligence per se on the part of PG Energy.
Next, the court considered PG Energy's argument that its
negligence was not the cause of the Shamnoskis' damages because the
damages would have been more severe if the Dam System was not in
place during the Hurricane. The court noted liability attaches to a
negligent party if the negligent act was a significant factor in causing
the injury, regardless of the fact such negligent act combined with an
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The court determined that,
"Act-of-God" to produce damages.
although the hurricane was an Act-of-God, PG Energy's negligence was
a substantial factor causing the resulting damage.
Finally, the court considered PG Energy's argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in accepting the Shamnoskis' testimony
regarding the value of the lost property that resulted in an
inappropriate damages calculation, especially with respect to delay
damages. The court recognized the Shamnoskis' damages occurred
fifteen years before the date of the appeal and the record did indicate
many periods of inactivity. The court declined to decide whether the
trial court's calculation of delay damages was appropriate, but
remanded the case with directions that the trial court provide the
superior court with an explanation of its method for calculating the
damages awarded.
Megan Becher-Harris
RHODE ISLAND
R&R Assocs. v. City of Providence Water Supply Bd., 765 A.2d 432
(RI. 2001) (holding the City of Providence ("City") neither effected a
defacto condemnation of mill owners water rights, nor breached the
contract between the mill owners and the City regarding
condemnation compensation when the City supplied water to
communities not mentioned in the statute establishing the Scituate
Reservoir).
In 1915, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted a statute
("Act") enabling the City of Providence Water Supply Board ("City") to
condemn lands and water in and around the north branch of the
Pawtuxet River to establish the Scituate Reservoir ("Reservoir"). The
Act specified the City and other named municipalities could receive
water from the Reservoir. Over the years, the General Assembly
amended the Act many times to allow additional communities to
receive water from the Reservoir.
In 1922, the City contracted with mills that abutted the north
branch of the Pawtuxet River downstream from the Reservoir, to
compensate them for the taking their riparian rights through the Act.
The contract specified that under section 6 of the Act, the City could
not impair the mills' residual water rights, and that all rights enjoyed
by the mills under the Act would remain in force.
The superior court certified R&R Associates, L&L Associates, and
Robert LaFerriere (collectively, "R&R") to represent a class that
constituted the successors in interest to the mills. In 1996, R&R filed
suit arguing that by allowing additional communities to use the
Reservoir over the years, the City had breached the contract and taken
their residual water and property rights without just compensation.
R&R argued the language in both the Act and the contract gave them
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water rights in addition to the original water rights the City had
condemned and compensated them for in 1922. Thus, R&R argued
they were entitled to compensation for the taking of these additional
water rights.
The trial court found the City's sale of water to additional
communities did not affect an uncompensated taking or breach of the
contract. First, the court found the language of the Act did not create
additional water rights in the mills. Rather, the Act specifically gave
the City an "open-ended right" to supply water to communities not
mentioned in the Act and required only that the City maintain
minimum water levels for the downstream mills. Second, the court
examined the condemnation documents and the contract, which
together demonstrated the City took all the water rights along the
Pawtuxet River leaving R&R the enjoyment of a minimum-flow of
water. The court found the City had not breached the contract
because R&R did not allege the City had failed to comply with the
minimum-flow requirements.
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, R&R argued the
trial court misinterpreted the Act and the contract. R&R argued that
the contract provisions, which required the City to discharge water
into the north branch and maintain minimum quantities of water in
the north branch for the mills, created residual water rights in the
mills. Thus, R&R argued a defacto condemnation of their water rights
occurred each time the City sold water to communities not listed in
the Act, because the City was required to discharge any unused water
into the north branch for R&R's use. In addition, R&R argued the
City breached the contract by selling water to communities not named
in the Act.
The City argued the condemnation documents and contract's
"Statement of Taking" indicated the City took all water rights
associated with the north branch of the Pawtuxet River, subject only to
the minimum-flow requirements. The City argued the contract
neither created new water rights nor altered R&R's existing water
rights. Thus, the City argued that because R&R had no proprietary
rights to the water, the City did not effect a de facto condemnation
when it sold water to additional communities. The City also argued
the use of the words "hereafter supplied" and "elsewhere" in the Act
allowed the City to sell water to communities not listed in the Act.
Finally, the City cross-appealed challenging the decision of the trial
court to exclude certain extrinsic evidence to show the parties' intent
concerning the condemnation process and the contract.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the relevant sections
of the Act and the contract and determined the trial court had
correctly determined the meaning of the contested sections. Thus, the
court held the Act and the contract created no additional water rights
in R&R and required only that the City maintain the specified
minimum-flow on the Pawtuxet River for the mill owners. In addition,
the court agreed the Act's language allowed the City to supply water to
communities not named in the Act. Thus, because R&R was entitled
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only to the benefit of the minimum-flow and did not retain any
proprietary rights in the water, the City did not violate the Act or the
contract when it supplied water to communities not named in the
documents.
Thus, the court denied R&R's appeal and affirmed the trial court.
Therefore, the court did not rule on the City's cross-appeal.
JulieE. Hultgren
TENNESSEE
The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lake Mgmt. Ass'n, No. W2000-0021 1-COA-R3CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000)
(finding a lake owner's conveyance of property with appurtenances
and adjacent to a lake included the right to use the water).
Lakewood Development Corp. ("LDC") owned both man-made
Garner Lake ("Lake") and its adjacent land. The purpose of the
Lake's creation was to develop the surrounding land into lakeside
LDC conveyed the land underneath the lake to Lake
homes.
Management Ass'n ("LMA"). Likewise, LDC conveyed the adjacent
land to two individuals, who later formed The Pointe, L.L.C. ("The
Pointe"), in order to develop the property. The Pointe's deed
included "all the appurtenances and hereditaments thereunto."
LMA sought to impose restrictions and fees on adjacent
landowners. In response, The Pointe filed a declarative action to
determine whether it could access and use the Lake without paying
fees to LMA. LMA responded with a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted LMA's summary judgment motion. The Pointe
appealed.
To determine the propriety of summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee first determined whether the deed's language
entitled The Pointe to unrestricted use and enjoyment of the Lake.
The court found The Pointe's three theories for its legal right to
unrestricted use-appurtenances, riparian rights, and implied
easements-were related. The three theories described methods
through which a property owner may use something to enhance the
enjoyment of the property. The court determined The Pointe
acquired the right to use freely the Lake as an appurtenance to the
riparian property it owned. Further, the right was in the form of an
implied easement.
The court determined the appurtenance within the deed included
the right to use the Lake. The court recognized that an appurtenance
in a deed is meant to enhance the property. The riparian land's
inherent value arose from its proximity and accessibility to the water.
Furthermore, when a grantor conveys property adjacent to water, a
court presumes the right to use and enjoy water accompanies the
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grant. Moreover, a conveyance of adjacent land, done by the owner of
both the water and the surrounding land, transfers riparian rights,
absent express provisions to the contrary. As the Lake was an
appurtenance to the deed and the deed did not exclude use of the
Lake, the court concluded The Pointe was entitled to free use of the
Lake.
LMA argued the non-navigability of the Lake prevented riparian
rights from passing in the deed. The court noted that navigability only
served to determine ownership of land under the water, and riparian
rights concerning use do attach to non-navigable water.
The court then addressed the nature and extent of The Pointe's
rights. The court acknowledged that the party attempting to prove an
implied easement existed must demonstrate three factors. First, the
party must show a separation of title occurred. The court found
separation of title occurred when LDC transferred the property to The
Pointe and LMA. Second, the party must demonstrate the use
continued over a long period. The court found over thirty years prior
to LDC's transfer, LDC created the Lake specifically to develop
lakeside homes on the adjacent property. Finally, the party must show
the easement was necessary for further enjoyment of the land. The
court noted that without access to the Lake, the property would be
useless for lakeside development. Therefore, the court held The
Pointe's rights to use the Lake were in the form of an implied
easement.
Sara Wagers
TEXAS
Dyegard Land P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 2001)
(holding original covenants prohibiting drilling for minerals did not
prohibit lot owners from drilling water wells because water is not a
mineral).
In May 1994, Dyegard Land Partnership ("Dyegard") with the
approval of Oak View Estates, a rural subdivision, filed a subdivision
plat and restrictive covenants with the Parker County Clerk. The
thirty-eight covenants restricted building design, construction
materials, and property use. Covenant eighteen expressly prohibited,
on any lot within Oak View Estates, the drilling, quarrying, mining,
prospecting, or development of minerals of any kind, and the
construction of wells, tunnels, tanks or any other structure used for
mineral boring.
In 1997, Robert and Jackie Hoover and Donald and Cynthia Tye
(collectively, the "Hoovers") purchased lots from Dyegard with notice
that their lots were subject to the original covenants.
Dyegard
provided Oak View Estates with water from a central water system.
After purchasing the lots, the Hoovers discovered problems with
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pressure, quantity, and volume of water provided, and explored the
possibility of drilling a private well on their lots. Dyegard denied their
request, claiming covenant eighteen barred water well drilling.
Subsequently, Dyegard amended covenant eighteen to expressly
prohibit well drilling for private water sources.
The Hoovers filed suit for declaratory judgment in the District
Court of Parker County, claiming the covenants did not restrict water
well drilling on their lots. Dyegard's response stated the amended
covenants specifically prohibited drilling water wells and further, the
original covenant language prohibited water well drilling. The
Hoovers filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the Hoovers' motion.
Dyegard appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals of
Texas, and contended the trial court erred because the original
covenants expressly prohibited well drilling. Moreover, Dyegard
argued the trial court erred because the amended covenants were
enforceable.
Dyegard argued the covenant clearly prohibited drilling for water,
because water is a mineral. The court of appeals did not agree. The
appellate court pointed to Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., where
that court held the definition of minerals excluded water.
Furthermore, the Texas Property Code defines mineral to mean oil,
gas uranium, sulphur, and other substances, yet, purposely omits
water.
The appellate court also noted that laws pertaining to
groundwater developed entirely separately from oil and gas law.
Covenant eighteen's extensive list of mining prohibitions contributed
to the court's conclusion that the covenant referred to minerals, and
not water. The appellate court concluded the Hoovers could drill
water wells under the original covenants, because water is not a
mineral.
Dyegard maintained the amended covenant clarified any
ambiguity by clearly prohibiting water wells within Oak View Estates.
The Hoovers argued the amended covenants were not valid, because
the original covenants did not authorize Dyegard to make
modifications to the covenants without property owner concurrence.
The appellate court concluded the original covenants clearly reserved
the developer's right to amend the covenants, thus finding Dyegard's
amendment valid as a matter of law.
The appellate court affirmed summary judgment that the original
covenants allowed the Hoovers to drill water wells, reversed summary
judgment regarding the amended covenants' validity, and remanded
for further proceedings.
Holly Kirsner
Hess v. McLean Feedyard, Inc., No. 07-99-0519-CV, 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8114 (Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2000) (affirming no-evidence
summary judgment motion on basis that landowners failed to produce
expert evidence on the cause of alleged water contamination).
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Jake Hess, II and neighboring landowners (collectively,
"Landowners") sued McLean Feedyard, Inc., ("McLean") for allegedly
contaminating their surface and groundwater when lagoons holding
cattle sewage overflowed during a period of heavy rains. In response,
McLean filed a no-evidence summary judgment motion asserting the
landowners had not provided evidence of causation. The trial court
granted McLean's motion and denied the landowners any relief. The
landowners appealed, contending genuine issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment were raised as to causation, and the
trial court abused its discretion when it excluded affidavits as summary
judgment evidence. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed that the
trial court did not err in striking the affidavit of the landowner's expert
and in granting McLean's no-evidence summary judgment motion.
McLean operated a commercial cattle feedyard, located in the
Little Skillet Creek watershed, with a capacity of 25,000 cattle and a
series of lagoons to collect and hold cattle waste. The discharge gates
of McLean's lagoons were located approximately one mile upstream
from the nearest landowner, Hess, who also held 4,000 cattle in his
preconditioning operations.
On three occasions in April 1997,
McLean's lagoons overflowed after repeated heavy rains. McLean
properly reported the discharges to authorities.
The Landowners claimed the discharges from the lagoons
contaminated their surface water and groundwater supplies, making
them unsuitable for consumption by humans and livestock. McLean
did not deny the discharges contained manure, but contended the
water volume passing through Little Skillet Creek diluted the waste so
that downstream landowners were not harmed.
However, the
Landowners submitted with their summary judgment motion, the
affidavit of their expert witness as proof that the lagoon discharges did
damage their water supplies.
Under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the proponent of an expert
opinion submitted by affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding has
the burden to show the expert opinion met the requirements of Texas
Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, the trial judge is the gatekeeper who
determines the admissibility of expert evidence and the appellate
court only reviews whether a trial judge abused his discretion.
In considering the Landowners' expert witness affidavit, the court
determined the expert opinion constituted bare conclusions and did
not provide supporting facts. The most damaging aspect of the
expert's submission, according to the court, was the complete lack of
data regarding water quality before the April 1997 lagoon overflows.
Thus, the court found the expert based his opinion on conjecture or
speculation regarding the water quality before the heavy rains. Thus,
the opinion did not constitute causation evidence. Furthermore, in
response to McLean's no-evidence summary judgment motion, the
burden fell on the Landowners to present evidence that raised a
genuine fact issue. A no-evidence summary judgment is improperly
granted if the non-movant presented more than a scintilla of probative
evidence. The Landowners contended the affidavit of their expert
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presented the necessary causation evidence, but the trial court
disagreed. Therefore, the reviewing court concluded the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavit and the trial court
properly granted the no-evidence summary judgment motion.
John A. Heifrich
VIRGINIA
Carrv. Kidd, 540 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 2001) (holding an historic mean
water line that is unaltered by man is the appropriate measurement in
the apportionment of riparian rights, and a riparian owner will gain
the right to water frontage unless the grantor of the interest in such
riparian property clearly retains such right for himself or another on
the face of the granting deed).
Plaintiffs, Robert C. and Marjorie B. Kidd, and defendants, the
Mark S. and Lori Crowley, owned adjoining land fronting a cove
located on Tanner's Creek in Norfolk, Virginia. Upon the Crowleys'
objection to the Kidds' desire to construct a pier into the cove, the
Kidds hired Robert L. Taliaferro, a riparian surveyor, to determine
each of the parties' riparian rights. Taliaferro determined the Kidds'
proposed pier was within their riparian rights and the Crowleys
existing pier was encroaching on the Kidds' rights. The Kidds sued
the Crowleys requesting a determination of each of the parties' rights
and claiming trespass.
In response, the Crowleys hired their own surveyor, Robert M.
Kennedy, whose survey results were nearly identical to those of
Taliaferro. The parties reached a tentative settlement that would have
required the Crowleys to remove their current pier and allow
construction of new piers by both parties within their determined
rights.
Upon learning of the pending settlement, Leslie G. Carr and
Janice N. Kohl (collectively, the "Carrs"), neighbors of the Crowleys,
intervened claiming the Kennedy survey incorrectly drew rights across
the Carrs' property.
The trial court referred the matter to a commissioner in chancery
who recommended allocation of riparian rights pursuant to the
Kennedy survey. The commissioner noted in his report that a historic
mean water line, or one unaltered by man-made improvements, is the
appropriate measurement to determine riparian rights. The trial
court affirmed the commissioner's report and entered judgment
accordingly.
On appeal, the Carrs first claimed the commissioner's acceptance
of the Kennedy survey was inappropriate because the survey used an
incorrect mean low water line measurement in determining each of
the parties' riparian rights. Second, the Carrs claimed the source deed
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for both the Kidd and Crowley properties did not contain an express
grant of riparian rights and, therefore, the Kidds and Crowleys had no
legal right to claim riparian rights to their properties.
With respect to the mean water line claim, the supreme court
recognized the Kennedy survey used a mean water line designated in
1908, when the parties' properties were originally platted ("Historic
MWL"). The Carrs claimed the correct measure to determine riparian
rights was the current mean water line ("Current MLW"). The
supreme court stated the general law governing the measurement and
allocation of riparian rights is that any man-made improvements to a
riparian owner's shoreline that alter the location of the shoreline
should be disregarded in a determination of riparian rights, but that
any natural accretion of the shoreline may be considered.
The supreme court recognized evidence before the commissioner
that indicated man-made improvements altered the Carrs' shoreline.
As such, the supreme court concluded the trial court correctly
affirmed the commissioner's decision to use the Kennedy survey that
used the Historic MWL to determine the parties' riparian rights.
With respect to the Carrs' claim that the Kidds and Crowleys were
not granted riparian rights with their land, the supreme court
determined that an owner of riparian land has a right to water
frontage of such riparian land unless the grantor of the land on the
face of the granting deed manifestly retains those rights. The supreme
court held there was no evidence of any severance or retention of the
riparian rights to either the Kidd or the Crowley property in the chains
of title to both of their properties.
Megan Becher-Harris
WASHINGTON
Hsieh v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, No. 19126-5-H, 2001 Wash. App.
TEXIS 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2001) (affirming dismissal of permit
holders' action, finding the statute of limitations and the doctrine of
laches barred declaratory relief, conversion, and injunction claims,
reversing the judgment awarding attorney fees, and finding the
mortgage was extinguished at the time of foreclosure and the permit
holders' action was not frivolous).
Jack and Dorothy Hsieh ("Hsiehs") had a water permit to
appropriate water from the Columbia River to irrigate their property.
Appellee, State of Washington Department of Ecology, established this
water permit initially when it issued the permit to the Esmieu Trust,
who later assigned the permit to the Hsiehs. In order to secure a loan,
the Hsiehs executed a mortgage to Appellee, John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. ("John Hancock"), on the property covered by the
water permit. In 1985, John Hancock foreclosed on the mortgage.
Appellees, J.R. Simplot Co. ("Simplot") and Iowa Beef Processors
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("IBP") then acquired the property. The Hsiehs claimed they still held
the water permit and sued John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP. The
Hsiehs challenged the lower court's grant of summary judgment
dismissal and award of attorney fees to John Hancock, Simplot, and
IBP. The first issue was whether the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of laches barred the Hsiehs' claims for (1) declaratory relief,
(2) a finding of conversion, and (3) an injunction. The second issue
addressed (1) whether the award of attorney fees was erroneous
because the mortgage was extinguished when the property was
foreclosed, and (2) whether the Hsiehs' action was frivolous.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
dismissing the Hsiehs' case, finding the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of laches barred their declaratory relief, conversion, and
injunction claims. The court reversed the judgment awarding attorney
fees, finding the Hsiehs' case was not frivolous and the mortgage
ended when the property was foreclosed.
The Hsiehs argued the court should award them a declaratory
judgment. The court found the statute of limitations barred this
action. The court stated parties must bring declaratory judgments
within a reasonable amount of time and the statute of limitations for
real property, including water permits, was ten years. Because the
Hsiehs waited eleven years, their claim was unreasonable, and, thus,
barred by the statute of limitations. The Hsiehs also argued the court
should make a finding of conversion. The court found the relevant
three-year statute of limitations barred this claim as well.
The Hsiehs also argued the appellate court should award an
injunction to prohibit John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP from
interfering with their water rights and to quiet title to their water
rights. The court found that because these claims were equitable
actions, they were subject to the defense of laches. Laches consists of
two elements: (1) inexcusable delay, and (2) prejudice to the other
party from the delay. The court determined the Hsiehs knew they
assigned their interest in the water permit to John Hancock, but waited
at least twelve years to bring this action. The court also determined
the Hsiehs' delay prejudiced John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP.
Moreover, John Hancock relied on the permit, which provided that
the water rights were appurtenant to the land. Finding both elements
of laches present, the court barred the Hsiehs from pursuing equitable
actions.
Finally, the Hsiehs argued the lower court erred by awarding
attorney fees to John Hancock, Simplot, and IBP. The court agreed
with the Hsiehs and found no basis for attorney fees existed based on
the terminated mortgage. In addition, the court found the lower
court awarded attorney fees under a statute, which permits awards of
attorney fees for frivolous actions. Here, the Hsiehs' claims were not
baseless. Thus, the reviewing court found the lower court erred in
awarding attorney fees.
Willow Morrow
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Sharp v. Union St. Dev. Co., No. 19001-3-rn, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS
2121 (Wash Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2000) (holding a dispute over rerouting
an irrigation mainline may fall within the scope of an arbitration
agreement).
Loren K and Teresa A. Sharp appealed a Benton County Superior
Court decision dismissing their motion for arbitration and awarding
Union Street Development Co. ("Union") attorney fees.
The Sharps and Union entered into a settlement agreement to
resolve an issue regarding an easement and rights to irrigation water
access. The Sharps and Union owned adjacent parcels of land that
were served by one irrigation system. In order to straighten the shared
boundary, create easements for both to establish irrigation systems,
and to do so with the intent of allowing both parties optimal use of
their property, they entered into an agreement. The agreement
required both parties to submit preliminary plans regarding lot
placement and irrigation lines to the other party. Arbitration was the
exclusive method of resolution in case any dispute arose.
If a party had concerns regarding the other party's plan, they were
to send written notice of their concerns to the other party and then
meet to discuss the issue in good faith. If the issue was unresolved, the
parties were to engage in mediation and if necessary, arbitration.
Attorney fees would be awarded to the prevailing party.
Union objected to the Sharp's cutting and rerouting the main
irrigation line. The Sharps received written notice of the objection
and replied that the objection was subject to the procedures in the
agreement. Union refused to meet with the Sharps. The Sharps
applied for the appointment of an arbitrator and Union filed an
answer stating the issue was not subject to the agreement. The parties
went to mediation, but failed to reach an agreement. The Sharps then
moved the court to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the
motion and awarded Union attorney fees.
On appeal to the Washington Court of Appeals, the Sharps argued
the court should have restricted its analysis to the scope of the
agreement, and instead decided the case on its merits. Union argued
the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to modify the terms of the irrigation
easement.
The court determined the complaint called for an interpretation
of the irrigation agreement, and the issue was one of fact to be
decided by an arbitrator. The court reasoned the arbitration clause
was broad, as it contained no exclusions. Without an express
exclusion of the issue, the parties intended to have the dispute settled
in arbitration. The court remanded the case for arbitration. The
court also reversed the award of attorney fees, because no prevailing
party existed until arbitration resolved the issue.
Lynne Stadjuhar
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WEST VIRGINIA
Shaffer v. W. VA. Dep't of Transp., 542 S.E.2d 836 (W. Va. 2000)
(holding a property owner seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the
West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways to
institute eminent domain proceedings for flood damage it allegedly
caused, must show reasonable cause to believe ajudge and jury should
resolve questions regarding the cause and the amount of existing flood
damages).
Verla Shaffer owned real property in Evans, West Virginia. In
1997, the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of
Highways ("DOH") constructed a storm water drainage system near
Shaffer's property. On June 2, 1997, one week after the drainage
system's completion, Shaffer's property was flooded and damaged
during a rainstorm. Prior to completion of the drainage system,
Shaffer never experienced a flooding problem. Shaffer repeatedly
notified DOH of the damage and attempted unsuccessfully to get
DOH to repair the drainage system.
On January 22, 1999, Shaffer filed a petition with the West Virginia
Circuit Court. In this petition, Shaffer alleged DOH's design and
maintenance of the drainage system caused damage to her property.
In addition, Shaffer sought to compel DOH to institute eminent
domain proceedings to assess the damage DOH caused and to
compensate her for the damage. DOH responded with a motion to
dismiss, claiming that under the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, Shaffer had to file her action as a complaint, not as a
petition. On March 30, 1999, the court granted DOH's motion, but
preserved Shaffer's right to apply for a writ of mandamus.
On April 27, 1999, Shaffer filed a complaint, in compliance with
West Virginia's Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting the same allegations
as in her petition. DOH responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming
Shaffer's action was not cognizable in mandamus. By an order entered
on August 2, 1999, the court granted DOH's motion and dismissed
Shaffer's complaint, with prejudice. The court found Shaffer had
failed to prove the elements necessary to compel DOH to institute
In particular, Shaffer had not
eminent domain proceedings.
demonstrated DOH's actions had damaged her property. Shaffer
appealed the circuit court's order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.
According to the appellate court, for the writ of mandamus to
issue, three elements must exist. First, DOH must have a legal duty to
institute the proceedings Shaffer sought. The court found Shaffer met
this element because DOH had a statutory duty to institute adequate
eminent domain proceedings under circumstances such as Shaffer's.
Second, no other remedy must exist. The court found Shaffer met this
element because state case law held mandamus was the only
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appropriate remedy if DOH failed to institute eminent domain
proceedings under circumstances such as Shaffer's. Third, Shaffer
must demonstrate a clear legal right to an eminent domain
proceeding. Specifically, Shaffer had to make a good faith showing of
probable damage to her property. If such a showing gave reasonable
cause to believe a judge and jury should resolve questions regarding
the cause and amount of damages, the legal right was satisfied. By
requiring Shaffer to prove DOH's actions damaged her property, the
court felt the circuit court had set Shaffer's burden beyond what was
required. Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court's order and
remanded Shaffer's case to determine whether she had alleged
sufficient facts to satisfy the reasonable cause burden.
MatthewJ Costinett

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
APPLICATION FOR CHANGE IN USE AND PLACE OF WATER RIGHTS,
CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF VALLEY

DEVELOPMENT GROUP, L.L.C., IN INDIAN CREEK IN THE SOUTH PLATrE
Case No.
RIVER WATERSHED, DOUGLAS COUNTY, COLORADO.

Applicant: Valley
(Water Division 1, Dec. 2000).
2000CW231
Development Group, L.L.C. (Atty. Thomas C. Williamsen, Helton &
Williamsen, P.C.).
1. Application
The Valley Development Group ("Valley") seeks to change the use
and place of use of a decreed water right. Valley is the owner of
Meadow Ditch and its associated water rights. Valley requests the
historic diversion from Meadow Ditch be expanded from exclusively
irrigation purposes to include storage, augmentation, domestic,
commercial, fire protection, fish and wildlife propagation, and
Valley is not requesting an enlargement,
aesthetic purposes.
expansion, or increase of the decreed quantity of water historically
applied to beneficial use.
The Meadow Ditch headgate is located in the W1/2, NE1/4,
Section 21, Township 7 South, Range 68 West of the 6th P.M. at a
point 2055 feet from the North section line and 2380 feet from the
East section line. Meadow Ditch diverts from Indian Creek, upstream
from that stream's confluence with West Plum Creek. West Plum
Creek is tributary to the South Platte River. The original ditch right of
5.0 c.f.s. was adjudicated on December 10, 1883. Valley claims the
calculated historical use of the Meadow Ditch water right, measured
during a representative period of time, attained a maximum
consumptive use of 218.4 acre-feet per year. The historical use of the
Meadow Ditch water right is the annual irrigation of approximately
100 acres on the Lambert Ranch ("ranch").
Valley plans to develop the ranch into a residential community.
However, Valley will develop the ranch incrementally. Therefore, the
Valley will continue to utilize the portion of the ranch that remains
undeveloped for the commercial production of hay. Valley plans to
transfer slowly the use of the water right from irrigation to residential
purposes as it develops the ranch. In addition, Valley will change
points of diversion from Meadow Ditch incrementally. Valley claims it
will alter the present return flow regimen only when designated lands
are taken out of irrigation, and water is transferred to new uses as well
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as alternate points of diversion.
Valley immediately requires a portion of the water right use to be
changed from irrigation to fire protection. The water required for this
use would be stored in an existing pond on the ranch property.
Lambert Ranch Fire Protection Pond No. 1 is located in the NW1/4 of
the SE1/4, Section 6, Township 7 South, Range 68 West of the 6th
P.M. at a point approximately 1500 feet from the South section line,
and 2100 feet from the East section line. The dimensions of the pond
are approximately 250 feet by 200 feet by 5 feet, with a total capacity of
about 6.0 acre-feet. Valley claims that the requested change will not
injuriously affect other owners or persons entitled to use water under
vested or decreed conditional water rights.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition have been filed.
Kirk Waible
APPLICATION

FROM

SOUTH

SUBURBAN

PARK AND

RECREATION

DISTRIcT, FOR WATER RIGHTS IN ARAPAHOE COUNTY.

Case No.
2000CW230 (Water Division 1, Dec. 2000).
Applicant: South
Suburban Park and Recreation District (Attys. Robert G. Cole & Evan

D. Ela, Collins, Cockrel & Cole, P.C.).

1. Application
South Suburban Park and Recreation District ("South Suburban")
seeks a decree for water rights from Big Dry Creek, a tributary of the
South Platte River. South Suburban owns approximately 190 acres of
golf course and landscaping known as the South Suburban Golf
Course. South Suburban wishes to divert water from two locations and
store water in four ponds located on the golf course property. The two
diversion points are (1) the Upper Big Dry Creek Diversion located on
the left bank of Big Dry Creek in Section 31, Township 5 South, Range
67 West of the 6th P.M., at a point approximately 2050 feet from the
east section line of said Section 31 and 250 feet from the south section
line of said Section 31, in Arapahoe County, and (2) the Lower Big
Dry Creek Diversion located on the left bank of Big Dry Creek in
Section 31, Township 5 South, Range 67 West of the 6th P.M., at a
point approximately 1050 feet from the west section line of said
Section 31 and 1250 feet from the south section line of said Section 31,
in Arapahoe County. The four storage rights pertain to existing ponds
on the golf course property. The four ponds are off-channel storage
structures used to irrigate the property and provide golfing hazards
and aesthetic value to the course. The four ponds are the Upper
South Pond, Lower South Pond, North Pond, and Entrance Pond.
South Suburban requests an amount of 10.0 c.fs. of conditional
water from the Upper Dry Creek Diversion and from the Lower Dry
Creek Diversion. South Suburban requests the right to divert water at
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a maximum rate of 10.0 c.f.s. from the Upper and Lower Dry Creek
Diversions to supply water to the storage ponds. The amount of water
requested to hold in each pond is 5.0 acre-feet for the Upper South
Pond, 21.0 acre-feet for the Lower South Pond, 15.0 acre-feet for the
North Pond and 5.0 acre-feet for the Entrance Pond. The diversion
points and storage ponds are part of South Suburban's integrated
surface water irrigation system. Currently, South Suburban has a
Denver Basin ground water irrigation system that stores water in the
four storage ponds. South Suburban will use the requested surface
water rights in conjunction with the ground water rights.
South Suburban desires to use the water on the land for irrigation,
recreation, augmentation, exchange, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.
South Suburban also requests the right to use and reuse the water
right to extinction. South Suburban claims a date of appropriation of
September 6, 2000, for the Lower Big Dry Creek, a date of September
18, 2000, for the Upper Big Dry Creek, and a date of December 13,
South Suburban initiated the
2000, for the storage claims.
appropriations by field observation, location of the claimed diversion
points, and stream flow monitoring.
South Suburban requests the court grant a decree for the
requested water rights at the rates and locations stated. South
Suburban also requests the court grant such additional relief that it
deems necessary and appropriate to further the purposes of the
diversion systems requested.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition have been filed.
Karen McTavish

WATER COURT DIVISION 4
APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS OF RICK CURTIS, CONNIE
CURTIS AND WILLIAM JOHNSON, IN DELTA COUNTY, COLORADO. Case

No. 00CW178 (Water Division 4, Nov. 2000).
Connie Curtis and William Johnson.

Applicants: Rick and

1. Application
Rick Curtis, Connie Curtis, and William Johnson (collectively,
"Curtis") seek a 0.013 c.f.s. conditional water right for irrigation and
domestic purposes on forty acres of land in Delta County, Colorado.
The water will be drawn from Dusty Spring #1, a tributary to
Cottonwood Creek and the North Fork of the Gunnison River. Curtis
proposes a water collection area 200 feet in diameter, the center of
which will be located at a point in the El/2 SW1/4 SW1/4 of Section
21, Township 15 South, Range 91 West 6th P.M., from which the
southwest corner of Section 21 bears South 33o34'57" West, 1469.29
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feet. Appropriation began on November 6, 2000 with filing of this
application; the water is not yet being used.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition have been filed.
Makayla A. Shannon

APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS OF BRUCE AND NANCY
DONEGAN, IN OURAY COUNTY, COLORADO.
Case No. 00CW179

(Water Division 4, Nov. 2000). Applicants: Bruce and Nancy Donegan.
1. Application
Bruce and Nancy Donegan request a 0.01 c.f.s. conditional water
right to be drawn from Micah Spring, a tributary of the Uncompahgre
River. The Donegans will use the water for irrigation purposes on 0.4
acres of the their property. The Donegans initiated the appropriation
on October 27, 2000 with the installation of a culvert.
Micah Spring is located in the roadcut for Elk Ridge Trail in Ouray
County, Colorado. The spring flows for 180 feet in a bar ditch on the
west side of the trail to a culvert. The spring then flows 120 feet under
the Elk Ridge Trail until it again intersects the bar ditch on the west
side. The spring flows through the bar ditch to a culvert, then under
the trail and onto the Donegan's property in the Idlewild subdivision.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition have been filed.
Makayla A. Shannon

WATER COURT DIVISION 5
APPLICATION FOR ABSOLUTE WATER RIGHTS IN SUMMIT, EAGLE, AND
LAKE COUNTIES, COLORADO. Case No. OOCW210 (92CW340) (Water
Division 5, Oct. 20, 2000). Applicant: Eagle Park Reservoir Co. (Atty.
Glenn E. Porzak, Porzak, Browning & Bushong L.L.P.).
1. Application
In Case No. 92CW340, Eagle Park Reservoir Co. ("Eagle Park") was
granted a conditional water right for 5300 acre-feet with an
appropriation date of March 16, 1991. This application seeks to make
absolute 3148 acre-feet of this 5300 acre-feet conditional right. Two
other adjudications pertaining to the Eagle Park Reservoir are Case
No. 93CW301 and Case No. 97CW288. In Case No. 93CW301, Eagle
Park was granted an enlargement of 22,300 acre-feet conditional, with
an appropriation date of May 18, 1993. In Case No. 97CW288, the
right to divert and store 80 c.f.s. of the Pando Feeder Canal was

Issue 2

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS

confirmed under an August 10, 1956 appropriation date.
One water source for the Eagle Park Reservoir is the East Fork of
the Eagle River, which includes run-off, surface flow, and seepage from
the area above the reservoir and tributary thereto. Another water
source is a tributary to Tenmile Creek, which is a tributary of the Blue
River.
The beneficial uses for water stored, released, and divertedwhether directly or by exchange-under the Eagle Park Reservoir
storage right include mining, milling, industrial, snowmaking,
municipal, domestic, stock watering, recreational, fish and wildlife,
irrigation, agricultural, exchange, replacement, and augmentation.
The seven facilities comprising the specific diversion points into
storage for Eagle Park Reservoir are as follows:
1) Eagle Park Reservoir: The north abutment of the Eagle Park
Reservoir dam crest is located approximately 160 feet north of the
south section line and 650 feet east of the west section line of Section
28, Township 7 South, Range 79 West, 6th P.M., Eagle County,
Colorado.
2) East Fork Interceptor Ditch: The East Fork Interceptor Ditch
has a capacity of 48 c.f.s. and diverts from unnamed tributaries of the
East Fork of the Eagle River at the following points, all of which are
located in Eagle County, Colorado:
i) Point 1: 900 feet south of the north section line and
1100 feet west of the east section line of Section 5,
Township 8 South, Range 79 West, 6th P.M.
ii) Point 2: 1250 feet south of the north section line and
700 feet east of the west section line of Section 4,
Township 8 South, Range 79 West, 6th P.M.
iii) Point 3:1200 feet north of the south section line and
800 feet east of the west section line of Section 33,
Township 7 South, Range 79 West, 6th P.M.
iv) Point 4: Run-off, surface flow, and seepage from the
area above the East Fork Interceptor Ditch as it runs
between the above-described points of diversion and
Eagle Park Reservoir.
3)
Chalk Mountain Interceptor Ditch: The Chalk Mountain
Interceptor Ditch has a capacity of 12 c.f.s. and diverts run-off and
seepage as it runs a distance of approximately 3.4 miles from Fremont
Pass, located in the West 1/2 of Section 11, Township 8 South, Range
79 West, 6th P.M., northwesterly along State Highway 91 and the south
side of Robinson Tailing Pond, thence westerly to the south of Chalk
Mountain Reservoir and Robinson Reservoir, thence northwesterly to
Eagle Park Reservoir. The Chalk Mountain Interceptor Ditch diverts
water from the headwaters of Tenmile Creek in Lake and Summit
Counties and from the headwaters of the East Fork of the Eagle River
in Eagle County.
4) East Interceptor Ditch: The East Interceptor Ditch has a
capacity of 20 c.f.s. and runs northeasterly from a point whence the
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northeast corner of Section 2, Township 8 South, Range 79 West, 6th
P.M. bears north 77 degrees and 20 minutes east a distance of 850 feet
at the north fork of McNulty Creek, thence along the east side of
Robinson and Tenmile Tailing Ponds into Supply Canal No. 1. The
East Interceptor Ditch diverts water from the north fork of McNulty
Creek and surface flow, seepage, and run-off from watersheds above it
that are tributary to Tenmile Creek.
5) Supply Canal No. 1: The Supply Canal No. 1 has a capacity of
10 c.f.s. and diverts water from the following tributaries of Tenmile
Creek at the following points:
i) On the west bank of Humbug Creek at a point whence
the southwest corner of Section 18, Township 7 South,
Range 79 West bears south 71 degrees and 35 minutes
west a distance of 3250 feet.
ii) On the south bank of Mayflower Creek at a point
whence the northeast corner of Section 24, Township 7
South, Range 79 West, 6th P.M. bears north 16 degrees
and 55 minutes east a distance of 2550 feet.
iii) Run-off, surface flow, and seepage from the area above
the Supply Canal No. 1 as it runs between the abovedescribed points of diversion and the Climax Mill.
iv) Supply Canal No. 1 can also divert water from Clinton
Gulch Creek. However, water from Clinton Gulch
Creek is not claimed as a source for the water rights
decreed herein.
6) Supply Canal No. 2: The Supply Canal No. 2 has a capacity of
10 c.f.s. and diverts water from the following tributaries of Tenmile
Creek at the following points:
i) On the west bank of Searle Creek at a point whence
U.S.L.M. Kokomo bears south 45 degrees and 58
minutes east 3740 feet (located in the NW1/4 of the
SE1/4 of Section 13, Township 7 South, Range 79 West,
6th P.M.).
ii) On the south bank of Kokomo Creek at a point whence
U.S.L.M. Kokomo bears north 39 degrees and 36
minutes east 2635 feet (located in the SE1/4 of Section
22, Township 7 South, Range 79 West, 6th P.M.).
iii) Run-off, surface flow, and seepage from the area above
the Supply Canal No. 2 as it runs between the abovedescribed points of diversion and the Climax Mill.
7) East Fork Pumping Plant: The East Fork Pumping Plant has a
capacity of 6 c.f.s. and diverts from the East Fork of the Eagle River at a
point in the SE1/4 of the NE1/4 of Section 32, Township 7 South,
Range 79 West, 6th P.M. at a point whence the northeast corner of
said Section 32 bears north 31 degrees and 53 minutes east a distance
of 2414 feet.
Eagle Park Reservoir began filling in the Spring of 1998. On June
14, 1999, the Reservoir reached full capacity of 3148 acre-feet of water.
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The water stored was beneficially used commencing on or about
November 1, 1999, and through the present date for all decreed uses
within the service areas of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation District
and the Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority, the contract service
area of the Colorado River Water Conservation District, and for
snowmaking and augmentation purposes (directly and by exchange)
at the Vail, Beaver Creek, and Arrowhead ski areas.
2. Opposition
Objecting are Climax Molybdenum Company ("Climax"), City and
County of Denver ("Denver"), Brian M. Nazarenus, and Mary B.
Rastall.
Climax requests that the court require Eagle Park to prove in detail
each element of its claims. Including ownership of each water right
and structure described in the application. Specifically, Climax objects
to Eagle Park's right to use the East Fork Interceptor Ditch, the East
Interceptor Ditch, Supply Canal No. 1, and Supply Canal No. 2.
Further, any use of the Chalk Mountain Interceptor Ditch must be
consistent with and limited by Eagle Park's agreements with Climax.
Moreover, the East Fork Pumping Plant is not yet constructed and its
use must be consistent with and limited by the applicant's agreements
with Climax.
Denver objects because it is the owner and claimant of water
appropriations made out of the Colorado River and its tributaries,
which are the subject of the Eagle Park Application. Denver's water
rights are decreed for various priorities and amounts, for both direct
use and for storage. Therefore, Denver requests Eagle Park provide
specific proof that the water right claimed as absolute was put to
beneficial use under its own priority and in priority, and that the
accounting for the absolute water rights was accurate. Denver argues
Eagle Park's claimed beneficial uses and places of use may not be
included in the decrees referenced in the Application, and/or
included as part of the storage right.
Also, both parties object to the exclusion of relevant, pertinent
facts from the Application, and reserve the right to raise additional
objections in the future.
Tiffany Turner

APPLICATION FOR A FINDING OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE, IN EAGLE

COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 00CW245 (94CW323) (Water Division

5, Dec. 12, 2000) (Original decree: Aug. 6, 1976, Case No. W-2883).
Applicant: Adam's Rib Recreation Area (Attys. Arthur B. Ferguson, Jr.
and ShaneJ. Harvey, Holland & Hart, L.L.P.).
1. Application
Adam's Rib Recreation Area ("Adam's Rib") seeks a finding of
reasonable diligence concerning the beneficial use of Adam's Rib
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Diversion No. 1 ("Diversion 1") and Adam's Rib Diversion No. 2
("Diversion 2"). Diversion I diverts water from East Brush Creek at a
point on the right bank where the S1/4 corner of Section 22,
Township 6 South, Range 83 West of the 6th P.M. bears south seven
degrees and east thirty minutes a distance of 1400 feet. Diversion 2
diverts water from Brush Creek at a point on the right bank where the
S1/4 of Section 1, Township 6 South, Range 84 West of the 6th P.M.
bears south one degree and east zero minutes a distance of 4775 feet.
On February 29, 1972, the WaterJudge for Division No. 5 decreed
to Adam's Rib conditional water rights ("Rights") for Diversion 1 in
the amount of 20.0 c.f.s. and for Diversion 2 in the amount of 10.0
c.f.s. The judge granted the Rights on the condition that Adam's Rib
use the water for construction, operation, maintenance, replacement,
and repair of a four season resort, including the following beneficial
uses: domestic, recreation, industrial, commercial, school and day
care, restrooms, restaurant, cafr and lounge, health club, sauna,
jacuzzi and spa, water fountains, swimming pools and water recreation,
open space and parks, emergency service, fire protection,
snowmaking, livestock watering, street and driveway cleaning, vehicle
washing, dust suppression, construction, irrigation of forty acres, and
other beneficial uses.
Diversions 1 and 2 are part of an integrated water supply system
serving Adam's Rib Planned Unit Development ("PUD") and Adam's
Rib Ranch Planned Unit Development. Adam's Rib has completed the
following eight tasks toward the beneficial use of the water. First,
Adam's Rib performed analysis and field assessment of Diversions 1
and 2. Second, the Eagle County Board of Commissioners approved
the Adam's Rib PUD sketch plan. Third, Adam's Rib submitted to
Eagle County an application for a preliminary plan. Fourth, Adam's
Rib submitted to Eagle County a sketch plan and preliminary plan for
Adam's Rib PUD in accordance with the County's Land Use
Regulations. Fifth, Adam's Rib has developed a comprehensive
irrigation plan for its residential and golf course developments. Sixth,
Adam's Rib monitors water resources and its water needs. Seventh,
Adam's Rib spent considerable sums of money analyzing the
integration of the water rights into its water system. Finally, Adam's
Rib has conducted a comparative analysis of its water rights with the
water rights of other developments in the Brush Creek drainage area
to develop a potential irrigation plan for the project. Adam's Rib asks
that based on its completion of these eight tasks, the Water Court will
find it has shown reasonable diligence regarding its conditionally
decreed water rights.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition were filed against the Application.
Kevin Rohnstock
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COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS

APPLICATION FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS IN SUMMIT

COUNTY,

COLORADO. Case No. 00CW281 (Water Division 5, Dec. 28, 2000).
Applicant: Town of Breckenridge (Attys. Glen E. Porzak and P. Fritz
Holleman, Porzak Browning & Bushong, L.L.P.).
1. Application
The Town of Breckenridge ("Breckenridge") seeks confirmation of
a conditional water right for flow deflector and control structures on
the Blue River that form the Breckenridge Whitewater Park ("Park").
The Park will modify the existing channel of the Blue River with a
number of different dam and deflector structures. The structures will
control, concentrate, and direct the flow of the Blue River for use by
kayaks, canoes, rafts, and other forms of recreational boating and
floating. The structures will also establish fish habitat.
Breckenridge requests conditional water rights in the following
amounts: April-39 c.f.s; May-281 c.f.s; June-524 c.f.s; July-343
c.f.s; August-205 c.f.s; September-82 c.f.s; October-51 c.f.s; and
November- 27 c.f.s., for each of the fifteen proposed structures
included in the Park. The Park will stretch approximately 1800 feet
within the existing channel of the Blue River, a tributary of the
Colorado River, in Breckenridge.
The construction of the Park is proposed to occur in two phases.
Phase one will consist of eight structures. The phase one structures
are located in the NW1/4 SWI/4 and SW1/4 SW1/4 of Section 30,
Township 6 South, Range 77 West, the 6th P.M. Structure one is a "U"
shaped dam in the channel of the Blue River at a point approximately
1240 feet from the west line and 1000 feet from the south line of said
Section 30. Structure two is a "V" shaped dam in the channel of the
Blue River at a point approximately 1190 feet from the west line and
1090 feet from the south line of said Section 30. Structure three would
consist of two opposing rock deflector dams on either side of the
channel of the Blue River located approximately 1160 feet from the
west line and 1230 feet from the south line of said Section 30.
Structure four would have two opposing rock deflector dams on either
side of the channel of the Blue River located approximately 1130 feet
from the west line and 1310 feet from the south line of said Section 30.
Structure five is a "U" shaped dam in the channel of the Blue River at a
point approximately 1110 feet from the west line and 1400 feet from
the south line of said Section 30. Structure six would encompass two
opposing rock deflector dams on either side of the channel of the Blue
River located approximately 1120 feet from the west line and 1530 feet
from the south line of said Section 30. Structure seven would be
comprised of two offset "V" dams on either side of the channel of the
Blue River located approximately 1120 feet from the west line and
1560 feet from the south line of said Section 30. Structure eight is a
"U" shaped dam in the channel of the Blue River at a point
approximately 1120 feet from the west line and 1610 feet from the
south line of said Section 30.
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The seven structures comprising phase two are located in the
SW1/4 SW1/4 of Section 30, Township 6 South, Range 77 West of the
6th P.M., and are labeled structures nine through fifteen. Structure
nine is composed of two opposing rock deflector dams on either side
of the channel of the Blue River located approximately 1230 feet from
the west line and 370 feet from the south line of said Section 30.
Structure ten is a "U" shaped dam in the channel of the Blue River at a
point approximately 1180 feet from the west line and 430 feet from the
south line of said Section 30. Structure eleven is a "U" shaped dam in
the channel of the Blue River at a point approximately 1140 feet from
the west line and 490 feet from the south line of said Section 30.
Structure twelve includes a "U" shaped dam in the channel of the Blue
River at a point approximately 1130 feet from the west line and 590
feet from the south line of said Section 30. Structure thirteen is
comprised of a "U" shaped dam in the channel of the Blue River at a
point approximately 1170 feet from the west line and 660 feet from the
south line of said Section 30. Structure fourteen is two opposing rock
deflector dams on either side of the channel of the Blue River located
approximately 1270 feet from the west line and 770 feet from the
south line of said Section 30. Structure fifteen is two opposing rock
deflector dams on either side of the channel of the Blue River located
approximately 1250 feet from the west line and 880 feet from the
south line of said Section 30.
Breckenridge Town Council's authorization for the City to file a
Section 404 Dredge and Fill Permit with the United States Army Corps
of Engineers evidences Breckenridge's intent to appropriate the water.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition have been filed against the Application at
this time.
Tiffany Turner
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The Nineteenth Annual Water Law Conference provided two days
of informative discussions on various watershed management issues.
The conference opened with a keynote address by Professor Joseph L.
Sax, followed by two morning sessions attended by all. In the
afternoon, attendees selected from four breakout sessions focusing on
tribal water issues, ethics, and various practice skills. The second day
provided three additional sessions, including a comprehensive panel
discussion addressing the pros and cons of watershed management, as
well as those components that make a watershed management
program successful. This report provides a summary of the comments
presented in each session.
DAY ONE
KEYNOTE ADDRESS-PROFESSOR JOSEPH L. SAX

Professor Joseph L. Sax opened the conference with his keynote
address identifying current issues in the watershed management
movement. Professor Sax explained that the roots of the watershed
concept are found in the common law, but emphasized that the
modern era presents new and unique difficulties. First, Professor Sax
stated watershed management is much broader than water
management, as a watershed includes any land uses affecting water.
Professor Sax noted that successful watershed management might
require centralized administration, which conflicts with the current
trend toward localized management. Second, Professor Sax identified
the difficulty of how to measure success of watershed management
when a watershed constitutes the medium for working towards the
Professor Sax's keynote address
goal of biological restoration.
concluded with perhaps the central questions pertaining to watershed
management: (1) what institutional structure is best fitted for largescale managerial efforts?; and (2) how comprehensively can a
managerial system function without collapsing under its own bulk and
complexity?
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SESSION ONE-THE EVOLVING ROLE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
CONSULTATION IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

Melanie Rowland of the National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration moderated Session One. Rowland's introduction
focused primarily on the Endangered Species Act's ("ESA") section 7
jeopardy prohibition. Specifically, Rowland addressed how, with
limited knowledge and resources, we can identify which activities in a
watershed will or will notjeopardize an endangered species. Rowland
stated that the panelists would address the advantages of fish and
wildlife agencies' early involvement in projects that may require ESA
consultation.
The first panelist, Tom Lindley of Perkins Coie LLP, outlined
"successful" consultation. Lindley used the 93,000-acre Three-Mile
Canyon Farm on the Columbia River as an example. The listing or
potential listing of several species under the ESA has caused
considerable controversy regarding the large operations of this farm.
Therefore, the farm has attempted to create a win-win settlement with
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") that takes into account
endangered/threatened species and economic impacts. Although
definite advantages exist to working with the Corps and the National
Marine Fisheries Service, the parties must address other problems.
Lindley was hopeful this new consultation approach would result in a
more effective way to address problems concerning watershed
management.
The second panelist, Richard Opper, the Executive Director of the
Missouri River Basin Association ("MRBA"), addressed ESA
consultation in the context of the Missouri River Basin. Opper stated
that the Missouri River Basin was one of the most unpredictable basins
in terms of flooding and drought until Congress passed the Pick-Sloan
Program, a part of the Flood Control Act of 1944 and the Bank
Stabilization and Navigation Project. Both of these Acts significantly
affect the ecological make-up of an area along the Missouri River that
is larger than the state of Rhode Island. Opper asserted that in
addition to ecological effects, the Acts failed to control flooding
completely. The Missouri River flooded in 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997.
The Missouri Basin Governors formed the MRBA in 1981, and in 1995,
the Corps asked MRBA to create a plan to address new issues. MRBA
designed the plan to include input from many different organizations
that incorporated issues concerning overall basin health, drought flow
management, and recovery of threatened and endangered species
within the basin. Opper noted that the resulting planning document
is a valuable resource both for solving current issues and for drafting
the necessary biological opinion for the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service ("USFWS"). Currently, the Corps and the MRBA are
developing a plan to incorporate the biological opinion.
The third panelist was Wayne White, Field Supervisor for the
USFWS. White's presentation addressed the ESA's role in watershed
management beyond the section 7 consultation process. White stated
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that habitat loss is the main factor leading to species listing. Because
watershed management is essentially ecosystem management at the
watershed level, it fits well with the ESA's goals of species/ecosystem
recovery, subject to many challenges. In order to address these
challenges, watershed managers should prepare plans with the USFWS
to make sure they are consistent with the ESA. White used the
CALFED Bay-Delta Program to illustrate how section 7 relates to
watershed planning and the complexities that arise in section 7 and
watershed management plans. White concluded that use of this
"programmatic opinion" accelerates the consultation process because
planners have already analyzed the program's effects.
Opper added to White's presentation in stating that watershed
plans should include land uses within the watershed. One way to
accomplish this is to integrate Habitat Conservation Plans ("HCP").
Opper used the Natomas Basin HCP as an example, since it included
urban development, farming, and habitat protection. Opper also
noted that watershed management plans should consider non-listed
species in the event the USFWS lists one in the future.
SESSION TWO-CREATiVE PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS TO INCREASE
WATER SUPPLY

Douglas W. MacDougal of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.
moderated Session Two. MacDougal presented an overview of creative
programs and projects to increase water supply. He stated that the
purpose of Session Two was to discuss various ways to "hold back and
redistribute" available water to meet two identified needs: (1)
population growth, and (2) sufficient instream flows for wildlife. The
panelists presented three different approaches for meeting water
demands: watershed conservation, management, and storage.
The first panelist, Alf W. Brandt of the Regional Solicitor's Office,
United States Department of the Interior, spoke on the use of
environmental water accounts ("EWAs") and used the CALFED EWA
as an example. The CALFED EWA was a solution to several problems
the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta area faced. Brandt identified
some of the problems, which included the listing of species under the
ESA, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, and the rejection of
state water quality standards in the area. EWAs establish a water
budget, which is more flexible than placing restrictions on water
operations in order to meet environmental needs. Brandt noted that
some water users objected to the CALFED EWA because they believed
it would provide water for fishery needs and reduce their water supply.
However, an EWA is designed to identify environmental water needs
early on to reduce the need for substantial reductions at a later time.
Brandt then addressed the fact that agencies operating EWAs have
faced several managerial challenges. These challenges include: (1)
accounting for water use; (2) controlling water assets/project
operations; (3) judging risk; (4) integrating other environmental
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supplies; (5) preparing a finance plan; (6) providing for increased
deliveries; (7) acquiring water; and (8) establishing long-term
environmental water development. In addition, Brandt identified
legal issues the agencies have faced, including: (1) federal-state
coordination/supremacy; (2) ESA commitments; (3) water rights
versus contract rights; (4) dependence on water transfers; and (5)
operational flexibility under water rights.
The second panelist, Martha 0. Pagel of Schwabe Williamson &
Wyatt, addressed mitigation and mitigation banking strategies in
Oregon's Deschutes Basin, an area experiencing rapid population
growth. One piece of legislation affecting water use in the area is the
Oregon Scenic Waterway Act, which requires a certain amount of
instream flow in a designated waterway. Pagel explained that the
Oregon Water Resources Department created an advisory group and
steering committee to develop a mitigation strategy that considers
instream flows. The mitigation strategy's main goal was to "directly
replace the projected impact of a groundwater use by adding
protected flow to the river." An applicant must include a mitigation
plan when applying for a new groundwater right. In addition, the
advisory group created a "mitigation credits and banking" program.
Pagel concluded by addressing the three main issues that arise in
mitigation programs: (1)qualitative versus quantitative mitigation; 2)
canal lining and piping; and 3) enforcement.
The third panelist, Jeanne Zolezzi of Herum Crabtree Brown,
addressed aquifer storage and recovery ("ASR") in California. Three
main types of aquifer storage and recovery exist: in-lieu surface water
use, direct recharge, and groundwater banking. Zolezzi defined each
in turn. In-lieu surface water use involves using surface water, rather
than groundwater, in areas where groundwater is a primary source.
Direct recharge moves surface water directly into a groundwater basin.
Groundwater banking recharges water from imported supplies and
recovers water for export. Zolezzi noted that governmental agencies,
environmental groups, and private corporations all support ASR.
However, despite the support for ASR, local agricultural interests and
overlying users often oppose the projects out of concern that ASR is
really a plan to reallocate their groundwater rights to other users.
Zolezzi concluded that adjudications and groundwater storage
agreements are the most promising possible solutions to the conflict.
BREAK-OUT SESSION ONE-TRIBAL WATER ISSUES IN WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT

The first Break-Out Session concerned tribal water issues within
watershed management. The moderator, Lorna Babby of the Native
American Rights Fund, addressed tribal regulatory authority over
water resources as a major consideration in watershed management
and planning. Babby pointed out that since tribes possess the power
to regulate conduct that directly or indirectly affects them, tribal
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sovereignty guarantees that the tribes have a say in the continuing
discussion regarding water use and protection.
After Lorna Babby introduced the topic, Michael Connolly, the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Laguna Resource Services,
Inc., discussed basin planning with regard to tribal participation.
Connolly provided a tribal perspective and contended that treating
tribes as states, where water quality regulation under the Clean Water
Act is concerned, was beneficial to all parties involved. Connolly
expressed that "reciprocity in interest" exists, whereby all parties would
reap benefits from tribal involvement.
Next, Tim Vollmann, the former Associate Solicitor for Indian
Affairs, United States Department of Interior, provided a federal
perspective and focused upon tribal water rights as related to the ESA.
Specifically, Vollmann discussed tribes having to undergo section 7
consultation in accordance with the ESA to obtain water project
approval. Vollmann noted that often tribes that possess unused senior
water rights do not, in fact, have senior rights. Vollman explained that
under the USFWS's or the National Marine Fisheries Service's
(collectively, "Service") regulations, the party who completes section 7
consultation first gets seniority to the water. Additionally, Vollmann
stated that the Service has refused to consider the "future exercise of
senior water rights" in dealing with the section 7 consultation issue. As
a possible solution, Vollmann suggested pursuing settlements
regarding tribal water rights, as opposed to decades of uncertain
adjudication. He remarked that such settlements could provide
solutions in the form of federal funding, watershed improvements, and
a water supply for tribal use that is also accessible to non-tribal
communities.
Finally, Jeff Fassett, the President of Fassett Consulting LLC, gave a
non-tribal perspective and discussed the realities of water
administration in an intricate, multi-jurisdictional river basin. Fassett
drew upon his experience as the State Engineer for the State of
Wyoming where he dealt with the Wind River Basin, which contains
both tribal and non-tribal communities. Fassett emphasized the
importance of state coordination of efforts with tribal officials
concerning water issues in order to produce continuing dialogue,
education, and information exchange. Fassett stressed the importance
of establishing communication between key participants within the
affected tribal and non-tribal communities, even though such
communication may consume considerable time, include a variety of
partakers with differing interests, and result in an adversarial situation.
BREAK-OUT SESSION TWO-ETHICS:
WATERSHED PROCESSES

CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES

IN

The second Break-Out Session concerned ethical issues likely to
arise in relation to water allocation matters, discharges, and other
water-related environmental topics. The moderator, Irma S. Russell of

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 4

the University of Memphis School of Law, stated that this discussion
focused on ethical issues that arise in connection with consultants and
public entities. Specifically, the session addressed issues related to the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules"), including the Model Rule 4.2 contract prohibition,
the Model Rule 1.6 prohibition against disclosure, and the issues
presented in Model Rules 1.7 through 1.11.
The first speaker, Bradley F. Tellam of Barran Liebman LLP,
addressed the legal and ethical standards that govern attorney
interactions with experts.
Tellam first discussed basic issues
surrounding attorney contact with experts including expert fees,
whether a lawyer may direct an expert to destroy notes or other
documents the expert takes during retention, and the problem of false
expert testimony. Tellam then addressed confidentiality of expert
information, which he argued generally depends upon the expert's
status. Tellam's final discussion concerned contact and conflict with
experts. Tellam explained that set procedures often govern contact
with opposing parties' expert witnesses, and, thus, Tellam advised
attorneys to carefully follow these rules. In addition, Tellam cautioned
attorneys to pay close attention to the Model Rules when dealing with
experts who have "switched sides," or experts who will not testify.
The second speaker, Cynthia F. Covell of Alperstein, & Covell P.C.,
discussed confidentiality, disclosure, and communication when
dealing with government agencies and employees. Covell noted that
while client identification helps determine the extent of
confidentiality, Covell warned that determining the proper level of
confidentiality becomes complicated when trying to discern the
identity of a government attorney's client. If the public is the client,
the lawyer needs to consider whether a "higher duty" exists, and what
that duty might be. Covell also identified that some confusion exists
with regard to communications with government attorneys. For
example, in some states, such as Colorado, the Model Rules essentially
treat private and government lawyers the same. However, in other
places, such as Washington, D.C., a government lawyer must act to
further the public interest.
BREAK-OuT SESSION THREE-PRACTICE SKILLS: NEGOTIATION AND
EVIDENTIARY IssuEs CONCERNING SCIENTIFIC MODELING

The third Break-Out Session pertained to negotiation and
evidentiary issues concerning scientific modeling. The moderator,
Gary Weatherford of Weatherford & Taaffe, LLP, began the session by
emphasizing that scientists increasingly use mathematical models in
the search for scientific facts on which to base and influence water
resource decisions. Weatherford stated that attorneys utilize computer
models for a variety of illustrative purposes, including reconstruction
of past runoff in a watershed or basin, and reproduction of events.
Weatherford contended that models could be used for prediction

Issue 2

COMERENCEREPORT

purposes, data organization, process explanation, and problem
solving. Weatherford cautioned, however, that predictive models
could not meet an impossible standard of accuracy, since the future is
unpredictable.
The first speaker, Steven Larson of S.S. Papadopulos & Associates,
Inc., discussed models in engineering, science, and litigation. Larson
asserted that individuals could use models for varying purposes, such
as forecasting, historical analysis, alternative historical analysis, design,
and performance assessment. Moreover, Larson explained that two
types of models exist: (1) an empirical model, which conveys
relationships among variables; and (2) a deterministic model, which
conveys mathematical descriptions of a certain physical process-such
as momentum or continuity. Larson stated that the modeling process
includes both constructing and validating the models.
The second speaker, Stuart Somach of Somach, Simmons & Dunn,
discussed the use of computer models in the courtroom. Somach
stressed the overall importance of using computer models in the
practice of environmental law. Somach asserted that the use of models
in the courtroom is generally similar to using other types of
demonstrative evidence. Somach contended that when an attorney
seeks to admit models, an attorney should initially consider: (1) the
admission of the model's input for the truth of its contents; and (2)
the admission of the model's assumptions/formulae and operations as
scientific evidence. Somach also stated that models have utility both
inside and outside of a courtroom. If such were not the case, then, in
his view, models' ultimate value and reliability would be questionable.
Furthermore, Somach advocated that attorneys use models as an
effective way to transform computer output into a "picture" of what
such output depicts. Somach also recognized that computer models
are useful in the legal field regarding water quality.
BREAK-OUT SESSION FOUR-PRACTICE SKILLS: TRANSACTIONAL DUE
DILIGENCE

Break-Out Session Four addressed: (1) state water rights basics; (2)
water right identification; (3) water right ownership and title
examination; (4) validity of a water right, including nonuse,
abandonment, and forfeiture; (5) security of priority; (6) water quality
impact on water availability; (7) change of use and transfer issues; and
(8) whether the water is wet. Each panelist addressed the issues for
one of six states, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Oregon. The panelists included Elizabeth Newlin Taylor of Ryley,
Carlock & Applewhite, for Arizona and New Mexico; Scott Shapiro, of
Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, LLP, for California; Michael F.
Browning of Porzak, Browning, & Bushong, LLP, for Colorado; Sylvia
Harrison of McDonald Carano Wilson McCune Bergin Frankovich &
Hicks LLP, for Nevada; and Laura A. Schroeder of Schroeder Law
Offices, P.C., for Oregon. While each state approaches the eight

WATER LAWREVLEW

Volume 4

topics differently, similarities do exist.

DAY TWO
SESSION THREE-BEYOND ALLOCATION: EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
AND INTERSTATE WATERSHED PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT

Jerome Muys of Muys & Associates, P.C. opened day two of the
conference with a presentation pertaining to equitable apportionment
and interstate watershed protection and management. Muys focused
on United States Supreme Court decisions that produced equitable
apportionments of interstate rivers and interstate compacts. Muys
stated that, traditionally, the Supreme Court focused on quantitative
allocation, rather than management of either the allocations or the
watershed that produces the water to satisfy the quantitative
allocations. Muys recognized that in Wyomingv. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,
484 (1922), the Supreme Court added "reasonable use" as a criterion
to an equitable apportionment analysis. Further, in Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), 476 U.S. 310 (1984), he stated that the
Supreme Court expanded on the "wasteful uses" concept. Muys noted
the Supreme Court in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1995),
pronounced that, with regard to equitable apportionment,
consideration of evidence of an upstream state's proposed actions
impacts on downstream wildlife and wildlife habitat is appropriate. He
further discussed that the Clean Water Act ("CWA") has superseded
some earlier Supreme Court decisions dealing with water quality
issues. Muys argued that international law is ahead of the United
States in the area of equitable apportionment because international
law explicitly imposes watershed protection and management duties
upon nations sharing international watercourses. To negate the
Supreme Court's lack of watershed management and protection
consideration within equitable apportionment cases, Muys suggested
that the United States government get more involved in such
disputes-especially for the purpose of the administration and
oversight of comprehensive regulatory programs that largely impact
water rights, such as the CWA and the ESA. As an additional solution,
Muys suggested Congress could repeal subsection (c) of the McCarran
Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, which provides that the Amendment's
inclusive sovereign immunity waiver for river system water
adjudications is not applicable to any United States' controversy in the
Supreme Court concerning states' rights to use the water of any
interstate stream.
SESSION FOUR-INTERJURISDICTIONAL WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

The first panel on day two addressed interjurisdictional watershed
management. The moderator, Jennifer Gimbel, an Assistant Attorney
General within the Colorado Attorney General's Office, discussed
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section 7(a) of the ESA. Gimbel stated that section 7(a) does not
mandate the consideration of Upper Basin operational effects on
Lower Basin species. Specifically, Gimbel referenced the situation in
which the Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental
organizations filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of Reclamation for the
Bureau's alleged failure to abide by the ESA in analyzing its lower
Colorado River operations.
The first panelist, Charles DuMars, a professor at the University of
New Mexico School of Law, discussed interjurisdictional compacts as
tools for watershed management. DuMars stated that current water
laws are often contradictory due to the varying interests that prompt
each law. DuMars argued that new agreements for the common use of
transboundary streams might be the solution to contradictory water
laws. DuMars delineated steps parties to new agreements must follow
in order to settle water-related disputes successfully. First, these new
agreements need common data compilations. Second, at least one
party to the agreement should build and calibrate a hydrologic model
of the appropriate water system. Third, the parties must construct at
least one model that depicts current conditions and future scenarios to
illustrate both water supply and water quality effects that parties either
want to achieve or avoid. Fourth, the parties should engage in
discussions and negotiations. Finally, when the parties have mutually
agreed upon negotiation results, the parties should integrate their
agreement into a memorandum of agreement. DuMars noted that
impartiality of the parties is crucial for the success of such new
agreements. Furthermore, DuMars asserted that compacts are useful
between individual states and between states and Indian tribes.
The second panelist, Kara Gillon of the Defenders of Wildlife,
discussed the Lower Colorado River and the Middle Rio Grande.
Gillon presented the Colorado River and the Rio Grande as
informative case studies of the relationship between political
boundaries and watersheds/river basins in resource management.
Gillon highlighted the perceived tension between a state and federal
governmental agencies that implement environmental laws. Gillon
stated that watershed protection attempts face the problem of
surmounting fragmented, incomplete, and shared regulatory schemes
existing from and within the three levels of government.
The third panelist, James Lochhead of Brownstein, Hyatt & Farber,
P.C., differentiated the experiences in bi-national watershed
management of the Great Lakes from the experiences of the Colorado
River. Specifically, Lochhead distinguished between state law, federal
law, international law, dual country agreements, and recent events
associated with the Great Lakes and Colorado River. Lochhead
concluded that severing an allocation formula creates "irreconcilable"
problems. Additionally, once parties establish frameworks, they must
move forward from that point to implement them. Further, Lochhead
advocated solving issues at their source and not solving problems on
other states' backs. Lastly, he believed that watershed management
could be achieved, via cooperation, without breaking up
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laws/compacts that already exist.
SESSION FIVE-WHAT MAKES WATERSHED PROCESSES WORK?

The last session of the conference involved a discussion regarding
what makes watershed processes work. Reed Benson of WaterWatch of
Oregon, discussed concerns about watershed processes. Benson
pointed out that, generally, conservationists are skeptical about
watershed processes. Benson defined watershed groups as a collection
of stakeholders and decision-makers who congregate to take actions
that could affect the health, management, or use of natural resources
in a specific watershed. Benson identified several negative aspects of
watershed groups. First, Benson stated that watershed groups often
lack a "mission" because they focus on reducing controversy over "hot"
issues, instead of focusing on protection and/or restoration of
environmental health. Second, Benson contended that watershed
groups suffer from a lack of diverse "membership" involvement.
Further, some watershed groups lack environmentally focused
members. Third, Benson stated that watershed groups present a
"management" problem in that they are closed to the public
and are
not really accountable to anyone. Additionally, Benson mentioned
that few watershed groups function under clearly established standards
or processes, and no way exists to dispute their actions. Fourth,
Benson stated that "motivation" could be problematic when key
players show up to the table advocating specific things from the
watershed group process. In contrast, Benson emphasized that some
positive aspects of watershed groups exist. First, watershed groups
provide a mechanism to bring stakeholders to the table to talk.
Second, watershed groups allow for the identification and
implementation of projects.
Third, watershed groups instigate
stewardship. Fourth, watershed groups provide a mechanism to
inform the public.
Second, Mark Smith, the Director of Water Policy in the
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, discussed the
results of the Massachusetts watershed initiative. Smith introduced the
Massachusetts' watershed program, which identifies statewide policy
needs and establishes watershed teams to test new approaches to
address new environmental issues. Smith stressed the essential feature
to Massachusetts' watershed initiative was the creation of multidiscipline watershed teams in each of the major watersheds and the
assignment of full-time team leaders to coordinate the teams' activities.
Another essential aspect of the watershed initiative is the fact that "no
prioritization between the watersheds" exists. Smith attributed the
watershed initiative's success to the teams' empowerment, funding
given to public interest groups, and to the existence of continuous
dialogue.
Finally, William Stelle, Jr. of Preston Gates & Ellis, LLP, spoke on
the ingredients necessary for watershed management initiatives. Stelle
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believed that watershed management initiatives are still in an
experimental period.
Thus, Stelle advocated allowing the
experimental period to "run its course" before watershed management
initiatives are widely implemented. Stelle argued that the two key
ingredients of watershed management is the recognition of (1) the
increasing adverse affects on landscapes due to population growth;
and (2) better science, to provide an improved understanding of
management inadequacies. Stelle presented the essential ingredients
for watershed management programs to proceed successfully. First,
"failure" must exist, because without "failure" watershed growth is
difficult to perceive. Second, "consequences" must stem from the
"failure(s)." Third, "local leadership" is needed to build watershed
management programs. Fourth, "capacity" is necessary to understand
the institutional and technical needs that will empower people to know
more on different scales. Last, people need to foster "inventiveness" to
develop new solutions.
Sara Franklin and Rebekah King

